Notes Introduction: Regions and the Dynamics of Political Space
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Notes
Introduction: Regions and the Dynamics of Political Space
1. ‘Are you in favour of Catalonia being a sovereign, social and democratic state
within the European Union?’ This was the question put to 700,000 Catalans
on 13 December 2009 by nationalist groups. Whilst not legally binding, this
referendum nonetheless represented a further step in the empowerment of
Catalonia within the Spanish political system.
2. The movement organised large and mediatised events, such as that of
2 November 2013 in Quimper, where 25,000 ‘Red bonnet’ protesters urged
the cancellation of the new ecological tax and the granting of more regional
powers for Brittany.
3. In this book the term ‘region’ without an initial capital means a regional space
in the broad sense; while ‘Region’ should be understood in the more restricted
sense as applying to the French political institution of the Conseil régional
(Regional Council).
4. This project is a Eurocore programme funded by the Fondation européenne de
la Science (ESF – European Science Foundation) and coordinated by Professor
Charlie Jeffery from the University of Edinburgh. The principal hypothesis
of this project is that there is a possible regionalisation of citizenship anal-
ysed in terms of political participation and economic and social solidarity.
In this perspective, public opinion polls were carried out simultaneously in
14 regions of five states of the EU (Germany, Austria, Spain, Great Britain and
France) in 2009 using a telephone survey and with a sample size of 900 peo-
ple per region. The French survey, carried out by the author, was financed
by the Regions of Brittany and Alsace, and the University of Rennes 1. The
database can be consulted online at: http://www.institute-of-governance.org/
major_projects/citizen_after_the_nation_state.
5. The first part of this book draws on a series of historiographical secondary
sources which cover the construction of the French political model since
the Revolution. Alongside this book I have also authored or co-authored
an in-depth study of regionalism in Brittany as well as several comparative
works on the regions in southern Europe (Gomez-Reino and Pasquier 2004)
or between western Europe and central and eastern Europe (Pasquier and
Perron 2008). The second part of the book draws on primary sources (oral
archives) collected over ten or so years in the context of different research
projects, particularly from a report I wrote on the political maturity of French
regions for the Institut de la décentralisation. On that occasion I was able to
carry out a series of interviews with elected officials and high-ranking civil
servants involved in the second phase (Acte II) of territorial decentralisation,
and then participate in a working group on the future of French decentrali-
sation in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections. This initial study was
complemented by a number of interviews concerning the preparation of the
third phase of decentralisation (Acte III) with members of the Comité pour
184Notes 185
la réforme des collectivités territoriales, which was presided over by Edouard
Balladur in 2008–2009. Several interviews were also carried out with represen-
tatives from the official bodies responsible for the reform of state territorial
administration after 2007, in particular with the Mission interministérielle
pour la réforme de l’administration territoriale de l’Etat (MIRATE). Finally,
the third part of the book draws on a number of research projects looking at
how regional policies are implemented, including professional training poli-
cies and state-region plan contracts, as well as the European Union cohesion
policies.
6. Which does not prevent grass roots movements temporary periods of influ-
ence, such as Corsican nationalism at the beginning of the 1990s, or the social
movement in the West indies islands (Guadeloupe and Martinique) in spring
2009 or in Brittany in Autumn 2013.
7. As Pierre Bourdieu (1980a: 6) states: ‘every historical action brings together
two historical (or social) states: objective history – in other words the history
which has accumulated over time in things, machines, buildings, monu-
ments, books, theories, customs, laws etc. – and embodied history, which
has become habitus. This actualisation of history is the effect of habitus, the
product of a historical acquisition which enables one to acquire historical
knowledge.’
1 Regionalism and the Construction of Identity
1. The expression ‘banal regionalism’ is taken from Michael Billig’s (1995:
6) ‘banal nationalism’, which he defines as ‘the ideological habits which
enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced’. The origi-
nality of Billig’s position lies in the fact that he is less interested in when
and how the nation was constructed and more interested in the daily social
logic of the psychological attachment it inspires. He defends the idea that
in recent history, this attachment is not a result of demands imposed on
the nation-state’s population from outside, but of the reproduction of a set
of social measures which nationalise the nationals. This line of argument
highlights the importance of daily routine, of the repetition of familiar repre-
sentations which enable a sense of national belonging to become embedded.
I am suggesting that a similar process operates in certain regions of France.
2. Intendancies were administrative units presided over by an Intendant,
appointed by the monarch as part of a strategy of royal centralism and
absolutism. Financing, policing and justice fell under their remit.
3. The careful observer cannot fail to ask questions about how this organising
principle played out within the development of French decentralisation.
4. An administrative, judicial and legal territorial unit (similar to a bailiwick),
under the control of a bailli. Baillages were found primarily in northern
France.
5. The equivalent district in southern France, and Brittany, under the control
of a sénéchal.
6. His revenues were generally managed by a prévôt, an agent of the lord.
7. From the reign of Philippe Auguste, these were emissaries sent by the king
throughout the territory he controlled.186 Notes
8. Several baillis came to be regrouped under the authority of a lieutenant-
general appointed by the king, who assumed civil and military powers on
his behalf.
9. The term ‘province’ is borrowed from the administrative vocabulary of the
Roman Empire. Under the ancien régime, the term ‘region’ was also used but
applied to particular geographic areas (Brittany, Normandy, Provence), also
known as ‘nations’ (Rossi-Landi 1992).
10. As early as 1764, the Marquis of Argenson summarised the major points of
the debate in his Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien and présent de la
France: ‘If together we are strong, then separated we are weak: thus one may
divide up a state into parts, and subdivide the realms of authority until they
are self-sufficient and can effectively self-govern; but such that they may in
no way overshadow the general authority from which they derive’ (quoted
in Nordman and Revel: 133).
11. Duquesnoy, 4 November 1789, in A.P, t.9: 671 (quoted in Rosanvallon 2004:
34–35).
