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REGIONALREPORT
Regional perspectives on radicalisation
and violent extremism in the Balkans
The research leading to these results has
received funding from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme,
under Grant Agreement no. 870772
Consortium Members CONNEKT REGIONAL REPORT Published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean D3.3 PERSPECTIVES ON RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN MENA,THE BALKANS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans Lulzim Peci, Executive Director, Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) Agon Demjaha, Senior Research Fellow, Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) This publication is part of the WP3 of the project, lead by the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) Editors: Corinne Torrekens and Daphné de le Vingne Reviewers: Lurdes Vidal and Jordi Moreras Editorial team: Mariona Rico and Elvira García Layout: Núria Esparza March 2021 This publication reflects only the views of the author(s); the European Commission and Research Executive Agency are not responsible for any information it contains. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed).
Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
CONTENTS
REGIONAL OUTLOOK 3
DEFINITIONS OF RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM 8
PRESENCE OF RADICALISED AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS
IN THE BALKANS 11
PUBLIC POLICIES ON PREVENTION AND COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM (P/CVE) 17
EU POLICIES TOWARDS P/CVE IN THE BALKANS 24
2
BIBLIOGRAPHY 28Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
REGIONAL OUTLOOK
POLITICAL CONTEXT
All four countries under consideration used to belong to the communist bloc and are in fact rather young
democracies. However, while Bulgaria was already an independent state, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),
North Macedonia and Kosovo were constitutive parts of former Yugoslavia and became independent after
its disintegration.1 After the end of the Cold War and collapse of communism, all four countries entered a
long and painful transition period towards democracy and free-market economy. In addition, they all
adhered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) one of their key
foreign policy strategic priorities. Membership of these two organisations was seen by all four countries as
the best way for the development of a functional democracy and coherent security system. Today, Bulgaria
and North Macedonia are members of NATO and BiH started implementing the Membership Action Plan
in 2018, while Kosovo is lagging behind in its efforts to join the Alliance.2 On the other hand, Bulgaria
became a member of the EU in 2007 and North Macedonia has been a candidate country since 2005, while
both BiH and Kosovo signed Stabilisation And Association Agreements with the EU in 2008 and 2015,
respectively.
In addition, all four countries have made considerable progress in creating effective, impartial and
3 authoritative institutions that guarantee the rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms. To
achieve these goals, in addition to the EU and NATO, membership of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was also of the utmost importance for all these
countries. The CoE is undoubtedly one of the key international organisations for upholding human rights,
democracy and the rule of law in Europe. On the other hand, within its comprehensive approach to security,
the OSCE addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, which among others include human rights,
national minorities and democratisation. Still, all four countries need further comprehensive reforms on their
path towards fully consolidated democracies. This is especially true for the three Western Balkan countries
that require crucial reforms related to the rule of law, fight against corruption and organised crime, economy
and competitiveness as well as regional cooperation and reconciliation (European Commission, 2019). These
internal issues, coupled with political instability, weak economy and relatively high levels of poverty, have
turned these countries into fertile ground for radicalisation and violent extremism.
ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION
The size of the overall population of the four Western Balkan countries that are subject of this report
differs greatly. Kosovo has the smallest population (1,739,825 residents) and Bulgaria the largest
1
BiH declared its independence on 15 October 1991, North Macedonia on 8 September 1991, and Kosovo on 17 February 2008.
2
Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration process has been hindered because five EU member states – Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus
– have not yet recognised its independence. The first four countries are also NATO members.Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
(7,364,570 residents), while BiH and North Macedonia are somewhere in between with 3,531,159 and
2,022,547, respectively.3 In all four countries, the population is quite diverse and dynamic. Since the collapse
of communism, all four countries have witnessed an ongoing migration, especially of their young
population. Population in all four countries is rather mixed both ethnically and religiously. The ethnic
composition of the population in Bulgaria, BiH, Kosovo and North Macedonia is given in Table 1.4
TABLE 1. Population by Ethnic Affiliation
BULGARIA BiH KOSOVO NORTH MACEDONIA
Total Total Total Total
7,364,570 3,531,159 1,739,825 2,022,547
Bulgarian 6,245,155 Bosniak 1,769,592 Albanian 1,616,869 Macedonian 1,297,981
(84.8%) (50.11%) (92.9%) (64.18%)
Turkish 567,072 Serbian 1,086,733 Bosniak 27,533 Albanian 509,083
(7.7%) (30.78%) (1.6%) (25.17%)
Roma 360,864 Croat 544,780 Serb 25,532 Turk 77,959
(4.9%) (15.43%) (1.5%) (3.85%)
Russian 15,595 Others 96,539 Turk 18,738 Roma 53,879
(0.21%) (2.73%) (1.1%) (2.66%)
Armenian 9,978 Not declared 27,055 Ashkali 15,446 Serb 35,939
4
(0.13%) (0.77%) (0.9%) (1.78%)
Roma 8,824 Egyptian 11,524 Bosniak 9,659
(0.5%) (0.7%) (0.48%)
Gorani 10,265 Vlach 20,993
(0.6%) (1.04%)
Roma 8,824
(0.5%)
Source: CONNEKT Country Reports. Own production.
