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ISSUE 5 | FEBRUARY–MARCH 2020
CIVIL SOCIETY OBSERVATORY OF
ILLICIT ECONOMIES
IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS
RISK BULLETIN
1. Organized-criminal syndicates are muscling in 3. The Global Initiative’s IUU Fishing Index provides
for a share of the profits of southern Africa’s insights into illegal, unreported and unregulated
avocado and macadamia nut markets. fishing in East and Southern African countries.
While fruit and nut markets might not seem the Promoting successful, sustainable fisheries is a
most likely avenue for organized crime, large- key objective for many East and Southern African
scale theft of avocados and macadamia nuts has countries. To achieve this, it is necessary to under-
been on the rise in Southern Africa. Although stand the scope of illegal, unreported and unreg-
most stolen avocados are reportedly sold in ulated (IUU) fishing. Data on this issue has, for a
South African markets, reports from growers’ long time, been largely unavailable, but the Global
associations suggest that macadamia theft is a Initiative’s new IUU Fishing Index sheds some light
regional phenomenon, with Zimbabwean growers on regional dynamics. Index data suggests that
in particular affected by armed robberies. The the East and Southern African region is, for both
thefts have knock-on effects for the farming geographical and political reasons, more vulnerable
industry, as growers and distributors deal with to IUU fishing than the global average. In partic-
the additional costs of security and the impact ular, the Seychelles, although it scores highly on
of substandard stolen produce on customers’ government responses to IUU fishing, suffers from
perceptions of product quality. vulnerability on several fronts, including the fact
that its large marine exclusive economic zone is
2. Elephant poaching has dramatically decreased difficult to monitor effectively.
in Mozambique’s Niassa National Reserve,
once an epicentre of the illegal trade. 4. Uganda’s Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
It has been nearly two years since an elephant Substances Act 2016 has left individuals
was poached in Mozambique’s Niassa National vulnerable to abuse while failing to deter major
Reserve, which was previously an epicentre of drug traffickers.
Africa’s ivory crisis. Recent fieldwork conducted Uganda introduced new narcotics legislation in
by the Global Initiative in the port city of Pemba February 2016. Four years on, civil-society groups
has found that previously rampant ivory traffick- continue to condemn the deteriorating circum-
ing has declined to nothing. The success in the stances in which people who use drugs are target-
Niassa Reserve has been ascribed to a robust ed by law enforcement, as the law has created the
anti-poaching response, tougher sentencing and opportunity for harassment, corruption and human-
improved partnerships between government rights violations. Field research conducted for this
agencies, and between the government and Risk Bulletin found that faulty implementation of
external partners. While these factors almost the law has led to harsher sanctions for low-level
certainly all played a role in stopping poaching, drug offences, while at the same time creating a
other broader changes, which may be harder to permissive environment for drug trafficking.
discern, may have been the real drivers. The case
of Niassa may offer lessons for tackling other
types of organized crime in the region.
ABOUT THIS ISSUE
Each story in this edition of the Risk Bulletin of Illicit unavailable. This month, we draw on data from the Global
Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa looks at a dif- Initiative’s IUU Fishing Index to show the dynamics of
ferent illegal market: from trade in stolen agricultural government responses to IUU fishing across Eastern and
produce to illegal fishing and ivory poaching. What unites Southern Africa.
several of the stories, however, is how organized crime
can have development impacts and undermine the man- We also report on a success story in the fight against
agement of natural resources, whether these are wild the illegal wildlife trade. Elephant poaching in the Niassa
flora and fauna, such as elephant populations and fish National Reserve, Mozambique, has dwindled to nothing
stocks, or agricultural crops. just a few years after the reserve became a regional epi-
centre of ivory trafficking. We investigate how this was
The surprising emergence of black markets for avocados brought about and what lessons this success story may
and macadamias in Southern Africa is the focus of our hold for conservation elsewhere.
lead story this month. Rising avocado theft echoes crim-
inal trends seen globally in avocado-producing countries, Finally, four years ago, Uganda introduced new narcotics
as worldwide demand has caused prices to skyrocket. legislation. Its impacts are now being widely felt: our
Macadamia theft is a phenomenon seen across Southern reporting shows that the new legislation has worsened
Africa to differing degrees of severity in Zimbabwe conditions for people who use drugs in Uganda, who
(where clashes between growers and thieves have turned are targeted by the harsh penalties set out in the legis-
to violence), South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. lation. At the same time, the way the penalties are struc-
tured creates a more permissible environment for drug-
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is a com- trafficking organizations.
plex issue, for which reliable data has long been largely
1. Organized-criminal syndicates are muscling in for a share of the profits of Southern
Africa’s avocado and macadamia nut markets.
Markets for agricultural produce may not be commonly as- the harvesting season, as the unripe fruit appears ready
sociated with organized crime, corruption and violence. But to eat and prices are high due to pre-season scarcity.
for people in South Africa’s farming sector, it may come as Macadamia thefts likewise rise as the harvesting season
no surprise that black markets for macadamia nuts and av- begins in March.
ocados are booming. Both are premium crops. Macadamias
are the most expensive nuts in the world, and price records AVOCADO THEFT: A SOUTH AFRICAN
continue to be broken year on year, reportedly reaching up MANIFESTATION OF A GLOBAL PHENOMENON
to US$25 per pound on international markets.1 Avocados South Africa is a leading player in the global avocado
are commonly dubbed ‘green gold’, with worldwide demand industry, with an estimated 17 000 hectares under
pushing prices sky high. In South Africa, avocado prices cultivation.5 While Zimbabwe and, to a smaller degree,
have reached 25 rands per fruit in February this year as Mozambique also have nascent avocado industries, South
pre-season demand outstrips supply. 2
Africa is by far the largest producer in Southern Africa.6
The popularity of both crops has become something of a According to Bram Snijder of the South African
double-edged sword for the farming industry in Southern Avocado Growers’ Association, avocado thefts have
Africa. Macadamia thefts have surged across the region affected large-scale and smallholder farmers alike, and
in the past five years, as have avocado thefts, particularly growers have shouldered the burden of extensive se-
in South Africa. Farming associations say it is increasingly
3
curity operations in their efforts to ward off potential
becoming an organized crime, with syndicates dealing in thieves. ‘It’s shocking to see how much money we
stolen produce infiltrating the legitimate market. 4
spend on security,’ he said. ‘It’s not only fences and
alarm systems and things like that, but it’s also about
February and March are a particularly vulnerable period guarding orchards and properties day and night during
for both avocado and macadamia theft in South Africa. the season. … There’s a massive cost involved in ensur-
Avocado thefts reportedly spike in the months preceding ing the fruit doesn’t get stolen.’