12. The historians wiped the slate clean long ago concerning the accusations of
federalism levelled against the Girondists. Girondist federalism meant keep-
ing a distance from Paris, that bloated political capital which, because of
its instability, risked endangering the gains of the 1789 Revolution (Ozouf
1991).
13. Abbé Sieyès’ project drew its inspiration directly from enlightened utopias,
and in particular from the work of Robert de Hesseln, the king’s geogra-
pher, who had devised a new land survey register for the kingdom in almost
identical terms (Nordman and Revel 1989).
14. So, for example, the Comte de Mirabeau fought for these new departmen-
tal divisions to respect the provincial heritage, and the towns, both big
and small, also battled to achieve institutional recognition (of their status)
through these divisions.
15. Toulouse, Montpellier, Limoges, Lyon, Nancy, Metz, Besançon.
16. The extent of constitutional debates and regime instability in the first half of
the nineteenth century came to overshadow the argument over decentrali-
sation. It appeared rarely as a theme in writings by liberal authors such as
Alexis de Tocqueville, who conceived of municipal freedoms as a safeguard
for the individual against the hold of centralised power (Rossi-Landi 1992).
17. As demonstrated by the names of movements promoting decentralisation
in France up until the Second World War: Fédération régionaliste, Ligue de
représentation professionnelle and régionaliste. We will come back to these
movements later in the chapter on the politicisation of regionalism.
18. Most nineteenth century French ideologists – Lamennais, Tocqueville,
Proudhon – tackled the question of decentralisation. On the whole they
agreed that local authorities played an important role in mediating between
the individual and the state; difficulties arose, however, as soon as an inter-
mediary level between the local and the national was seriously envisaged.
19. As early as 1864, Frédéric Le Play proposed a new division of the regions.
A conservative philanthropist, Le Play felt the department to be of an inad-
equate scale for high-level decisions. His proposal was to divide the country
into 13 provinces, distinct from the divisions of the ancien régime, and based
on the reality of social ties and economic specialisation.Notes 187
20. There is a striking similarity between Le Play’s project and that on which De
Gaulle was outvoted during the referendum of April 1969.
21. Geological maps of the departments were gradually drawn up between 1835
and 1880. The detailed geological map of France (1/80 000e ) was constructed
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
22. The Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP) supervised by Elizabeth
Dupoirier and Alain Lancelot at Sciences Po Paris from 1986–1998.
2 Regionalism and Political Competition
1. See Chapter 1.
2. See Chapter 3.
3. See Chapter 3.
4. This term describes political movements and organisations which challenge
the established framework of the nation-state, and thus oppose a kind of
minority nationalism to the dominant nationalism of the state. All nations
without a central state (such as Catalonia, Scotland and Quebec), in Europe
and throughout the world, have been the subject of this particular set of
claims.
5. On the 12 September 1927 an avowedly apolitical central committee for
national minorities was established in Quimper, bringing together represen-
tatives from Alsace, Brittany, Corsica and Flanders. Thereafter it was almost
entirely inactive.
6. The Cartel des Gauches attempted to standardise the system of education
and religious education in Alsace-Lorraine by repealing the Concordat. [The
Concordat is the agreement, still in force today, which allows religious
education – essentially Catholic, Protestant and Jewish – to take place in
these regions’ public (state) schools. The exception arose because when the
Concordat was abolished for the rest of France in 1905, to be replaced by the
separation of Church and State, these regions were still incorporated into
German territory].
7. Maurice Duhamel and Morvan Marchal were the leaders of the federalist
wing. Olier Mordrelle et François Debauvais militated for an extreme-Right
form of nationalism with fascist undertones/tendencies. These latter two
later founded the (Breton) PNB and propelled/steered it towards collabora-
tion with Nazi Germany.
8. At the Liberation, those who had supported pro-Vichy or pro-German col-
laboration were condemned, but managed to escape. The leaders of those
who had gone as far as to enlist and wear the German uniform – several
dozen – were condemned to death, but managed to find refuge abroad; Olier
Mordrelle, for example, fled to Argentina.
9. See Chapter 1.
10. Regional conferences were held in the wake of the socialist meeting
in Grenoble [most notably in St-Brieuc where the PSU, Parti socialiste
autonome (Unified socialist party) had a strong presence].
11. ‘La gauche et les régions’, Le Monde, 12 juillet 1966.
12. The demands by the Liyannaj Kont Pwofitasyon (LKP) in Guadeloupe in spring
2009 also subscribed to this ideological and political register.188 Notes
13. The European Free Alliance is an alliance of regional and minority parties
which brings together 25 European political organisations. It was created in
1981 and is traditionally allied with the European Green party within the
European parliament. In 1994 it officially became a federation of parties,
and then a European political party in 2004 in Barcelona.
14. Through (their membership of) the European Free Alliance, the French
regionalists also gained a place on the list headed by Antoine Waechter
in the European elections of 1989. Max Simeoni, leader of the Corsican
UPC (Unione di u Populu Corsu), and third on the list, was elected. Thus,
according to the terms of the agreement between the UPC and the UDB, a
member of the UDB – Christian Guyonvarc’h in this instance – became the
parliamentary assistant to Max Simeoni for five years.
15. See Table 1.1 in the preceding chapter.
16. Elisabeth Dupoirier (2007) shows, in particular, that in 2001 there were more
individuals who declared themselves ‘more attached to their region than to
France’ in Corsica (34%) than in Brittany (22.1%) or Alsace (17%).
17. At the end of 1996, the mayors in the Basque region decided to launch a
consultation to ascertain how much support there was for creating a Basque
département. On 31 October 1997, 64% of Basque mayors declared themselves
in favour of the idea.
