Networks and mobility: A case for complementary pathways - TRAFIG
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policy brief no. 3 • 06/2021
Networks and mobility:
A case for complementary pathways
Martin Wagner & Caitlin Katsiaficas
Complementary pathways have gained much prominence in 4 The German Western Balkans Regulation, community spon-
recent global and European policy discussions as an inno- sorship or similar initiatives are examples of the opportuni-
vative and new tool to broaden and scale up third-country ties created by networks and offer a plethora of findings that
solutions for refugees. Indeed, the need for ramping up could further develop complementary pathways for refugees.
access to durable solutions for refugees is pressing in the face
of ever longer-lasting conflicts and far too low resettlement 5 From a governance perspective, complementary pathways are
numbers. While complementary pathways are commonly at the cross-section between protection and regular migration
considered as new legal pathways that need to be developed on the one hand and home and development/humanitarian
for refugees, thereby perpetuating the narrative of refugees affairs on the other. Progress on complementary pathways,
needing support while neglecting their human and social therefore, requires overcoming sectoral governance ap-
capital, various examples show that refugees do possess and proaches and seeking synergies between these spheres.
use existing pathways and seek individual solutions outside
of the refugee regime—if their resources and networks allow 1 An introduction to complementary
them to do so. Based on various examples, this policy brief,
therefore, argues that facilitating movement for forced mi- pathways
grants based on their human and social capital could become
the key added value of complementary pathways. How the concept developed
“Complementary pathways” is quite a recent term in internation-
al protection. Nearly 20 years ago, Noll (2003, p. 11) referred to
Central findings and policy implications “protected entry procedures” when he considered “resettlement
1 Refugees use their social and professional networks to seek alone as too mono-dimensional and too limited to bring relief
third-country solutions if their human, social, and financial in the[access] crisis.” Some 10 years later, Hein and Donato
capital allows them to do so—often without even entering (2012, pp. 24-29) referred to “complementary forms of access
into any formal refugee regime. to protection” to describe “diplomatic asylum, protected entry
procedures, resettlement and evacuation and dispersal.”
2 While the most vulnerable refugees require a high level of
support, which is offered through (admittedly little) resettle- At the global policy level, the term ‘complementary pathways’
ment, the key added value of complementary pathways could most likely premiered in the 66th Standing Committee of the UN
be to support refugees whose human or social capital exists High Commissioner for Refugees, which looked into new ap-
but is too weak to seek third-country solutions on their own. proaches to expand access to solutions for refugees. Since then,
the term has become increasingly prominent in global protection
3 Devising strategies that develop and link networks in major discussions, ultimately finding its way into the New York Decla-
host countries with those in potential destination countries ration. This landmark document listed complementary path-
farther afield and creating favourable entry conditions for ways in line with the three traditional durable solutions (return,
refugees could become essential building blocks for comple- local integration and resettlement), suggesting the emergence
mentary pathways. of a fourth durable solution. The resulting Global Compact on
Refugees contained multiple references and an entire chapter on
TRAFIG policy brief no.3 • 06/2021 • 2
complementary pathways (section 94). Additionally, a concrete Despite their growing popularity, not everyone agrees with
initiative developed out of the Global Compact, the CRISP - the concept. Of particular concern are pathways that are not
Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initia- specifically designed for refugees and displaced people (i.e.
tive, led jointly by the International Organization for Migration non-humanitarian, regular migratory pathways) and that offer for
(IOM) and UNHCR to support stakeholders in creating and some only a temporary solution. Additionally, while comple-
expanding refugee resettlement and complementary pathways. mentary pathways are heavily promoted in global and EU policy
documents, they have so far triggered less interest among states.
At the EU-level, institutions have brought forward policy The narrative that refugees need protection and support above
options for the establishment of “safe and legal avenues” all else does not fit with the image of refugees capitalising upon
(European Parliament, 2016) to enable protection seekers to their resources, connections and skills to access third-country
reach the European Union or “orderly and safe pathways to the solutions beyond the classical ones reserved for them, namely
EU for third-country nationals in need of protection” (European resettlement, humanitarian admission or claiming international
Commission, 2016). While the European Commission published protection upon arrival in a destination country. With refugee
recommendations for EU member states under the Commission issues usually separated from legal migration agendas, one of the
Recommendation on enhancing legal pathways for persons in challenges of promoting complementary pathways is to identify
need of international protection in September 2017, complemen- policymakers responsible for taking up the issue (i.e. which de-
tary pathways as such only entered EU asylum and migration partment or ministry). Complementary pathways are, therefore,
policy under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, introduced one of the cases where the strict divide between categories like
in September 2020. With the Recommendation on legal path- migrants and refugees is unproductive (Wagner, 2017).
