Middle Powers as Stabilizers? An Analysis of South African Involvement in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
『広島平和科学』42（2020）pp. 103-121 ISSN ０３８６-３５６５
Hiroshima Peace Science 42（2020）
Middle Powers as Stabilizers?
An Analysis of South African Involvement in Conflict Resolution
in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Frederic KHONDE NTOTO
Doctoral Student, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
Hiroshima University
Mari KATAYANAGI
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University
Research Associate, The Center for Peace, Hiroshima University
Abstract
The fears and concerns about the future of the international order call for middle power cooperation
and collaboration. Although the research on middle powers has increased, African middle powers
are understudied. This study addresses this research gap by focusing on South Africa’
s strategies
in dealing with the Second Congo War. These strategies were analyzed using a framework that
comprises material, normative and ideational considerations and led to two major findings. First,
Pretoria has moved from Mandela’
s non-intervention approach to a combination of soft and hard
measures under Mbeki, making South Africa the principal peace negotiator and peacemaker in the
conflict. A combination of factors such as efforts toward African revival, conformity to self-conceived
roles, and other economic and material concerns explain this shift. Second, South African strategies
under Mbeki were a combination of multilateral and bilateral initiatives. While the country
has supported UN-led and regional efforts, it has also individually assisted the DRC in capacity
building. Despite the skillfulness of its leaders in mediating the conflict, suspicions about South
Africa’
s intention and handling of regional crises are still a matter of concern. The country needs to
reassure the skeptics to take heed of the global call for middle power coalitions.
－ 103 －1. Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, middle powers have contributed in diverse ways to
deal with global challenges. During the Cold War, middle powers played functional roles focusing
on limited issues such as peacekeeping. They tended to act as intermediaries and legitimizers of
the existing global political structure because of the benefits such roles can generate (Cooper and
Dal, 2016; Walton and Wilkins, 2019).
Freed from East/West bipolarity constraints and energized by the rise of a normative
culture on rights and responsibilities, the middle powers have concentrated their efforts toward
redefining their ideational and entrepreneurial roles in the post-Cold War period. As a result, they
led many initiatives such as campaigns against anti-personnel mines, child soldiers, small arms,
and the promotion of the new norms and institutions such as Responsibility to Protect and the
International Criminal Court, together with civil society groups (Cooper and Dal, 2016).
However, the hopes at the end of the Cold War have been recently challenged by the rise of
China, the resurgence of Russia with revisionist agendas to reshape the global order according to
their interests (Panda, 2021), and the relative decline of U.S. influence and commitment, notably
under the Trump regime. Recent issues such as the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the Rohingya
issue, and the COVID-19 pandemic have caused paralysis in the UN Security Council (UNSC)
reminiscent of the Cold War–and have thus raised fears and concerns about the future of the
existing international order. The feeling of uncertainty has increasingly called for middle power
cooperation (Rachman, 2018; Andersen, 2019; Nagy, 2020; Paris, 2019;).
These concerns and uncertainties about power transition and the future of the liberal
international order have also revived the academic interest in the middle powers (Gilley and O’
Neil
2014; Walton and Wilkins, 2019; Giacomello and Verbeek, 2020). Nevertheless, except for a volume
edited by Gilley and O’
Neil (2014), studies on African middle powers are rare. This reality is
unfortunate because, with the increasing Chinese and Russian involvement, the African continent
will be one of the places where challenges toward the liberal international order may be the most
apparent. Besides, as a continent with weak capacities and prone to different problems and crises,
Africa may need middle power mobilization more than any other region in the world. Thus, it is
crucial to assess African middle powers’capacity and willingness in building a coalition both within
the African and worldwide contexts.
This paper is a historical analysis of the South African intervention strategies during and
after the Second Congo War (August 1998 – July 2003) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
It analyzes South Africa’
s conflict resolution strategies–the driving factors behind them and the
consequent impact these strategies have on the current call for middle power cooperation and
collaboration. We argue that while South Africa has positively contributed to conflict resolution in
－ 104 －the DRC, its move from a principled approach toward more realist considerations in its strategy,
notably under the Zuma administration, may have weakened its reputation as a neutral and
reliable peacemaker in the region.
South African involvement in the DRC has been the subject of various research projects,
often concerning the foreign policy of South Africa toward the African continent (le Pere, 2006;
Sidiropoulos, 2007, 2008; Alden and Schoeman, 2013; Landsberg, 2014). Some scholars have
focused on the drivers of South African intervention in the DRC (Landsberg, 2002; Adetiba, 2017).
However, the impact of South Africa’
s strategies on its image as a peacemaker has been rarely
studied, with a few exceptions, such as the work of Alden and Schoeman (2013). Therefore, this
study mainly deals with the drivers of the South African intervention and their impact on the
country’
s image in the DRC and the continent. Using insights from policy documents issued by
the South African government, scholarly literature, news reports, and observation of the war and
post-conflict reconstruction efforts, this study deepens the understanding of the challenges that an
eventual middle power cooperation may face.
This paper, following this section, consists of six sections. The second section introduces the
middle power status and role of South Africa. The third section provides our theoretical framework
for the analysis of South Africa’
s strategies in the DRC. After introducing the Second Congo War in
the following section, the fifth section details the South African strategies. The penultimate section
analyzes these strategies, and the conclusion emphasizes the implications of the study.
