Police Powers and Public Assemblies: Learning from the Clapham Common 'Vigil' during the Covid-19 Pandemic
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Article
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Police Powers and Public Assemblies:
Learning from the Clapham Common ‘Vigil’
during the Covid-19 Pandemic
Clifford Stott *, Matt Radburn *, Geoff Pearson*, Arabella Kyprianides *,
Mark Harrison * and David Rowlands *
Abstract The policing of peaceful public assembly during the Covid-19 pandemic has been one of the most central
challenges to police legitimacy. This is arguably because mass gatherings are assumed to carry a high risk of conta-
gion yet, at the same time, peaceful public assembly is a protected human right. In this article, we explore this issue
by using a case study to provide a detailed chronological interactional analysis of the policing operation surrounding
a highly controversial public assembly that took place on Clapham Common in March 2021 in London, England.
We explore the utility of a research and theory-based model for public order policing in pandemics as a framework
for understanding the way the event evolved and identifying what lessons can be learnt for policing assemblies, both
in future pandemics and more generally. We contend that ambiguity in the application of emergency powers and
the potential for heavy fines to be applied using the legislation created a divergence between stakeholders and culmi-
nated in a leadership vacuum among protesters. Moreover, the context of acute political sensitivity led to a highly
centralized public order operation that limited the capacity of police to enact dialogue-based solutions when leader-
ship (re)emerged during the event. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis for understanding the
inherent dangers of regulatory frameworks that place too heavy a burden of discretionary power into the hands of
police in determining whether public assemblies are ‘lawful’, and under what conditions they can occur.
Introduction entailed powerful legal restrictions on fundamental
In most countries, ‘non-pharmaceutical interven- rights. Police forces globally have struggled to ex-
tions’ to control the Covid-19 pandemic have ercise these extensive new powers legitimately and
*Clifford Stott, Professor, School of Psychology, Keele University, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK. E-mail: c.stott@keele.ac.uk
*Matt Radburn, Research Fellow in Policing, School of Psychology, Keele University, UK
*Geoff Pearson, Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK
*Arabella Kyprianides, Research Fellow in Policing at UCL, Department of Security and Crime Science, University College
London, UK
*Mark Harrison, Professor, Faculty of History, University of Oxford, UK
*David Rowlands, Research Fellow in Policing, School of Psychology, Keele University, UK
Policing, Volume 00, Number 0, pp. 1–22
doi:10.1093/police/paab060
C The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
V
For permissions please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com2 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
indeed lawfully, in what have been unprecedented, seekers, veterans’ rights, and loyalist–nationalist ten-
complex, and highly ambiguous circumstances sions in Scotland.2 By September, when large anti-
(Kyprianides et al., 2021). As Tomes (2010, p. 52) lockdown demonstrations occurred in London and
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noted in her historical study of the 1918–19 global other cities, some of these different issues coalesced
influenza outbreak, these kinds of pandemics are into what became, in essence, an anti-authoritarian
diseases of the ‘crowd’ rather than of the ‘house’ platform.3 The protean nature of these gatherings
and as such physical gathering is generally was perhaps a function of a context where social
assumed to pose a high risk of contagion. Thus, norms and expectations concerning epidemic control
management of peaceful public assembly was al- were evolving and hotly contested. But the intercon-
ways going to be a central challenge for policing nected nature of these protests and challenges they
during Covid-19.1 However, peaceful public as- posed for policing were already evident.4
sembly is both a protected human right and a pri-
mary means through which people can and do Fairness in police–citizen encounters
exercise their democratic entitlements to protest When it comes to the right to protest within a pan-
perceived injustices. demic, the legitimacy of police action is framed by a
legislative context that can be perceived very differ-
The complexity of protest and resistance in ently by different groups (c.f. Radburn et al., 2018).
pandemics On the one hand, in the UK, the right to protest
This powerful objective tension began to confront peacefully is protected under the Human Rights Act
the police of liberal democracies early in the pan- (1998; HRA; Mead, 2010). Section 6(1) of the HRA
demic, when, in May 2020, George Floyd was mur- provides that ‘It is unlawful for a public authority
dered by a police officer in Minneapolis, USA. The to act in a way which is incompatible with a
incident symbolized for many the historically Convention right.’ This places a direct duty upon
embedded racist inequalities of policing, which police not to act in a way that infringes the rights
evidence suggests were being further amplified by granted to citizens under the European Convention
the pandemic (SPI-B, 2020; Harris et al., 2021). on Human Rights (ECHR). Specifically, the ECHR
Subsequent Black Lives Matter demonstrations protects the right of people to peacefully assemble
developed in multiple cities across the world, sev- and enjoy free expression. Furthermore, in addition
eral transitioning into riots. to the duty placed on police not to infringe ECHR
Over the course of the summer 2020, in the UK, rights, Article 1 ECHR and European Court of
the substantive issues of demonstrations, as well as Human Rights jurisprudence also create a ‘positive
matters arising from their policing, became entangled obligation’ for the police ‘to secure the effective en-
with other concerns including protests against asylum joyment of these rights’5; this is often seen as a duty
1
The actual risks are difficult to determine as evidence is fragmentary and sometimes points in different directions. Numerous
factors also mediate transmission, including wearing face coverings and social distancing. See: https://www.canterbury.ac.uk/sci
ence-engineering-and-social-sciences/spear/docs/REPORT-Outdoor-Transmission-of-COVID-19.pdf; https://www.sciencemedia
centre.org/expert-comments-about-outdoor-transmission-of-sars-cov-2-and-use-of-facemasks-outdoors/
2
For example, https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/asylum-seekers-protest-glasgow-claiming-22286803; https://www.not
tinghampost.com/news/nottingham-news/reaction-after-huge-protest-nottingham-4449282
3
https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-protesters-and-police-officer-hurt-in-clashes-at-anti-lockdown-rally-in-central-
london-12082468; https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/police-clash-anti-lockdown-protesters-london-73116707
4
As the first phase of lockdown formally lifted, and into the summer 2020, there were multiple instances where police
sought to break up gatherings, including football celebrations, house parties, raves, and ‘block-parties’. Other less-formal
large group gatherings in parks and other public places, such as beaches, also posed challenges for policing the Public
Health regulations.Police powers and public assemblies Article Policing 3
to facilitate protest. On the other hand, in the con- (CoP/NPCC, 2020).7 The approach was developed
text of the pandemic, the emergency legislation to ensure policing of the new emergency powers
restricted people’s rights to assemble and there was would be more likely to be seen by the public as
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considerable political pressure on the police to pre- fair and therefore legitimate. Thus, officers are
vent people from gathering and criticism of them instructed to first Engage in conversation before
for perceived failures to act.6 This suggests a distinc- Explaining the importance of following the public
tion needs to be made between actions that are le- health guidance. Should this dialogue-based inter-
gally, tactically, or operationally valid and their vention be unsuccessful the next stage is to further
strategic or political implications (c.f. Cronin and Encourage people to comply and only if these
Reicher, 2009). steps fail should officers move to Enforce through
However, the perceived legitimacy of policing is issuing fines, making arrests, or using force.