ways to protection in the EU: promoting resettlement, humani-
tarian admission, and other complementary pathways, released What complementary pathways could be
alongside the New Pact, the Commission is promoting the use of Complementary pathways thus far have been addressed via
complementary pathways for those in third countries who are in a top-down approach. Global and EU policy documents (e.g.
need of international protection. the Global Compact and New Pact on Migration and Asylum)
address states and encourage them to provide pathways that
What complementary pathways are now refugees and displaced people can access. While laudable, the
Since complementary pathways emerged, policymakers and development of this policy approach is largely detached from
scholars have tried to conceptualise and define them; however, displaced people and their social capital (family ties or profes-
these efforts have met with limited success. Rather than devel- sional networks), their human capital (skills) or their economic
oping a concrete definition in both academic and policy circles, capital (financial resources).
they list various initiatives that may fall under the complementa-
ry pathways umbrella, such as humanitarian visas, humanitarian Complementary pathways could well be understood as an inter-
admission, community sponsorship, or existing legal pathways mediate third-country solution between resettlement and legal
for family reunification, education opportunities, employment pathways, which may overlap in both directions (see Figure 1).
opportunities or “other opportunities” (UNHCR, 2019). Com- Resettlement as a protection tool offers a third-country solution
plementary pathways in this respect are described as “migration to the most vulnerable refugees—those who have no social or
channels which, though not always originally designed for professional connections or financial means. Well-connected
international protection, can complement resettlement schemes” refugees, on the contrary, may fully rely on their own capac-
(OECD, 2016). ities (financial means or skills) and social relations (strong
professional or private networks) to find protection and better
There have been several attempts to categorise complementary long-term opportunities on their own. They are likely to use
pathways. For instance, the European Council on Refugees and legal migration pathways. Complementary pathways, in turn,
Exiles (ECRE) differentiated between forms of legal admission may offer third-country solutions for those in-between. As will
rooted in the international protection regime (resettlement,
humanitarian admission programmes, private sponsorship and
humanitarian visas) and those rooted in regular migration and
mobility schemes (family reunification, labour migration and
education mobility) (ECRE, 2017). More recently, Wood (2020)
distinguished between needs-based (e.g. humanitarian visas or
humanitarian admission programmes) and qualification-based
(family, employment or education) complementary pathways
on the one hand and ‘custom-made’ complementary pathways
versus regular migration channels on the other. The latter refers
to whether the pathway has been specifically developed for
refugees or whether it is generally open for migrants, including
Figure 1: Third-country solutions for refugees
refugees. © ICMPD, Martin Wagner, Camilla FogliTRAFIG policy brief no 3 • 06/2021 • 3
be presented below, refugees are striving to capitalise on their Existing pathways that leverage networks
networks and find a solution to their displacement, which in- Several existing pathways tap into these personal and profes-
cludes mobility via existing migratory pathways. In this sense, sional networks, either at the individual or organisational level,
complementary pathways can help to bring and settle refugees and overlap with many of those channels deemed to be comple-
in third countries by supporting them in building new networks mentary pathways.
and leveraging or restoring interrupted and weak networks.
Complementary pathways, in this understanding, shall not Naturally, family relations (often) offer powerful networks and
necessarily provide new pathways that offer more exclusive notably come with a legal right to family reunification for
mobility rights to refugees but rather shall develop policies that refugees. Migration pathways for family reasons have tradi-
allow them to use their social capital, skills and resources as tionally contained elements of sponsorship, including proof of
well as their professional or social networks. employment, financial means or adequate housing. Exceptions
may be made for certain groups of sponsors, most commonly for
2 The potential of networks for tapping refugees and those with subsidiary protection. However, family
reunification is mostly limited to nuclear family members and
into mobility thus does not address more distant relations. Moreover, dis-
The role of networks placed people often face particular barriers to family reunifica-
The role of networks, particularly migrant networks, has long tion as they often cannot obtain birth and marriage certificates
been emphasised in migration theory and academic debate. and other documents due to the specific circumstances under
Migrant networks have been conceptualised as “sets of in- which they had to flee.
terpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and
non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of Another way networks have been leveraged is scholarship
kinship, friendship and shared community origin” (Massey et programmes in various countries like Mexico, Japan or Aus-
al., 2005, p. 42). More recent discourses, however, show that tralia for students who have been displaced (Wood & Evans,
the understanding that migrants are mainly navigating within 2020). In Europe, the Portuguese-led Global Platform for Syrian
migrant networks only addresses part of the plurality of exist- Students started to build networks for students already in 2013 to
ing networks. It neglects the relevance of other facilitators such receive education or finalise studies that were interrupted by the
as universities, employers or governments, and the rising role conflict in Syria.
of the Internet in providing access to information and new net-
works via various online platforms or social media (Meeteren & On refugee labour mobility, the organisation Talent Beyond
Pereira, 2018). However, they also acknowledge that the social Boundaries (TBB) has received perhaps the most attention, as
capital potentially available in networks is not always made it is the most advanced example. In essence, TBB connects the
readily accessible but rather “needs to be mobilised through talents and skills of refugees in major hosting countries like
networking strategies” (Meeteren & Pereira, 2018, p. 941). This Jordan or Lebanon with employers in Western countries via a
points to the importance of cultivating and leveraging refugees’ specifically designed “Talent Catalogue”. Other initiatives look
networks. into intra-EU mobility based on refugees’ skills, as explored by
the EU agency Cedefop or moveurope!. Numerous civil society
The research project Transnational Figurations of Displacement networks like Startup refugees in Finland, More than one Per-
(TRAFIG) investigates the importance of mobility and net- spective in Austria and Workeer in Germany have emerged at the
works in finding solutions for displaced persons facing protract- national level to connect refugees with employers, while busi-
ed situations. The central hypothesis is that the more connected nesses are also creating networks, such as the TENT Partnership
and mobile refugees and displaced people are, the less likely it for Refugees.
is that they end up in situations of protracted displacement and
vice versa. TRAFIG research in the Horn of Africa, the Middle A tool that has received much attention of late is community
East and Europe shows that displaced people rely heavily on sponsorship, a community-based approach mostly linked to
their capital and networks. Their networks may include family resettlement schemes that enables private citizens and organi-
members or friends living abroad, professional connections in sations to welcome refugees to their country. Under Canada’s
other cities or countries or educational prospects. However, it long-standing programme, community sponsorship can facili-
is not just the quantity of contacts but rather their quality that tate the actual journey of refugees to the country and also assist
influences the opportunities these networks can help unlock with their reception and integration. However, the concept of
(for more, see Etzold et al., 2019). Thus, while refugees seek community sponsorship is flexible and can be applied to various
to tap into their networks, policymakers and practitioners can migration pathways beyond resettlement. Indeed, it offers an
play a role in supporting the building and strengthening of these array of possibilities for communities, civil society and the
networks (Katsiaficas et al., 2021). private sector to engage in welcoming refugees. It thus createsTRAFIG policy brief no.3 • 06/2021 • 4
an umbrella for all sorts of networks that can support refugees. Five years after the regulation took effect, the first evaluations
However, existing networks such as family relations often do not documented that, between November 2015 and May 2020,
play an important role or are even considered as a hindrance to around 244,000 preliminary approvals for applicants for em-
community sponsorship. Many current community sponsorship ployment from the Western Balkans in Germany were granted;
programmes, such as those in the United Kingdom and Germa- 57,750 were rejected (Brücker et al., 2020). For the purpose
ny, do not provide the option to select family members or ‘name’ of this policy brief, the assessed importance of networks is
other persons to sponsor, even though many refugees and other even more relevant: According to a report by the Institute for
migrants living in Europe and other third countries have fre- Employment Research (IAB), the majority of the regulation’s
quently requested this and would be ready to set up supporting beneficiaries relied on personal or professional relations. Only
communities to welcome members of their own networks. in some isolated instances did citizens of the six Western Balkan
countries benefit from the regulation without the support of any
Digitalisation also offers plenty of opportunities to bridge long networks (Brücker et al., 2020).
distances and make translocal and transnational networks come
alive. These include opening up new opportunities, markets and Ultimately, the combination of networks and the facilitation of
networks to people who would otherwise be marginalised from mobility allowed approximately 98,000 citizens from the West-
mainstream economic avenues by virtue of their displacement ern Balkans to arrive and work legally in Germany based on this
(Easton-Calabria, 2019). Digital platforms may also increase the regulation and to meet the needs of the German labour market.
visibility of refugees’ human and social capital to employers or This model does not need to be limited to the Western Balkans
universities abroad (see various examples in Easton-Calabria, and could well be used to expand solutions via more mobility
2019, p. 9). options for refugees.