2. South Africa as a middle power
The concept of middle powers is well recognized in the international system and has
been widely used, as many researchers studied their role and behaviors. Nevertheless, there
is no consensus on the definition of middle powers (Behringer, 2012; Gilley and O’
Neill, 2014).
Middle powers are generally identified based on three factors: their position in the international
system, their foreign policy behavior, and their identity (Gilley and O’
Neil, 2014). However, it is
theoretically problematic to put many countries with few commonalities regarding their foreign
policy in one category (Jordaan, 2017).
Therefore, Jordaan (2017) called for limiting the use of the term for more clarity and
contended that the contribution to the stability of the liberal international order be a criterion
to identify middle powers. Furthermore, he suggested dropping adjectives such as“emerging”or
“Southern”middle powers and restricting the term to mid-range states that play active roles in
the liberal international order. The term middle powers would then be limited to countries such
as Canada, Nordic Countries, and the Netherlands, traditionally considered as such, and to a few
－ 105 －others, like South Korea, Mexico (Jordaan, 2017), and Indonesia (Jordaan, 2019).
Akin to how Andersen (2019) agreed with the call of Jordaan (2017), this study approaches
South Africa’
s middlepowership from the perspective of the country’
s efforts for regional stability.
Although its anti-hegemonic rhetoric and its attempt to develop parallel institutions such as
the New Development Bank of the BRICS may be a matter of concern, its efforts toward conflict
prevention and resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction, make it a potential middle power
candidate. Using the typology of middle power’
s role developed by Giacomello and Verbeek (2000),
South Africa can be considered a middle power that plays the role of a regional power, considering
its economic and military capacities and its commitment to developing the African continent.
3. Theoretical Framework
Why states intervene as third parties in conflicts or peace operations is a question that
has garnered the keen interest of international relations scholars. The neorealist scholars such
as Mearsheimer (1990) and Waltz (1979) argue that in an anarchic world where security is the
predominant matter, states intervene as third parties only when their interests are at stake.
Liberal theorists, on the other hand, believe that democracies should avert the spread of war and
tackle its root causes. For liberal peace theorists, democracy, human dignity, and economic freedom
support each other, and thus liberal intervention through multilateral institutions can be an option
(Lebovic, 2004).
In studying the implication of rising powers such as India, China, and Brazil in conflict
management, Dal (2018) suggested four aspects that can be explored in analyzing their motivation.
First, as third parties, rising powers might search for a peaceful resolution to the crisis that
affects their interests and preferences. Second, rising powers might engage in conflict resolution
for status purposes or soft power strategies. Third, rising powers are inclined to calculate costs
before engaging in a new normative initiative. Thus, rising powers might prefer complying with
the existing structures or improve the existing institutions instead of undertaking new initiatives.
Fourth, since rising powers tend to focus on regional issues because of their limited institutional
and normative capabilities, they are more inclined to deal with conflicts whose negative security
externalities are high (Dal, 2018). It can be argued from these hypotheses that material and
security considerations and the search for status are essential factors in assessing the behavior of
rising powers toward conflict management.
In his article“Interests or Ideas? Explaining Brazil’
s Surge in Peacekeeping and
Peacebuilding”, Charles Call (2018) used different theories to assess Brazil’
s increasing activism
in peacebuilding since the 2000s. He explored classic realist views of power-seeking considerations
－ 106 －or liberal commitment to global trade and order. Call further investigated whether post-colonial
theories and identity-based approaches might have influenced Brazil’
s strategies. Despite arguing
for interest-based theories such as realism and liberalism, he added that constructivist and post-
colonial theories should also be considered to get a fuller picture of middle powers’engagement in
peacebuilding.
As the works of Dal (2018) and Call (2018) put forward, middle powers’attitudes toward a
conflict can be understood by looking into the material, normative and ideational considerations.
South Africa’
s strategies concerning the DRC conflict may be explained by interest-based
considerations, and to some extent, ideational factors. We will thus apply this framework to analyze
conflict resolution strategies adopted by South Africa.
4. The Second Congo War (August 1998 – July 2003)
The origin of the Second Congo War can be traced back to the First Congo War (1996–1997),
when the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), a rebel group
led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, overthrew President Mobutu, receiving direct military support from
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Angola (Zachariassen, 2017). However, a few months after he
had seized power, President Kabila ended his cooperation with his allies and asked their advisors
and their soldiers to leave the country within twenty-four hours (Hesselbein, 2007; Zachariassen,
2017). On August 2, 1998, a new rebellion, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), started in
the Eastern Part of the DRC, and on August 4, the second front opened in the South-West, about
600 kilometers from the capital Kinshasa. The RCD was composed of many former members of the
national army and spearheaded by Rwanda and Uganda (Sweet, 2021).
Contrary to the RCD’
s expectation of an easy victory, the conflict stalled. On the one hand,
President Kabila received the backing of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), as well as Chad and Sudan, and was able to stop the progress
of the rebels. On the other hand, the rebellion itself was further fragmented. While the RCD
continued receiving support from Rwanda, Uganda created a second proxy, the Movement for
the Liberation of Congo (MLC), in 1998. In 1999, the Rally for Congolese Democracy/Kisangani-
Movement for Liberation (RCD/K-ML) defected from the RCD and was supported by Uganda
(Sweet, 2021), adding to the complexity of the conflict. Eight countries were involved: Angola, Chad,
Namibia, Sudan, and the DRC, on the one side, and Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda on the other
side. In addition, a range of local defense groups emerged, such as the Mayi-Mayi (Hesselbein,
2007; Vépierre, 2016; Sweet, 2021). At the peak of the war, the DRC was broadly divided between
three areas of influence: its government, Rwanda, and Uganda, respectively.