3 Regionalisation and Policies of Territorial Justice
1. See Table I.2 in the introduction to this book.
2. In French, the term for territorial planning and development is aménagement
du territoire. This term does not appear in printed and archival sources
before the Liberation of France, apart from on one occasion: in an ini-
tial report in October 1942 on ‘industrial decentralisation’, in which it is
planned that this decentralisation – a project of the Délégation nationale à
l’Equipement national (the national organisation for infrastructure develop-
ment) – should be implemented via ‘material territorial development’ (Dard
2002: 66). At this point territorial planning was seen only in terms of tech-
nical procedure, and not as a federative matrix capable of connecting a wide
range of public policies. If such public policies in effect represented the point
at which the concept of territorial planning as we know it became institu-
tionalised, they were also the end-point of decades-long reflection on the
matter.
3. Within the array of reform movements in the 1930s, L’Etat Moderne (1928–
1940), a specialist journal representing a ‘realist’ school of thought, occupied
a particular position and made a specific contribution to the debate.
4. The army, the education system and the law all found themselves obliged to
resort to supra-departmental scales – the military district, the academy, the
court of appeal – but did so without coordinating their decisions.
5. Beyond the official texts published in the Journal officiel, the main source of
information concerning this first phase of regionalisation was also one of its
principal actors: Henri Hauser (1924). His book, Le Problème du régionalisme, is
referenced by all authors writing about this issue for the inter-war period.
6. Interwiew, European Commission, DG regio, December 2008.Notes 189
4 Regionalisation and Territorial State Reforms
1. See the first two chapters of this book.
2. See Map 4.1.
3. Throughout his political career Gaston Defferre occupied important posi-
tions on the Left of the political spectrum. He was a member of parliament
from 1945 to 1958, and again from 1962 to 1981, a member of the Senate
from 1958 to 1962, and a government minister from 1981 to 1986; for sev-
eral decades he embodied the city of Marseilles where he was mayor from
1944 to 1945, then from 1953 until his death in 1986.
4. Gaston Deferre, quoted in Rondin (1985: 50).
5. For a more detailed analysis, see Chapter 2.
6. The Guichard report calls in particular for a review of legality to be intro-
duced; makes an early plea for the reform of local government finances, or
the creation of formal groupings of towns (communautés de villes) or urban
communities (communautés urbaines).
7. The fiscal aspects of the reform (their clarification, and the guarantee of
local authorities’ fiscal autonomy) were achieved via two successive laws in
1979 and 1980. However, the election of François Mitterrand prevented the
implementation of the third component of the plan which dealt with the
separation of powers between the state and local authorities. The Mauroy
government drew on the achievements of the Bonnet plan to draft the
decentralisation laws. In the event, Gaston Deferre decided to retain the
services of Pierre Richard – who had been appointed by Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing – to run the regional and local authorities, thus benefiting from
the experience of a seasoned team used to thinking through these issues
(Rondin 1985).
8. ‘To get their projects through, ministers have frequently to go cap in hand to
local authorities. Then we’re surprised how the state’s credibility has fallen’
(Raffarin 2002: 55).
9. Extract from the speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, to the
Congress of both houses of the French parliament, 22 June 2009.
10. The grands corps de l’Etat comprise the very senior civil servants recruited
from the grandes écoles, especially the Ecole nationale d’administration. The
corps intermédiaires are social groups situated between the individual and the
state, including political parties, trades unions, chambers of commerce and
businesses.
11. This culture of accumulating political offices in France has several root
causes: the centralisation of the political system; the weakness of politi-
cal parties and the shortcomings of the status of elected representative.
Those who support this very French tradition claim that accumulating polit-
ical offices enables members of parliament to be up to speed with what’s
happening on the ground; personal and practical knowledge of how local
communities work and what their problems are is to be desired. But a mem-
ber of parliament who has been elected in a first-past-the-post system doesn’t
need to accumulate political offices in order to understand what the prob-
lems are; the constituency office, the postbag and the local press constitute
the vantage points from which to glean first-hand information, as do any
previous local political offices which he or she may have held. It is entirely190 Notes
legitimate that those who seek to serve in a political context first hold local
office before embarking on a national political career, if they have the oppor-
tunity to do so. But in most western democracies there is no easy path
leading directly from local office to national office, political success being
measured in terms of the highest political office attained. There is nothing
to prevent elected representatives successively holding national then local
office. In Germany, ex-ministers or members of parliament can govern a city
or a Land. In Italy, the accumulation of the offices of mayor or president
of a province is time-limited (two consecutive offices are permitted), which
encourages politicians to hold office in different local authorities. Under the
Fifth Republic in France, not accumulating political offices has become the
exception. If they want to ensure control of a political region or continuous
political power, those who accumulate political offices must prevent them
from passing to someone else in order to continue to benefit from the elec-
toral advantage which political office confers. Accumulating political offices
thus limits the circulation of elites. Although the reform in 2000 of the
rules governing accumulation restricted its scope, it in no way challenged
the prevailing logic in France behind accumulating political office – in other
words, the political link between national and local responsibilities (refus-
ing to acknowledge conflicts of interest between local communities and the
state).
12. See Le Monde, ‘Décentralisation: M. Raffarin consulte les régions’,
25 June 2003.
13. Moreover, a number of regions engaged in pluralist thinking upstream of the
reform, with the aim of identifying those areas of responsibility where pol-
icy experimentation might be introduced. During these Assises, all regions
expressed their desire to complement and consolidate their existing powers
at the very least. Certain regional proposals went much further, seeking to
push the decentralised architecture of the unitary state to its limits. Thus,
Brittany and Alsace jointly called for the establishment of regional regu-
latory powers, fiscal autonomy, and pilot projects for additional areas of
responsibility. Brittany essentially targeted economic development, regional
planning and development, European Structural Funds, the environment
and cultural policy. Alsace demonstrated innovative thinking and petitioned
to trial new powers in the areas of education, public health, agricultural
development and higher education. Conseil régional d’Alsace, Une vraie
Région pour une France forte. Propositions de la Région Alsace, October 2002.