important also from theoretical perspectives. However, despite this impact upon operational
Procedural Justice Theory (PJT; Tyler, 1990) and practice, there are powerful questions about if, and
its associated research suggest that adherence to how, this PJT-based approach applies to the policing
the law, or ‘self-regulating’, are critically depend- of public assemblies during pandemics; not least of
ent on the extent to which ‘citizens’ experience the all because these assemblies can involve communities
police as an appropriate and legitimate authority. where there are already high levels of distrust in the
It is a widely shared interpretation of PJT that the police (c.f. Kyprianides et al., 2020). For example, re-
primary pathway by which officers construct legit- search from the USA suggests that procedurally just
imacy and compliance is through ‘procedural fair- policing did little to positively influence the attitudes
ness’ achieved by enacting four ‘rules’ in their of individuals who already felt high levels of antip-
interactions with members of the public. These athy towards the police. Conversely, those with al-
are: (1) that police officers should treat people ready high levels of belief in the legitimacy of the
with dignity and respect; (2) that the police should police were more likely to see police interventions as
be transparent in their decision-making; (3) that just (Worden and McLean, 2017; see also Radburn
officers should provide citizens the opportunity et al., 2018). Moreover, research from the UK on po-
for voice (‘to tell their side of the story’); and (4) lice stops and searches8 found that while officers typ-
that the police should demonstrate that they are ically followed the correct procedures and were
acting benevolently in that their motives are courteous and communicative, this appeared to have
‘trustworthy’. little effect in terms of how citizens from urban
The impact of the theory upon policing in the working-class communities in the north of England
UK during the Covid-19 pandemic has been fun- responded to them (Pearson and Rowe 2020).
damental. Specifically, its central tenets have been Thus, as Waddington and colleagues noted, it
the conceptual rationale of the policing approach should not be assumed there is a ‘coherent, unitary
adopted nationally through what is referred as the public standard of what is acceptable and satisfac-
‘4Es’ guidance, produced jointly by the College of tory police conduct’ (2015, p. 212). Any such
Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council mechanistic reading of PJT is further challenged in
5
Wilson and the National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96,
ECHR 2002-V Para 41.
6
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coronavirus-lockdown-priti-patel-wants-police-to-stop-protests-of-more-than-two-
zdpv3xczx
7
CoP/NPCC, 2020. Engage, Explain, Encourage, Enforce—applying the four ‘E’s. UK: College of Policing.
8
See Code A of the Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for information on the statutory powers relating to stop and
search: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117611/pace-code-a-
2011.pdf4 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
public order contexts. In typical encounters, it is meaningful and made possible through participants
assumed that the laws and procedural rules are adopting a shared group-level self-definition, or so-
relatively clear and mutually established. For ex- cial identity. This social identity provides the per-
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ample, that officers should explain why they are spective from which common meanings are derived
carrying out a stop, or a search, or making an ar- which then acts as the psychological basis for collect-
rest, and can defer responsibility for their actions ive actions, leadership, social influence, and inter-
to objective and well-tested aspects of ‘the law’.9 group relations during crowd events (Reicher, 1987;
Public order policing, and particularly the policing c.f. Turner et al., 1994).