－ 107 －After many unsuccessful attempts to end the conflict, parties to the conflict agreed to hold
an“Inter-Congolese Dialogue”and signed the Sun City Agreement in April 2002. The Agreement
served as the framework for a multi-party government, set a timeline for elections, and reduced
violence. However, since some disagreements remained, neither the formation of a government nor
the drafting of a new constitution took place (Hesselbein, 2007; Zachariassen, 2017).
Once peace agreements were sealed between Rwanda and the DRC, and Uganda and the
DRC, respectively, the DRC Government, rebel groups, political opposition, and civil society signed
the“Global and All-Inclusive Agreement”on December 17, 2002. The agreement called for a
ceasefire and peaceful solution to the crisis, the creation of“a restructured, integrated national
army,”the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and“the disarming of the armed groups and militia
and to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC”(Inter-Congolese Dialogue,
2002, 2-3).
The“Global and All-Inclusive Agreement”also established a power-sharing mechanism which
included one president, Joseph Kabila, and four vice presidents, representing the government,
the RCD, the MLC, and the political opposition, often referred to as“1+4”(Hesselbein, 2007;
Zachariassen, 2017). The transitional government’
s objectives included the country’
s reunification
and reconstruction, the restoration of territorial integrity and state authority, national
reconciliation, the creation of a national army, and the organization of free and transparent
elections (Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 2002).
The signing of the Final Act on April 2, 2003 officially ended the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and
the Second Congo War (Zachariassen, 2017), and led to the withdrawal of foreign troops (Schoeman,
2003). It is estimated that more than three million people died between 1998 and 2008 (BBC News
Afrique, 2010).
5. South Africa and Conflict Resolution in the DRC
South Africa participated in various stages of conflict resolution in the DRC. Its participation
can be divided into two periods: from 1998 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2019. The first period covers
the beginning of the war up to the first multi-party elections that ended the transition period, and
the second period starting from 2006 includes state-building efforts until the first peaceful power
transition in January 2019.
5.1. The First Period (1998-2006)
Three SADC countries, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were militarily involved in the DRC
conflict since 1999. In contrast, South Africa, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, preferred a
－ 108 －politically negotiated solution that could involve fighting groups as well as neighboring countries (le
Pere, 2006). This position did not change when Mbeki became president in 1999. Pretoria pushed
for a political solution and supported SADC-led peace talks hosted by Zambian President Chiluba
(OCHA, 1999). The peace talks under the Zambian leader led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement in 1999 by six states (Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), three
international organizations (SADC, Organization of African Unity, and the UN), and two rebel
groups (the RCD and MLC) (Sweet, 2021).
The parties agreed to an immediate ceasefire to be enforced by a UN mission and a joint
military commission to facilitate the integration of armed groups into a national army at the end
of the war. However, fighting continued, and after multiple calls for a ceasefire, the UNSC finally
adopted Resolution 1279, establishing the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (referred by its French initials, MONUC).1
While things stalled, President Kabila was assassinated in 2001. His son, Joseph Kabila,
succeeded him and agreed to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Meanwhile, South Africa, a backstage
leader, strengthened its role as the mediator under Mbeki. For many months, Mbeki hosted more
than three hundred representatives from rebel groups, political parties, civil society groups, and
the government for consultations. The Pretoria Agreement was signed under his leadership in 2002
(Besharati and Rawhani, 2016).
Aside from leading peace negotiations, South Africa extended its efforts toward peacebuilding
by first deploying its troops under the MONUC (Adetiba, 2017), and provided financial and
logistical support for the 2006 elections (South African Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.). South Africa
further provided training for the national electoral commission personnel, technical assistance,
monitoring, and communications equipment, and supported the printing and delivery of ballots
throughout the country (Besharati and Rawhani, 2016). The elections were held in 2006
despite several impediments, such as failed security sector reforms, the existence of parallel
administrations within the security forces, and the persistent influence of wartime networks during
the transition period (Hesselbein, 2007; Sweet, 2021). Nonetheless, restoring state authority in the
country remained one of the biggest challenges.
5.2. The Second Period (2006-2019)
On February 14, 2004, South Africa and the DRC signed a General Cooperation Agreement,
which serves as the foundation for bilateral cooperation between the two states and the basis
for political, economic, and technical cooperation. The agreement established a Bi-National
Commission (BNC), which meets yearly as a strategic mechanism at the level of Heads of State
1
UNSC resolution 1279. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4076th meeting on 30 November 1999, S/
RES/1279.
－ 109 －(Republic of South Africa, 2020). It was under this agreement that South Africa assisted the DRC
before and after the 2006 elections. As international efforts focused on restoring state control over
the country, Pretoria assisted the DRC in developing managerial capacity through a Post Conflict
Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) program (South African Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.). Its
strategy consisted of training programs and the provision of technical assistance.