14. A Pyrrhic victory some would say, given how much this transfer of powers
has contributed to the financial strangulation of a number of departments.
15. Interview with the minister of the Interior (Home Office), June 2003.
16. This phrase is used as a loose translation of the métropoles.
17. In Paris, the métropole will probably consist of the Paris commune, along
with the main EPCI (intercommunal public corporations), but exclude the
departments. The focus will mainly be on housing and transport.
18. In Lyon, the proposed métropole is by far the most integrated, with the
city of Lyon taking over social policy responsibilities from the Rhône-Alpes
department.
19. In Marseilles, there is very serious opposition from nearly all local players
to the proposed métropole, which will merge Marseilles city with a numberNotes 191
of outlying urban centres. Though the Left has little chance of winning back
Marseilles, it might be able to lessen UMP control by merging Marseilles with
the broader conurbation.
20. See Map 4.1.
21. The 2015 draft bill ‘Nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République
(NOTRE)’ is intended to set out the gradual phasing out of departments in
metropolitan areas.
22. The 1982 law concerning the rights and freedoms of communes, departments
and regions is set out as the introduction to a series of texts which it lists
in the first Article: the law on the transfer and division of powers (1983 and
1985); on the local and regional civil service (1984 and 1985); on the sys-
tem of election (1982); on limiting the accumulation of public offices (1985)
and the status of elected representatives (1992); and on intercommunalité (the
cooperative grouping of communes to share resources) and the democratisa-
tion of local life (1992). Other texts, not originally anticipated, were also
added to this initial series thus modifying the process of decentralisation
which began in 1982: the law on improved decentralisation (1988); on urban
solidarity (1991); on territorial planning and local development (1995) and
on territorial planning and sustainable development (1999).
23. Public investment (the creation of teams and infrastructure) are calcu-
lated across the statistical aggregate relating to gross fixed capital formation
(formation brut de capital fixe FBCF). In 2007, of 61.8 billion of public
investment, 45.1 million (or 73%) was attributable to local authorities.
24. Between 1985 and 2005, staff numbers within the territorial civil service
went up from 981,000 to 1,351,000, and staff costs increased from 20.4 bil-
lion to 40.2 billion. Over the same period staff numbers in the national
civil service continued to grow, despite the transfer of powers.
25. OECD, Government at a Glance, 2009.
26. At the end of the 1990s, the decision not to include wage costs when cal-
culating business tax (1999) and the abolition of car tax (which had been
payable to the departments) (2001) had already had an impact on the fiscal
autonomy of local and regional authorities.
27. This contrasts with a federal situation, where regions have guaranteed
representation within the upper chamber, on the model of the German
Bundesrat.
28. The business tax represented 50% of local authorities’ fiscal resources.
29. With the abolition of the business tax, the taxe sur les droits de mutation (a tax
payable on completion of a property purchase) became the most fruitful tax
instrument for the departments; revenue from which partly dried up during
the housing market crisis of 2009–2010.
30. Thus in 2010, the regions benefited from the buoyancy of the vehicle
registration tax system as a result of the policy of support for the car indus-
try (in the form of a vehicle scrappage scheme) established by the Fillon
government in 2009.
31. ‘If we want to give more power to the regions, we have to take them away
from the state, not from the departments or communes. And that, obviously,
is where I kept coming up against the ministers!’ (Schmidt 1992: 36).
32. Only the position of mayor enjoys significant regulatory authority in the
areas of public order and urban planning.192 Notes
33. Regional powers, which were set out in the law of 2 March 1982, were devel-
oped in a number of further laws: that of 29 July 1982 concerning planning;
those of 7 January and 22 July 1983, and 25 January 1985, on the divi-
sion of powers between local authorities and the state and of the 13 August
2004 concerning local freedoms and responsibilities. (Note that this is not
an exhaustive list.)
34. The law of 4 February 1995 (the LOADT law; Loi d’orientation pour
l’aménagement et le développement du territoire) provided for a trial period
in relation to the organisation and funding of regional public transport. Six
regions in 1997, then seven in 1999 (Alsace, Centre, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Pays
de la Loire, PACA, Rhône-Alpes and Limousin), volunteered to conduct tri-
als in this area. The success of these trials in terms of the increase in the
number and quality of the services offered was unanimously hailed; such
that the law of 13 December 2000 on urban solidarity and renewal (SRU; Loi
relative à la solidarité et au renouvellement urbains), with effect from 1 Jan-
uary 2002, extended to all French regions the power to organise and finance
regional passenger train services (and replacement services by road), which
had previously been the responsibility of the state (Barone 2008).
35. Since 2002, the Alsace region has been experimenting with the self-
management of structural funds in the region. The European office which
was previously based in the regional prefect’s office has been transferred to
Alsace’s regional council.
36. – For the communes, Article L. 2121–29 of the General Local Authorities
Code (Code général des collectivités territoriale) states that ‘The local council
regulates the commune’s affairs./( . . . ) The local council makes recommen-
dations on all matters of local interest.’
– For departments, Article L. 3211–1 of the same Code provides that ‘The
general council regulates the department’s affairs./ It adjudicates on all
matters it is required to consider by law and regulation, and, in general,
on all matters brought to it which are of interest to the department’.
– Finally, for the regions, Article L. 4221–1 provides that: ‘The regional
council regulates the region’s affairs./ It is competent to promote the
economic, social, health-related, cultural and scientific development of
the region, undertake regional planning and development, and ensure
the preservation of the region’s identity, whilst respecting the integrity,
independence and individual characteristics of the departments and com-
munes./ It may engage in activities which complement those of the state,
other local authorities, and public bodies situated in the region, within
the areas and conditions specified by the laws setting out the division of
powers between state, communes, departments and regions.’
37. ‘The very definition of sustainable development opens the way to all pub-
lic policy’; thus, according to the Brundtland Report, which was presented
by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment (WCED) to the General Assembly of the United Nations, sustainable
development is ‘a type of development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs’.