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 2 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION
Thefts range from single opportunists carrying out Most stolen fruit finds its way onto the informal market,
small-scale raids to large-scale thefts by organized syn- as roadside hawkers of fruit operate outside formal
dicates – groups who have established links to buyers regulation. Yet a proportion of the spoils also infil-
they know will take on the stolen fruit. These groups trate South Africa’s formal, municipal fruit markets, as
are not limited to particular areas, but reportedly travel unscrupulous buyers may purchase the stolen goods
widely across avocado-growing regions to target farms,7 outside the market area and thus outside the legal au-
and will often strategically hit several farms in an area thority of market inspectors. While groups such as the
simultaneously in order to divide security operations in South African Avocado Growers’ Association attempt
the area. to monitor thefts and keep track of stolen fruit being
brought to market, gaps in the formal inspection regime
Large-scale thefts may move between 20 and 30 tonnes have proven hard to close.
of avocados in a single night, which are then distributed
through different channels around the region. According According to Snijder, regulations in the international
to Snijder, farmers joke darkly about the night-time market – including traceability systems and certification
raids, remarking that ‘the night shift can pick faster than of produce – are strict enough to keep stolen produce
the day shift’. out of the international supply chain. However, demand
for avocados within South Africa is high enough for the
In a 2018 survey carried out by the South African stolen fruit to be consumed within the country.
Subtropical Growers’ Association (Subtrop), the orga-
nization which manages the affairs of South Africa’s Despite the difficulties in policing informal and mu-
avocado, lychee and mango growers’ associations, 83% nicipal markets, and the costs of increased security
of growers surveyed said that avocado theft was a on farms, the avocado market has, it seems, turned a
problem on their farms. Figure 1 indicates the scale of 8
corner. ‘I think these illegal traders have become very
avocado theft in recent years (estimates for the 2018 wary that [there are] more inspections going on every-
and 2019 seasons were not available at time of writing). where,’ Snijder said, ‘and they’ve also burned their fin-
gers with immature fruit and then people are not going
back to their stands to buy fruit again. We’ve actually
seen in the last two years there is definitely a decrease
in theft cases.’
1 710
1 549 The experience of South African growers is far from
unique. Amid the surging popularity of the avocado,
1 270 thefts have been reported as a problem in places as
Estimated total volume of fruit stolen (tonnes)
widespread as New Zealand, Spain, California and
Mexico, where in the ‘avocado belt’ of Michoacan,
cartels more commonly associated with drug trafficking
have muscled in on the business, extorting farmers and
hijacking up to 48 tonnes of fruit per day.9 Competition
between criminal groups for regional control of the
trade has led to violence, including several killings,10 to
the extent that some analysts have argued that avo-
cados could be seen as a ‘conflict commodity’, akin to
mineral resources in other conflicts, due to the links
with extortion, violence, forced labour and environ-
mental degradation.11
2015 2016 2017
FIGURE 1: Reported avocado thefts in South Africa, Although the South African black market is clearly not
2015–2017 experiencing violence comparable to that occurring
in Mexico, it is clear that avocado markets around the
SOURCE: South African Subtropical Growers’ Association,
data provided by email, 7 February 2020 world are similarly vulnerable to criminal exploitation.
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 3 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION
MACADAMIA THEFT: A CHANGING PHENOMENON nephew is due to be tried for the murder.20 A new law cre-
ACROSS SOUTHERN AFRICA ated in response to the violence, which mandated licens-
Reports from macadamia growers in South Africa suggest ing of macadamia buyers and growers, was welcomed by
that, like avocados, the nuts are the targets of organized industry actors.21
syndicates, which are involved from the farm gate to the
processing and redistribution stage of the market.12 Major IMPLICATIONS: MORE THAN JUST LOST PRODUCE
suppliers that are supposedly operating legitimately are According to Lizel Pretorius, CEO of Macadamias South
also suspected of knowingly purchasing and redistribut- Africa, one of the challenges of dealing with macadamia
ing stolen crops.
13
thefts is that – unlike avocados, which rapidly deterio-
rate in quality once picked – the nuts can be stockpiled
According to information gathered in 2017 by Maca- for 12 to 18 months before being reintroduced into the
damias South Africa, a growers’ organization, based on market. Where they are presented as legitimate produce,
reporting from several private investigators, thefts are differentiating between legally and illegally acquired nuts
carried out both from the groves themselves and from becomes impossible.
processing facilities, and may involve the farm workers
themselves, organized teams of independent harvesters, The impact on macadamia growers is not merely the loss
or macadamia hawkers either buying directly or collud- of stolen produce, but the fact that the sale of stolen
ing with groups of thieves to receive stolen nuts. Armed nuts (at a fraction of the normal market value) suppresses
robberies are also reportedly on the increase. 14
prices on the international market. Stolen macadamias are
also not processed in accordance with industry hygiene
Reporting from Macadamias South Africa suggests that, standards. The reputational damage caused by produce
unlike avocados, stolen macadamias are being transport- that is a health risk being sold from South Africa (which
ed internationally, many via Zimbabwe. Other reports prides itself on producing some of the best macadamias in
have also suggested the stolen produce is shipped via the world) can affect the entire industry.
Zimbabwe, and one investigation by a local South
15
African newspaper, The Lowvelder, found that business- Avocado growers have also expressed concern that stolen
es operating in Mbombela, the capital of Mpumalanga fruit will have an impact on consumer demand, as the fruit
province, were exporting stolen nuts via Maputo in is generally stolen while it is immature, meaning it will
Mozambique to the United States. 16
never fully ripen and therefore gives consumers (who may
have bought the fruit unwittingly) a mistaken impression
Macadamia theft is also pervasive in neighbouring coun- of the quality of South Africa’s produce.
tries. In southern Malawi and Mozambique, macadamia
thefts have reportedly contributed to tensions between These concerns mirror developments in the international
smallholder and commercial growers, as commercial market for abalone, as reportedly the influx of poached
growers view the informal market as the conduit for South African abalone into Hong Kong’s food markets has
stolen produce and are therefore unwilling to bring small- contributed to Japanese abalone being seen as a superior
holders into the formal market.17
delicacy to legal South African produce. The poached
specimens, like the stolen macadamias, are not processed
Reporting from Zimbabwe has described several instanc- according to food safety standards, and this has impacted
es where brazen daylight thefts of macadamias by groups the industry at large.
armed with machetes have led to clashes between grow-
ers and thieves, particularly in the macadamia groves The implications of avocado and macadamia theft go
surrounding the town of Chipinge. Several macadamia
18
beyond the cost of stolen produce. As growers face un-
thieves have been killed and several injured.19 In one sustainable security costs and the potential for damaged
incident, a suspected nut thief was shot dead at the farm consumer trust in the industry, the thefts place the develop-
of a Zimbabwean army official who is also head of the ment of sustainable, viable markets for these crops at risk.