For instance, South Africa actively participated in reforming the security forces in the DRC,
as the South African Defense Forces (SADF) trained three battalions, including the Rapid Reaction
Force Battalions 42 and 43, to fight against armed groups. Likewise, the South African Police
Services trained the National Police of Congo (PNC) in several fields, including human resource
management, crowd management, and VIP protection, and provided technical assistance as well
(South African Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.).
Furthermore, South Africa conducted capacity-building programs through its government
departments. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) trained
more than 700 DRC diplomats. The Department of Public Service and Administration helped the
DRC develop its anti-corruption strategy and assisted in establishing effective control of public
service. Under the program, Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy and a
National School for Public Administration (ENA) to train public officials were created. Likewise,
the Department of Home Affairs assisted the country in population and immigration matters and
provided appropriate equipment and technology for the standardization of procedures regarding
immigration and population matters (South African Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.).
In the economic sphere, South African investment rose significantly, from mining to banking,
telecommunications sector, agriculture and retail, logistics, and other services (Besharati and
Mthembu-Salter, 2016). As for trade, South Africa represents 21.6% of the DRC’
s total imports,
being the country’
s top supplier of foreign goods and services (South African Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.).
Finally, South Africa has also been active in the DRC through multilateral organizations
such as the MONUC and its successor, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Initially, the task of MONUC included
the establishment of contacts with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement, liaison with and
provision of technical assistance to the joint military commission, provision of information on the
local security conditions to the UN, the observation planning of the ceasefire and disengagement
of forces, and the maintenance of liaison with all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and the protection of human rights (UNSC resolution 1279).
The mission was first expanded in 2000 with new responsibilities such as monitoring the
implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the release of prisoners of war and military captives.2
2
UNSC resolution 1291. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4104th meeting, on 24 February 2000, S/
RES/1291.
－ 110 －The UNSC added election support, security sector reform, and the enforcement of the arms
embargo as part of the mission’
s task in 2004.3 Furthermore, with the persistence of armed groups
in the Eastern part of the country, the mission’
s mandate was expanded to include duties such as
supporting the government in dealing with armed groups. Stressing the stabilization aspect of the
mission, MONUC became the MONUSCO in 2010.4
The UN mission was expanded due to the rise of a new rebellion, the Mouvement du 23 Mars
(March 23 Movement, or M23). As the M23 seized towns and cities, MONUSCO was severely
criticized for its inability to protect civilians. With the growing pressure and calls to strengthen the
mission, the UNSC finally allowed the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) under the
MONUSCO in 2013.5 As an offensive unit, the FIB successfully fought against the M23 together
with the government troops. Since then, the FIB has been fighting against other armed groups.
South Africa participated actively in the creation of the brigade and sent troops together with
other SADC countries. With a contingent of 1345 soldiers (SA Defence Web, 2014), South Africa,
along with Tanzania and Malawi, were the primary troop-contributing countries of the 3069-strong
FIB (Roux, n.d.).
As this overview described, South Africa was a key player in the efforts to end the conflict in
the DRC and the subsequent post-conflict reconstruction. Its strategies included two main aspects:
multilateral and bilateral initiatives. First, South Africa led conflict resolution by acting as a
mediator and supporting multilateral initiatives under the UN mission and regional bodies. Second,
based on the General Cooperation Agreement signed by the two countries on February 14, 2004,
Pretoria developed a PCRD program through which its government agencies assisted Kinshasa
in capacity building. Finally, South Africa’
s approach underwent a major shift under the Mbeki
government: from non-intervention under Mandela, to intervention, either under the MONUSCO’
s
FIB or by assisting government troops. The factors behind these shifts will be discussed in the
following section.
6. Drivers of South African intervention in the DRC conflict
South African foreign policy underwent a significant shift as it moved from a principled
approach under Mandela to a more strategic one that mixed principles and pragmatism under
Mbeki (Landsberg, 2012). More ambitious than his predecessor, Mbeki believed that to make South
3
UNSC resolution 1565. Adopted by the Security Council at its 5048th meeting, on 1 October 2004, S/
RES/1565.
4
UNSC resolution 1925. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010, S/RES/1925.
5
UNSC resolution 2098. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6943rd meeting, on 28 March 2013, S/
RES/2098.
－ 111 －Africa a major actor in the continent and a reliable global player, there was a need for developing
a more predictable foreign policy which provides a progressive agenda (Landsberg, 2012). As
described in the 2005-2008 Strategic Document of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) (2005), Mbeki’
s agenda was centered around two factors: national interests and the primacy
of Africa. The Document declared that“our foreign policy is guided by the same goals that we
pursue at home”(DFA, 2005, 9).
As for the centrality of Africa, the Document stated that“in the first instance, our greatest
challenge is to consolidate the African agenda and, in this way, to contribute to the victory of the
African Renaissance”(DFA, 2005, 10). The high priority that Mbeki gave to Africa is even more
apparent in the Fifteen Year Review , which affirms that“the regeneration of Africa is the main
pillar of South Africa’
s foreign-policy objectives. It is central to ensuring a better life for all in South
Africa and on the continent”(South African Government, 2008, 58). A similar claim about Africa’
s
s participation in peace missions was visible in the 1999 White Paper
centrality in South Africa’
on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999 White Paper ) (South African
Government, 1999).
