Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

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Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Moscow, July, 2012

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Military Reform:
Toward the New Look
of the Russian Army
        Valdai Discussion Club
        Analytical Report
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
The authors of the report:

                   Mikhail Barabanov,
Editor-in-Chief of Moscow Defense Brief
                Konstantin Makienko,
       Deputy Director of the Center for
 Analysis of Strategies and Technologies;
member of the Expert Council under the
Russian State Duma Defense Committee
                       Ruslan Pukhov,
   Director of the Center for Analysis of
   Strategies and Technologies; member
 of the Public Council under the Russian
                        Defense Ministry

      Russian military reform was
   discussed at the conference of
the Defense and Security section
     of the Valdai Discussion Club
titled “Modernization of Russia’s
   Armed Forces and Cooperation
 in International Security” which
    was held on May 25—27, 2011
                        in Moscow.
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Contents

 3   0. Introduction

 5   1. Prerequisites for the Military
     Reform

9    2. Military-Political Context of
     Reform: Risks and Threats to
     Russia’s Military Security

12   3. Demographic and Financial
     Resources

15   4. Strategic Objectives of the
     Serdyukov-Makarov Reform

25   5. Dynamics of Conscription
     and Enlistment

29   6. Rearming the Army and the Navy

32   7. Interim Results of the Reform
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

0. Introduction

In October 2008, Russian Defense Minister          by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Anatoly Serdyukov announced the launch of          of the Russian Empire Count Sergei Witte:
a new stage of military reform, aimed at tran-     “In Russia, you need to enact reforms quickly;
sitioning the Russian Armed Forces to a new        otherwise they mostly do not work out and are
look. This rapid and intensive military reform     inhibited.”
has turned out to be the most radical transfor-
                                    It should also be noted that the top politi-
mation of the country’s military since the crea-
tion of the Red Army in 1918.1 The Defense
                                    cal leadership fully supports the Serdyukov-
                                    Makarov military reform. It is this support
Ministry has embarked on an active and vig-
                                    that has played a significant role in stabilizing
orous campaign of reforms, most of which
                                    the reform, given the intense criticism by the
were completed on an organizational level by
                                    military and the “expert community” of many
December 1, 2009. However, the reform pro-
                                    aspects of the changes. This political support
cess is still continuing on many fronts.
                                                 has resulted in consistent increas-
                                                 es in spending on the country’s
                                                 defense. Moreover, these increas-
In an unprecedentedly short period for           es have been forthcoming not only
peacetime, the Russian Armed Forces              in periods of economic growth,
                                                 but also during the acute phase of
have been given a new look that is               the 2008–2009 economic crisis.
radically different from the traditional
form of the Red, Soviet and Russian                               The importance and the scale
                                                                  of transformations were noted
armies                                                            in Vladimir Putin’s report, pub-
                                                                  lished on the threshold of the
The changes affected all the main elements of      presidential elections: “We have adopted and
Russia’s Armed Forces – strength, command          are implementing unprecedented develop-
and control, organization, and officer train-      ment programs for our armed forces and for
ing. It is not only the radical nature but also    the modernisation of Russia’s defense indus-
the speed of the reforms that is astonishing.      try. All in all, we will allocate something like
In fact, in an unprecedentedly short period for    23 trillion rubles for these purposes over the
peacetime, the Russian Armed Forces under-         next decade. Frankly speaking, there have
went a restructuring that was radically differ-    been plenty of discussions regarding the size
ent from the traditional form of the Red, Soviet   and timeliness of such sizable allocations. I
and Russian armies. Whether by intuition or        am convinced that they fully correspond to the
consciously, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyu-      country’s potential and resources. And, most
kov and Chief of General Staff of the Armed        important, we cannot put off the goal of creat-
Forces Nikolai Makarov in this respect seem        ing modern armed forces and of comprehen-
to be following the principle once formulated      sively strengthening our defensive potential.”2

                                                                           Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                               Analytical report      3
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

    It is too early to gauge the final outcome of the   is of key importance. Success in personnel
    reform process. Although the organizational         preparation will mean that the Russian Armed
    transformations have to a large extent already      Forces can become Russia’s most efficient
    been made, two of the most time-consuming           public institution, against the backdrop of a
    aspects of the reforms – strength acquisition       generally rather inefficient and corrupt Rus-
    and the training of new, professional and           sian bureaucracy. Failure will be tantamount
    adequately motivated personnel (both officers       to the failure of the entire military reform
    and contract soldiers), and rearmament – are        program overall.
    far from complete.
                                                        1 Some believe that the most radical transformation took
    The results of the reforms in these two areas          place before and during World War II.
    will not be visible before 2012–2015. It needs      2 Vladimir Putin`s article “Being strong: National security
    to be clearly understood that it is the prepara-     guarantees for Russia” //Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February
    tion of the new officer and new soldier that         20, 2012

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Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

1. Prerequisites for the Military
         Reform

1.1. The Russian Armed Forces before the         overall strength, while the structure of the
      Reform in 2008                              officer personnel was well below standard.
                                                  Instead of a “pyramid,” in which junior offic-
On the eve of the radical changes, widely         ers made up the majority of the personnel,
referred to as “giving the armed forces a         there was an “egg” shape, with almost as many
new look”, the Russian Army was in fact still     lieutenant colonels as there were captains, and
holding on to the main features of its Soviet     even more majors.
predecessor. However, compared to the Soviet
Army, it had deteriorated substantially in        1.1.3. A low proportion of stand-by combat-
almost all the basic parameters – the quality     ready units, less than 13% of the total num-
of combat training and personnel, motivation,     ber of units. In the Army, this share reached
modern equipment, or even simply in terms         17%, in the Air Force it was no more than
of new weapons and military hardware. The         7% (and none at all in the Anti-Aircraft Mis-
main weaknesses of the Russian Army in the        sile Troops) and in the Navy it was 70%.
period before the reforms were:                   Only the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF)
                                                                  and the Airborne Forces were
                                                                  100% ready for combat opera-
                                                                  tions. A period of one year was
On the eve of the radical changes                                 needed to achieve full com-
the Russian Army had deteriorated                                 bat readiness and deployment
                                                                  of the Army, while the vast
substantially in almost all the basic                             majority of armed conflicts of
parameters                                                        the past 20 years have been
                                                                  characterized by volatility and
                                                                  lack of a clearly defined period
                                                                  of threat.
1.1.1. Disproportionate echelons of command.
While the total number of personnel in the        1.1.4. In the period from 1992 to 2008, i.e.
Armed Forces was 1.35 million, there were         over 16 years, virtually no significant pur-
52,000 command-and-control personnel. At          chases of weapons and military equipment
the same time, the actual strength of combat-     were made for general-purpose forces. As a
ready forces, as shown by the experience of the   result, at the outset of the reforms, the Army
two Chechen wars, was no more than 100,000.       was equipped with obsolete and outdated
Consequently, there was one command-and-          weapons and military equipment, much of
control professional for every two combat-        which was in out-of-commission status. The
ready soldiers and officers.                      situation was particularly dire in one of the
                                                  most hi-tech services of the Armed Forces,
1.1.2. A disproportionately large proportion      the Air Force, where up to 55% of the total
of officers and warrant officers – 50% of the     equipment was out of commission.