Leveraging networks to enable mobility 3 The role of networks and mobility for
Particularly in the EU context, complementary pathways are
mainly discussed with respect to new or alternative migratory complementary pathways
routes. However, pathways do exist, and networks appear to
be vital in accessing these. Once a network offers a solution Forcibly displaced people are certainly not a homogenous
(e.g. a job offer, student scholarship or family reunion), states group—not only because of their varying nationalities or ethnic
should facilitate entry by, for instance, easing requirements backgrounds but foremost because of the different levels of
such as qualifications, student certificates, marriage documents human, social and financial capital that they possess. Indeed,
or other formal requirements which refugees may not possess, as outlined by UNHCR, “how a displaced person fares in the
or by broadening the definition of family members who can be future, whether in the country of asylum or origin or in a third
reunited. country, depends on the skills, experiences and qualifica-
tions, mental and physical health, material assets and attitudes
The rationale for eased entry seems justified when the purpose of maintained and developed while displaced” (2016, section 6).
migration has been defined, and a network (community spon- While this is true for local integration, it is also true regarding
sorship, the family, a university or an employer) is in place to third-country solutions.
welcome the refugee and support them in settling in. As it was
put, “contemporary approaches toward forced migrants focus on As visualised in Figure 2, the human, social and financial capital
securing protection and providing assistance, not on facilitating of refugees not only has a substantial impact on third-country
movement” (Aleinikoff, 2018, p. 1). In this vein, facilitating solutions that are open to them but also on the level of support
movement for forced migrants based on their human and social they need to compensate for no or weak human, social or finan-
capital could become the key added value of complementary cial capital. This policy brief argues that three general groups
pathways. of third-country solutions can be envisioned to correspond with
different refugee profiles:
When networks meet mobility: Germany’s Western Balkans
Regulation 1 Those with strong networks and financial means need little to
Although the German Western Balkans Regulation (Bundes- no support to access existing legal pathways.
agentur für Arbeit, n.d.), introduced in 2016, does not address 2 Those with limited capital and weak networks will need
people in need of international protection per se, it is an example targeted support to strengthen their networks and allow
of the power of networks to foster mobility. This policy opened flexibility regarding access to third countries, namely via
the German labour market to all skill and qualification levels complementary pathways.
of migrants from the Western Balkans, including low-skilled 3 Those with high protection needs because of limited to no
migrants. Instead of calling for certain language or professional relevant capital or networks continue to rely primarily on
qualifications, the regulation requires applicants to have been resettlement.
offered a job from an employer in Germany for which no eligible
candidate in Germany can be found.TRAFIG policy brief no.3 • 06/2021 • 5
Figure 2: The correlation between networks, capital and third-country solutions for refugees
© ICMPD, Martin Wagner, Camilla Fogli
Strong human, social and/or financial capital—Little to no In comparison, during this same period, nationals of these seven
support is needed countries submitted four million asylum applications, 2.2 mil-
There is a significant number of refugees who never enter the lion people were granted refugee status or subsidiary protection,
refugee protection regime. Their human and social capital, in and 572,000 refugees were resettled to OECD countries and
the form of family, social or professional networks, allows them Brazil (OECD & UNHCR, 2021).
to move from countries of persecution or war to safety, arriving
(or, as ‘refugees sur place’, already staying) in EU countries on Following this exercise and based on Eurostat data on first-time
residence permits based on work, family or education. Despite residence permits issued for major source countries of refugees
several shortcomings with available data, a 2021 OECD– with a high protection need (determined by a recognition rate of
UNHCR study mapped the residence permits issued by OECD above 50 per cent), one can see that citizens from Syria, Afghan-
countries and Brazil to citizens of seven major source countries istan, Iraq, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen also make significant
of refugees with high recognition rates, namely Afghanistan, use of legal pathways to come to Europe (see Table 1). More
Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Venezuela, which together relevant, however, may be that they outnumber—by far—refugees
were the source of 62 per cent of displaced persons in 2019 who are resettled.
(OECD & UNHCR, 2021). According to their calculation, near-
ly 1.5 million first-time residence permits were granted between Above all, these numbers show that refugees use existing
2010 and 2019 to citizens of these countries on the grounds of pathways and seek individual solutions outside of the refugee
family, work or study. Of these permits, 67 per cent were granted regime—if their resources and networks allow them to do so.
for family reasons, 18 per cent were given for study, and 13 per
cent were granted for work purposes (OECD & UNHCR, 2021).