Table 1 shows that, in terms of ethnic composition of the population, Kosovo and Bulgaria are the two most
homogenous countries, with Albanians constituting 92.9% and Bulgarians 84.8% of the total population in
Kosovo and Bulgaria, respectively. It is interesting that although the proportion of minorities in Kosovo is
very small, it has the highest number: seven recognised ethnic groups as ethnic minorities. In Bulgaria, in
addition to Bulgarians, Turks with 7.7% and Roma with 4.9% represent two others large ethnic minorities
in the country. On the other hand, BiH is made up of three major constituent nations/ethnic groups, while
other minorities are insignificant. As can be seen from the table, Bosniaks make up exactly half of the
3
Official data from the latest census in respective countries. It should be noted that the last census in Bulgaria and Kosovo took place in 2011,
in BiH in 2013 and in North Macedonia as early as 2002.
4
Unless indicated otherwise, data used in all tables is taken from CONNEKT Country Reports of BiH Kapidžić, Dudić, Kadić et al., 2020), Bulgaria
(Dzhekova, 2020), Kosovo (Peci and Demjaha, 2020) and North Macedonia (Georgieva, Kambovski and Trajanovski, 2020).Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
population with 50.1%, while Serbs and Croats account for 30.8% and 15.4%, respectively. It should be
clarified that the category “Others” that makes up around 2.7% of the total population in BiH refers to the
members of national minorities and people who do not identify with any of the three constituent nations.
In North Macedonia, Macedonians and Albanians represent the two major ethnic groups with 64.18% and
25.17%, respectively. It is worth noting that, except in BiH, ethnic Turks are present as an official minority
in all other countries.
On the other hand, as already mentioned, the four countries under consideration are also quite
heterogeneous in terms of religious affiliation of the population (Table 2). It should be noted that, although
religious affiliation in these countries most of the time is intrinsically linked with ethno-national identities,
there are also exemptions with many groups for whom religious, linguistic and ethnic markers do not
correspond to such a classification. While the majority of Bulgarians, Macedonians and Serbs are Orthodox,
there are also Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks), Macedonian-speaking Muslims (Torbesi), and Serbian-
speaking Muslims. On the other hand, while a huge majority of Albanians in Kosovo are Muslims (95.6%),
there are also Catholic and Protestant Albanians in the country. In addition, it must be noted that there are
significant historical differences among Muslims living in various countries of the Western Balkans in terms
of numerous languages and ethnicities (Peci and Demjaha, 2020).
TABLE 2. Population by Religious Affiliation
BULGARIA BiH KOSOVO5 NORTH MACEDONIA
Total Total Total Total
5 7,364,570 3,531,159 1,739,825 2,022,547
Orthodox 4,374,135 Muslim 1,790,454 Muslim 1,663,412 Orthodox 1,310,184
(59.4%) (50.7%) (95.6%) (64.78%)
Muslim 577,139 Orthodox 1,085,760 Catholic 38,438 Muslim 674,015
(7.84%) (30.75%) (2.2%) (33.32%)
Protestant 64,476 Catholic 536,333 Orthodox 25,837 Catholic 7,008
(0.87%) (15.1%) (1.7%) (0.35%)
Catholic 48,954 Atheist 27,853 Other 1,188 Protestant 520
(0.66%) (0.82%) (0.07%) (0.026%)
Armenian- 1,715 Agnostic 10,816 No religion 1,242 Other 30,820
Gregorian (0.023%) (0.33%) (0.071%) (1.52%)
Jewish 706 Not declared 32,700 Not declared 2,495
(0.01%) (0.94%) (0.14%)
N o answer 1,605,476 Other 40,655 Prefer not 10,265
(21.8%) (1.16%) to answer (0.59%)
No answer 6,588
(0.20%)
Source: CONNEKT Country Reports. Own production.