38. Interview with the Association des régions de France, October 2008.
39. For further details, consult the last two chapters of this book.Notes 193
40. As reformed in 2003, the Constitution prevents the control (tutelle) of any
one local authority over another.
41. The expression doublons refers to the duplication of employment by local
authorities and the state. In relation to the state, employees in the ‘decon-
centrated’ field services are maintained in post despite functions having been
transferred to local authorities. More generally, doublons refers to lower-level
local authorities (especially communes) retaining staff although functions
have been transferred elsewhere [generally upwards, to the intercommunal
public corporations (EPCI)].
42. Particularly when it comes to protecting local jobs.
43. The Warsmann Report recommended differentiated approaches to local
organisation across all of France.
44. Jacques Chirac, 11 March 2000, Martinique.
45. Which the electors in the French Antilles refused in 2003; then in 2010 the
Etats généraux de l’Outre-mer (a workshop on the future of French overseas ter-
ritories) set in motion a process leading to the creation of single collectivities
in both Martinique and French Guiana after the law of 27 July 2011.
46. The law of 2 March 1982 brought into being the ‘Corsican Assembly’,
the local term for the regional council, but ‘merely a linguistic conces-
sion’. Although, following the campaign proposals of President Mitterrand,
Corsica came to occupy a unique position amongst the regions, this was
only in so far as the reforms linked to the decentralisation laws were imme-
diately implemented there (the first Regional Assembly in France was elected
in Corsica on the 8 August 1982, but in 1986 in the other regions).
47. The CTC is comprised of, on the one hand, the Corsican Assembly and its
president, and on the other the executive council of Corsica and its presi-
dent. The executive council is made up of the president and six councillors
who are politically responsible to the Regional Assembly. The president and
the councillors may attend the Assembly’s sessions and, at their request, may
speak on agenda items. In turn, the Corsican Assembly (Assemblée de Corse,
AC) may challenge the council’s actions by a vote of no confidence.
48. The Ile-de-France also has specific resources in addition to normal regional
resources [from various taxes, funds allocated by the state, repayments from
loans made to certain businesses or communities, such as the RATP (Régie
autonome des transports parisiens, one of the public bodies responsible for
transport in Paris) and the SNCF (the French national railways)].
49. See Jean-Luc Warsmann’s report on clarifying the powers of territorial col-
lectivities (October 2008), or the report by the Comité pour la réforme des
collectivités locales (Committee for the Reform of Local Authorities) entitled
Il est temps de décider, known as the Balladur Report, from March 2009.
50. The regional president is appointed at the first session after the election of
regional councillors. An absolute majority of votes cast is required in both
the first and second rounds, or a relative majority in the third round, if this
is the case. Vice-presidents are appointed at the same time and under the
same conditions, and the president of the regional council decides whether
or not to delegate power or signing authority to them. The president’s role
and powers are as follows: to preside over the Deliberative Assembly and
the standing Committee of the Regional Council; to prepare and carry out
the decisions of the Regional Council; commit regional revenue, authorise194 Notes
expenditure and signs orders. The president is head of the Regional Civil
Service.
51. It is up to the regional council to establish its own rules of procedure con-
cerning the composition and functioning of its committees, or the order
of appointment of vice-presidents. Regional council sessions are open to
the public. A quorum is required of half of all members who make up the
Assembly.
52. On the 6 May 1997, Brittany’s regional council voted unanimously for the
electoral district to be regional in the 1998 elections. See Ouest-France, 7–8
May 1997.
53. See the two following chapters.
54. Interview with local elected representative, Alsace, May 2008.
55. The distinction between devolution and decentralisation was established as
early as 1895 in France. Léon Aucoc was the first to make the distinction in
his Introduction à l’étude du droit administratif, première conférence faite à l’Ecole
des Ponts et Chaussées (1895). Up until that point the terms were often used
interchangeably.
56. This decision provoked such an outcry amongst the préfets that it took two
years for the circulars implementing it to be applied (Miossec 2008: 399).
57. ‘The current structure is hardly conducive to overarching concepts and
coordinated action. This is why, at the same time as restructuring the ver-
tical divisions of the administration, which will essentially be required to
implement the decisions of government, we must also reinforce the already
developed horizontal structures – the functional departments as well as those
responsible for policy design, and especially those whose role is to prepare
key decisions pertaining to the economy and society ( . . . ). Lastly, in relation
to the state’s external divisions and local administration, the Committee
restates the need to reorganise administrative districts and reconsider the
existing clusters of, or mergers between, communes.’
58. The CIRE of 13 July 1999 was followed by two decrees of 20 October 1999,
which reinforced the powers of the préfets to coordinate state policy.
59. On this subject, see the uncompromising report by the Cour des Comptes
(Audit Commission) on La conduite par l’Etat de la décentralisation (2009).
60. Révision générale des politiques publiques, La modernisation de l’organisation
locale de l’Etat, December 2007: 1.
61. Révision générale des politiques publiques, La modernisation de l’organisation
locale de l’Etat, December 2007: 2.
62. Circulaire (n˚5285/SG) sur la Réforme de l’organisation des services territo-
riaux de l’Etat (Circular concerning the reform of the organisation of state
territorial services), 19 March 2008; Circulaire relative à l’organisation de
l’administration départementale de l’Etat (Circular concerning the organisa-
tion of state administration at departmental level), 7 July 2008; Circulaire
(n˚5285/SG); Circulaire (n˚5359/SG) relative à l’organisation départementale
de l’Etat (Circular concerning departmental organisation of the state), 31
December 2008.