The 2005-2008 Strategic Plan summarized the foundation which guided Mbeki in his
approach toward Africa. The Document defined three pillars upon which South Africa’
s engagement
with Africa rests. They include (1)“strengthening Africa’
s institutions continentally and
regionally;”(2)“supporting the implementation of Africa’
s socio-economic development program,
the New Partnership for Africa’
s Development (NEPAD);”and (3)“strengthening bilateral political
and socio-economic relations by way of effective structures for dialogue and co-operation”(DFA,
2005, 9).
Thus, through the banner of the“African Renaissance,”Mbeki advocated strategic
partnerships such as the NEPAD (Landsberg, 2012; Alden and Schoeman, 2013), a vision
and framework for developing Africa. As Alden and le Pere (2004) commented, the“African
Renaissance”discourse served as a call for the African responsibility to transform the continent.
They argued that Mbeki was an advocate of norms and standards for good governance and sound
economic management. In addition, the continental revival and development required the creation
of new institutions and the reform of existing ones. It is from this perspective that South Africa
notably contributed to the creation of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council,
as well as the Organ for Politics, Defense, and Security of the SADC.
Another aspect that Mbeki believed to be crucial was conflict resolution and peace missions.
s foreign policy was equally highlighted by the
The importance of conflict resolution in Mbeki’
2005-2008 Strategic Plan of the DFA. The Document insisted that“the Department’
s goals for the
Continent are therefore the resolution of conflict and the building of a framework within which
socio-economic development can take place”(DFA, 2005, 19). Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister
－ 112 －of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, equally stressed the link between
prosperity and stability in a speech at the University of Pretoria. She declared that“the ultimate
goal of African development and the prosperity of its people are premised on a stable political
environment. Therefore, the challenge relating to peace and security on the continent remains of
paramount concern”(DIRCO, 2011).
From the perspective of liberal theory, it can be argued that the South African commitment
to the peaceful resolution of the Second Congo War was part of Pretoria’
s Africa-centered foreign
policy and its desire for the development of the continent. As Minister Nkoana-Mashabane
argued, South Africa shares the belief that building stable democratic systems“will make a
positive contribution to the challenge of peace, democracy, development and stability”in Africa
(Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012, 6). Therefore, like in the DRC, South African leaders use mediation,
peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction and development as their strategies to actively
participate in finding solutions to the issues that the continent faces (DIRCO, 2011). As leaders
who were particularly committed to the African cause, both Mandela and Mbeki were personally
involved in the process, and Mbeki accompanied the DRC transitional government.
Ideational considerations also informed the strategy of Pretoria. The 1999 White Paper defines
the South African conception of peace missions and declares that participation in these missions
“is increasingly a requisite for international respectability and for an authoritative voice in the
debate on the future on international conflict management and the reforms of intergovernmental
organizations”(South African Government, 1999, 20). As Alden and Schoeman (2013) pointed out,
these ideational considerations were notably evident in Mbeki’
s first term, when South Africa
strived to be the bridge-builder between the developed and developing worlds while being an anti-
imperialist voice.
Similarly, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, under President Zuma, stressed the role of South
Africa as“a critical player in shaping the development of agenda of Africa.”Speaking for South
Africa, before the country chaired the presidency of the UNSC, the minister had declared in these
terms:“We have defined ourselves as a progressive agent for positive change. In practice, we have
assumed the role of peacemaker and negotiator in Africa and a champion of Africa’
s interests
abroad”(Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012, 6).
Based on this role conception and the evaluation of performance, Alden and Schoeman (2013)
argued that decision-makers such as Mbeki tried to develop their foreign policies according to their
self-prescribed roles to strengthen the international leadership of the country. In other words,
leaders such as Mbeki were also guided by their perception of South Africa’
s role in the continent
and the world. According to Gqiza and Ogunnubi (2019), leaders had to show their commitment
to peaceful resolution and to work through multilateral venues such as the MONUSCO or SADC
to increase the status of South Africa as the creator of premier norms and values, negotiator and
－ 113 －peacemaker.
It should be noted, however, that although liberal and normative considerations explain
why South Africa called for a peaceful solution and continued to participate in UN peacekeeping
throughout and after the conflict, they cannot explain the shift from non-intervention to
intervention in 2013 or the bilateral cooperation on many areas such as security and defense.
Aside from liberal and ideational factors, it is argued that realist features such as political,
security, and economic calculations influenced the South African intervention in the Congolese
conflict (le Pere, 2006; Adetiba, 2017). The 1999 White Paper stressed the importance of
participation in peace missions. The document asserted:
the level and size of South African contribution to any peace mission will depend on how closely
the mission relates to national interests and the type of demand that exists for the type of
contribution outlined about. Indeed, where core national interests are clearly at stake, the level
and the size of the South African contribution may well exceed that of the envisaged potential
contribution. (South African Government, 1999, 25)
As of December 2020, South Africa was the top troop-contributing African country to the
MONUSCO, with 1003 troops (United Nation Peacekeeping, 2020), and is the biggest contributor
of the FIB’
s troops. Furthermore, in 2019, 1,190 troops were involved in UN peacekeeping missions
in the DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan. Considering the number of troops deployed as of 2020, South
African peacekeepers are most present in the DRC.