5
It is worth noting that the 2011 Kosovo population census was largely boycotted by the Kosovo Serbs (especially in North Kosovo), who
predominantly identify as Serbian Orthodox Christians, and therefore the Serb population and Orthodox religion were underrepresented. See
Collaku, 2011.Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
According to Table 2, it is clear that the Orthodox and Muslim religions are dominant in the four
countries under consideration. Another important factor is that in all four countries under
consideration a significant proportion of the population is made up of Muslims. In Bulgaria,
Orthodox religion constitutes 59.4%, while Muslims make up only 7.84%. However, one cannot
ignore the fact that 21.8% of the citizens in Bulgaria did not answer the question about their religious
affiliation. In Kosovo, on the other hand, with 95.6%, Muslims make up by far the most dominant
religious group in the country. It is worth noting that, in addition to the majority of Albanians, all
other ethnic minorities except Serbs also belong to Islam. In North Macedonia, the majority of the
population are Orthodox (64.78%), while 33.32% belong to the Muslim religion. In BiH, similarly to
ethnic composition, religious affiliation of the population is also more balanced with 50.7% Muslims,
30.75% Orthodox and 15.1% Catholic. It should be noted that except for the case of Croat Catholics
in BiH, Catholic and other religions in these four countries are represented in symbolic percentages.
Significantly, the collapse of communism in the four countries under discussion left an ideological
vacuum that provided space for the strengthening of nationalism and revival of religiosity, which
then gave rise to strong ethno-religious identities. The roots of such complex ethnic/religious
structures in all four countries actually go back to the millet system of the Ottoman Empire. This
system created an institutional structure for administratively integrating increasingly growing
numbers of Balkan non-Muslims into the Ottoman state. It organised the Ottoman Empire according
to religious adherence, rather than by territory, economic status or ethnic background. All subjects
were distributed among three millets that represented the most important existing non-Muslim
6
faiths: (1) the Orthodox Christians, (2) the Jews, and (3) the Armenian Christians (Daskalov and
Vezenkov, 2015: 386). Obviously, the Muslims de facto constituted the fourth millet, making at the
same time the Muslims of the Balkans members of the Ottoman-Turk “political nation” regardless
of their mother tongue (Hupchick, 2002: 133). Such millet identification eliminated all considerations
of ethnicity, and thus lacked any territorial connotations associated with the Western European
concept of nation. Millet affiliation governed one’s life no matter where one lived within the empire,
or how mixed the population was. Consequently, for all Ottoman subjects the homeland was
anywhere within the borders of the empire, thus increasingly leading to mixed ethnic populations
throughout the Balkans (Hupchick, 2002: 134).
Since in the millet system the national communities had no geographical boundaries, every cultural
community considered all territories in which its congregation was a majority as its own. As a result,
once the Ottoman Empire started disintegrating, the newly-emerged Balkan nations claimed each
others’ territories as their own. In that way, such a system from the beginning carried in itself the
possibility of bloody wars that followed after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, it is
worth noting that while in the case of other Balkan nationalisms religion as a factor of unification for
the population played a positive role in the development of nationalism, in the Albanian case it
certainly had a divisive role.6 Since both the Ottoman Empire and its neighbours insisted on dividing
6
Albanians were basically divided into three religions: Islam, Orthodoxy, and Roman Catholicism. Muslims who made up about 70% of the
population were further divided into Sunni Muslims (forming the majority) and Bektashi Muslims, a liberal Shiite sect which was a heterodox and
syncretic order that harboured the first pioneers of nationalism among Albanian Muslims. See Demjaha and Peci, 2016: 11.Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
Albanians along religious lines, for the Albanians it was crucial to overcome the religious division by
opting for a secular Albanian national identity based on “cultural and linguistic unity” (Misha, 2002:
41). After the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, history has basically repeated itself with the ethnic
and religious background of adversaries reinforcing each other. In Croatia, Catholic Croats fought
against Orthodox Serbs, while in BiH, Orthodox ethnic Serbs fought against Muslim ethnic Bosniaks and
Catholic ethnic Croats, though at some points during the war everybody fought against everybody. In
Kosovo, the police, military and paramilitary forces made by Orthodox ethnic Serbs fought against
predominantly Muslim ethnic Albanians, and in Macedonia the conflict was basically between Orthodox
ethnic Macedonians and Muslim ethnic Albanians.
7Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
DEFINITIONS OF RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS STEMMING FROM NATIONAL STRATEGIES
Official definitions of radicalisation and violent extremism were outlined in the National Strategies
for preventing and countering violent extremism that were adopted in all four countries under
consideration.7 Since the drafting of these strategies in all countries was heavilly assisted by
international experts, especially American, in many aspects they are quite similar, and basically also
employ similar definitions. It is interesting that the “Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for
Preventing and Combating Terrorism, 2015-2020” does not explicitly define “terrorism” or “violent
extremism”. It refers in various ways to “terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena” or “violent
extremism that can lead to terrorism,” and cites “new terrorist challenges” that include foreign
fighters, but never defines any of these terms. In terms of definitions, the Strategy only builds on the
definition by the OSCE, that is: “Violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism.”
Kosovo’s “Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism,
2015-2020” defines “Violent Extremism” as “extremism which involves the use of violence; including
but not limited to terrorism” and “Radicalisation” as the “process of approving extremist religious
beliefs and in some cases converting into a violent extremist.”
8
On the other hand, the Bulgarian “Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism (2015-2020)”
defines “radicalisation” as “a process of adopting extreme opinions, views, beliefs and ideologies,
to the extent of fierce rejection of all alternatives.” Also, according to the Strategy, “radicalisation”
is “characterised by a decisive readiness for imposing one’s views and principles over the rest of
society, through rejecting the constitutional foundations of democracy and non-respect for
fundamental human rights. In some cases, it can lead to adopting the ideology of violence.” In
addition, the Strategy defines “radicalisation which leads to violence” as “a phenomenon where
individuals or groups of people adopt opinions, views and ideas, which might lead to acts of
terrorism,” and “Violent extremism” as “a phenomenon where individuals or groups of people
support or carry out ideologically motivated violence to achieve their ideological goals.” Similarly,
in North Macedonia, according to the “National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for
Countering Violent Extremism 2018-2022” “violent extremism” refers to “the beliefs and actions of
people who support or use ideologically motivated violence to pursue radical ideological, religious,
or political views.”
7
BiH and Kosovo were the first two countries in the Western Balkans to adopt the National Strategies. In July 2015, BiH adopted the “Strategy
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Preventing and Combating Terrorism, 2015-2020”, while in September 2015, Kosovo adopted the “Strategy on
Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism, 2015-2020”. On the other hand, Bulgaria adopted the “Strategy for
Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism (2015-2020)” in January 2016, while in North Macedonia the “National Strategy of the Republic of
Macedonia for Countering Violent Extremism 2018-2022” and the “National Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2018-2022” were adopted only
in March 2018.Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
DEFINITIONS IN ACADEMIC WORK
In addition to official definitions of radicalisation and violent extremism discussed above, the academic
community from all four countries under consideration has also made serious efforts to distinguish between
“radicalisation”, “extremism” and “violent extremism,” while at the same time developing definitions for
these terms. However, these efforts came with a certain delay since, until recently, authors in the Western
Balkans gave little attention to the terminology related to radicalisation and violent extremism. During
recent years, attempts were made to conceptually distinguish between the terms “radicalisation” and
“extremism” (often used interchangeably) as well as “violent extremism” and “terrorism” (also often used
interchangeably) (Becirevic, 2016). Academic experts believe that, in addition to being a weakness, the
unclarity of terminology represents a serious concern because official definitions are an important aid in
developing a common understanding of how to structure and implement P/CVE activities.