                                                                          Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                              Analytical report      5
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

        Staffing of the armed forces of the Russian Federation
        until 2008
                                                   STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN                   FUNCTIONAL WEAPONS
                                                   ARMED FORCES UNTIL 2008.                   AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
                                                   UNITS OF PERMANENT
                                                   COMBAT READINESS

                                                                 FUNCTIONAL                                FUNCTIONAL
                                                                 WEAPONS                                   WEAPONS
                                                                 AND MILITARY                              AND MILITARY
                                                                 EQUIPMENT                                 EQUIPMENT

        Army             Formations and units      17%           75-85%                        100%        85-90%

                         Aviation units            7%                                          100%
                                                                 45-50%                                    50-55%
        Air Force        Air defense units         0%                                          100%

                                                                                PERIOD
        Navy             Ships and patrol boats    70%           75-80%         OF THREAT      100%        75-80%
                                                                                UP TO ONE
        Strategic                                                               YEAR
        Missile Forces   Missile regiments         100%          100%                          100%        100%

        Airborne
        Forces           Formations and units      100%          85%                           100%        85%

        Size of the Armed Forces
                                                    1,35 MIL                                   4,20 MIL
                                                  in peacetime                                in wartime

        Source: Russian Defense Ministry

    1.2. Military, Political and Technical                             (due to the collapse of one of them) is believed
          Prerequisites for the Reform                                  to have reduced the probability of large-scale
                                                                        war, preparations for which had always been
    The essential features of the Soviet Army were                      the main task of the Soviet Army. Even if we
    retained for 15 years after the collapse of the                     assume that the elimination of deep ideologi-
    Soviet Union, but the Russian Armed Forces                          cal contradictions and Russia’s desire to build
    were in a qualitatively new military-political,                     the same type of Western economic (market
    technological and resource (especially demo-                        economy) and political system (open pol-
    graphic and financial) environment, which                           yarchy, more commonly referred to today as
    naturally required them to adapt to a new                           “democracy”) do not mean the end of military
    context. Among the most significant changes                         and political rivalry, it is clear that Moscow
    that triggered the transformations are the fol-                     does not have sufficient resources to continue
    lowing:                                                             competing in the conventional field.

    1.2.1. A radical change in the global military                      Containment of NATO, if it is still relevant,
    and political situation. The end of the ideo-                       can only be done with a nuclear deterrent. On
    logical confrontation between the two systems                       the other hand, all the real evidence shows

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Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

that since 1979, the Soviet, and subsequently       “elite” military units, combined into a single
Russian, Army has been perpetually involved         real-time “combat information network” that
in local, counter-guerilla and counter-terror-      gives them access to unprecedentedly high
ism wars, and has also conducted numer-             levels of reconnaissance, situational data and
ous peacekeeping operations. It is clear that       target designation, and imparts to these com-
preparations for this type of conflict have far     bat units an unheard-of capacity for coordina-
less stringent requirements in terms of army        tion. Network-centric military operations have
strength and mobilization capability, but at        a number of features that distinguish them
the same time call for a significant increase in    qualitatively from the nature of war under the
professionalism and combat readiness.               “deep-battle” theory which prevailed during
                                                                  the Second World War and for
                                                                  several decades thereafter. These
                                                                  special features include:
Containment of NATO can only be done
with a nuclear deterrent                                          1.2.2.1. The development of
                                                                  command, control, communi-
                                                                  cations, computer, intelligence,
                                                                  surveillance and reconnaissance
1.2.2. The evolution of forms and methods of        (C4ISR) systems, as well as firepower lead-
warfare. The Russian military hold that the         ing to an increase in the importance of the
theory of network-centric warfare, which has a      actions and the combat effectiveness of rela-
profound theoretical basis and has had practi-      tively small groups of “combat units.” Units
cal confirmation, dominates modern Western          of even low tactical value are dispersed, which
(primarily American) military thinking.             requires a good knowledge of the enemy, as
                                                    well as knowledge and understanding of the
The “network” concept presupposes that the          intentions of one’s own higher command.
traditional linear, centralized and hierarchical    Combat operations are conducted with the
principle of social systems (“center – periph-      highest degree of autonomy and independence
ery,” “trunk – branches”), which is character-      of units, with increased initiative of command
istic of an industrial society, will be replaced    among them.
with self-organizing, nonlinear and fundamen-
tally non-structuralized systems suitable for a     1.2.2.2. Combat operations are carried out
modern information society. It is assumed that      very rapidly, and are distinctive in their rapid
in such “nonlinear” systems, there is no “core,”    and constant maneuvering, including “verti-
i.e. no clearly defined “center,” since every       cal” maneuvering.
cell of such a set may, under certain circum-
stances, assume the function of the “center.”       1.2.2.3. The massing of forces and resources
Consequently, modern military organization          and fires, is no longer a decisive factor in mili-
is conceived as a totality of highly professional   tary superiority. Furthermore, such massing

                                                                             Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                                 Analytical report       7
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