Pretoria’
s policies toward the continent were influenced by its belief in the link between the
peace and development of Africa and the national security of the country. This ideal was apparent
in a speech given to journalists in 2014 in Cape Town by the then Minister of Defense, Nosiviwe
Mapisa-Nqakula:
…our commitment to the renewal of the African continent, and to the promotion of peace and
stability which will lead to sustainable development in Africa is based on the understanding
that our national interest is inextricably linked to what happens in our sub-region, SADC, and
the continent of Africa in general. (Allison, 2014)
The above statement supports the claim that national interest considerations play an essential
role for rising powers to define their approaches toward conflict resolution (Dal, 2018). As for the
DRC case, it can be argued that economic factors significantly influenced South Africa’
s approach.
A comparison with Lesotho supports this argument. While at the beginning of the conflict, leaders
in South Africa continued calling for a negotiated political solution, the same country intervened
－ 114 －militarily in Lesotho in September 1998. Commenting on South Africa’
s motivations in Lesotho,
Likoti (2007) argued that the intervention was motivated by resource concerns, notably the control
of the Katse Dam, which was vital to South Africa. In comparison, the DRC was of little strategic
interest to leaders in Pretoria at that time.
However, South African interests in the DRC changed since 1999. The country has
been massively investing in many sectors of the Congolese economy. South African mobile
telecommunications giants Vodacom and MTN, mining companies, Standard Bank, and state-
owned electricity provider Eskom are active in the country (Adetiba, 2017). Besharati and
Mthembu-Salter (2016), in a study of the two countries’trade relations, underlined the substantial
imbalance in bilateral trade. In 2012, for example, South Africa exported goods and services to
the DRC worth USD 88 million, while Congolese exports to South Africa barely reached USD 4.5
million. As of 2018, South Africa was the DRC’
s biggest supplier of foreign goods and services,
providing 21.6% of its total imports (South African Embassy Kinshasa, n.d.).
Many in South Africa regard the DRC as a strategic partner and a country with diverse
opportunities. Speaking at a business seminar in Kinshasa in 2015, Deputy Minister of Energy,
Thembisile Majola, stated:
South Africa regards the DRC as a strategic market and partner due to the enormous potential
that exists between the two countries driven by the mining, reconstruction of roads and
energy infrastructure, as well as the impact of the agricultural campaign launched in 2012.
Notwithstanding the global challenges, the DRC’
s economy has remained strong with the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 8.6% in 2014. (South African News Agency, 2015)
Finally, South Africa has been eyeing the DRC’
s energy potential to compensate for its energy
shortage. Since 2011, a joint RSA-DRC development of the Grand Inga hydroelectric has been
under consideration. With a proposed capacity of 40,000-MW in its final phase, the Grand Inga
hydroelectric project on the DRC’
s Congo River is of vital interest to South Africa (DIRCO, 2020).
Hence, if one agrees with the remarks made by Mapisa-Nqakula and Deputy Minister Majola, it
can be argued that economic factors and security concerns such as spillover effects (e.g., the flow of
refugees) played a role in Pretoria’
s decisions to participate in MONUSCO’
s FIB heavily. Pretoria
has invested economically and politically in the country so much that stabilization of the DRC
had critical importance. It was a tendency that realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau (2006)
highlighted a long time ago.
This analysis of South Africa’
s involvement in the Second Congo War under the framework
consisting of material, normative and ideational considerations led us to two findings. First,
Pretoria has moved from a non-intervention approach to a combination of soft and hard measures.
－ 115 －While Mandela called for a political solution and supported regional efforts, Mbeki turned South
Africa into a major peace negotiator and peacemaker in the conflict. A combination of factors
such as efforts toward African revival, conformity to self-conceived roles, and other economic
and material concerns explain the shift mostly undertaken under President Mbeki. Second, the
South African strategy under Mbeki has consisted of a combination of multilateral and bilateral
initiatives. While it has supported UN-led and regional efforts, South Africa has individually been
assisting the DRC in capacity building.
7. Conclusion
The contribution of South Africa to the Congolese crisis has been significant. This paper
analyzed the country as a middle power for its mid-range economic and military capability and
aspiration to be a regional leader. While the country has shown extraordinary leadership in the
DRC conflict, many other challenges remain in the continent and the world. Strengthening the
AU’
s major organs, economic and political integration, poverty eradication, lack of infrastructures,
and human development are but some of the challenges that require sound regional leadership and
cooperation.
South Africa made a significant contribution in solving the crisis that affected much of the
Great Lakes Region. Although armed groups still control some areas of the DRC, state control
has relatively been restored, elections regularly organized, and power transfer took place in 2019.
Consequently, South Africa is generally well accepted as a leader and mediator in the DRC by
the government and the opposition. At a business meeting in Kinshasa in 2016, the Minister of
Economy in the DRC, Modeste Bahati, has requested South African businesspeople to exploit
existing opportunities in the DRC and to invest in other provinces of the country (South African
New Agency, 2015). Similarly, opposition leaders often hold consultations and discussions in South
Africa (BBB News Afrique, 2018). Many articles in the press welcome with enthusiasm South
African investments in the country (Mediacongo.net, 2014; Diasso, 2015)
The attitudes of many leaders and the public in the DRC concerning South Africa’
s
intervention are in contrast with suspicions and criticism toward Pretoria within the continent. In
the SADC, the role of South Africa as a leader is sometimes contested. For instance, Angola and
Zimbabwe criticized Pretoria’
s refusal to join them in fighting rebels upon the request of President
Laurent-Desire Kabila in 1998 (Likoti, 2007). Likewise, at the continental level, there are cases of
resistance to Pretoria’
s agenda. The rejection of Mbeki’
s mediation in Cote d’
Ivoire by West African
states and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’
s bid against Jean Ping for the AU Commission significantly
damaged the image of South Africa in the continent (Alden and Schoeman, 2013). Finally, recurrent
－ 116 －xenophobic attacks against migrants from other African countries challenge Pretoria’
s self-image
as a“champion of Africa’
s interests”(Nkoana-Mashabane, 2012, 6).