In Bulgaria, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) has in its numerous studies published since 2016
mainly adopted official definitions described in the country’s National Strategy. However, the CSD has
also provided a review of the state of the art in academic discourses on definitional issues (Dzhekova et al.,
2015), which is used as a reference point for other authors. The CSD often points to the difference between
violent and non-violent radicalisation in its work. It also uses definitions by the EU and United Nations (UN)
institutions such as the European Commission (EC) definition of radicalisation as “a process of socialisation
leading to the use of violence” (European Commission’s Experts Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008: 5),
as well as the CoE’s definition of violent extremism: “promoting, supporting or committing acts which may
9
lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or
religious supremacy and opposing core democratic principles and values” (Council of Europe, 2015). It
should be noted that other authors in Bulgaria either adopt the official state definitions, refer to foreign
academic works or do not provide a definition at all.
In Kosovo, definitions about the concepts of radicalisation and violent extremism are still unclear and there
is hardly a consensus within the country about their meaning and use. Nevertheless, a number of
researchers have utilised various definitions about the concepts of radicalisation and violent extremism. For
instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study has used definitions of these terms
given by the Oxford Dictionary. Accordingly, extremism is defined as “the holding of extreme political or
religious views [or] fanaticism,” while violent extremism is defined as direct usage of violence or as
“encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of violent acts to achieve political,
ideological, religious, social, or economic goals” (Qirezi, 2017: 26). On the other hand, a report by Berghof’s
Foundation defines only the concept of extremism as “any ideology that opposes a society’s core values
and principles.” While acknowledging that extremists do not necessarily engage in violence, the report
defines violent extremism as the one that occurs “when extremist worldviews are accompanied by the
justification and use of extreme violence against those who do not share the same belief or ideology”
(Morina et al., 2019: 4). Interestingly, Krasniqi defines radicalisation and extremism exclusively through the
prism of Islam. He defines “Islamic radicalism” as all forms of actions that are “manifested mainly through
the discourse of the conservative doctrines of Islam‘s interpretation that exhibit a high degree of puritanism
and religious intolerance” (Krasniqi, 2019: 10). In North Macedonia, several researchers adopt Mohammed
Hafez and Creighton Mullins’s definition on radicalisation, as a process which “involves adopting anRegional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
extremist worldview, one that is rejected by mainstream society and one that deems legitimate the use of
violence as a method to effect societal or political change” (Hafez and Mullins, 2015: 260).8
It is worth noting that, when discussing definitions related to radicalisation and violent extremism,
researchers try to avoid stigmatisation of individuals and groups who adhere to radical religious ideologies
and hold radical religious or political beliefs within the legal boundaries of liberal democratic societies.
According to Bećirević, Halilović and Azinović, authors and researchers have begun to employ these terms
with more caution because they acknowledge that radicalisation does not necessarily lead to violence.
They argue that it is necessary to distinguish between radicalisation linked to violent extremism and
terrorism, and radicalisation aimed at initiating societal changes through non-violent means (Bećirević et
al., 2017). As a result, phrases such as “radicalisation into violent extremism” or “radicalisation towards
terrorism” are used more frequently by different authors. For instance, a 2018 study in Macedonian
published by the OSCE provides a compound definition of “radicalisation towards terrorism” as a
“dynamic process in which a person accepts the terrorist violence as a possible, even legitimate action”
(OSCE, 2018). Such an approach towards radicalisation was later recreated in the aforementioned National
Strategy9 of North Macedonia and other governmental documents. Bećirević, on the other hand, insists
that in the Bosnian context, any analysis of “radicalisation into violent extremism” must acknowledge the
process of reciprocal radicalisation, wherein mutual forms of extremism feed one another (Bećirević, 2018).
Although Krasniqi also acknowledges that “Islamic radicalism” is not necessarily manifested through
violence, he claims that “Islamic radicalism is a dynamic process of embracing and manifesting extreme
perceptions of a religious ideology, which may also affect the legitimacy of terrorist acts” (Krasniqi, 2019:
10
10). Similarly, Krasniqi defines the notion of “Islamic extremism” as “actions against constitutionalism
characterized by the active opposition of any other religious doctrine or ideology” (Krasniqi, 2019: 10).