of protest, however, places far more responsibility Fundamental to ESIM is the idea that social iden-
upon senior officers to set the ‘ground rules’ of tity is merely one element of a broader intergroup
what gatherings can take place, where, when, and process (Stott and Reicher, 1998). Therefore, crowd
under what conditions. For example, in the UK events are conceptualized as typically intergroup
under the Public Order Act 1986, the law being encounters within which social identities can be
enforced by the police is often the law made by the radically transformed from one moment to the
police in the hours, days, and weeks before the next. Indeed, several studies have identified how a
protest.10 specific pattern of interaction between police and
crowd participants acts as the basis for identity
Legitimacy and the policing of crowds change and therefore to the initiation and spread of
As Jones (2020, p. 2) argues in his article on the fu- collective conflict. First, there needs to be an asym-
ture impacts of pandemic policing, ‘research con- metry in how participants view themselves (e.g. as a
sistently shows that whether the public trusts the legitimate and peaceful assembly) relative to how
police and views it as legitimate has important con- the police perceive the crowd (e.g. as an illegitimate
sequences of whether or not people obey the law’ presence or threat). Second, the police need to im-
(citing Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Mazerolle et al., pose their interpretation of the situation using force
2013; Terrill et al., 2016). As with PJT, research in or other means of coercion in ways that are per-
the field of public order suggests that perceptions of ceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate by crowd
police legitimacy are also central to understanding participants. Third, the subsequent identity change
the extent to which people resist or comply with it means that crowd participants increasingly judge
by ‘self-regulating’ collective behaviour within that they have the legitimate right to resist and to
crowds (Stott et al., 2007; 2008). Specifically, the become collectively empowered to confront police
Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behav- actions (e.g. Reicher, 1996; Drury and Reicher,
iour (ESIM) rejects the still commonly assumed 2000). However, while research has demonstrated
idea that crowds preclude individual consciousness that the forms of identity change and the percep-
in ways that release underlying atavistic tendencies tions of police (il)legitimacy associated with conflict
toward violent and antisocial behaviour (e.g. Le within crowd events can endure far beyond the ini-
Bon, 1895; Zimbardo, 1969).11 Instead, the theory tial encounters in question (e.g. Vestergren et al.,
proposes that collective action in crowds is 2018; Livingstone, 2021), the extent to which, and
9
See the ‘GOWISELY’ stop and search guidance from the College of Policing: https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-con
tent/stop-and-search/professional/
10
For example, section 12 allows the imposition of conditions upon public processions, and section 14 allows the impos-
ition of conditions upon public assemblies. A person who then ‘knowingly’ breaches a condition will be committing a crim-
inal offence. The Policing, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Bill 2021 will extend these powers and sanctions further.
11
See for example https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-05-23/the-mob-made-me-do-it-rioters-claim-jan-
6-crowd-at-faultPolice powers and public assemblies Article Policing 5
how, these ESIM dynamics and PJT-derived polic- Drawing upon social identity-based theories of
ing approaches apply to policing public assemblies collective resilience in disasters (see Drury, 2020 for a
in the context of a pandemic is opaque. recent overview) these authors suggested that NPTs
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should be empowered to support the specific needs
The current study and requirements of neighbourhoods and ‘scaffold’
In this study, we advance the literature by providing existing and emerging community resilience (Mao
a detailed empirical case study of the policing of a et al., 2020). Consequently, if and where ‘public
public assembly during a specific phase of the UK’s order’ tactics were judged to be necessary, the NPTs
could be firmly integrated within the public order re-
pandemic response. We do so to explore the capacity
sponse to ensure such interventions would be based
of these existing theoretical models to understand
upon an understanding of local sensitivities. The
how one specific event evolved and developed. We
public order deployments could also then draw
also use our analysis to examine the extent to which
upon local KINS to help de-escalate or otherwise
it conformed with, or deviated from, the model set
more proportionately target any coercion or use of
out by Stott et al. (2020). Our ambition is to use
force judged to be necessary. However, due to the
detailed empirical analysis to learn lessons from the
economic austerity faced by police in the UK across
pandemic to broaden both theoretical understanding
the last decade, Neighbourhood Policing has been se-
and operational knowledge of how to approach the
verely depleted as NPTs have been diverted into
policing of public assemblies both within future
higher priority Response policing (Pearson and
mass emergencies and more generally.
Rowe, 2020, see also HMIC, 2012, p. 7)12 and at pre-
It is self-evident that the Covid-19 pandemic has
sent the utility of this theoretical model remains
created a complex, rapidly evolving, and highly am-
underexplored empirically (c.f. Drury et al., 2015).
biguous policing landscape (Jones, 2020). As a re-
sult, during its early stages, Reicher and Stott
(2020) and Stott et al. (2020) drew upon both Method
ESIM and PJT to propose a theory and research- The empirical section of this study provides an
based model for public order policing in the pan- evidence-based interactional analysis of what
demic. They suggest that to avoid inadvertently turned out to be a highly controversial episode of
escalating conflict, public order policing should crowd policing that took place on Clapham
build on a bedrock of local Neighbourhood Common in London in March 2021. We selected
Policing Teams (NPTs), prioritizing partnerships this event for several reasons. First, it was an event
within their local communities. Through this day- that began as a peaceful crowd assembly but trans-
to-day approach, police forces could develop and formed into one involving police use of force and
foster ‘key individual networks’ (KINS) within their conflict. Second, it was an event that resulted in
local areas, including influential members of diverse widespread accusations of police illegitimacy
communities and organizations. In partnership which provoked a formal inquiry requested by the
with the KINS, the role of the NPTs would be to UK’s Home Secretary. Third, it was the first of a
undertake regular community assessments designed sequence of protest events during the pandemic
to gain a sense of the impact of the pandemic upon that began in London but subsequently spread to
the local community and the on-the-ground ‘look other cities in England, so it is important to focus
and feel’ of urban neighbourhoods. on because of its potential role as a ‘catalyst’ event.
12
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/policing-in-austerity-one-year-on.pdf6 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
Having selected this assembly, we draw upon a On 9 March, the Metropolitan Police Service
body of secondary data that emerged from it. In (MPS) announced that Wayne Couzens, one of its
this regard, we utilize the report of an official in- serving officers, had been arrested in connection
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quiry into the policing of the event conducted by with her disappearance. The following day,
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary and Everard’s body was found and, on 12 March,
Fire and Rescue Service (HMICFRS). We then sup- Couzens was formally charged with her kidnap
plemented and cross-referenced this with video and murder. The significance of this lies not mere-
data and testimonies gathered from several sources ly in the fact that a woman walking alone at night
including mainstream media and people ‘live was abducted and murdered but that the male
streaming’ directly from the event, accessible implicated was a serving police officer. The legit-
through social media. We also draw upon testimo- imacy of the MPS was further challenged at this
nies provided by the MPS Commissioner and re- time due to accusations that as early as 8 March,
sponsible Assistant Commissioner provided to a officers had been ‘knocking on doors’ and advising
UK Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee. women to remain at home for their own safety.13
We triangulated this evidence to explore the context On 10 March, a locally based organization
and planning of the police operation and to build a emerged from within Lambeth called ‘Reclaim
detailed understanding of the evolving chronology of These Streets’ (RTS). The organization included
the event. Throughout, we draw upon the data to ex- two women elected as local councillors, one of
plore both the pattern of police–crowd interactions whom sent an email later that evening to the bor-
and the social–psychological dynamics of the gather- ough police commander and to the assistant dir-
ing as it unfolded throughout the afternoon and into ector of community safety at Lambeth Council,
the early evening. Using this approach, we provide a informing them of RTS’s intention to organize a
temporal chronology that is subdivided into three vigil in memory of Sarah Everard to be held on
main sections relating to pre-, during, and post-event Clapham Common on Saturday 13 March.