    could actually have an adverse effect, since it  demographic dynamics, have impacted on
    makes it easier to find targets for destruction. the traditional Russian military hierarchy
    There will be a tendency for the prevalence of   of different services and combat arms. First
    smaller, highly mobile and agile forces.         of all, achieving the capability to conduct
                                                     network-centric war presupposes a radical
    1.2.2.4. Military operations are designed to not modernization of command, control, com-
    only defeat the enemy physically, but also to    munications, computer, intelligence, surveil-
    crush their morale, and not just of the troops   lance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), particu-
    but also of the people and the government.       larly at the tactical level, an area where the
    Factors such as the depth of support for the war Soviet Army typically lagged behind. On the
    among the general population play an increas-    other hand, the demographic crisis and the
    ingly important role and, accordingly, so does   declining quality of conscripts mean that
    understanding and using culturally specific      the Russian Army will no longer be able to
    features of the enemy and his political system,  rely on its usual trump card of numerous
    including through exposure via the media.        motorized rifle and tank forces. Perhaps for
                                                                   the first time in its military his-
                                                                   tory, the Russian Army cannot
                                                                   count on a guaranteed numeri-
    The evolution of the external environment                      cal superiority over the enemy,
    and the deterioration of the demographic                       and therefore needs to raise its
                                                                   technological level. Accordingly,
    situation make it absolutely imperative to                     hi-tech tools of “stand-off war-
    transform a mass mobilization army into                        fare,” such as aircraft and pre-
    one that is more compact and professional                      cision weapons, are becoming
                                                                   increasingly important. It goes
                                                                   without saying that maintaining
                                                                   the strategic balance, by defini-
    1.2.2.5. The distinction between “civilian” and  tion, requires the preservation of the pri-
    “military” segments of society is disappearing.  macy of all three components of the Strategic
    The aim of a military campaign is to impact      Nuclear Forces (SNF).
    not only the enemy army, but also its society,
    understood in terms of its cultural as well as   In addition, the active efforts of the U.S.
    its physical aspects. This trend makes it neces- to create new and effective means of high-
    sary to conduct joint “civilian-military” opera- precision conventional attack make it neces-
    tions, rather than purely military ones.         sary to strengthen the Aerospace Defense
                                                     Forces. In general, both the evolution of the
    1.2.3. Changes in the contribution of the        external environment and the deterioration of
    services and combat arms of the Armed            the demographic situation make it absolutely
    Forces in achieving the ultimate goal of com-    imperative to transform a mass mobilization
    bat operations. The military, political and      army into one that is more compact and pro-
    doctrinal evolution, as well as unfavorable      fessional.

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Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

2. Military-Political Context
           of Reform: Risks and Threats
           to Russia’s Military Security

Any discussion of military reform will inevita-       stan does not come under attack.) On the
bly involve constructing a hierarchy of military      other hand, a conflict with NATO, which seems
risks and threats. This should proceed from           unlikely for now, could compromise the lives of
the fact that the priorities publicly announced       most of Russia’s population and the very exist-
in a variety of doctrinal documents may differ        ence of the Russian Federation as a state. If the
significantly from the true hierarchy of threats      main criterion is probability of armed conflicts
which lies at the base of real military prepa-        with Russian involvement, the following hierar-
rations. For example, there is no mention in          chy can be defined:
official documents of a possible military threat
from the China, while the actual military organ-
izational development clearly cannot ignore
such a threat. However, non-governmental              2.1. Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space
observers may be freer to express their views
on the priorities of military security. In building   2.1.1. The entire Belavezha Accords system
a hierarchy of military priorities for Russia, we     of state and territorial structure, which took
should distinguish the probability of an armed        shape as a result of the 1991 national disaster
conflict and the scale of threat that this conflict   (the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991), is
poses for the vital interests of the country. For     illegitimate, random, unstable and therefore
example, the most probable scenario for today         fraught with conflict. The entire post-Soviet
is the emergence in the medium term of con-           Eurasian space is an area with a complex
flicts in Central Asia, which may affect Russia’s     combination of integration, separatist and
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)        irredentist tendencies. The system has been in
allies, but it will not pose a threat to the vital    a state of permanent crisis for almost all of the
interests of Russia itself (at least while Kazakh-    20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union,

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                                                                                  Analytical report       9
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

     and it is safe to say that in future it is doomed   will inevitably worsen in the case of withdraw-
     to more or less conflict-ridden transforma-         al of Western coalition troops from the coun-
     tion. Specific forms of this transformation can     try, which will more than likely be followed by
     range from short-term revivals of currently         a return to the Taliban rule. Most likely, the
     frozen conflicts to the collapse of some of the     authoritarian but weak Central Asian regimes
     post-Soviet states. In this case, any conflict      will not independently provide effective resist-
     in the post-Soviet space is highly likely, if       ance to a highly motivated and experienced
     not certain, to lead to Russia’s intervention,      Taliban force, and Russian intervention in one
     including military intervention. After all, Rus-    form or another will become all but inevita-
     sia is committed to ensuring the safety of the      ble, turning into an absolute certainty should
     CSTO, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia.        Kazakhstan come under attack.

                                                                     2.1.3. It is not a hypothetical, but
                                                                     a very real conflict in the North
     The entire Belavezha Accords system                             Caucasus that persists within the
     of state and territorial structure is                           territory of Russia. The ethnic
     illegitimate, random, unstable and                              separatist rebellion in Chechnya at
                                                                     the turn of 2002–2003 was trans-
     therefore fraught with conflict
                                                                     formed into a pan-Caucasian Salafi
                                                                     underground, which is waging a
                                                                     subversive and terrorist “insurgen-
     2.1.2. Today, the most likely threat is a dra-   cy war.” The scale of military operations (up to
     matic aggravation of the situation in Central    300 militants and a similar number of military
     Asia. The fundamental cause of weakness of       and law enforcement officers are killed each
     the states in the region is, in essence, their   year) is equivalent to a low-intensity conflict, and
     artificial nature: the current national territo- the spatial scale of the sabotage and zone affected
     rial demarcation did not stem from a long        by terrorism to that of a regional conflict.
     historical evolution, but was the result of the
     discretionary decisions of the Bolshevik lead-   2.1.4. Russia is committed to ensuring the
     ership in Moscow. Moreover, the proneness        security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which
     to conflict in Central Asia is both endogenous   it has recognized as independent states and
     and can be encouraged from outside. The          whose political sovereignty is challenged by
     sources of internal conflict can be clan and     Georgia. Although today the resumption of the
     regional rivalries (as has already happened      Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian
     in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and partly in       conflict seems unlikely, there is no doubt that
     the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan), national      the idea of revenge will continue to be central
     and ethnic divisions (Kyrgyzstan; Uzbek-Tajik    in Georgian political and military planning for
     tensions in Uzbekistan) and social tensions.     decades to come, and these conflicts will be
     External threats emanating from Afghanistan      revived at the slightest weakening of Russia.

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Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

2.2. Other Threats                                 which, in view of the real balance of power
                                                   between China and Russia, may, of course,
2.2.1. A “Falklands scenario” for the Kuril        only be achieved through the nuclear deter-
Islands. Japan is persisting in its open ter-      rent. Accordingly, the need to preserve and
ritorial claims against Russia, and has all        increase the effectiveness of the Strategic
the necessary military and technical tools for     Nuclear Forces is dictated not only by the
occupying the disputed Kuril Islands. Even         imperatives of maintaining strategic stability
the stagnant Japanese economy and the insta-       in relation to the U.S. and NATO, but also the
bility of its government could be catalysts        need to contain China.