It should be noted that the official definitions adopted in National Strategies are rather broad, and in
principle cover all types of radicalisation and violent extremism. However, in reality the main focus of law
enforcement and intelligence efforts has predominantly been on Islamic radicalisation. To a certain extent
the same is also true for the academic literature since most of the authors cover only Islamic religious
communities. Due to donor-driven research priorities, academic literature on violent extremism and
radicalisation in BiH mostly mention the Salafi movement and studies are exclusively concerned with Islamic
radicalisation (Kapidžić, Dudić, Kadić et al., 2020). In Kosovo, only a few of the authors adopt more general
definitions that, in addition to religious, also encompass political, ideological and social groups and
individuals (Peci and Demjaha, 2020). In reality, extremism is also present among all religious groups in the
four countries under consideration. The same applies to far-right radicalisation and ethnically and politically
motivated acts of violence. Unfortunately, such forms of radicalisation and violent extremism are often
overlooked and remain largely under-reported, under-researched and often under-prosecuted (Dzhekova,
2020). For the time being, representatives of state institutions in all four countries continue to view violent
extremist threats mainly through the Islamist religious prism.
8
For the studies by the Macedonian researchers using this definition, see Stojkovski and Kalajdžioski, “Perspektivi na Zaednicata”, Selimi and
Stojkovski, “Assessment of Macedonian efforts”, and Stojkovski and Kalajdžiovski, “Report on Macedonia”.
9
For more details see “National Counterterrorism Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia (2018-2022)”, Government of the Republic of
Macedonia. National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism (2018), 11.Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
PRESENCE OF RADICALISED AND VIOLENT
EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THE BALKANS
FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND RETURNEES
The proportion of Muslim population in the countries being discussed in this report is of special
importance since nearly all who departed to join various insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq were
Muslims. It should be noted that determining the exact number of persons from these countries that
have joined Daesh/ISIS is rather difficult. In many cases entire families have travelled to Syria and Iraq.
While in most cases such family travel was either initiated or imposed by a senior member of the family,
it is difficult to distinguish whether only men were engaged in combat activities. Another factor that
complicates the foreign fighters picture is the fact that a considerable number of individuals who
travelled to conflict zones either have dual citizenship or long-term residence outside of the four
countries under consideration. Accordingly, different sources and authors operate with different figures,
and the ones under discussion represent the best possible estimates.
Apart from Bulgaria, which had only one citizen who has allegedly joined Daesh, the number of citizens
that have travelled to Syria and Iraq from the other three countries was rather worrisome. The
distribution of numbers of men, women and children from Bulgaria, BiH, Kosovo and North Macedonia
11 who have travelled to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq is given in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Numbers of Men, Women and Children in Syria and Iraq
Countries Men in Syria/Iraq Women in Syria/Iraq Children in Syria/Iraq Total
Bulgaria 1 0 0 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 188 61 81 330
Kosovo 255 53 95 403
North Macedonia 140 14 No data 154
Total 585 128 176 889
As already mentioned, despite claims by certain foreign sources that up to 10 Bulgarian citizens may
have joined Daesh (ICCT, 2016), according to the official data, during the period (2013-2016) only
one Bulgarian citizen of Syrian descent fought with Daesh (Дневник, 2017). In general, the Ministry
of the Interior and the State Agency for National Security (SANS) consider that Bulgaria acts primarily
as a transit zone for foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq.10 On the other hand, as shown in
Table 3, a total number of 188 men, 61 women and 81 children travelled to Syria and Iraq, from BiH
and from the Bosnian diaspora between 2012 and 2015, with the largest number of departures being
registered during 2013 (Hamidicevic and Plevljak, 2018). In Kosovo, according to the latest data,
10
According to the State Agency for National Security, around 332 FTFs passed through Bulgaria between 2013 and 2015 en route to Syria and
Iraq. See Stollova, 2016, “The Roma and the Radicals: Bulgaria’s Alleged ISIS Support Base”, Balkan Insight.Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
since 2012, an estimated 403 individuals travelled from Kosovo to join terrorist organisations in Syria
and Iraq, of whom 255 were men, 53 women and 95 children (Perteshi, 2018: 18). It is interesting to
note that the size of the contingent of Kosovo and BiH in conflict zones has increased due to
children born in Syria and Iraq to Kosovan and Bosnian parents. According to official data, as of
early 2019 there were 78 children born to Kosovan nationals and 77 born to Bosnian nationals
(Shtuni, 2019: 18-19). Finally, Table 1 shows that 140 men and 14 women travelled from North
Macedonia to Syria and Iraq during the period from 2012 to 2017, while there is no data about the
eventual number of children (Azinović, 2018). It is also worth mentioning that, according to the
available data, it is estimated that 75 foreign fighters from Kosovo have been reported killed in
conflict zones (Perteshi, 2018: 18). In April 2018, BiH authorities made public in the media death
certificates for 76 fighters with BiH citizenship (including five women and four children) who were
killed in Syria (Hamidicevic and Plevljak, 2018). The reported number of casualties in North
Macedonia stands at 27 men (Šutarov, 2018).