phases. Each main section is then further divided
into different thematic and descriptive subsections, Centralized decision-making. An assembly
designed to draw out both the temporal ordering but of this kind would normally be dealt with by police
also the theoretical relevance of the processes we sug- within the local borough. However, according to
gest were taking place during these phases. the Commissioner, because of the pandemic, the
MPS had centralized its decision-making in rela-
Analysis tionship to policing public assembly.14 As a result,
the event was brought to the attention of the MPS
The pre-event phase HQ Southern command, New Scotland Yard
(NSY). According to the HMICFRS, in the after-
A growing context of police (il)legitimacy. noon of 11 May, a meeting took place between the
On 3 March 2021, Sarah Everard, a 33-year-old two local councillors involved in RTS, some senior
woman, went missing in the vicinity of Clapham community safety and public protection officials
Common in the borough of Lambeth in London. from Lambeth Council, representatives of Lambeth
13
https://www.mylondon.news/news/south-london-news/sarah-everard-missing-women-clapham-19992681. Allegations
that HMICFRS asserted they could find no evidence to support. Yet Baroness Jenny Jones responded to the House of Lords
on 11 March that the best route to women’s safety would instead be a curfew imposed on men. https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2021/mar/13/men-curfew-sarah-everard-women-adapt-violence
14
https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/83/home-affairs-committee/news/155078/home-affairs-committee-to-take-
evidence-from-met-commissioner-cressida-dick/Police powers and public assemblies Article Policing 7
Borough command, and the operations and events obligation upon public authorities, including the
unit at NSY. police, not to act in a way that is incompatible
At the meeting, detailed plans were put forward with them.15 This includes the rights under ECHR
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by RTS concerning how they believed they could Articles 10 and 11 to Freedom of Expression and
manage the event safely. They proposed that the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
vigil would begin at 6 pm and last for 1 h. Given it which would be engaged by the planned vigil. This
was to take place in the open air they judged that meant that peaceful public assembly should not be
it would be relatively safe. Moreover, the ‘organis- prohibited by a police force unless primary legisla-
ers had registered for NHS track and trace QR tion could not be interpreted in any other way, or
codes and all vigil communication stated the need unless the interference was necessary and propor-
for masks to be worn. . . A separate press area was tionate for one of the reasons set out in Articles
to be established as well as missing child points 10(2)/11(2). Given that the regulations were a
and a public address system to prevent crowding. statutory instrument rather than primary legisla-
Hand sanitisers had been ordered and the organis- tion the former reason did not allow such an inter-
ers proposed to enlist 40 volunteers to ensure ference by MPS.
safety and support social distancing’ (HMICFRS, Lambeth borough command was apparently
2021, p. 15). In other words, RTS had put forward present at the initial meeting with RTS, and it
what appears to have been a coherent plan of how appears that aware of the impact of the murder
to manage the public safety threats posed by the within their local community, were keen to facili-
potential gathering. tate the assembly. For example, HMICFRS states
that ‘some Lambeth-based police officers appear
The emergency legislation. At that time, the to have adopted a more receptive stance to the
Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions; All idea of a vigil as proposed by RTS, before the in-
Tiers; England) Regulations 2020 was in place, volvement of the Directorate of Legal Services and
which prohibited individuals leaving their home, more senior personnel from New Scotland Yard’
or assembling with more than one other person (p. 44). Indeed, HMICFRS was explicit in their re-
outside the same household unless those individu- port that police opinion at the initial planning
als had ‘reasonable excuse’. The legislation pro- meeting was divided. They state that ‘from our
vided a list of some 20 reasonable—and therefore interviews, we sensed that many participants
lawful—excuses. It is apparent that the MPS con- (including some police officers) felt that support-
sidered this list to be exhaustive and given that ing the event was the right thing to do for the
protest was not listed, they took the view that the community.’ Moreover, the vigil organizers were
vigil would therefore be illegal. The MPS had been aware of ‘a difference in opinion between Lambeth
holding this view for some time and had been dis- police officers and those from New Scotland Yard
persing other gatherings on that basis. In her state- (NSY)’ and that ‘organizers believed that local
ment to the Select Committee, the Commissioner Lambeth officers wanted to adopt a more collab-
was clear that the MPS placed a priority on polic- orative approach and understood the trust that
ing restrictions consistently and therefore that for needed to be rebuilt with the community, given
these reasons the vigil should not go ahead. the circumstances of Sarah Everard’s death.’