                                                                2.2.3. “External” conflicts near
                                                                Russia’s borders pose a genu-
People’s Republic of China containment                          ine threat to Russian security –
                                                                above all instability in the Mid-
is becoming an ever more urgent task,
                                                                dle East, and the situation in
which, in view of the real balance of power                     Iran and the Democratic People’s
between China and Russia, may only be                           Republic of Korea.
achieved through the nuclear deterrent
                                                                 2.2.4. Finally, the NATO opera-
                                                                 tion in Yugoslavia, the United
                                                                 States’ and its allies’ invasion in
for hostile ambitions, just as it happened in      Iraq, the French-British-Italian intervention
Argentina in 1982. In this context, the priori-    in the civil war in Libya, as well as continu-
ties of Russia’s military planning should be the   ing territorial claims of some NATO countries
defense of the Kuril Islands, a counter-attack     against Russia and its ally Belarus are keeping
to recapture the islands in the case of Japa-      the task of containing NATO a priority. This
nese occupation, and in the broader sense,         containment requires, above all, maintain-
general containment of Japan, including using      ing the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent,
the nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, the size of   especially in the context of the U.S. missile
Japan’s economy (second to third largest in        defense program. However, a direct military
the world), the continued development of its       conflict between Russia and NATO in the fore-
military technological capabilities make this      seeable future seems extremely unlikely. The
task quite difficult.                              main trigger for such a conflict could be West-
                                                   ern attempts to intervene in Russia’s relations
2.2.2. Given the rapid growth of the eco-          with other former Soviet republics; however,
nomic, technological and military power of         as the experience of August 2008 has shown,
the People’s Republic of China, its contain-       NATO takes quite a cautious and restrained
ment is becoming an ever more urgent task,         approach in these situations.

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                                                                               Analytical report       11
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

     3. Demographic and Financial
               Resources

     3.1. Demography                                  It is thought that 700,000 men reach induc-
                                                      tion age in Russia each year, but with defer-
     One of the main factors that will determine      ments and exemptions this figure is reduced
     the nature of Russia’s military organizational   to 550,000. Worse still, some demographers
     development in the short and medium term         are predicting that in the coming years Russia
     is the demographic crisis. This factor is likely is expected to enter a “demographic valley” –
     to be even more important than the country’s     the consequence of a sharp decline in the
     financial capabilities. Demography to a great    birth rate during the national disaster (col-
     extent defines the parameters of conscription,   lapse of the Soviet Union) in the late 1980s
                                                                   and early 1990s. The number
                                                                   of conscripts during this period
                                                                   is predicted to fall to 300,000
     Hopes of achieving the announced army                         per year. However, the main
     strength of one million is nothing more                       limiting factor is not even the
     than a pipe dream                                             number of conscripts, but their
                                                                   quality. Above all, this is about
                                                                   the health of the young men
                                                                   called up for military service.
     and, therefore, the ratio of conscripts to con-  The medical health of conscripts is at an all-
     tract soldiers in the Armed Forces. Ultimately,  time low and is declining still further. While
     demographic limitations will be the decisive     at the end of 2007 the percentage of suitable
     factor in determining the actual size of the     recruits was 70.4%, by the end of 2009 it
     army. In all probability, hopes of achieving the was already down to 68.4%. This suitability
     announced army strength of one million are       percentage has a clear inverse relationship
     nothing more than a pipe dream.                  with the level of urbanization and income in

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Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

                           Common medical conditions
                           resulting in Russian citizens
                           being exempted
                           from the draft in 2009

                                                          Musculoskeletal
                                                          disorders
                                                          19,7%

                                                 Mental disorders
                                                 13,4%

                                            Digestive
                                            disorders                        Other
                                            10,5%                            disorder
                                                                             s38,8%
                                          Circulatory
                                          disorders
                                          8,9%

                                         Nervous
                                         disorders
                                         8,7%

                           Source: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

different regions across Russia. The lowest                competitiveness of the broader Russian civic
suitability percentage for recruits at the end             identity against Islamic religious or ethnic
of 2009 was observed in the Siberian (65.2%)               identity.
and Moscow (66.9%) Military Districts, and
the highest was in the North Caucasian
(72.6%) and the Far Eastern (72.2%) Military
Districts.                                                 3.2. Financial and Economic Resources

Another important indicator of the quality of              Spending on national defense has been deter-
conscripts is the level of civic loyalty among             mined for 2011–2013.
recruits from the North Caucasus region,
especially those from Dagestan. Apart from                 The schedule (p.14) clearly shows that the next
the fact that soldiers from the North Cauca-               two years will be a time of intensive growth
sus are the principal instigators of bullying              in military spending, which will increase in
and crime in the Army, there are serious                   2012 by 9.1%, and in 2013 by 26.8%. Growth
doubts about their loyalty to Russian nation-              in military spending is expected not only in
al interests. Nevertheless, the Caucasus is                absolute terms, but also as a percentage of the
where the most physically fit, best-trained                GDP – from 3.1% in 2011 to nearly 3.4% in
and motivated recruits come from. Obvi-                    2013. If these plans are realized, Russia will
ously, the resolution of this contradiction                be the third or fourth largest military spender
cannot be found at the level of the Armed                  in the world, behind only the United States,
Forces alone. This perspective covers issues               China, and possibly the UK. Significantly,
that are fundamental to Russia’s future,                   the trend toward increased military spend-
such as the modernization of the Caucasian                 ing goes against the trend of decline in most
republics, increasing the attractiveness of                of the developed countries, but is in line with
the pan-Russian national project and the                   the general flow of the mainstream that can be

                                                                                        Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                                            Analytical report    13
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

                                Schedule of budget
                                allocations under the
                                heading “National Defense”,
                                2011-2013
                                bln rub
                                                                                   2098,6

                                                      1655,7
                                1517,1

                                 2011                          2012                  2013

                                Source: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

                                                                  sifying their combat training will
                                                                  require increasing the percentage
     The planned military spending formula                        share of the GDP spent on the mil-
     can be defined as the maximum possible                       itary to 4% or even higher. This is
     spending, taking into account the                            the maximum permissible level
                                                                  of military spending – anything
     economic potential of Russia, and the                        higher would have a detrimental
     minimum necessary to reconstruct an                          effect on Russia’s economy. Even
     effective military machine                                   a prolonged period of 4% military
                                                                  spending is highly undesirable in
                                                                  a country that requires a radi-
                                                                  cal overhaul of its infrastructure,
     observed in countries with emerging markets,   healthcare and education. Nevertheless, that is
     such as China, India, and to a lesser extent,  the minimum level of funding needed to carry
     Brazil.                                        out the military reform and the moderniza-
                                                    tion of the Armed Forces. Thus, the planned
     Obviously, this places quite a high burden on  military spending formula can be defined as
     the relatively small and weak Russian economy. the maximum possible spending, taking into
     We can assume that after 2013, implement-      account the economic potential of Russia, and
     ing all the commitments to raising wages for   the minimum necessary to reconstruct an effec-
     servicemen, re-equipping the Army and inten-   tive military machine.