Once Daesh started losing most of its controlled territory in Syria and Iraq, the number of returnees
increased rapidly, while the number of foreign fighters joining the conflict zones declined
considerably. By mid-2016 intensified efforts of authorities in BiH and Kosovo contributed to a
complete halt of new departures to conflict zones. Meanwhile, the only citizen from Bulgaria who
joined Daesh returned to Bulgaria in 2017 (Дневник, 2017). In BiH 47 men and 8 women came back
by the beginning of 2016, while by the end of 2017 a total of about 50 adults returned to BiH from
Syria and Iraq (Azinović, 2018). In 2019, BiH authorities managed to repatriate only 7 more foreign
12
fighters. On the other hand, Kosovo authorities not only succeeded in preventing further departures
of its citizens to conflict zones but have been rather successful in returning Kosovo citizens from Syria
and Iraq. Out of the total estimated number of 135 returnees, 110 were repatriated in April 2019, of
whom 74 are children, 32 women, and 4 alleged male foreign fighters (Shtuni, 2019: 19). In North
Macedonia, the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq also considerably declined from
2017, and completely stopped in 2018.11 Meanwhile, the number of returnees to North Macedonia
from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq was estimated at around 80 (Georgieva, Kambovski and Trajanovski,
2020). However, a considerable number of citizens from these countries still remain in Syria and Iraq. It
is believed that as of December 2018, 98 adult Bosnian citizens (49 men and 49 women) still remain in
Syria and Iraq (Atlantic Initiative, 2018). However, Shtuni claims that in 2019 BiH nationals made up the
largest group from the Western Balkans that remained in Syria and Iraq, since there were still some 102
Bosnian adults in conflict zones (Shtuni, 2019: 19). On the other hand, around 190 individuals from
Kosovo are supposed to have remained in conflict zones (Perteshi, 2018: 18). However, of those
remaining, there is an estimated number of only 66 men who are considered potential combatants,
since it is believed that some 70% of them or 139 (47 women and 92 children) were non-combatants (not
directly engaged in fighting) (Kursani, 2018: 18). According to various security sources, the number of
citizens from North Macedonia still remaining in conflict zones is somewhere between 25 and 35
(Azinovic, 2017: 10; Georgieva, Kambovski and Trajanovski, 2020).
11
The reasons for these developments, besides the demise of the Daesh controlled territory, are reported to be the new legislation on terrorism
in North Macedonia, as well as the novel and practical obstacles for reaching the war zones in Syria and Iraq (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 2018:
4-5). See also the National Counterterrorism Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia (2018-2022) by the Macedonian Government and the
National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Countering Terrorism published in February (2018).Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
It is worth noting that at a certain point Kosovo and BiH were considered to have the highest number
of foreign fighters per capita out of any European country (Peci and Demjaha, 2020; Kapidžić, Dudić,
Kadić et al, 2020). However, it seems that such numbers tend to be blown out of proportion and are
the result of calculating the number of fighters per one million inhabitants of a certain country. As
Azinovic points out, “such calculations are subject to the (un)reliability of counts of these individuals
and, moreover, must be interpreted within the appropriate framework” (Azinovic, 2017: 9). Namely, if
the ratio of foreign fighters to the total Muslim population is taken into account, the number of foreign
fighters for Kosovo and BiH is actually slightly below the average of the EU (Hamidicevic and Plevljak,
2018). By way of example, let us compare the rates of citizens’ engagement in Belgium with those in
BiH, Kosovo and North Macedonia.
Initially, let’s compare the total number of foreign fighters with the overall population in these
respective countries (Table 4).
TABLE 4. Comparison of the Number of Foreign Fighters in Overall Population
Country Total Number of FF per Prevalence of
Population Foreign Fighters12 1,000,000 FFin general
people population
Belgium13 11,370,000 498 44 1 in 22,727
BiH 3,531,159 249 70 1 in 14,289
13
Kosovo 1,739,825 308 177 1 in 5,649
North Macedonia 2,022,547 154 76 1 in 13,157
Source: CONNEKT Country Reports. Own production.