63. See Circular of 7 July 2008: 4.
64. The ARS were established by the law of 21 July 2009 on hospital reform,
which concerned patients, health and the regions. They were the central pil-
lar of health system reforms, and combined the resources of the state andNotes 195
health insurance at regional level. ARS bring several organisations respon-
sible for health policy in the regions and departments together in one
body: the Regional and Departmental Offices for Health and Social Affairs
(DRASS et DDASS), the Regional Hospital Boards (ARH), Regional Public
Health Clusters (GRSP), Unions régionales des caisses d’assurance maladie
(URCAM, Health Insurance Funds), Regional Health Organisations (MRS,
missions régionales de santé) and the hospital component of health insur-
ance, made up of a number of staff from the regional health insurance
funds (Caisses régionales d’assurance maladie, CRAM), from the régime
social des indépendants (RSI, a social security and insurance organisation
for the self-employed), from the Mutualité sociale agricole (MSA, a similar
organisation for farmers and agricultural workers), and the Regional Medical
Offices (DRSM). The ARS’s scope of intervention includes public health and
how medical care is delivered. The director of the ARS is also appointed to
the Conseil des ministres, and takes all decisions relating to the ARS’s mis-
sion, organisation and operations within the framework of the overall policy
direction set at national level. It’s not clear, then, what authority the préfet
de région might have over this new role of regional public health préfet.
65. With the exception of the Ile-de-France, Corsica, and France’s overseas terri-
tory, where specific arrangements apply, departmental administration is to
be structured as follows: the prefecture; the Direction départementale de
la population et de la cohésion sociale (DDPCS, Departmental Directorate
of Citizenship and Social Cohesion); the Direction départementale des
territoires (DDT, Departmental Territorial Directorate); the schools inspec-
torate; the Direction départementale des finances publiques (departmental
directorate for public finances); and the domestic security services. In the
most populous departments, or where the social need or urban policy jus-
tifies such a measure, a Direction départementale de la cohésion sociale
(DDCS, Departmental Directorate for Social Cohesion) will be established.
5 Regions and European Governance
1. Denis de Rougemont began to develop his ‘Europe of the regions’ hypoth-
esis in the 1960s, seeking to establish its importance through the lens of
the renewal of European federalism. The context of the 1960s played a cen-
tral role in the evolution of his thinking as regionalist demands emerged
in western Europe, along with the foundations of European regional policy
(Saint-Ouen 2003).
2. See in particular the reforms put forward as part of the work on the European
Convention.
3. To put this another way, the development of these new instruments of gov-
ernance provides a means for European institutions to extend their room for
manoeuvre within their regulatory capacity, although member states are for
the most part hostile to this. Where European administrations have, there-
fore, developed good practice guides in the areas of environmental policies or
local development, used benchmarking as a tool to increase global economic
competitiveness or, after the Lisbon Summit in 2000, institutionalised the
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to facilitate concerted development196 Notes
in social and public health policies across the EU, this signifies a desire
to increase regulatory capacity just as much as it translates a situation of
institutional weakness.
4. The Lisbon Strategy was operative between 2000 and 2010 in the European
Union. Centred on the knowledge economy as a frame of reference, its goal
was to make the European Union’s economy the most competitive in the
world by 2010. The expression ‘knowledge economy’ first appeared in an
OECD report in 1996. The recent focus on the knowledge economy comes
as a result of the observation that certain ‘immaterial’ activities linked to
research and education were starting to assume increasing significance in
the global economy. This significance was first noted in quantitative terms:
the relative share of these activities was showing consistent signs of growth
within the GDP. More accurately, it was the share of ‘intangible’ investments
(research and development, education and health) which was growing in
relation to ‘tangible’ investments (physical capital, material resources). Thus
so-called ‘technology-intensive’ activities, such as in the electronic and com-
puting sectors, telecommunications or biotechnologies, underwent far more
rapid growth on average in the 1980s–1990s than other sectors. These activ-
ities were considering as supporting a phase of upward growth in a long
cycle of economic development. The knowledge economy was to develop at
the intersection of initiatives in innovation, education, and training. Sub-
sequently the Europe 2020 strategy took up the baton, adding sustainable
development to the knowledge frame of reference; the EU aimed to cre-
ate ‘intelligent, sustainable, and inclusive’ growth. See http://ec.europa.eu/
europe2020/index_fr.htm.
5. See previous chapter.
6. Interview with DATAR/DIACT, November 2008.
7. Interview, European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy, French section, 2008.
8. The software was tested for the 2000–2006 programmes, and rolled out to
all user sites – the programme managers as well as other interested partners
(public accounts, local authorities). The application was to allow all partners
to have real-time data concerning the progress of the programme. Depart-
mental prefectures and the evaluating offices of Regional Councils record in
PRESAGE all the requisite details of a project, at each stage of its progress, in
order to ensure that it can be tracked (submission of project application; eval-
uation; approval by the technical committee, planning, implementation,
inspection, sign-off of finances, automatic recommitment and archiving.
9. Interview with the section head of the Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy, European Commission.
10. Interview with the section head of the Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy, European Commission.
11. Interview with the SGAR, Ile-de-France, September 2008.
12. Interview, Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, urban section,
October 2007.
13. Interview, European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy, December 2008.
14. Interview, DIACT-DATAR, December 2008.Notes 197
15. ARF seminar on regional perspectives and policy 2007–2013, Bordeaux,
6 June 2005.
16. Agence France Presse, 26 April 2006.
17. The managing authority’s responsibilities are set out in Article 60 of Regula-
tion (EC) 1083/2006 of the Council of 11 July 2006. The managing authority
is responsible for the management and implementation of the operational
programme in accordance with the principle of sound financial manage-
ment. In particular, it ensures that the operations are selected according to
European and national rules of eligibility, and carried out according to appli-
cable European and national obligations. It carries out checks on services
rendered, or delegates that responsibility to a third party. It ensures that all
necessary information is recorded in the single managing authority’s com-
puterised system, that the project partners have separate accounting or an
equivalent suitable for the recording of transactions relating to co-financed
projects. It takes responsibility for evaluation.