14   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

4. Strategic Objectives of the
          Serdyukov-Makarov Reform

In general, as has already been stated, the           220,000). Dissolution of the warrant officer
ultimate goal of the reforms is to create mod-        corps.
ern, well-trained Armed Forces equipped               • Forming a brand new command and con-
with the latest weapons and military equip-           trol system for the Armed Forces. Instead of
ment.                                                 six Military Districts, establishing four inter-
                                                      service United Strategic Commands, while
Specific areas of ongoing reform as of October        retaining several combat arms – the Stra-
2008 are:                                             tegic Missile Forces, the Aerospace Defense
• Reducing the strength of the Russian Armed          Forces, and the Airborne Forces – under
  Forces from 1.35 million in 2007 to 1 million       central command.
  in 2012.                                        •   Transitioning the Army to brigade organiza-
• Eliminating reduced-strength combined               tion and abolishing the divisional, corps and
  units in the Army and the conversion of all         army levels.
  combined units to Permanent Readiness           •   Reorganizing the Air Force and Air Defense;
  Forces, while reducing the number of units          abolishing armies, corps, divisions and air
  and combined units in the Armed Forces, as          regiments and transitioning to a system of
  well as military bases. In other words, it is       air bases and aerospace defense brigades.
  the de facto renunciation of a mass mobili-     •   Centralizing the personnel training system
  zation army in favor of a more professional         through the transformation of 65 military
  and combat-ready outfit.                            educational institutions into 10 “system-
  • Changing the personnel structure to the           wide” military universities.
  normal “pyramid” structure. Reducing the        •   Significantly reducing the Central Admin-
  number of officers from 335,000 to 150,000          istrative Staff and the military command
  (this threshold was subsequently raised to          and control authority of the Defense Minis-

                                                                             Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                                 Analytical report       15
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

                              Goals and objectives
                              of Armed Forces reforms
                              The purpose of the reforms is to create mobile
                              and well-trained armed forces equipped with modern
                              equipment and weapons

                              Priorities

                                1   Re-deployment of all formations and units
                                    for permanent combat readiness, 100% staffing
                                    for a state of war

                                2   Re-equipment of the Armed Forces with
                                    modern armaments, military and special
                                    equipment to meet modern requirements

                                3 Revision  of program statutory documents
                                  for instruction, training and conduct of military
                                    operations of the Armed Forces, as well
                                    as planning and guidance documents to ensure
                                    the vital functions of troops and forces

                                4 Training of new officers and non-commissioned
                                  officers, compiling of new training programs,
                                    creation of a modern network of military schools

                                5 Ensuring decent military pay, fulfillment
                                  of permanent and service housing requirements
                                    and resolution of complex social security
                                    problems

                              Source: Russian Defense Ministry

                                                                          • Significantly intensifying combat
     The goal of the reforms is to create                                 training, radically increasing the
                                                                          number of exercises at all levels –
     modern, well-trained Armed Forces                                    from the individual and tactical
     equipped with the latest weapons and                                 level to the annual carrying out of
     military equipment                                                   exercises on a strategic scale.
                                                                          • Adopting a new State Arma-
                                                                          ment Program for the period
                                                                          2011–2020, in the course of
       try, as well as support and service support             which forces would be almost completely
       units from 51,300 to 13,400 personnel in                rearmed with new and 70% modern weap-
       total.                                                  ons and military equipment.
     • Outsourcing logistic support and material             • Significantly increasing pay and allowances
       welfare to civilian contract organizations.             for members of the military and resolving

16   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

   Changing the number of staff at the Central Office
   of the Russian Defense Ministry and supply
   and security units
                             CENTRAL OFFICE         MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF   SUPPLY AND SERVICE      TOTAL
                             OF THE RUSSIAN         THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE       UNITS OF THE CENTRAL    (NUMBER
                             DEFENSE MINISTRY       MINISTRY                  OFFICE OF THE RUSSIAN   OF UNITS)
                                                                              DEFENSE MINISTRY

   Before reforms
                       10 523                   11 290                  29 500                   51 313

                                                    Staffing
                                                    reduced,
   After reforms                                    functions
                       10 523                       transferred         2 912                    13 435
                                                    to the central                                    Staffing
                                                    office                                             reduced
                                                                                                      by 75%

   Source: Russian Defense Ministry

 the housing problem with the aim of vastly                  the start of the reforms), but this figure has
 raising the prestige of military service.                   already been reached by 2012. The officer
                                                             corps was originally planned at 150,000
Let us look at some of these areas, primarily                personnel (from 335,000 officer positions
related to structural changes in the Russian                 in 2008), and then the bar was raised to
Armed Forces.                                                220,000. Nevertheless, the actual reduction
                                                             in the number of officers was less: 40,000
                                                             out of these 355,000 officer positions were
                                                             in fact vacant and eliminated before the end
4.1. R
      educing the Strength of the Armed                     of 2009. In addition, by the end of 2008,
     Forces, Including Reduction of the                      26,700 officers had reached the age limit for
     Number of Officers                                      military service and were subject to compul-
                                                             sory dismissal on age grounds, and in 2009,
One of the most obvious, though certainly                    a further 9,100 officers were due to reach the
not the most important, manifestations of                    age limit. As of 2008, there were 7,500 offic-
the reforms is a marked reduction in the                     ers commissioned for two years after gradu-
strength of the Armed Forces, including the                  ation from civilian colleges: they should also
officer corps. It was previously planned to                  have been dismissed at the end of their terms
bring the number down to one million per-                    of service, and from now on, such profession-
sonnel by 2016 (down from 1.35 million at                    als will no longer be recruited.