However, this was a contentious position be- Nonetheless, regardless of the validity of the
cause at the same time the HRA 1998 places an various positions, it is evident that the meeting
15
HRA sections 6, see above.8 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
between the stakeholders was characterized by am- any progress and was adjourned pending the out-
biguity and disagreement. HMICFRS concluded come of the hearing. Nonetheless, as one news art-
that while ‘both parties were in receipt of legal ad- icle later claimed, a leaked NPCC memo sent to all
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vice’ it was clear that ‘views differed’ on how it Chief Constables following the meeting made clear,
should be interpreted and that the legal ‘picture was ‘the message from Patel and the government before
uncertain’ (p. 16). As a result, at the end of the the vigil had been clear, that a ban on gatherings
meeting RTS informed the MPS that they planned had to be enforced’,16 but that, as the HMICFRS
to challenge their decision in the High Court and a put it, ‘a police interviewee suggested that, as the
hearing was subsequently set for Friday 12 March. afternoon went on, the Government support wasn’t
forthcoming in the manner expected and the antici-
Onto a national stage. While the death of pated message from the Home Secretary was
Sarah Everard and the arrest of Couzens was al- watered down’ (HMIC, 2021, p. 19).
ready a high-profile news story, on the morning of
12 March, the policing of it entered the national Reinforcing the power of police to define
arena. At 8 am, the NPCC held its weekly meeting the law. The High Court hearing took place
of ‘Operation Talla’, the UK’s pre-established na- later that afternoon, at 3.45 pm, and by this time
tional coordinating body for the Covid-19 policing the policing of the vigil had become one of the
response. The meeting brings together a representa- main national news stories. The subsequent judge-
tive body of Chief Constables and plays the key role ment was complex and interpreted in contrasting
in setting a national framework for policing policy ways by the stakeholders. On the one hand, the
and guidance during the pandemic. Given the fact judge declined to make the legal declarations
that vigils were by this time being planned in mul- requested by the legal team representing RTS. In
tiple towns and cities across the UK, it is perhaps so doing it reaffirmed that, in the context of the
unsurprising that the policing approach to them pandemic and under specific circumstances,
was a primary matter of discussion. According to peaceful public gatherings could have restrictions
HMICFRS, this powerful national committee was placed around them by the police rendering them
‘united in the view that the All-Tiers Regulations unlawful. Thus, while no blanket ban on protests
needed to be adhered to and enforced if necessary, existed because of sections 2 and 6 of the HRA, the
and that vigils should not go ahead’ (p. 19). police were entitled to interfere with the qualified
Immediately afterward, it also appears that the rights of assembly and expression for one of the
position of the Op Talla meeting was fed into a reasons stated in Articles10(2)/11(2), which
Ministerial-level meeting. According to HMICFRS, included protection of public health. However,
the Home Secretary was represented by her interferences on these grounds could only take
Personal Private Secretary who expressed general place if proportionate and necessary, which would
agreement with the NPCC position and promised depend entirely upon the specific circumstances in
that supportive communications from the Home place at the time. As HMICFRS then concluded,
Secretary would be issued later that day. ‘the more effective the measures to manage the
Subsequently, there was a second meeting between risk to public health at a protest, the more likely it
the Council, Police, and RTS, where it is evident is that [the protest] will be lawful under the All-
that the position of the stakeholders had become Tiers Regulations. However, there may be circum-
divided. The meeting appears to have made little, if stances in which the threat to public health is
16
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/19/priti-patel-wanted-police-stop-people-gathering-sarah-everard-vigilPolice powers and public assemblies Article Policing 9
simply too great and a planned protest cannot law- gathering. Their position was apparently based
fully go ahead’ (p. 24). The court ruling meant upon their localized threat assessment that thou-
that it would be left to the police to make that sands of people would be converging on Lambeth
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judgement, but having done so they may later who would pose significant threats of spreading the
have to defend that decision in a court of law. virus.18 As the meeting was progressing, the MPS
On the other hand, the judgement reaffirmed issued a public statement asking people not to at-
that the HRA had primacy and that the All-Tiers tend.19 In contrast ‘organisers believed that they
regulations had to be applied in a manner consist- were meeting with the Metropolitan Police to agree
ent with the ECHR. Thus, under specific circum- a way for the vigil to take place’ and had come
stances, people gathering peacefully and in a ‘safe’ armed with a plan of how to mitigate these poten-
manner could claim that protest provided a ‘rea- tial harms (p. 25). Moreover, such was now the
sonable excuse’, even though this was not explicitly profile and significance of this event, that both the
listed in the regulations. As the judge held, ‘it is in- organizers and the local council judged it would still
appropriate to treat the 2020 Regulations as if they take place despite its formal cancellation. Indeed,
give rise to a blanket prohibition on gatherings for Harriet Harman QC MP and Chair of the
protest’ (HMICFRS, 2021, p. 22). As HMICFRS Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights
subsequently explained, this is because when people sent a letter to the MPS Commissioner asking that
were ‘exercising the human right to protest, they she: ‘. . . confirm that in view of the fact that
may have a reasonable excuse to what would other- Parliament has not specifically acted to constrain
wise be a criminal offence under the All-Tiers the right to demonstrate, so long as social distanc-
Regulations’ (p. 22). HMICFRS also concluded ing is observed this vigil will be perfectly lawful. I
that, given ‘the current public health concerns, the look forward to hearing from you, and also wish to
decision about whether a protest would be lawful let you know that I will be attending the vigil my-
will very probably need to include whether and self.’ (p. 18).
what risk assessments have been conducted, According to the HMICFRS, the council’s view
whether social distancing will be adhered to and was that the cancellation ‘increased the risk fac-
maintained, and any other measures that may assist tors. They feared there was potential for things to
in managing the risk to public health, such as mar- go wrong and felt that it may have been better to
shalling’ (p. 24) As the barrister for RTS argued, the go ahead with organisers on board’ (p. 26).
judgement meant for RTS that the ball was ‘in the However, given that organizers could consequently
MPS’s court to tell the organizers how this event be subjected to heavy fines, RTS judged it neces-
can take place lawfully’.17 sary to withdraw from negotiations, publicly an-
nounce the cancellation of the vigil and actively
A leadership vacuum among protesters.
distance themselves from any role in organizing it.