18. The global grant can only be awarded to a candidate organisation with recog-
nised competence in that particular domain, and that organisation must
be able to provide guarantees of its solvency and demonstrate the legal,
administrative and financial capacities required to manage European funds;
generally it will also co-finance the project in question.
19. Interview, SGAR, Ile-de-France, February 2010.
20. In addition there are usually one or two interns and/or an International
Business volunteer [volontaire international en entreprise, VIE].
21. Interview, European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy, December 2008.
22. Interview, SGAR, Brittany, January 2010.
23. Interview, regional council of Brittany.
24. Interview, regional council of the Centre region.
25. Founded in 1973 by the CELIB, the CRPM was the first interregional lob-
bying body at European level. The birth of the CRPM illustrates certain
sub-national actors’ expectations of European regional policy and of the
early mobilisations it inspired. The ‘peripheral’ regions who mobilised were
all similarly handicapped in relation to the emerging Common Market and
the industrial heartland of Europe: they were far from the centre, but also
(except the British regions) dominated by agriculture, under-industrialised,
and under-equipped. When the final resolution was taken in 1973, the
regions demanded a European regional policy which would make restoring
a balance in Europe – between the centre and the periphery, and between
rich and poor regions – a priority. The CRPM played a key role at the end of
the 1980s in the gradual institutionalisation of representation of local and
regional powers to the European Commission.
26. Essonne, Saine Saint-Denis, Val de Marne and Val d’Oise in 1999, Seine et
Marne in 2001.
27. With 14 researchers per 1,000 inhabitants, the Ile-de-France is the foremost
region in Europe for technological research (with 6.2% of European patents)
and the second for academic research (with 5.8% of European publications).
Employment is led by the service industries (which represent 83% of total
employment), in particular by knowledge-intensive business services which198 Notes
have been central to job creation over the last ten years. It is also the pre-
mier tourist region in the world, with more than 45 million visitors in
2004.
28. Agglomeration communities consist of a commune of at least 15,000 inhabi-
tants (or a prefecture with less than 15,000 inhabitants) and its independent
suburbs.
29. The European interregional space Bretagne–Pays de la Loire–Poitou-
Charentes was created in 2005 with eight permanent members of staff.
Brittany however retained a dedicated presence to deal with more specifically
Breton affairs.
30. Interview at the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, France
section, December 2008.
31. Interview at the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, France
section, December 2008.
6 Regions and Territorial Governance
1. Although the abolition of the local business tax reduced the fiscal auton-
omy of the regions, they remain relatively unencumbered by debt, unlike
the departments, for example.
2. From 1947 until 1992, modernisation and infrastructure-building in France
were carried out on the basis of a five-year National Plan. The decentralisa-
tion which came into force from 1981 necessarily impacted how the Plan was
developed and managed. The law of 29 July 1982, which addressed reform of
the planning process, introduced contracts between state and region. Article
11, paragraph 3 states that ‘the planning contract agreed between the state
and the region defines the actions that the state and region contractually
commit to undertaking jointly during the timescale of the plan.’ This new
approach to planning and implementing territorial projects aimed to achieve
the strategic goal of aligning national and regional objectives, and to create a
partnership which would formalise the reciprocal commitments of the state
and its partners.
3. State–region project contracts (contrats de projets Etat–région) is the new
term for state–region planning contracts (contrats de plan Etat–régions) (both
abbreviated to CPER).
4. 1984–1989; 1989–1993; 1994–1999; 2000–2006 et 2007–2013.
5. Nicolas Jacquet, delegate for territorial development, quoted in Rapport
d’information sur l’exécution des contrats de plan Etat–Région et la programmation
des fonds européens, Assemblée nationale, June 2005.
6. For instance, several French regions have developed energy plans, regional
schemes for transport and travel, tourism, natural heritage and biodiversity,
and cultural heritage, and regional plans for agriculture and fishing, regional
strategies for ports and airports; plus charters for coastal, rural, and mountain
areas.
7. For Pierre Nora (1984: 8), ‘memory is the frame rather than what it frames,
an issue which is always live, a set of strategies, a being-there which is less
important for what it is, than for what we make of it’.
8. See previous chapter.Notes 199
9. An agglomeration community (French: communauté d’agglomération) is a
metropolitan government structure consisting of a commune of at least
15,000 inhabitants (or a prefecture with less than 15,000 inhabitants) and
its independent suburbs.
10. In so doing, Jean-Yves Le Drian institutionalised practices which existed
in the 1980s–1990s. Thus, in 1993, the regional council created a regional
coordination committee which brought together the four departments and
the eight major cities in Brittany. Similarly, in October 1998, the presi-
dent of the regional council (Josselin de Rohan) and the four presidents of
the departmental councils in Brittany met to agree a regional coordination
arrangement so that they would ‘speak with one voice to the state and to
Europe’.
11. The groups cover all sectors of economic activity: initial and ongoing train-
ing, higher education and research, agriculture and agri-food businesses,
sea-related economic activities, communication and transport, economic
development and energy, environment, cultural, social and sporting activ-
ities, territorial development and planning and tourism.
12. The region designated the pays as the appropriate territorial level for public
policy in the mid-1990s. Since 2000 it has drawn up multi-year contracts
with the Breton pays concerning development priorities.
13. See Chapter 3.
14. Interview, departmental council, Côtes d’Armor, March 1998.
15. In addition to the high-speed line between Brittany and the Pays de la Loire
(Connerré – Rennes), which was deemed to be in the public interest on
26 October 2007, the operation to improve the rail links between Rennes and
Brest and Rennes and Quimper, which had been included in the state–region
project contract, Brittany 2007–2013, involved adapting the infrastructure to
allow an increase in speed limit to 180–220km/h over certain sections of the
line.
16. Interview, Yves Morvan, president of the Brittany CESR (Conseil
économique, social et environnemental régional/Regional economic, social
and environmental council), September 1998.