                                                                                          Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                                              Analytical report    17
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

                                The ratio of military rank
                                categories in the structure
                                of the armed forces
                                until 2008
                                Generals                                     1 107
                                                                             0,3%

                                Colonels                                     25 665
                                                                             7,2%

                                Lieutenant colonels                          87 637
                                                                             24,7%

                                Majors                                       99 550
                                                                             28,1%

                                Captains                                     90 411
                                                                             25,4%
                                Senior lieutenants,
                                lieutenants                                  50 975
                                                                             14,3%

                                Source: Russian Defense Ministry

                                                                            number of lieutenants and senior
     One of the most obvious manifestations                                 lieutenants should increase from
     of the reforms is a marked reduction                                   50,000 to 62,000. In 2009, the
                                                                            warrant officer corps was all but
     in the strength of the Armed Forces,                                   eliminated, their numbers falling
     including the officer corps. In parallel                               from 142,000 to 118,700. At the
     the organization and establishment                                     same time, up to 20,000 warrant
                                                                            officers, who were in command
     of the Army is being restructured                                      positions, were commissioned as
     in terms of job categories                                             officers, and the rest were dis-
                                                                            missed or switched to non-com-
                                                                            missioned officer roles.
     In parallel with the downsizing of the army,
     its organization and establishment is being
     restructured in terms of job categories, from
     the pre-reform “egg-shaped” structure, dom-               4.2. Establishing Unified Strategic
     inated by colonels and lieutenant-colonels,               Commands
     who outnumbered junior officers, into the
     standard “pyramid” structure. As of Septem-               The most significant administrative and
     ber 1, 2008, there were 1,107 generals and                organizational reform was the abolition of the
     admirals in the Russian Armed Forces; by                  “traditional” Military Districts in 2010. The
     2012, this number was reduced to 610. The                 six “old” Military Districts have been replaced
     number of colonels is being reduced to 7,700;             by four new “large” Military Districts and
     majors are down to 25,000, and captains are               the corresponding four Joint Strategic Com-
     down from 90,000 to 42,000. In contrast, the              mands (JSC).

18   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

     Changes to the military administrative division of Russia

     Before reform                                                        1. Moscow Military District
                                                                          2. Leningrad Military
                     2                                                       District
             1                                                            3. Volga-Urals Military
                                                          6                  District
                            3
                                                                          4. Northern Caucasus
        4                               5                                    Military District
                                                                          5. Siberian Military District
                                                                          6. Far Eastern Military
                                                                             District

     After reform                                                         1. Western Military District
                                                                          2. Central Military District
                 1                                                        3. Southern Military
                                                                             District
                                                      4                   4. Eastern Military District
                                   2
         3

     Source: Russian Defense Ministry

                                                           trict (South JSC, commanded
Under the new model, service commands                      from Rostov-on-Don) and
                                                           includes the Black Sea Fleet. The
and combat-arm commands are actually                       Volga-Urals Military District and
transformed into appropriate combat-arm                    the western part of the Siberian
headquarters, while retaining all the                      Military District were reincorpo-
                                                           rated into the Central Military
basic functions in organizational
                                                           District (Center JSC, command-
development, strength acquisition,                         ed from Yekaterinburg). The
and combat training, but losing direct                     remaining part of the Siberian
operational control of them                                Military District and the former
                                                           Far Eastern Military District are
                                                           being merged to form the East-
                                                           ern Military District (East JSC,
The Western Military District (West JSC,      commanded from Khabarovsk), which also
commanded from St. Petersburg) was formed     includes the Pacific Fleet.
from the old Moscow and Leningrad Mili-
tary Districts and is made up of forces from  These four commands correspond to the major
the two former Military Districts, as well as strategic areas that the modern Russian mili-
the Northern and Baltic Fleets. The former    tary thought considers to be the main areas
North-Caucasian Military District is being    of potential threat and potential theaters of
transformed into the Southern Military Dis-   military operations (West, South, East), while

                                                                            Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                                Analytical report         19
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

     the Center JSC will apparently play the role of   4.3. Reorganizing the Army
     “continental reserve.”
                                                     The basic philosophy of the reorganization of
     The idea of establishing JSCs is based on       the Army is to renounce the traditional Russian
     the formation of unified, joint, integrated     and Soviet model of a mass mobilization army
     and different-service force groupings in the    (that is, one mostly composed of combined
     independent strategic sectors (theaters of      units which are subject to full deployment only
     operations). The composition of these force     upon mobilization) and to transit to a fully
     groupings under a unified command should        manned army based on units in a permanent
     include all the forces of the Army, the Air-    state of combat-readiness in peacetime. The
     borne Forces, the Air Force, Air Defense and    Soviet Army of the 1980s had four catego-
     the Navy that are stationed on the territory    ries of armored and motorized rifle divisions,
     of a JSC. Forming a system of coordination      depending on their peacetime manning levels.
     between different-service forces and materiel   Moreover, only around 50 out of 200 or so
     in modern warfare requires that permanent       divisions were deemed Grade A, meaning they
     joint command-and-control agencies should       had 100% manning levels and were ready for
                                                                  immediate commitment to bat-
                                                                  tle. The remaining 150 divisions
                                                                  (at Grades B, C and D) required
                                                                  partial or full manning with mobi-
     All the new look combined units must be
                                                                  lized reservists and a long lead
     fully manned and constitute permanently                      time for wartime deployment. In
     combat-ready forces                                          addition, there were also reserve
                                                                  divisions that were completely
                                                                  “scaled down” in terms of their
                                                                  strength (after 1989, they were
     be created at the operational and strategic     analogous to division- or brigade-level weap-
     levels, as well as the establishment of perma-  ons and equipment storage bases). This com-
     nent different-service joint forces at the same bination of permanently combat-ready units
     levels. The new JSCs are designed to reflect    and ones that required additional mobilization
     precisely these requirements.                   (“scaled down” to varying degrees) remained
                                                     in force in Russia until 2009. Consequently,
     Under the new model, service commands and       all the reduced-strength units were subject to
     combat-arm commands are actually trans-         disbandment during the reforms. All the new
     formed into appropriate combat-arm head-        look combined units must be fully manned and
     quarters, while retaining all the basic func-   constitute permanently combat-ready forces.
     tions in organizational development, strength
     acquisition, and combat training, but losing    An essential part of the reforms is to convert
     direct operational control of them.             the Army to brigade structure and three-level

20   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

   The approximate composition of the Army’s units of
   permanent combat readiness in new Russian military
   districts as of the beginning of 2011 (excluding training
   and reserve units)
                                              WESTERN        CENTRAL        SOUTHERN       EASTERN       FOREIGN         TOTAL

   Army headquarters
                                          2              2              2              4                            10

   Tank brigades
                                          2              1                             1                             4
   Motorized infantry
   brigades
                                          6              7              8              8                            29

   Intelligence brigades
                                                                        2                                            2

   Covering brigades
                                                                                       1                             1

   Air assault brigades
                                                                        1              2                             3
   Machine gun
   and artillery division
                                                                                       1                             1
   Military bases
   (motorized rifle brigades)
                                                                                                     4               4