These suspicions and feelings may affect South African ability to deal with future conflicts
and limits its ability to transform its economic and military capability into tools for influence
(Crouzel, 2002). As Kefale, Alden, and Schoeman (2017) adamantly argued, South Africa needs to
listen to Africa’
s views about its role on the continent.
References
Adetiba, T. (2017), South Africa’
s Military and Peacekeeping Efforts: A new paradigm shift in its
foreign policy since 1994, Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies , 9(5), 157–168.
Alden, C., le Pere, G. (2004), South Africa post-apartheid foreign policy, from reconciliation to
ambiguity? Review of African Political Economy , 31(100), 283–297.
Alden, C., Schoeman, M. (2013), South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in
a transforming global order, International Affairs , 89 (1), 111–129.
s African adventures. Daily Maverick .
Allison, S. (2014), Defence minister breaks down SA’
Retrieved from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-03-31-defence-minister-breaks-
down-sas-african-adventures/
Andersen, L. R. (2019), Curb your enthusiasm: Middle-power liberal internationalism and the
future of the United Nations, International Journal , 74(1), 47–64.
BBC News Afrique. (2010), DR Congo war deaths‘exaggerated’
. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/8471147.stm
BBC News Afrique. (2018), Les leaders de l’
opposition congolaise se retrouvent en Afrique du Sud.
Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-45974067
Behringer, R. M. (2012), The Human Security Agenda: How Middle Power Leadership Defied U.S.
Hegemony (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group).
Besharati, N. A., Mthembu-Salter, G. (2016), Eyes on the prize: South African business in the DRC.
SAIIA Policy Insights 38. Retrieved from https://saiia.org.za/research/eyes-on-the-prize-south-
african-business-in-the-drc/
Besharati, N. A., Rawhani, C. (2016), L’
Afrique du sud et la RDC: évaluation d’
un partenariat sud–
sud au service de la paix, de la gouvernance et du développement. South African Institute of
International Affairs . Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25900
Call, C. T. (2018), Interests or ideas? Explaining Brazil’
s surge in peacekeeping and peacebuilding,
Third World Quarterly , 39(12), 2272–2290.
Cooper, F. A., Dal, E. P. (2016), Positioning the third wave of middle power diplomacy: Institutional
elevation, practice limitations, International Journal , 71(4), 516–528.
－ 117 －Crouzel, I. (2002), L’ une nouvelle donne continentale? Politique africaine ,
Afrique du Sud: moteur d’
4(4), 120–130.
Dal, E.P. (2018), Rising powers in international conflict management: an introduction, Third World
Quarterly , 39(12), 2207–2221.
DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs). (2005), Strategic Plan: 2005 – 2008 . Retrieved from http://
www.dirco.gov.za/department/stratplan05-08.pdf
Diasso, A. (2015), Coopération: l’
Afrique du Sud et la RDC relancent le projet Grand Inga,
Agence d’
information d’
Afrique Centrale . Retrieved from https://www.adiac-congo.com/content/
cooperation-lafrique-du-sud-et-la-rdc-relancent-le-projet-grand-inga-
DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation). (2011), Public Lecture by
Minister Maite Nkoana Mashabane at the Department of Political Science, University of
Pretoria, on:“A vision for South Africa’
s Foreign Policy – Now and Beyond,”11 September 2012.
Retrieved from http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/mash0911.html
Giacomello, G., Verbeek, B. (2020), Introduction: Middle Powers as the Ugly Ducklings of
International Relations Theory. In G. Giacomello, B. Verbeek, (Eds), Middle Powers in Asia and
Europe in the 21st Century , 1–12 (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Lexington Books).
Gilley, B., O’
Neil, A. (2014), China’
s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers. In B. Gilley, A. O’
neil,
A. (Eds). Middle Powers and the Rise of China , 1–22 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press).
Gqiza, L., Ogunnubi, O. (2019), Change or Consistency? A Historical Overview of South Africa’
s
Post-apartheid Foreign Policy, Strategic Review for Southern Africa , 41(2), 1–14.
Hesselbein, G. (2007), The Rise and Decline of the Congolese State: An Analytical Narrative on
State-Making. Crisis States Research Center: Working Paper No. 21. Retrieved from https://www.
lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/
wp21.2-rise-and-decline-of-the-congolese-state.pdf
Inter-Congolese Dialogue. (2002), Political Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in
the DRC. Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ,
(Pretoria on 16 December 2002). Retrieved from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/CD_021216_Global%20and%20Inclusive%20Agreement%20on%20Transition%20
in%20DRC.pdf
Jordaan, E. (2017), The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye?, South African
Journal of International Affairs , 24(3), 395–412.
Jordaan, E. (2019), Faith no more: Reflections on the distinction between traditional and emerging
middle powers. In T. Struye de Swielande, D. Vandamme, T.S. Wilkins, D. Walton (Eds),
Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases , 111–121 (New York:
Routledge).