Chipinge macadamia growers’ association. The official’s
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 4 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION
2. Elephant poaching has dramatically decreased in Mozambique’s Niassa National
Reserve, once an epicentre of the illegal trade.
From 2009 to 2014, Mozambique lost nearly half of its dog populations still roam. This started changing in
elephants to poaching; the elephant population declined 2009, when the rampant elephant poaching under way
from an estimated 20 000 to 10 300. The majority
22
in Tanzania27 shifted south across the Rovuma River
of this loss occurred in the Niassa National Reserve in into the northern part of the Niassa Reserve, and af-
northern Mozambique, where the population fell from fected the whole reserve by 2013–2014 (see Figure 2).
an estimated 12 000 in 2011 to around 4 440 animals By 2014, the poaching had also become increasingly
in 2014. Despite the significantly lower density of el- professionalized, carried out by specialized gangs using
ephants in Niassa Reserve, the poaching continued high-calibre hunting rifles.28
into 2017 and early 2018.23 However, in May 2019,
Mozambique’s National Administration of Conservation By late 2014, northern Mozambique, and the port of
Areas (ANAC) announced that it had been a year since a Pemba in particular, had become a significant hub for
poached elephant had last been found in the reserve.24 ivory trafficking.29 Ivory was trafficked from Uganda,
Later in 2019, ANAC released the results of the 2018 and possibly further west, overland and by dhow down
national elephant census, revealing a stabilization of the the coast from Tanzania to northern Mozambique and
national population, with an estimated 9 122 animals, 25
then to Asia. By 2016, ivory stockpiles in Mozambique
although losses are still occurring in key populations in were being raided,30 and poaching of the Niassa Reserve
the west and south-west.26 elephants continued, even though the low density of
elephants made them hard to find. Before 2014, most
Niassa Reserve, at 42 300 km , slightly larger than
2
ivory from elephants poached in northern Mozambique
Switzerland, is one of Africa’s few remaining remote was moved into Tanzania and exited the African conti-
wilderness areas where large elephant, lion and wild nent from East Africa; but with the shift of trafficking to
KEY
Class 1 – fresh
Class 2 – recent
Class 3 – old
Class 4 – very old
N 0 25 50 100 Km
FIGURE 2: Elephant carcass distribution in the Niassa National Reserve, Mozambique
during a dry-season aerial survey in 2014
SOURCE: National Administration of Conservation Areas, Mozambique
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 5 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION4 000
3 500
3 000
Number of carcasses
2 500
2 000
1 500
1 000
500
0
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 2011 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019
Carcass estimate Upper/lower error limit
FIGURE 3: Estimated number of elephant carcasses and margin of error
NOTE:Estimating the count of elephant carcasses across a vast terrain, such as the Niassa National Reserve, faces a
number of practical barriers, such as the scale of the area and the difficulty of finding carcasses via an aerial count in
woodland areas.
SOURCE: National Administration of Conservation Areas, Mozambique
Pemba and Nacala in northern Mozambique, ivory stolen operating on the eastern side of the Niassa Reserve were
from stockpiles and poached in the Niassa Reserve began arrested and convicted in court in the province of Cabo
moving directly from Mozambique. Delgado in northern Mozambique.32 At the same time,
4 000 higher-level networks trafficking ivory from the ports of
The first actions that contributed to the later reduction northern Mozambique were being exposed, and in some
in poaching started in 2017 and 2018 (see Figure 3). A
3 500 cases dismantled and individuals arrested.33 Recent field-
key event was the July 2017 arrest and repatriation to work in Pemba, Mozambique, by a Global Initiative team
Tanzania of
3 a000
major ivory trafficker who had been operat- found no indication of ivory being trafficked through that
ing in northern Mozambique with impunity since 2013.31 port.34 Other sources in the area have indicated that the
Number of carcasses
The arrest2and
500transfer were the result of a three-year local ivory trade has ceased because the perceived threat
investigation involving a multi-agency collaboration be- of arrest and conviction is high.35 The same sources sug-
2 000
tween ANAC, the National Criminal Investigation Service gested that local ivory traders are holding small stockpiles
of the Police, and the Attorney General’s Office, with from the past but are too afraid to move or sell them.