Number of residence permits (2010–2019) Number of refugees Total positive decisions* and
resettled recognition rate
Family Work Education Total 2010-2019 2010-2019
Syria 257,834 10,497 13,986 282,317 54,050 991,270 94%
Afghanistan 61,696 1,632 3,014 66,342 4,240 270,085 52%
Iraq 91,228 7,007 6,580 104,815 3,345 213,835 58%
Eritrea 36,442 319 499 37,260 6,660 131,245 89%
Somalia 46,414 153 393 46,960 4,420 90,165 64%
Yemen 4,264 595 3,312 8,171 70 9,330 81%
Table 1: Overview of different refugee pathways
Source: Eurostat; *: refugee, subsidiary and humanitarian protectionTRAFIG policy brief no.3 • 06/2021 • 6
Figure 3: Policy implications for complementary pathways
© ICMPD, Martin Wagner, Camilla Fogli
No to very weak human, social and/or financial capital—High These refugees may possess education or skills in demand in
level of support is needed other countries but lack the necessary network, financial means
At the other end of the spectrum, many displaced people possess or knowledge of how to access such opportunities or even
neither the financial means nor the necessary human or social to make their skills known to potential employers. This, for
capital. This makes them most vulnerable to becoming stuck in instance, holds true for a significant share of persons living in
protracted displacement situations and limits their chances of situations of protracted displacement in Jordan (see Tobin et
finding safety. The international protection regime developed al., 2021) and Ethiopia (see Tufa et al., 2021). It is this group
a very special system to compensate for the lack of financial of people with limited human and social capital for whom
means or capital among the most vulnerable—the instrument of complementary pathways could become a game-changer. Well
resettlement, one of the durable solutions for refugees. Con- placed, complementary pathways could step in to provide a
ceived as a protection tool, it offers the greatest support to the network where they are lacking or strengthen networks that are
most vulnerable by offering an organised system well embedded too weak. In this context, complementary pathways could allow
in the international protection framework and overseen by a refugees to utilise their human capital if mobility is added to the
specialised agency, UNHCR. However, only 0.5 per cent of equation—facilitated, for instance, via family links or work or
the 20.4 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate worldwide education channels.
were resettled in 2019 (UNHCR, 2020, p. 48), illustrating that
the need far exceeds the opportunity. And this need is growing: Thus, it becomes clear that tapping into the potential of comple-
In 2021, UNHCR estimates that global resettlement needs will mentary pathways does not necessarily demand new pathways.
slightly increase to 1,445,383 persons as compared to 1,440,408 What it requires, however, is that policymakers invest in:
in 2020 (UNHCR, 2020b).
1 building and leveraging quality networks to enable displaced
Limited human, social and/or financial capital—Targeted people to utilise their resources, and
support is needed 2 adjusting entry conditions by making visa regulations more
Finally, there is the group of refugees who may not be among the flexible and reducing bureaucracy.
most vulnerable and who are thus not targeted for resettlement,
but whose human or social capital may not be strong enough to
facilitate independent access to solutions abroad. For instance,
they may have family members abroad with whom they wish to
unite, but they may not be related closely enough to qualify for
the narrow family definition that allows for family reunification.TRAFIG policy brief no.3 • 06/2021 • 7
4 Policy implications: Networks + mobility = Third, refugees whose human or social capital offer them the
complementary pathways prospect of a livelihood in a third country, such as being received
by a community or having reasonable prospects of employ-
Complementary pathways are high on the agenda at the global ment, should also be met with more flexibility regarding their
and EU level. Yet much uncertainty remains regarding the use— entry conditions. A sense of flexibility shall not provide new
and ultimate impact—of this tool. States are often reluctant to refugee-specific pathways with more exclusive mobility rights
introduce new pathways, which might be but one of the reasons but should rather extend to waiving entry conditions of existing
why complementary pathways receive much attention from pathways that may be difficult for refugees to fulfil (e.g. because
academics but far less from national governments. Addition- of a lack of required documentation) and thus constitute the
ally, complementary pathways suffer from an understandable main hindrance to a third-country solution.