Shortly after the judgement was announced, a final
As one of the organizers subsequently stated:
meeting took place involving the MPS and RTS,
where the MPS stuck rigidly to their initial pos- We made many suggestions to the po-
ition asserting that ‘the court decision hadn’t lice and the [MPS] about how to do
changed anything’ (HMICFRS, 2021, p. 24) and as it, including staggering start times,
such they would not positively facilitate the splitting the event in time slots, all
17
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-56379248
18
https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/83/home-affairs-committee/news/155078/home-affairs-committee-to-take-
evidence-from-met-commissioner-cressida-dick/
19
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/03/12/sarah-everard-vigil-high-court-refuses-intervene-police-ban/10 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
ideas to make sure we can accommo- assemblies for protest would, at that time, be in-
date the police. I want to be really herently illegal. Nonetheless, here HMICFRS also
clear that while the Lambeth police took the view that the subsequent operational ap-
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were present, they were very positive, proach was appropriate, primarily because the
they were engaging with us quite a lot MPS understood that ongoing assessments of
and it was a very constructive discus- threat and risk would be needed. As they con-
sion. Scotland Yard would not engage cluded, their overall strategic and tactical approach
with us in discussion and did not ‘expressly considers protesters’ rights under
want to help us to work to ensure Articles 10 and 11 and identifies the need to decide
that a legal Covid secure vigil could what is a necessary and proportionate policing re-
take place. We were obviously very sponse in the individual circumstances of the case’
upset because we were convinced that (p. 28).
we could have made it happen in a Shortly after midday, people began to gather on
safe and legal way. But we had to Clapham Common and coalesce around the band-
make a decision and came together stand. According to video footage, the people
last night and talked until the early assembled there were near each other but appear
hours of the morning and concluded to have otherwise largely respected forms of ‘social
that we don’t want the community distance’. The majority, although not all, were
and women up and down the country wearing masks while they did so. During the after-
risking fines and especially we don’t noon, people largely stood silently paying their
want those thousands of fines to go respects and laying flowers on the bandstand itself,
into a system that we don’t feel sup- but several had banners and placards. There does
ports us enough. We therefore decided not appear to have been any formal stewarding or
to host the event online.20 fencing arrangements to assist in marshalling peo-
ple within and through the space around the
bandstand. Moreover, there is little evidence of the
The event phase
handful of police officers present engaging to ex-
Operation Pima: a centralized approach. plain and encourage people in the vicinity to keep
By the day of the assembly, the command, control, social distance or move away. Rather, police offi-
and resourcing of the policing operation were cers appear to have stood observing, largely in
firmly within the remit of NSY. Moreover, rather pairs or small groups of three, in and around the
than developing a bespoke strategy for the event, area of tarmac surrounding the bandstands. As
the MPS applied its existing pan-London Covid- one participant described ‘there were police vans
19 response, Operation Pima. HMICFRS asserts parked at every entrance and exit to the park so
that ‘in the Metropolitan Police decision to follow there was nowhere you could go where police were
Operation Pima, there remains some evidence of not watching you.’21
the legal confusion’ (p. 27) identified above. Most As the afternoon progressed, the Gold
notably that there was ‘an incorrect interpretation (Strategic) and Silver (Tactical) commanders were
of the All-Tiers Regulations’ (p. 27) evident in that in the NSY control suite, coincidently situated in
strategy because it presupposed that public Lambeth. Given the vigil was now within the remit
20
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/saraheverard/video-2374916/Video-vigil-Sarah-Everard-south-London-cancelled.html\
21
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼Gxg00QK-dfEPolice powers and public assemblies Article Policing 11
of Op Pima these senior commanders would have around the bandstand’. Despite their important
had a pan-London command responsibility on role in understanding the local situation and while
that day, which may explain why no one from the it ‘was expected’ as the afternoon progressed, it
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local council was present in the control room. The appears that actually, ‘Bronze Engagement had no
Clapham element of Op Pima was then delivered communication with Bronze Community, so no
by several Bronze (Operational) commanders who updates were passed to the Silver Commander.’
held different responsibilities. ‘Bronze 3’ was in Indeed, ‘Bronze 3 was away from Clapham
overall command of the police officers that were Common until 5.45 pm’, and during that period,
deployed on the Common. While a ‘Bronze ‘did not ask for, or receive, any update about
Community’ was also located on the Common, events, numbers of people or crowd behaviour.’ As
according to HMICFRS, they did not have a com- such, the Silver Commander appears to have not
mand responsibility for these police resources. received any assessments of the evolving situation
Rather, their role, ‘was to engage with local con- throughout the afternoon and thus relied exclu-
tacts, with whom there were long-standing rela- sively upon ‘a CCTV van positioned 100 metres
tionships. In the week before the planned vigil, from the bandstand’, until Bronze 3 returned to
this officer had overseen reassurance patrols in the the common in the early evening (all p. 30).
[local] community’ (p. 29). In addition, there was As a reflection of how significant the lack of
a ‘Bronze Engagement’ who held a pan-London updates from the Common was, at approximately
remit—for communication with organizations 4.30 pm, despite the MPS’s calls for the public to
and communities, presumably within Op Pima ra-
stay away, a senior member of the Royal Family, the
ther than merely in relation to the vigil.