NGO and 1 500 support. In 2014, this trafficker had been
donor
operating five poaching gangs in the Niassa Reserve. Just In early 2018, changes were also made on the ground in
two of the1gangs
000 had together supplied him with 825 ki- the Niassa Reserve. Key partners – ANAC, the police, the
logrammes that year alone. There is also evidence tying Wildlife Conservation Society (ANAC’s co-management
500 of 867 pieces of ivory from a stockpile in
him to the theft partner for the Reserve), the Niassa Conservation Alliance
northern Mozambique in late 2016. He was well known and other operators – began to implement a coordinated
for maintaining0a local network of bribery payments to anti-poaching strategy. This included deploying a specialized
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 2011 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019
maintain his anonymity and security – making his arrest rapid-response police unit, appointing a senior police liaison
and repatriation even more notable. officer to coordinate all police forces with Reserve scouts,
KEY
Carcass estimate Upper/lower
better equipping error limit
the scouts, making a light aircraft available
Gold dep
Following this arrest, and based on information gained year-round, and chartering a helicopter during the 2018 and
FPR gold
from interrogations, a further six ivory traffickers 2019 wet seasons. Improvements in communications were centres
Reported
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 6 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONDuring the poaching crisis, Mozambique lost almost 10 000 elephants – including this one from the Niassa National
Reserve – in just five years. A combined effort of law enforcement and park management has helped bring
poaching in the reserve down to nothing today. © Alastair Nelson
also made through investment in a radio network and recent fieldwork ascertained that while ivory from the
regular meetings between the partners. In addition, the Niassa Reserve was not for sale, live pangolins are,
partnership cleared out illegal mining and fishing camps in and local sources confirm that pangolin scales and lion
the reserve. Finally, a significant proportion of the ele bones originating from the reserve still transit Pemba
phant population were collared and tracked in order to and can be sourced if wanted. It is not surprising that
focus protection activities. In the first 12 months that the anti-poaching operations alone in an area the size of the
police rapid-response unit operated in the reserve, they Niassa Reserve have not stopped illegal wildlife trade
arrested 46 people, of whom 26 were convicted. 36
across the board. Further, there is evidence that sen-
tence length alone is not a good deterrent, but rather
A final key component of the reduction in elephant the likelihood of being caught and a sanction occurring
poaching in Niassa Reserve has been high-level political have a higher impact on deterrence.39 This may be ex-
support. In November 2018, Mozambique’s president, acerbated in Mozambique where prison overcrowding
Filipe Nyusi, visited the reserve and participated in a means that prisoners are fairly regularly released early to
widely publicized elephant-collaring operation. He 37
make space for new offenders. Therefore, while effec-
used this opportunity to emphasize the need to restore tive anti-poaching operations and effective sentencing
the rule of law, while also reducing resource conflicts are key components of improving the rule of law in and
with local people.38 around protected areas, there may be several other key
factors that are critical to reducing organized high-value
It is unlikely that the decline in elephant poaching in the poaching. In this instance, key specific factors include:
Niassa Reserve is purely the result of effective anti- ■■ the 2017 arrest of northern Mozambique’s most
poaching operations and increased sentencing. Our notorious ivory trafficker, who was the key link
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 7 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONbetween poaching and stockpile thefts in northern leakage from local law-enforcement agencies
Mozambique and the Pemba ivory traffickers ■■ direct operational support from donors and NGO
■■ the immediate follow-on arrests of lower-level ivory partners for these cooperating law-enforcement
traffickers activities
■■ disruption of the corrupt protection of ivory traf- ■■ the work of international law-enforcement agencies
fickers and poachers, which has, in turn, broken the to dismantle the ivory-trafficking networks operating
general perception of impunity from northern Mozambique; and
■■ the increased perception of the likelihood of arrest ■■ high-level political support.
and conviction for ivory trafficking resulting from the
recent crackdown At the same time, the wider context of the breakdown of
■■ reduced demand for ivory from traffickers in Pemba, the rule of law in northern Mozambique due to ongoing
which had become a major centre for transnational violence, and other ongoing illicit trades in the region,
ivory trafficking must be borne in mind. The specific successes described
■■ cooperation between trusted individuals in key here should be attributed to improved rule of law that
government law enforcement agencies (ANAC, the focused on a specific product – ivory. This has overcome
National Criminal Investigation Service and the a culture of impunity and created a feeling of vulnerability
Attorney General’s Office) to overcome information in the criminal networks dealing with that product.
3. The IUU Fishing Index provides insights into illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing in East and Southern African countries.
In January 2020, a study highlighting an innovative contains a wide variety of valuable fish resources, such as
methodology – using sensors attached to live albatross- tuna and abalone, which incentivizes IUU fishing.
es to monitor illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing – revealed that up to a third of the 353 fishing In the last few years, IUU fishing has become an increas-
boats the birds encountered fishing in the southwest- ingly prominent geopolitical issue in the region. In 2018,
ern Indian Ocean between November 2018 and March the European Commission cut funding for fisheries
2019 had turned off their automatic identification sys- development in the Comoros and identified it ‘as a non-
tems.40 These systems are used by national authorities cooperating third country in fighting IUU fishing’.45 EU
to inform maritime security efforts and to track vessel member states have also come under criticism – includ-
movements. As they are required to be switched on at ing Spain, which civil-society groups in the Seychelles
all times, when vessels turn them off it is a likely sign of alleged had underreported its tuna catch in the Indian
illegal activity. Ocean, leading to EU sanctions in 2019.46
Over the last decade, successful and sustainable ex- Many ESA countries rely heavily on the fisheries sector for
ploitation of the ocean has become a development ob- its contribution to gross domestic product, export earn-
jective for many East African countries, with Mauritius ings, employment and food security. Failure to reduce IUU
(2013), the Seychelles (2018) and, most recently, fishing in the region threatens these benefits, with poten-
Zanzibar (2020) launching ‘blue economy’ development tially serious consequences for the countries concerned.
strategies – yet along with these aspirations come anx-
ieties that IUU fishing will undermine them.41 Although RELIABLE AND COMPARABLE DATA
comprehensive information about the extent of IUU Recognizing its negative impacts on local, national and
fishing in East and Southern Africa (ESA) as a whole is global development, eliminating IUU fishing by 2020
not available, it is likely that IUU fishing is a significant was included as a target in UN Sustainable Development
problem throughout the region. Goal 14. A global IUU Fishing Index (www.iuufishingin-
dex.net) was launched in February 2019 to evaluate
Somalia has been recognized as an IUU fishing hotspot,42 countries’ exposure and the quality of their response.
as civil unrest has weakened its ability to control fish- The IUU Fishing Index was developed by Poseidon
ing in its waters, and there is evidence of illegal fishing Aquatic Resource Management (www.consult-poseidon.
in Tanzania and South Africa. The south-western
43 44
com) and the Global Initiative Against Transnational
Indian Ocean (of which ESA countries are coastal states) Organized Crime (https://globalinitiative.net/). The index
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 8 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONaddresses the lack of reliable and globally comparable
THE FISHBONE GRAPHIC
estimates of IUU fishing that enable comparisons across 5
countries and over time. The lack of such data has made it
difficult to identify where interventions are most needed, 3
and thus has hindered efforts to reduce and eliminate
1
IUU fishing. The index allows countries to be compara-
tively ranked as well as individually assessed in terms of
their exposure and responses to IUU fishing.
The index applies 40 indicators to 152 countries with a Coastal
Coastal Port
Port
maritime coastline. Each country is scored on a scale of Flag
Flag General
General
1 (good) to 5 (poor), based on the weighted indicators.
The scores do not establish how much IUU fishing there While the skull and the tail represent the overall IUU fishing score
is in each country; rather, they measure the relative risk (as a larger skull and tail shows a higher/poorer overall score) the fish-
bones represent the different types of state responsibilities that are
of IUU fishing incidence. measured in the index. Larger fishbones show higher/poorer scores.
STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
The 40 indicators are based on a combination of four state Coastal: Indicators related to things states should do and their obli-
gations in relation to IUU fishing that are specific to managing their
responsibilities and three indicator types, as shown in
exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
Figure 4. Flag: Indicators related to things states should do and their obliga-
tions in relation to IUU fishing that are specific to vessels they flag
(i.e. that are on their vessel register)
The index thus provides the basis for comparing countries, Port: Indicators related to things states should do and their obligations
world regions and ocean basins in terms of IUU prevalence, in relation to IUU fishing that are specific to managing their ports
General: Indicators that are not specific to flag, coastal or port state
vulnerability and response. The index can help to identify
responsibilities, including market-related indicators, and indicators
the countries, regions and areas where action would be applicable to the sector as a whole
beneficial and would reduce levels of IUU fishing. INDICATOR TYPES
Prevalence: Indicators that relate to known/suspected IUU incidents
Vulnerability: Indicators that relate to risks that IUU fishing may occur
EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN
Response: Indicators that relate to actions setting out to reduce IUU
COUNTRY SCORES fishing
Index scores for 12 ESA coastal countries – Comoros,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, FIGURE 4: Indicators considered in the IUU Fishing Index
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa
and Tanzania – are slightly worse than average global foreign vessels fishing in the waters of coastal states, and
scores for IUU fishing (Figure 5). the large size of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
(the area of sea from the coast to 200 nautical miles off-
The higher (worse) scores are mostly driven by higher shore), which makes it harder to monitor IUU fishing.
scores on prevalence and vulnerability. The region fares
particularly poorly for the indicator groups of coastal On the other hand, the ESA region scores slightly better
prevalence and coastal vulnerability, due to continuing than the global average on government response, as most
disputes over maritime boundaries, a large number of countries in the region are either contracting parties or
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
2.87 1.37 3.66 2.72
Coastal 25.8 1.60 3.17 2.51
1.22 2.78 1.79 1.92
Flag 1.31 2.69 2.23 2.01
1.55 2.47 3.50 2.41
Port 1.31 2.43 3.98 2.41
1.38 2.60 2.95 2.41
General 1.28 2.68 2.66 2.32
1.64 2.44 2.98 2.33
Overall Score 1.54 2.48 2.92 2.29
Prevalence Response Vulnerability Overall Score
ESA country scores (12 countries) Global scores (152 countries)
FIGURE 5: East and Southern Africa coastal country scores from the IUU Fishing Index compared to global average scores
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 9 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONIUUFishingIndex.net
IUUFishingIndex.net IUUFishingIndex.net
HIGHEST
5 5
cooperating non-contracting parties to all relevant
Somalia
3 3
regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), Somalia
Somalia 1 1
World ranking World
World ranking
ranking
and operate a national vessel monitoring system (VMS) 10 of 152 countries 10 of 152 countries
10 of 152 countries
IUUFishingIndex.net IUU IUU
and fisheries monitoring centre. RFMOs manage re-
Africa ranking Africa ranking
Score Score
4 of 38 countries 4Africa ranking
of 38 countries IUU
Score
4 of 38 countries 2.75 2.753.13
gionally shared fish stocks, typically highly migratory
West Indian Ocean ranking West Indian Ocean ranking 3.69 2.05 2.20 3.69 2.05 2.20 3.13
IUUFishingIndex.net
3 of 24 countries IUUFishingIndex.net
3 of 24 countries
2.75
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
West Indian Ocean ranking 3.69 2.05 2
stocks, such as tuna, that move between EEZs; a VMS 3 of 24 countries
Coastal
Flag
tracks fishing vessels using transponders, placed on the
5 5
vessels, which emit location data that are read by satel-
Tanzania
3 3
lites and transmitted to graphical displays on computer Tanzania
Tanzania 1 1
terminals in the fisheries monitoring centres. World ranking
18 of 152 countries
World
World ranking
ranking
18 of 152 countries
18 of 152 countries
Africa ranking IUUFishingIndex.net
Africa ranking IUU
Score
IUU
Score
7 of 38 countries 7Africa
of 38 countries
ranking IUU
Score
Comoros, Somalia and Tanzania have the worstWest
scores 7 of Indian
Indian Ocean ranking West
IUUFishingIndex.net
5 of 24 countries
38 countries
Ocean ranking
IUUFishingIndex.net
5 of 24 countries
2.65 2.25 2.29 2.65
3.11 2.83 2.25 2.29 3.11 2.83
2.65
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
and rank poorly in global terms. Kenya, Mauritius, West Indian Ocean ranking
5 of 24 countries
2.25 2.29 3
Coastal
Flag
Namibia and the Seychelles are the best-performing
5 5
countries in the ESA region, although these scores
Comoros Isl. Isl.