but ill-advised divide between refugees, who are understood
as primarily in need of protection, and migrants, who are seen Fourth, current governance structures segregate the admission
as moving for economic, educational or private reasons. This of refugees from that of other legal migrants. Complementary
divide is strongly reflected in national migration management pathways for refugees are orphans in this governance struc-
systems and presents a formidable challenge for determining ture, as they organisationally fit neither under the former nor
responsibility for a tool like complementary pathways, which the latter. Furthermore, investing in network opportunities for
caters to the “legal mobility” of “refugees”. If this divide can be refugees requires initiatives in Europe and first countries of asy-
successfully overcome, complementary pathways could become lum, demanding policies that encompass the EU’s internal and
a successful tool in the future. external dimension and involve different actors (DG HOME and
DG INTPA). Progress on complementary pathways, therefore,
5 Conclusions: Six ways to move forward requires actors to overcome sectoral governance approaches
and seek synergies between these areas.
on complementary pathways
The increased interest around complementary pathways, com- Fifth, the connection of networks and facilitated admission
bined with the abovementioned examples, show that it is a prom- opportunities for refugees, as proposed in this brief, could
ising way for expanding solutions for refugees. However, basing build on lessons learned from initiatives such as the German
complementary pathways on refugees’ capital and networks in Western Balkans Regulation. Additionally, further research
many ways remains to be tapped and tested.The points below on the legal pathways that people from major refugee source
highlight ways that European Union and other policymakers can countries take without entering the refugee regime may inform
make better use of this instrument. policies that can help strengthen refugee networks to leverage
complementary pathways to protection.
First, in acknowledging the human and social capital that
refugees possess, complementary pathways could become a tool Sixth and finally, enabling refugees to capitalise upon their
that offers refugees the possibility to seize opportunities based resources, connections and skills to access third-country
on their skills and networks. solutions could, in turn, create more space for those refugees
who are lacking social, human and financial capital and who
Second, refugees have social and professional networks, which need more support from the international community—ulti-
are often too weak to capitalise on. Complementary pathways in mately enabling these pathways to become truly complementary
this context shall set up networking strategies to make refugees’ instruments for refugees to access protection.
connections stronger. Networks in receiving countries may
develop further around the community sponsorship schemes
that are gaining increased momentum, as this approach encour-
ages and allows for flexible refugee support networks. These
networks can be based on communities, individuals, employers,
universities, faith groups or civil society. They may also be
broadened to encompass family sponsorship schemes and thus
widen the possibilities for family reunification, even if the tight
definition of family would normally not allow for this. Networks
in receiving countries, however also require corresponding
structures in key countries of first asylum, where refugees can
connect, for instance, to learn about education and employment
opportunities and to navigate the required bureaucracy—a po-
tential new area of action for development actors and embassies
of potential refugee-receiving countries.TRAFIG policy brief no.3 • 06/2021 • 8
Bibliography and further reading Tobin, S., Knudsen, A. J., Momani, F. A., Yakoub, T. A., & Al-Jarrah, R. (2021).
Figurations of Displacement in and beyond Jordan—Empirical findings and
Aleinikoff, T. A. (2018). Taking Mobility Seriously in the Model International Mobility reflections on protracted displacement and translocal connections of Syrian
Convention. 56, N 2, 296–302. refugees (TRAFIG working pPaper No 6).
Brücker, H., Falkenhain, M., Fendel, T., Promberger, M., & Raab, M. (2020). Labour Tufa, F. A., Rudolf, M., Abebe, M. G., Amsalu, D., Etzold, B., & Mengiste, T. A. (2021).
migration to Germany based on the Western Balkans regulation—Strong demand Figurations of Displacement in and beyond Ethiopia—Empirical findings and
and sound labour market integration (IAB Brief Report). Institute for Employ- reflections on protracted displacement and translocal connections of Eritreans in
ment Research. Ethiopia (TRAFIG working paper No 5).
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Contact Partners
Dr Benjamin Etzold, BICC BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion), Germany
Pfarrer-Byns-Str. 1, 53121 Bonn • phone +49 (0)228 911 96-0 Project Coordinator
contact@trafig.eu • www.trafig.eu • Twitter @TRAFIG_EU
Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
Authors Martin Wagner, Caitlin Katsiaficas, ICMPD
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
Copyediting / Layout Heike Webb CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Norway
Publication date June 2021 Danube University Krems, Austria
Dignity Kwanza – Community Solutions, Tanzania
Editorial design kippconcept gmbh FIERI (Forum of International and European Research on Immigration), Italy
ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development), Austria
SHARP (Society for Human Rights & Prisoners’ Aid), Pakistan
The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not Leiden University, The Netherlands
necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. The European Commission University of Sussex, United Kingdom
is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. Yarmouk University, Jordan
This project has received funding from the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under grant No. 822453. cf.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/You can also read