   Special forces brigades
                                          2              1              2              2                             7

   Missile brigades
                                          3              2              1              2                             8

   Artillery brigades
                                          3              1              2              3                             9

   Rocket artillery brigades
                                          1              1              1              1                             4
   Anti-aircraft missile
   brigades
                                          3              1              2              3                             9

   Engineering brigades
                                          2                                                                          2

    Source: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

command and control organization: military                             2009–2010, these arrangements for the for-
district – operational command – brigade.                              mation of Operational Commands were not
Instead of the existing divisions and com-                             implemented, and in the end it was decided
bined-arms armies (and army corps), bri-                               to retain command-and-control headquarters
gades based on the original reform concept                             of the armies.
were meant to unite under the Operational
Commands. The plan was to assemble eight                               During 2009, 23 divisions were disbanded,
Operational Commands using the available                               and 40 deployed brigades and brigade-level
nine combined-arms armies. However, in                                 military bases were established to replace

                                                                                                         Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                                                             Analytical report    21
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

     the old divisions and brigades: a total of four     ment. By 2015, it is planned to reorganize the
     armored brigades, 35 motorized rifle brigades       current brigades into three different types:
     and one protective cover brigade (in essence,       heavy, medium and light motorized rifle bri-
     a fortified area). Only two division-level units    gades. The heavy brigade should be the main
     were retained: the 18th Machine-Gun and             permanently combat-ready combined unit of
     Artillery Division in the Southern Kurils (reor-    the Army and will be equipped with tracked
     ganized into a brigade in 2011) and the 201st       vehicles. The medium (mobile) brigade must
     Military Base in Tajikistan (reorganized into a     be fully equipped with wheeled armored vehi-
     brigade in late 2010). Out of the 35 motorized      cles and serve as a rapid response unit. The
     rifle brigades, 10 were brigades that existed       light brigade must be highly mobile and move
     before 2008, 21 were formed as brigades on          around in light armored vehicles.
     the basis of motorized rifle divisions, and
     another four were deployed from storage             Experimental testing of the heavy, medium
     bases. In 2010, plans were announced for the        and light brigades began in 2010. The results
     formation of an additional six motorized rifle      will influence the second phase of reorganiza-
     brigades, as well as at least one engineers and     tion of all the brigades. A new type of brigade
     one anti-aircraft missile brigade.                  is the reconnaissance brigade, the first of
                                                                       which (the 100th) was formed in
                                                                       late 2009 in Mozdok.
     The combined Air Force and Air Defense                            The main reserve component of
     of Russia have undergone radical                                  the Army is the existing stor-
     organizational changes and been                                   age and maintenance facilities
     subjected to severe cutbacks                                      for weapons and military equip-
                                                                       ment, which are warehouses
                                                                       where sets of equipment are
                                                                       stored. In 2009, more than 60
     All the new brigades are in a full state of per-    storage bases were established, most of which
     manent combat readiness. In this way, the           were brigade-level, including 15 combined-
     number of permanently combat-ready units            arms brigades (one armored and 14 motorized
     nominally increased from 13% to 100% in the         rifle). At the same time, military educational
     space of one year. The actual manning levels of     institutions and district training centers are
     brigades range from 95% to 100%, with 100%          the new look mobilization centers.
     reserves of military equipment and other types
     of materiel.

     By the end of 2009, a total of 85 brigades had      4.4. Reorganizing the Air Force,
     been established. In addition to the afore-               Air Defense and Navy
     mentioned 40 combined-arms brigades, they
     include nine missile, nine artillery, four rocket   The combined Air Force and Air Defense of
     artillery and nine air defense missile brigades,    Russia have also undergone radical organiza-
     one engineers’ brigade, as well as signal, elec-    tional changes and been subjected to severe
     tronic warfare, and other types of brigades.        cutbacks. The basis for the radical restructur-
     Seven special forces brigades are under special     ing of the Russian Air Force was the abolition
     provision, and a reconnaissance brigade was         of the Soviet regimental structure of air units
     established as an experimental unit in Mozdok       that had existed since 1938. Instead of the air
     in the North Caucasus.                              regiment, the new basic unit of the Air Force
                                                         is the air base, which includes a command
     It should be noted that the reorganization at       element, between one and seven air squad-
     the brigade level was split into two stages. At     rons, an airfield maintenance battalion and
     the first stage, for the most part completed        signal elements.
     by December 1, 2009, the new brigades were
     formed with compromise staffing levels on the       The idea is to integrate all air and ground ele-
     basis of available weapons and military equip-      ments under a single airbase command. This

22   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

structure has long been in place in the Belaru-    and corps were disbanded and replaced by 13
sian Air Force, from where, according to some,     aerospace defense brigades, combining air-
it was borrowed.                                   bases of fighter aviation, air defense missile
                                                   regiments and radio electronic engineering
The 2009-type air bases are divided into three     regiments. These 13 brigades were divided
categories: 1st (equivalent to the former air      between the Operational-Strategic Command
division), 2nd (equivalent to the former air       of Aerospace Defense and the four Air Force
regiment), and 3rd (equivalent to a detached       and Air Defense Commands.

                                                           There were no radical organi-
                                                           zational changes to the Russian
There were no radical organizational                       Navy in 2009–2010, but a num-
changes to the Russian Navy, but                           ber of steps were taken to sim-
a number of steps were taken to simplify                   plify its organization and reduce
                                                           the number of units. The over-
its organization and reduce the number
                                                           all plan is to reduce them by
of units                                                   half, from 240 to 123 units. Joint
                                                           Commands of the Submarine
                                                           Forces have been established in
squadron). At the first stage, by the end of   the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The greatest
2009, 52 air bases were established in Russia, reduction was in the Navy’s Marine Corps:
replacing the 72 air regiments, 14 air bases   the only Marine Division (the Pacific 55th)
and 12 detached air squadrons and detach-      was reorganized into a brigade, the 77th Bri-
ments formerly existing in the Air Force and   gade stationed in the Caspian Sea was dis-
Air Defense Forces. The total number of units  banded, and the remaining four brigades in
and combined units in the Air Force and Air    the Marine Corps were reorganized into regi-
Defense Forces has been reduced from 340       ments. Reforms of the basic structures of the
to 180.                                        Navy were only launched in late 2011.