3 3
nevertheless still indicate a high risk of IUU fishing,
and poor performance in terms of global comparisons
Comoros
Comoros
Isl. 1 1
World ranking World
World ranking
ranking
20 of 152 countries 20 of 152 countries
20 of 152 countries
(Figure 6). Africa ranking Africa ranking IUU
Score
IUU
Score
8 of 38 countries 8Africa
of 38 countries
ranking IUU
Score
West Indian Ocean ranking
8 of 38 countries
West Indian Ocean ranking 2.61 2.61
2.56 1.74 2.56 3.30 2.56 1.74 2.56 3.30
6 of 24 countries 6 of 24 countries
Somalia has suffered from decades of civil war and 2.61
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
West Indian Ocean ranking 2.56 1.74 2
6 of 24 countries
a weak central government that has not been able to
Coastal
Flag
IUUFishingIndex.net
control or police its coastal waters. Unsurprisingly, itIUUFishingIndex.net
per- IUUFishingIndex.net
forms poorly in most indicator groups, with a particularly
below-average score for government response – 2.82,
5 5
compared to the regional average of 2.44 (Figure 7). The
Seychelles 3 3
government, for example, has not provided data on its Seychelles
Seychelles 1 1
vessels to the FAO Global Record of fishing vessels, a
World ranking World
World ranking
ranking
107 of 152 countries 107 of 152 countries
107 of 152 countries
repository of government-certified informationAfrica
intend-
ranking IUUFishingIndex.net
Africa ranking IUU
Score
IUU
Score
35 of 38 countries 35 of 38 countries
Africa ranking IUU
ed to combat IUU fishing. It does not comply with all
West Indian Ocean ranking
35 of
West 38 countries
Indian Ocean ranking 2.13 3.38 1.83 2.06
2.131.73 3.38 1.83 2.06
Score
1.73
21 of 24 countries
21 of 24 IUUFishingIndex.net IUUFishingIndex.net
2.13
countries
RFMO flag and port state responsibilities, and it has not
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
West Indian Ocean ranking
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
3.38 1.83
21 of 24 countries
ratified the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
Coastal
Flag
5 5
On the other hand, the Seychelles performs very well
Mauritius
3 3
Mauritius
on most response indicators, and is the best-perform- Mauritius 1 1
World ranking World
World ranking
ranking
ing country in the region overall. Its high response 101 of 152 countries 101 of 152 countries
101 of 152 countries
Africa ranking IUUFishingIndex.net
Africa ranking IUU IUU
score derives from the fact the country has signed and
Score Score
33 of 38 countries 33 of 38 countries
Africa ranking IUU
Score
West Indian Ocean ranking
33 of 38 countries
West Indian Ocean ranking 2.15 2.151.73
2.88 1.88 2.56 2.88 1.88 2.56 1.73
accepted most relevant international fishing agree- 19 of 24IUUFishingIndex.net
countries 19 of 24IUUFishingIndex.net
countries
2.15
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
West Indian Ocean ranking 2.88 1.88
ments, has developed a national plan of action to 19 of 24 countries
Coastal
Flag
combat IUU fishing, tracks its fishing vessels using a 5 5
VMS, and has supplied data on its vessels to the FAO
Kenya
3 3
Global Record. Kenya Kenya 1 1
World ranking World
World ranking
ranking
96 of 152 countries 96 of 152 countries
96 of 152 countries
Yet while the Seychelles has good scores for gov-
Africa ranking Africa ranking IUU IUU
Score Score
31 of 38 countries 31 of 38 countries
Africa ranking IUU
Score
31 of 38 countries 2.18 2.18
ernment response, it has the second worst scores West Indian Ocean ranking
17 of 24 countries
West Indian Ocean ranking
17 of 24 countries
2.50 1.74 1.89 2.53 2.50 1.74 1.89 2.53
2.18
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
Coastal
Flag
Port
General
West Indian Ocean ranking 2.50 1.74
in the region for prevalence, and the third worst for 17 of 24 countries
Coastal
Flag
vulnerability. The poor prevalence score is driven by
LOWEST
the assessment of IUU fishing levels by the people
involved in monitoring, control and surveillance, and FIGURE 6: Threehighest- and lowest-performing countries
by the number of vessels on the lists of IUU vessels on the IUU Fishing Index in East and Southern Africa
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 10 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3
4.40 1.00 4.00 3.69
Coastal 2.87 1.37 3.66 2.72
1.67 3.00 1.00 2.05
Flag 1.22 2.78 1.79 1.92
1.00 2.20 4.00 2.20
Port 1.55 2.47 3.50 2.41
2.29 3.50 3.44 3.13
General 1.38 2.60 2.95 2.41
Overall Score 2.19 2.82 3.36 2.75
1.64 2.44 2.98 2.33
Prevalence Response Vulnerability Overall Score
Somalia ESA country scores (12 countries)
FIGURE 7: IUU Fishing Index scores for Somalia compared to average scores for East and Southern Africa
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3
3.80 1.00 5.00 3.38
Coastal 2.87 1.37 3.66 2.72
1.67 1.56 2.50 1.83
Flag 1.22 2.78 1.79 1.92
1.50 1.75 3.50 2.06
Port 1.55 2.47 3.50 2.41
1.00 1.86 2.11 1.73
General 1.38 2.60 2.95 2.41
1.85 1.64 3.12 2.13
Overall Score 1.64 2.44 2.98 2.33
Prevalence Response Vulnerability Overall Score
Seychelles ESA country scores (12 countries)
FIGURE 8: IUU Fishing Index scores for Seychelles compared to average scores for East and Southern Africa
maintained by RFMOs, suggesting that vessels operat- ■■ Develop a national plan of action to combat IUU
ing under the country’s flag are involved in IUU fishing. fishing.
The Seychelles is also vulnerable to IUU fishing because ■■ Sign international fisheries agreements that aim to
of its large EEZ and the large number of foreign ves- reduce IUU fishing.
sels fishing in its waters and landing fish into its ports ■■ Better track vessel activity using a VMS.
(Figure 8). ■■ Provide data on their fishing vessels to the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization.
THE WAY FORWARD ■■ Ensure full, or at least better, compliance with all
The index clearly shows that many countries in the ESA RFMO obligations in relation to vessel and port
region are at above-average risk of IUU fishing. There management.
are only a limited number of actions that can be taken
to mitigate vulnerability to IUU fishing. Countries would While some of the actions would have cost implications,
not want to reduce the size of their EEZs, and resolving the costs may not be significant, and the actions are
maritime boundaries will take a long time. But several relatively easy to achieve if the political will is there.
actions can be taken by countries in the ESA region to
improve responses to IUU:
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 11 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION4. Uganda’s Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 2016 has left individuals
vulnerable to abuse while failing to deter major drug traffickers.
In February 2016, after three years of lobbying and re- Europe. Rising rates of heroin consumption within Uganda
peated attempts to pass the draft bill in Uganda’s parlia- also follow the patterns seen in countries across the
ment, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances region.51 Nominally, the 2016 Act was passed to counter
(Control) Act came into force. The Act intensified these two trends.