Duchess of Cambridge, arrived with her protection
officers, participated in the vigil, and left flowers at
Problems with situational awareness. As
the bandstand before departing. According to
laid out above, an important function for the
HMICFRS, ‘the Silver Commander learnt of her
officers in and around the Common was to
undertake the ongoing threat and risk assess- visit only when it was reported by Sky News’ (p.
ments that would be central to police capacity to 30). Moreover, HMICFRS also noted that toward
make informed decisions about any need for pro- the late part of the afternoon, high-profile ‘anti-
portionate enforcement activity. As Gold stated lockdown’ activists had arrived along with others
in an email, the ‘supervisors/Inspectors or who, ‘had brought a microphone and public ad-
[Bronze Commanders] will assess each site and dress system and erected them on the bandstand,
escalate in the event that there are larger numbers but this went unnoticed or unreported by the offi-
coming, or if it is clear that there are significant cers nearby’ (p. 30).22 In addition, apparently con-
breaches [of the All-Tiers Regulations] which is cerned about the changing situation, the Lambeth
likely to place people in danger, or if there is a Borough Council Gold Commander, ‘tried to con-
threat to public order/Queen’s Peace. At this tact the Metropolitan Police Gold Commander in
point more officers will attend, assess and if ne- Central Command during the evening but could
cessary [act]’ (HMICFRS, 2021, p. 30). not get through to him.’ Unsurprisingly, HMICFRS
Accordingly, ‘Bronze 3 went to Clapham concluded that ‘these shortfalls in updates seriously
Common at 12.30 pm’ but then ‘left around 2 pm compromised the Silver Commander’s situational
and instructed the officers to report to him any awareness of what was happening on Clapham
change in the situation on the Common, including Common’ (p. 30).
22
It is important to note we could find no corroborating evidence that a sound system was set up on the bandstand and cer-
tainly no sound system was evident or operational during the pivotal events set out below.12 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
Absences of problem solving and have seen, Bronze 3 was away from the Common
engagement. Given that RTS had withdrawn for most of the afternoon, so could not use these
from organizing the vigil, it would appear the specialist resources to liaise with anyone or other-
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MPS now had no direct point of contact with any- wise solve developing problems. According to
one who might play a leadership role within the HMICFRS, they were not deployed until 5.45 pm
gathering crowd. In effect, it appears that the MPS by Bronze 3 on his arrival back at Clapham
began the day of the gathering with no direct con- Common. In other words, as the afternoon pro-
tact with significant organizational groups within gressed, in the absence of Bronze 3—and associ-
the community likely to assist in promoting ‘self- ated resources, most notably the PLTs—
regulation’ within the gathering crowd. However, spontaneous ‘in-situ’ opportunities for early iden-
according to the HMICFRS, the MPS was in re- tification and engagement with activists likely to
ceipt of intelligence that a feminist direct action be playing a leadership role in the absence of RTS
organization called Sisters Uncut (SU) was plan- were lost. HMICFRS agreed, ‘with the observa-
ning to attend. This intelligence appears to have tions of an interviewee who described such a late
been a key command consideration. For example, deployment as a missed opportunity. The PLT
officers were ‘briefed that Sisters Uncut may attend may have been able to engage with individuals and
and the Police Liaison Team (PLT) officers made groups before more people arrived, including
further enquiries to learn more about this group’ those bringing the microphones and public ad-
(p. 29). This apparent lack of knowledge appears dress equipment. By the time the PLT got to the
to have been a significant intelligence gap since bandstand, there was already a large crowd and
Sisters Uncut was formed in 2014 and had been several people on the bandstand making speeches’
involved in several high-profile actions in London. (p. 32).
Additionally, the Silver commander took the deci-
sion not to deploy Forward Intelligence Officers to The tipping points. The period between 5 pm
identify anyone affiliated with that organization, at and 7 pm appears to have been critically important
least during the early stages of the event. This because it was during this period that significant
appears to have been an important decision; as we changes in policing and crowd norms occurred. By
will argue, in the absence of RTS as the organizing late afternoon, the bandstand itself contained only
fulcrum, SU became an important source of lead- a handful of people, including several photogra-
ership for those that attended, particularly those phers, journalists, and a man beating a slow
seeking to use the vigil as a form of protest. rhythm on a drum. Surrounding the bandstand
It also appears that the Gold and Silver was a crowd of several hundred people, with more
commanders had no direct line of communication continuously arriving. At some point around
with the local authority, which had been involved 5.30 pm, while the crowd stood quietly, a man
in the planning phase. While ‘Bronze community’ stood on the bandstand and began loudly espous-
appears to have been attached to the local borough ing anti-lockdown, anti-state, and anti-police
and on the Common all afternoon, it was Bronze 3 arguments.23 As the man began speaking, there
that had been allocated PLT officers (PLO). These were immediate and angry shouts of dissent from
‘PLTs are formed of specialist officers with good those in the crowd including, ‘Why are you speak-
communication skills and training to establish and ing.’ Opposition to him quickly became wide-
maintain dialogue with groups, adopting a com- spread. As he concluded his short speech, sections
munity policing style’ (p. 32). However, as we of the largely female audience chanted its, ‘Not
23
HMIC report but also corroborated by video evidence.Police powers and public assemblies Article Policing 13
your place, not your place’ and others shouted, (estimated to be about 1,500)’ (p. 31) but also that
‘Get him off.’24 At this point, ten police officers ‘there was a very different atmosphere in the crowd.
moved through the crowd, two of whom entered Some people were displaying placards more akin to
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the bandstand and, to widespread applause from a protest than a vigil’ (p. 31). There are several
the crowd, interacted with the man and assertively issues worthy of mention here, but pushing these
escorted him away. For a period after this, the aside, it is evident from triangulating the data that
crowd returned to sombre reflection standing fac- the transition the commander describes took place
ing the bandstand in silence with people periodic- some 20–30 min after Bronze 3 arrived. It may
ally laying flowers. therefore have been the failure to spontaneously
At around 6 pm, there appear to have been ap- disperse at the request of the councillor that was the
proximately 1,500 people gathered in a densely important decisive factor driving the Bronze
packed crowd. At around the time of the originally commander’s assessment of the transition from a
scheduled vigil, a local female councillor stood on vigil to a protest. Nonetheless, reflecting the con-
the raised platform of the bandstand and gave an- tinuing lack of situational awareness in Silver and
other speech. She thanked people for coming and Gold command, HMICFRS assert that at this time
called for and received a minute’s silence in ‘based on the information that the Silver
Sarah’s memory. Following the silence, the coun- Commander had, the assessment was that this was
cillor acknowledged the legitimacy of the gathering still a sombre event with a small crowd of about
but then emphasized the need for those assembled 200 people’ (p. 31).