Looking ahead, by 2012, there will be only
10 air bases (including two naval air bases).
Each airbase (all will be the 1st category) will   4.5. Establishing Aerospace Defense
include two to three airfields, making a total           Forces
of 27 airbase airfields (possibly excluding the
army aviation).                                    The next important step in reforming the Air
                                                   Force and Air Defense was the formation on
The Russian Air Force’s Air Defense Forces         December 1, 2011, of a new component ser-
have undergone a major reorganization as           vice of the Russian Armed Forces, the Aero-
well. In 2009, all the old air defense divisions   space Defense Forces (ASD), representing the

                                                                          Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                              Analytical report      23
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

                                                                      ernization of technical equip-
     Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces did                            ment. In this way, purchases of
                                                                      silo-based and mobile Topol-M
     not undergo any major changes during                             intercontinental ballistic missiles
     the early stages of the military reform                          have been ongoing since 1997,
     and maintained their existing structure,                         and 2010 saw the deployment of
                                                                      the RS-24 Yars mobile ballistic
     although they did experience some                                missile, a MIRVed version of the
     reductions at the command level                                  Topol-M. Work is underway to
                                                                      develop new types of missiles and
                                                                      warheads.
     fusion of the Space Forces, Antimissile and
     Air Defense Forces from the former Air Force
     and Air Defense. Accordingly, the ASD forces
     are now comprised of the Space Command             4.7. Reforming Military Education Systems
     and the Air and Missile Defense Command. In
     actual fact, this organization essentially looks   The military education system is undergoing
     like a return to the Soviet Air Defense Forces     major changes in terms of greater centraliza-
     as a separate service of the Armed Forces.         tion and reduction, which is closely related to
                                                        the downsizing of the officer corps. In 2008,
                                                        there were 65 military institutions of higher
                                                        learning (15 military academies, four military
     4.6. Strategic Missile Forces                      universities, 46 military schools and military
                                                        institutes). As part of the Armed Forces of
     Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces did not          Russia, 10 “system-wide” schools are being
     undergo any major changes during the early         created in 2012: three military training and
     stages of the military reform and maintained       research centers, six military academies and
     their existing structure (missile army – missile   one military university. The new “system-
     division – missile regiment), although they did    wide” schools will meet the challenges of
     experience some reductions at the command          officer training, and also conduct research.
     level. The SMF strength is mainly determined       All currently available teaching staff will be
     by the relevant international agreements with      concentrated in these schools. The military
     the U.S., especially the New START Treaty,         schools and military institutions that existed
     signed in Prague in 2010. At the same time,        in 2008 are being transformed into branches
     the Strategic Missile Forces (and, in general,     of these centers. At a later date, it will be deter-
     the Strategic Nuclear Forces, including the        mined which of the existing higher educa-
     air and naval components) are a significant        tional establishments will be phased out. The
     priority for government weapons procurement        new centers will be established on a territorial
     programs, thus allowing for the planned mod-       basis rather than on the service principle.

24   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

5. Dynamics of Conscription
         and Enlistment

Approaches to how the army should be              In the first phase, in 2008–2010, the Defense
manned have varied considerably over the          Ministry was leaning toward a rejection of the
last three years, and, as far as one can tell,    policy of increasing the number of contract
these approaches are based on three main          soldiers in the Armed Forces, at least in the
factors: the assessment of the efforts of the     Army, and was in favor of a transition from the
previous leadership of the Defense Ministry       contract system that had already been adapted
to implement the Federal Targeted Program         to staffing some units and combined units of
to convert the army to contract-based enlist-     the Army to a mixed system where conscripts
ment, the availability of financial resources     were “returned” to the forces. Later on, in ear-
(which in turn depends on the economic situ-      ly 2011, this trend was reversed. The military,
ation in the country and the priorities of the    having received the appropriate political sup-
top political leadership), and demographic        port and resource allocation guarantees from
constraints.                                      the President and the Government, announced
                                                                plans to increase the number of
                                                                new contract personnel.
Russia’s military and political                                Russia’s military and political
leadership have differed in their views                        leadership have previously dif-
on the place of contract service in the                        fered in their views on the place
strength acquisition system and                                of contract service in the strength
                                                               acquisition system and the pos-
the possibility of a full transition                           sibility of a full transition to
to manning by contract                                         manning by contract. During his
                                                               tenure as President, Boris Yelt-

                                                                          Valdai Discussion Club
                                                                              Analytical report      25
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army

     sin made repeated demagogic declarations          Assault Division, followed by a number of oth-
     concerning a future transition to full contract   er permanently combat ready combined units,
     manning of the Russian Armed Forces. The          primarily detached motorized rifle brigades.
     contract system of military service was devel-
     oped quite extensively during this period,        At the same time, since conscription service
     although it was hampered by economic con-         was still considered to be the most appro-
     straints.                                         priate way to train reserves for Russia, the
                                                       plan was to retain conscription but with a
     This trend was dominant under the new Pres-       subsequent reduction in the term of service.
     ident, Vladimir Putin. In November 2001,          Ultimately, the term of service under con-
     President Putin endorsed the proposed gov-        scription was to be limited to a period of
     ernment program (Mikhail Kasyanov was             six months in training units. After finishing
     Prime Minister at the time) of a gradual tran-    training, soldiers could either sign a contract
     sition of the Armed Forces to a contract-based    or become reservists, joining the Trained
     strength acquisition system by 2010.              Reserve. During the transition period, the
                                                                    enlistment-based manning lev-
                                                                    els in the army and navy should
                                                                    still be at least 30–50%.
     The Federal Targeted Program
     of Transition to the Contract Basis,                          It is fair to say that, on the whole,
                                                                   the Federal Targeted Program
     which was implemented in 2004–2007,                           of Transition to the Contract
     was a failure                                                 Basis, which was implemented
                                                                   in 2004–2007, was a failure.
                                                                   Given the program’s stated goal
                                                                   of bringing the number of con-
     The first step toward implementing this con-      tract personnel in the Armed Forces up to
     cept was the development of the Federal Tar-      400,000, the actual number of contract per-
     geted Program to transfer the Army to a           sonnel at the beginning of 2009 was about
     contract basis, implemented in 2004–2007,         190,000 and, more to the point, the quality
     which was conceived as a program of transi-       of the contract contingent was at rock bot-
     tion. During this time, a legal framework was     tom.
     to be established, financial issues resolved,
     and organizational issues worked through for      This was partly due to the fact that any
     each component of the armed forces under the      attempt to change over to a professional army
     new staffing conditions: one combined unit in     requires the presence of a professional corps
     each service was to be converted to contract-     of recruiters, which Russia has never had.
     based enlistment. The Russian Armed Forces’       The lack of professional recruiters is easily
     first contract unit was the 76th Pskov Airborne   explained by the historical lack of a volunteer

26   Moscow, JuLY, 2012
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