Uganda’s already prohibitionist approach to drugs by
significantly increasing penalties for all drug-related High-level corruption connected to drug trafficking also
offences. provides a significant backdrop to implementation of the
2016 Act. The delays faced in passing the Act through
The Act has been controversial from the outset. Although parliament were attributed by interviewees to entrenched
lawyers in Uganda and law-enforcement officials praised resistance among members of parliament, many of whom
the legislation, human-rights activists and rehabilitation are believed to draw large profits from drug trafficking
centres criticized the harsh sentences it prescribed. The and therefore to have vested interests in blocking higher
legislation also fails to properly distinguish between the sanctions for traffickers.52 According to a US government
offences of possession and trafficking, and places an submission in the 2019 drug-trafficking trial of the Kenyan
overarching emphasis on a criminal-justice response to brothers Baktash and Ibrahim Akasha, they and two as-
drugs rather than a public-health approach. 47
sociates attended a meeting at which Ugandan President
Yoweri Museveni’s sister-in-law allegedly ‘offered to pro-
Civil-society members argue that, while the Act has had a vide a license to import…ephedrine, two tons at a time, in
negligible impact on drug-trafficking networks, the most exchange for a percentage of the profits’. The documents
tangible change has been the level of abuse suffered by show that the Akasha network had ‘discussed using labo-
people who use drugs at the hands of law enforcement, ratories in Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania to manufacture
and in the bribes they must pay to evade arrest. Law-
48
the ephedrine into methamphetamine’.54
enforcement officers highlight the dearth of alternatives
to criminal-justice approaches, such as state-run rehabili- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT
tation clinics, in countering drug use. 49
The 2016 Act adopts an approach common in African
drug legislation, with escalating penalties for use, pos-
The Ugandan Human Rights Commission held a consul- session and trafficking. According to legal practitioners,
tation on the Act in October 2019, in which a number of the logic behind ascribing higher sanctions to possession
civil-society groups advocated the decriminalization of than to use is that a person possessing narcotics could
drug use. However, in Uganda’s current political cli-
50
be seeking to deal in them.55 The higher penalty for
mate, any reform is unlikely until after the 2021 national possession applies even if the amount of drugs is small,
elections. although of course this can be taken into account during
sentencing.
As part of its ongoing research into the political economy
of illegal drug markets in Uganda, the Global Initiative Although Uganda’s penalty structure is the same as, for
has investigated how the technical practicalities of im- example, Ghana’s, the impacts of the Ugandan legisla-
plementing the 2016 Act have had differing impacts on tion have reportedly been particularly punitive.56 While
the rights of vulnerable people who use drugs and on Ghanaian law-enforcement officers commonly charge those
organized-crime groups trafficking drugs. found in possession of a small quantity of illicit narcotics
with use rather than possession, to enable a less punitive
CONTEXT sentence,57 this trend has not been reported in Uganda.
Following an established and familiar pattern across
East and Southern Africa, Uganda has, over the past Most cases of possession are tried in Uganda’s lower
decade, become a significant transit country for Afghan courts, which are not courts of record, so it is impossi-
heroin brought to the East African coast and destined ble to know the exact number of people arrested and
for European markets. To a lesser extent, Uganda is also charged under the Act. However, legal practitioners
a transit state for South American cocaine destined for and law-enforcement officials reported that the vast
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 12 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONFour years after Uganda’s parliament passed a
draconian anti-narcotics law, civil-society groups
say the legislation has created an opportunity
for corruption and persecution of people who
use drugs. Here in Kisenyi, a slum in the heart of
Kampala, photographer Michele Sibiloni captured
a glimpse into the daily lives of addicts existing on
the margins of society. © Michele Sibiloni
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 13 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONmajority of those arrested are charged with posses- calling others into question. A Venezuelan national
sion, and that the number of individuals charged with arrested carrying 1.7 kg of cocaine and convicted on
possession has significantly increased. Few traffick-
58
parallel counts of trafficking and possession, was re-
ing cases are reported, and people who can afford a portedly sentenced to 11 years imprisonment on each
bribe are never charged. 59
count (22 years in total), together with the standard
fine. While consistent with reports that the fines im-
For the trafficking cases that do come to trial, there are posed are the minimum prescribed by the Act, it pres-
additional difficulties. The Act does not provide a clear ents an exception to the reported lack of imprisonment
distinction between the offences of possession and for trafficking cases, although it still does not amount to
trafficking, such as a specific amount of narcotics. This the life sentence prescribed by the Act.64
is a crucial distinction, as sanctions for possession grant
the judge discretion to sentence the perpetrator to a One lawyer interviewed by the Global Initiative sug-
fine or imprisonment, or both, while those for traffick- gested that the intention of the Act is that the market
ing mandate life imprisonment as well as a fine. value of seized narcotics is calculated based on the
value at their intended destination, with the street
In spite of this mandate, trafficking penalties handed price of drugs in New York or London used as a proxy.
down by Ugandan courts since the Act came into However, this presents significant challenges in accu-
force have been almost exclusively limited to fines. 60 rately determining the drugs’ destination, and, in any
This is reportedly due to judicial fear of appeals case, an officer responsible for determining the price
against decisions. has not been designated.
The financial penalties imposed under the Act have Although the fines currently imposed are insignificant
been meaningless to higher-level drug traffickers but for large-scale traffickers, they outstrip what most
harshly punitive for disadvantaged people who use drug users can afford. Failure to pay the fine is punish-
drugs. The Act dictates the same financial penalty for able by a 10-year prison term (a mandatory minimum
possession and trafficking: either a fine of not less than sentence not subject to judicial discretion). The Act is
10 million Ugandan shillings (€2 425), or ‘three times
61
noted to have fuelled extortion by law-enforcement
the market value of the narcotic drug … whichever is officers, who give people who use drugs a choice
greater.’ While the Act sets a minimum fine, in prac-
62
between 10 years’ imprisonment and a bribe. Families
tice courts appear to have adopted the minimum as the and friends are often prevailed upon to provide funds
standard amount. to pay the bribe.65
As regards the market value of the drug, beyond stating Although imposing arguably disproportionate sanctions
that this should be documented in a certificate signed on people who use drugs, the current application of
by an officer appointed by the minister responsible for the Act’s sanctioning regime has made Uganda attrac-
internal affairs,63 the Act provides no guidance as to tive as a transit country for drug-trafficking networks,
how the value is to be determined and, crucially, which for whom the relatively low penalties are merely a cost
market the price is based on. As of December 2019, of doing business.66 In large part due to ineffective
no officer had been appointed, ‘market value’ remained judicial implementation, and a lack of government guid-
undefinable and courts exclusively set fines based on ance, the Act’s impact on large-scale drug-trafficking
the Act’s mandated minimum. networks has been at best negligible and at worst
counter-productive.
One 2019 lower court judgment reported to the Risk
Bulletin confirms some of the trends identified, while
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 14 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONNOTES
1 Andries van Zyl, Crop theft has major impact on 12 Barry Christie, South African macadamia industry
macadamia industry, Limpopo Mirror, 4 November satisfied with stiff sentence for theft, Fresh
2017, www.limpopomirror.co.za/articles/ Plaza, 8 November 2017, www.freshplaza.com/
news/44770/2017-11-04/crop-theft-has-major- article/2184404/south-african-macadamia-industry-
impact-on-macadamia-industry; Irene Kim, What satisfied-with-stiff-sentence-for-theft/.
makes macadamia nuts the most expensive nuts 13 Andries van Zyl, Crop theft has major impact on
in the world, at $25 per pound, Business Insider, 6 macadamia industry, Limpopo Mirror, 4 November
March 2019, www.businessinsider.com/macadamia- 2017, www.limpopomirror.co.za/articles/
nuts-most-expensive-world-australia-hawaii-2019- news/44770/2017-11-04/crop-theft-has-major-
3?r=US&IR=T. impact-on-macadamia-industry.