to disperse ‘peacefully and everything else’, thank- Subsequently, HMICFRS record that ‘soon after
ing them once again for their presence. The crowd 6 pm Bronze 3 updated the Silver Commander,
applauded this speech, and some people did begin who revised his assessment of the event. He told us
to leave. However, the video evidence suggests the that the “look and feel” changed around that time.
majority of the crowd remained and shortly after- The transient vigil turned into a crowd around the
ward, at what we around 6.10 pm, another woman bandstand and developed into something better
stood on the bandstand platform and shouted: described as a rally. Updates from the ground
‘Everyone, thank you all for coming today, please showed that it was no longer a sombre affair. The
don’t leave yet. Thank you.’ The drummer contin- Silver Commander considered that to be the tip-
ued to beat a rhythm and some within the crowd, ping point’ (p. 31). While precise timings are un-
still estimated at around 1,000, began to chant ‘the clear, video footage25 triangulated with the above
sisters united, will never be defeated.’ Shortly after- account suggests that this report to Silver could not
ward, while it was still light, three women, who we have occurred any earlier than 6.05 pm. Video foot-
assume to be associated with Sisters Uncut, moved age shows PLOs deploying onto the bandstand,
onto the bandstand and began delivering a speech shortly after the relatively long speech was delivered
following a ‘call’ and ‘response’ format. Large sec- by the activists by which time it was beginning to
tions of the crowd repeated each clause and peri- become dark (as sunset was at 6.02 pm, we estimate
odically cheered at the speech content. this was around 6.20–6.30 pm). The senior PLO
HMICFRS record that shortly after Bronze 3’s ar- entered the bandstand and approached the three
rival back at the Common at 5.45 pm (15 min be- women after they had given their speech and
fore the local councillor’s speech), his judgement asserted loudly to the crowd that ‘Nobody is social-
was ‘that crowd numbers had significantly increased ly distanced here. We are in the middle of a
24
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publication-html/inspection-metropolitan-police-services-policing-of-
vigil-commemorating-sarah-everard-clapham-common/
25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼0J3L_frUsGs14 Policing Article C. Stott et al.
pandemic. We appreciate how everybody wants to weren’t even allowed to grieve for fellow
pay their respects, but now this is a gathering that women.’27
has become unlawful.’ In contrast to the earlier po- As this intervention occurred, a heated and pro-
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lice intervention that had merited applause, the ar- tracted discussion developed between the senior
rival of the PLO was met with widespread booing male PLO and a small group of female protesters
from those gathered around the bandstand as well on the bandstand. The PLO’s assertions revolved
as chants of, ‘let her speak.’ Instead of complying primarily around the fact that nobody within the
with police instruction the group on the bandstand crowd was socially distanced, which the MPS
began to lead a chant of ‘Where is Sarah?’. The PLO judged posed a danger in the context of the pan-
asserted that: ‘We are asking you to leave, thank demic and therefore that it had become what was
you’, turned and walked away. for the police an unlawful gathering. The protest-
ers’ assertions in response revolved around the
Police use of force. It was also at around this gathering as a direct outcome of the death of
time, that HMICFRS record the Gold Commander Sarah Everard and as such that it was still legitim-
authorized enforcement action against those on ate. The discussion quickly narrowed to a negoti-
the bandstand. The Silver’s decision log states that ation over the conditions through which the
this was because, ‘it [the public assembly] has different parties would leave the bandstand and
turned into a rally with limited or no social dis- disperse. The PLO offered the position that police
tancing. The initial attempts to go through 3 E’s would leave the stage if the activists gave an an-
[engaging, explaining, and encouraging] have been nouncement to the crowd that people should de-
unsuccessful.’ The video data suggests that after part. The activist then offered to provide such an
their first intervention, the PLOs returned to the announcement if the police left the bandstand. It
platform and re-asserted that the gathering was appears that neither party was prepared to shift
now unlawful and that the protesters on the band- their position. As another participant from within
stand, ‘needed to leave to let people go home’, and the crowd put it, the ‘majority of people here were
that they ‘need to encourage people to go home.’ women and I think the police didn’t anticipate
As this was occurring large numbers within the that women wouldn’t obey their orders. When
crowd chanted, ‘Let her speak.’ Within a few sec- they didn’t obey, then the police started to get
onds, a PSU serial26 also entered the bandstand violent.’28
attracting further widespread booing from the Shortly afterward, further PSU officers moved
crowd. In contrast to previously, this police inter- into the tarmacked area and forced their way
vention appears to have been seen by some as an through the crowd. Based on the video data, their
attempt to silence expressions and as an important objective appeared to have been to take control of
moment in driving a transition in the crowd. As the bandstand and remove everyone from it.
one participant from within the crowd described Officers surrounded the bandstand preventing
‘it didn’t begin as a protest. These were meant to anyone further from accessing it. They then under-
be vigils for women who had been victims of vio- took forceful arrests29 of four women who were
lence from men. We weren’t even allowed to have occupying the bandstand and, it appears, were
that. I think that’s what turned it into a protest refusing to leave. Several people in the crowd were
and why people were so angry is because women angered by these arrests. As one described ‘I was
26
Police Support Units are made up of 22 officers who have undertaken specialist training in public order tactics. They
comprise three “serials” of one sergeant and six constables.
27
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼Gxg00QK-dfE
28
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼Gxg00QK-dfEYou can also read