－ 118 －Kefale, A., Alden, C., Schoeman, M. (2017), It’
s time South Africa tuned into Africa’
s views
about its role on the continent, The Conversation , January 25, 2017. Retrieved from https://
theconversation.com/its-time-south-africa-tuned-into-africas-views-about-its-role-on-the-
continent-71019
Landsberg, C. (2002), The Impossible Neutrality? In John F. Clark, (Ed), The African Stakes of the
Congo War , 169–183 (Palgrave Macmillan, New York).
Landsberg, C. (2012), Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma
Governments, Africa Insight , 41(4), 1–16.
Landsberg, C. (2014), The Concentric Circles of South Africa’
s Foreign Policy under Jacob Zuma,
India Quarterly , 70(2), 153–172.
Lebovic, J. H. (2004), Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after
the Cold War, The Journal of Conflict Resolution , 48(6), 910–936.
action diplomatique sud-africaine pour la paix en Afrique, Transcontinentales , 2,
le Pere, G. (2006), L’
21–41.
Likoti, F. J. (2007), The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource
War? International Peacekeeping , 14(2), 251–263.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990), Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,
International Security , 15(1), 5–56.
Mediacongo.net. (2014), La RDC et l’
Afrique du Sud renforcent leur coopération dans le secteur
des ressources hydrauliques et électricité. Retrieved from https://www.mediacongo.net//article-
actualite-5547.html.
Morgenthau, H. J. (2006), Politics among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace (7th ed.), Rev.,
Kenneth W. Thompson, David Clinton (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education).
s time for the middle powers to step in, The Japan Times . Retrieved from www.
Nagy, S. (2020), It’
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/07/16/commentary/japan-commentary/time-middle-powers-step/
Nkoana-Mashabane, M. (2012). SA’ s interest abroad. Sunday
s aim: champion of Africa’
Independent , 15 January 2012. Retrieved from https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-
sunday-independent/20120115/textview.
OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). (1999), DR Congo: South Africa pushes
for ceasefire. News and Press Release . Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-
republic-congo/dr-congo-south-africa-pushes-ceasefire
Panda, J. P. (2021), China as a Revisionist Power in Indo-Pacific and India’
s Perception: A Power-
Partner Contention, Journal of Contemporary China , 30(127), 1–17.
Paris, R. (2019), Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order? Chatham House: The Royal
Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/can-
middle-powers-save-liberal-world-order
－ 119 －Rachman, G. (2018), Mid-sized powers must unite to preserve the world order. Financial Times .
Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/546ca388-625d-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56
Republic of South Africa. (2020), President Ramaphosa to host DRC counterpart, South African
Government News Agency . Retrieved from https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/president-
ramaphosa-host-drc-counterpart
Roux, A. (n.d.), South Africa and the UN Intervention Brigade in the DRC. Institute for Security
Studies. Retrieved from https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/south-africa-and-the-un-intervention-
brigade-in-the-drc
SA Defence Web. (2014), African peacekeeping deployments show what the SANDF can do.
Retrieved from https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/african-
peacekeeping-deployments-show-what-the-sandf-can-do/?catid=111%3Asa-defence
Schoeman, M. (2003), South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994-2003, In A. Habib, R.
Southall, J. Daniel, (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004 , 349–367 (Cape Town:
HRSC Press).
Sidiropoulos, E. (2007), South Africa’
s regional engagement for peace and security. South
African Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/
uploads/2008/04/south.africa.comment1.pdf
Sidiropoulos, E. (2008), South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period, South African
Journal of International Affairs , 15(2), 107–120.
South African Embassy Kinshasa. (n.d.), SA & DRC Bilateral Relations. Retrieved from http://www.
dirco.gov.za/kinshasa/bilateral.html
South African Government. (1999), South African Participation in International Peace Missions
White Paper. https://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-participation-international-peace-
missions-white-paper
South African Government. (2008), Towards a Fifteen Year Review . Retrieved from https://www.gov.
za/sites/default/files/toward_15year_review.pdf
South African News Agency. (2015), DRC a strategic partner for SA. Retrieved from https://www.
sanews.gov.za/world/drc-strategic-partner-sa
Sweet, R., (2021), Peacebuilding as State Building? Lessons from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, In Terence MacNamee, Monde Muyangwa, (Eds) The State of Peacebuilding in Africa ,
295–320 (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham).
United Nations Peacekeeping. (2020), MONUSCO Fact Sheet. Retrieved from https://peacekeeping.
un.org/en/mission/monusco
Est de la RD-Congo déchiré par 22 ans de guerre. La Croix .
Vépierre, A. (2016), L’
Retrieved from https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/LEst-RD-Congo-dechire-22-
guerre-2016-08-15-1200782377
－ 120 －Walton, D., Wilkins, T.S. (2019). Introduction. In T. Struye de Swielande, D. Vandamme, T. S.
Wilkins, D. Walton, (Eds), Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New
Cases , 45–56 (New York: Routledge).
Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press).
Zachariassen, A. (2017). Women in Peace & Transition Processes. Democratic Republic of the Congo
(2001–2003), Case Study . Geneva: Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative. Retrieved from https://
media.africaportal.org/documents/CCRPB04_Post-ConflictDRC_UpdatedApr2011.pdf
*All the internet sources were last accessed on March 5, 2021.
－ 121 －You can also read