2 Stefan de Villiers, Dogs deployed to help fight avo 14 Southern African Macadamia Growers’ Association,
theft in the Lowveld, The Lowvelder, 8 February 2019, Impact of macadamia theft on the industry and
https://lowvelder.co.za/467711/dogs-deployed- the South African economy, provided by email,
help-fight-avo-theft-lowveld/; Helena Wasserman, 12 October 2017.
There’s a shortage of avocados in South Africa – and 15 Andries van Zyl, Crop theft has major impact on
you can expect to pay R25 for one, if you can find it, macadamia industry, Limpopo Mirror, 4 November
Business Insider South Africa, 6 February 2020, www. 2017, www.limpopomirror.co.za/articles/
businessinsider.co.za/avo-avocado-shortage-south- news/44770/2017-11-04/crop-theft-has-major-
africa-2020-2. impact-on-macadamia-industry.
3 Interview with Lizel Pretorius, CEO of Macadamias 16 Tereasa Dias, Macadamia nut farmers losing millions
South Africa NPC, by phone, February 2020. due to theft, The Lowvelder, 24 August 2018, https://
4 Lindi Botha, Macadamia and avocado theft costs lowvelder.co.za/447395/macadamia-nut-farmers-
industry millions, Farmer’s Weekly, 8 January 2020, losing-millions-due-theft/.
www.farmersweekly.co.za/agri-news/south-africa/ 17 Amsita Parshotam, Cultivating smallholder inclusion
macadamia-and-avocado-theft-costs-industry- in Southern Africa’s macadamia nut value chains,
millions/; Barry Christie, South African macadamia Africa Portal occasional paper.
industry satisfied with stiff sentence for theft, Fresh 18 The great nut robbery: These machete-wielding
Plaza, 8 November 2017, www.freshplaza.com/ gangs don’t want cash, News24, 13 April 2017,
article/2184404/south-african-macadamia-industry- www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/the-great-
satisfied-with-stiff-sentence-for-theft/. nut-robbery-these-machete-wielding-gangs-dont-
5 South African Subtropical Growers’ Association want-cash-20170413; Luthando Mapepa Chipinge,
(Subtrop), Impact of avocado theft on the industry Macadamia thieves besiege Chipinge, Manica
and the South African economy, 2018, provided by Post, 11 January 2019, www.manicapost.co.zw/
email, 7 February 2020. macadamia-thieves-besiege-chipinge/.
6 Avocado production: Avocados in South Africa, 19 Macadamia robbers must be tamed, Zimbabwe Daily,
South Africa Online, http://southafrica.co.za/avocado- 16 January 2020, www.thezimbabwedaily.com/
production.html. news/384541-macadamia-robbers-must-be-tamed.
7 Lindi Botha, Macadamia and avocado theft costs html.
industry millions, Farmer’s Weekly, 8 January 2020, 20 Richard Muponde, Suspected macadamia nuts ‘thief’
www.farmersweekly.co.za/agri-news/south-africa/ shot at top army boss farm, NewsDay, 16 February
macadamia-and-avocado-theft-costs-industry- 2019, www.newsday.co.zw/2019/02/suspected-
millions/. macadamia-nuts-thief-shot-at-top-army-boss-farm/.
8 South African Subtropical Growers’ Association 21 Samuel Kadungure, Major breakthrough for
(Subtrop), Impact of avocado theft on the industry macadamia growers, Manica Post, 19 July 2019,
and the South African economy, 2018, provided by www.manicapost.co.zw/major-breakthrough-for-
email, 7 February 2020. A total of 93 growers were macadamia-growers/.
surveyed. 22 Mozambique announces major decline in national
9 Eleanor Ainge Roy, Electric fences and armed patrols: elephant population, Wildlife Conservation Society,
On the frontline of New Zealand’s avocado war, 26 May 2015, https://newsroom.wcs.org/News-
The Guardian, 30 October 2018, www.theguardian. Releases/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/6760/
com/food/2018/oct/31/electric-fences-and-armed- Govt-of-Mozambique-announces-major-decline-in-
patrols-on-the-frontline-of-new-zealands-avocado- national-elephant-population.aspx.
war; Avocados are highly coveted by thieves in Spain, 23 Jon Sharman, Poachers kill nearly 11,000
Fresh Plaza, 10 December 2019, www.freshplaza. Mozambique elephants in 7 years, Independent, 12
com/article/9171323/avocados-are-highly-coveted- February 2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/
by-thieves-in-spain/; Samuel Trilling, Mexican world/africa/elephants-poachers-kill-animals-
farmers: 48 tons of avocados lost to gangs every ivory-trade-africa-niassa-national-reserve-fauna-
day, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, flora-a8206626.html.
18 June 2019, www.occrp.org/en/27-ccwatch/ 24 Niassa Reserve celebrates one year without
cc-watch-briefs/9983-mexican-farmers-12-tons-of- a single elephant poached – Mozambique,
avocados-lost-to-gangs-every-day. Club of Mozambique, 28 May 2019, https://
10 Annie Todd, Cartel war seeks to control avocado clubofmozambique.com/news/niassa-reserve-
trade in Mexico, Organized Crime and Corruption celebrates-one-year-without-a-single-elephant-
Reporting Project, 13 August 2019, www.occrp. poached-mozambique/.
org/en/daily/10466-cartel-war-seeks-to-control- 25 Mozambique: Only 26 elephants killed in 2019,
avocado-trade-in-mexico. one less than year before, Club of Mozambique, 27
11 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Are Mexican avocados the January 2020, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/
world’s new conflict commodity?, The Guardian, 30 number-of-elephants-in-mozambique-stabilises-
December 2019, www.theguardian.com/global- at-10800-139795/.
development/2019/dec/30/are-mexican-avocados- 26 Interview with Carlos Lopes Pereira, Director of Law
the-worlds-new-conflict-commodity. Enforcement and Protection, ANAC, Mozambique,
11 April 2019, Maputo.
RISK BULLETIN • ISSUE 5 • FEB/MAR 2020 15 EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONYou can also read