17. Interview, Secrétaire général aux affaires régionales for Brittany, Novem-
ber 2007.
18. Other regions, such as Brittany, have since also established this type of body.
19. The Syndicat des transports d’Ile-de-France or the Ile-de-France water author-
ity (Syndicat des Eaux d’Ile-de-France), for example.
20. It is both a forward-planning document for regional development – it
replaces the Schéma régional d’aménagement et de développement du ter-
ritoire (SRADT) – and a prescriptive urban planning document; in other
words the local planning documents have to dovetail with its provisions
(i.e. respect its overall direction and not compromise the achievement of its
objectives). See Chapter 4.
21. The Essonne and Val-de-Marne departments have, for example, together
organised the ‘Assises du pôle Orly’ (The Orly Hub Conference), to which
the region was invited on the basis of its areas of responsibility, not because
of its role heading up regional development initiatives.
22. Taken from the speech by Bernard Landrieux, préfet of the Ile-de-France, at
the general meeting concerning the SDRIF, 29 November 2006.200 Notes
23. ‘Paris is the only urban centre in France not to have an urban community
(communauté urbaine: an inter-communal structure with the capacity to levy
its own taxes). Despite the fact that is the largest and the most strategic of the
regions, intercommunality here has meant creating a perimeter which con-
tains nothing of real substance. As for the departments, how can we compare
the role of a department within the inner ring with that of a rural depart-
ment? And yet they have the same powers, the same taxation status, the
same structure.’ Taken from the speech by Nicolas Sarkozy at the opening of
satellite terminal no. 3, Roissy Charles de Gaulle airport, 26 June 2007.
24. Presided over by the Région Bretagne and the five departments of ‘Historic
Brittany’ [i.e. including the Loire-Atlantique department], the highlight of
Breizh Touch was the Breizh parade, a procession of Breton musicians and
dancers along the Champs-Élysées, broadcast live on TF1. With around 20
famous Bretons as patrons (including Vincent Bolloré, Bernard Hinault,
François Pinault, Patrick Poivre d’Arvor and Alan Stivell), the project
attracted controversy, as much over the cost (2.5 million) as over the
particular image of Brittany that it projected.
25. This rhetoric of truth operates via the language of evidence: it is a scientific
and technical response to a social need, which the responder feels uniquely
qualified to provide (Paradeise 1985).
26. See Chapter 4.
27. Interview with the regional director of the CNFPT (Centre national de la
fonction publique territorial (National centre for the regional civil service),
September 2009.
28. For example, since 2008 the Ile-de-France region has been developing 3-year
support plans for a number of sectors which it has identified: optics, life
sciences, transport, multimedia, services à la personne (care and domestic ser-
vices), financial services, tourism, eco-businesses and engineering and the
creative industries. The model is broadly similar in Brittany, where a dis-
tinction is made between ‘sectors rooted in the Breton economy’ (agro-food
industries, ship-building and repair, the car industry, information and com-
munication technology) and ‘emerging sectors’ (eco-construction, renewable
energies).
29. See chapters 4 and 5.
30. Similarly, the regions may decide whether or not to build lycées, and how
big they will be, but they do not decide the content of the courses which are
taught there. They finance the facilities, but have no influence over school
curricula.
31. Press release from the ARF, 15 April 2010: ‘Despite initial discussions with
the state, in the end the ARF was excluded from the negotiations concern-
ing responsibility for the unemployed who are no longer entitled to claim
benefit ( . . . ). The regions condemn both the methods employed and the
unacceptable recentralising attitude of the state, and, particularly during
this time of profound economic crisis which will leave a growing number
of our fellow citizens by the wayside, recalls the absolute necessity of work-
ing together to steer employment and professional training policy at regional
level.’
32. The DIACT (Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement et à la compéti-
tivité des territoires; Interministerial delegation for regional planning andNotes 201
competitiveness) commissioned Ernst and Young to assess the CPERs for the
2000–2006 period.
33. With 3.28 billion at stake, transport remained the principle sector for
which contracts were drawn up, but these contracts essentially concerned
passenger or freight rail projects; followed by higher education and research,
with contracts worth 2.9 billion for research projects, university estate
projects, or projects which aimed to improve student accommodation. Next
came the environment and sustainable development (2.19 billion), with a
focus on the challenges of natural risks, saving energy, and promoting renew-
able energies. Finally we should note that the CPERs might also include
projects with a territorial component which benefit particular local, urban,
or rural areas – for example, natural parks with a focus on predefined themes
such as the battle against climate change.
34. At the same time, the state decided to develop two national development
plans alongside the CPERs, in the areas of higher education and rail trans-
port: the plan to renew the rail network in 2006, and the plan campus in 2008
(5 billion).
35. ‘Rapport d’information sur la réforme des contrats de plan Etat–régions,
Assemblé nationale,’ 12 October 2004.
36. Cf. CPER Nord Pas-de-Calais. Bilan qualitatif 2000–2006, Conseil régional et
Préfecture de région, 2006. There are four regions whose rate of program-
ming (meaning the total value of the projects which have been approved
by a programme committee, in relation to the amount stipulated in the
contract.) is much higher than the average: Brittany, Provence-Alpes-Côte-
d’Azur, Lorraine and Poitou-Charentes. In contrast, the four overseas depart-
ments and regions recorded rates of programming of around 60%, and
sometimes even lower.
37. Interview, ARF, October 2008.
38. In 2004 the debates centred on a number of issues: should the contract
arrangement be retained? If so, for what timescale? The senate proposed
reducing the contract period to 3 years; however, in the end the government
accepted the necessity to maintain a longer-term timeframe.
39. For more on this, see Chapter 4.
40. See above.
Conclusion: Regional Power and Territorial Differentiation
1. See Table I.3, Introduction.
2. With the possible exception of New Caledonia, whose economic self-
determination is potentially assured by nickel mining.You can also read