In terms of overall population, Table 4 clearly shows that all three countries of the Western Balkans
have a higher rate of citizen engagement than Belgium in the fighting in Syria and Iraq. Among the
countries of the Western Balkans, Kosovo with 177 foreign fighters per 1 million citizens has the highest
rate, followed by North Macedonia (76 per 1 million) and BiH (70 per 1 million). Belgium, on the other
hand, has registered only 44 foreign fighters per 1 million citizens (Azinović, 2018: 5). However, assuming
that the accounted number of foreign fighters in the available data refers almost exclusively to Muslims,
it is interesting to make the comparison of the rates of Muslim citizens’ engagement in Belgium with
the three countries of the Western Balkans (Table 5).
Table 5 clearly shows that when statistics about the foreign fighters in Belgium, BiH, Kosovo and North
Macedonia are placed within the context of the Muslim population in each respective country, the
comparison yields different results. Now the rate of citizen engagement in Belgium in the fighting in
Syria and Iraq is higher than all three countries of the Western Balkans. Namely, in this case there are
83 foreign fighters for every 100,000 Muslims in Belgium (Azinović, 2018: 5), meaning one foreign fighter
12
The overall number of foreign fighters includes citizens of fighting age, both men and women, in Syria and Iraq.
13
Data for Belgium is taken from Azinović (2018: 5).Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
in every 1,204 Muslims in Belgium. Table 5 also shows that, in this scenario, it is North Macedonia with
23 foreign fighters per 100,000 citizens (1 in 4,348 Muslims) that has the highest rate among the
countries of the Western Balkans. North Macedonia is followed By Kosovo with 19 foreign fighters per
100,000 citizens (1 in 5,263 Muslims) and BiH with only 14 foreign fighters per 100,000 citizens (1 in 7,143
Muslims). The analysis conducted shows that statements that Kosovo and BiH had the highest number
of foreign fighters per capita in Europe might be blown out of proportions and should be taken with
caution.
TABLE 5. Comparison of the Number of Foreign Fignters among the Muslim Population
Country Total Muslim Number of FF per Prevalence of
Population Foreign Fighters14 100,000 Muslim FFin Muslim
inhabitants population
Belgium 600,00015 498 83 1 in 1,204
BiH 1,790,454 249 14 1 in 7,143
Kosovo 1,663,412 308 19 1 in 5,263
North Macedonia 674,015 154 23 1 in 4,348
Source: CONNEKT Country Reports. Own production.
OTHER VIOLENT MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF UKRAINE
14
In terms of cases of citizens of these four countries having joined other violent movements abroad, the
only worrisome one is the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Ukraine. Namely, it has been reported that
a small number of BiH nationals has been fighting as part of foreign armed separatist groups in Ukraine.
While the official number of these fighters stands at seven, it is believed that the real number is much
higher. Predominantly, these fighters from BiH travel to Ukraine through Serbia and are assisted by
the Movement of Serbian Chetniks Ravna Gora. In Ukraine, they join pro-Russian paramilitary
formations, together with fighters from Serbia as part of the “Serbian Hussar Regiment”. Despite the
phenomenon, according to BiH police agencies, in October 2017 only one BiH national was on trial for
fighting in Ukraine (Hamidicevic and Plevljak, 2018). It is interesting to note that according to the Atlantic
Initiative Survey of 2,110 citizens and 12 focus groups in BiH, there is a much higher support among
Serbs for fighters going to Ukraine than from Bosniaks for fighters going to Iraq or Syria (Atlantic
Initiative, 2018). A similar phenomenon of foreign fighters has been also reported in Kosovo, with Serb
individuals living in the north of Kosovo having travelled to Ukraine. According to certain media reports,
around 300 Serbian foreign fighters funded by the Russian organisation “the Kosovo Front” have been
fighting in the Ukrainian separatist territories (Stelmakh and Kholodov, 2017). While not all these fighters
are from Kosovo, it is difficult to determine their exact numbers since usually all of them are referred
to as Serb nationals (Velebit, 2017).
14
The overall number of foreign fighters includes citizens of fighting age, both men and women, in Syria and Iraq.
15
According to Azinovic, the total number of Muslim population in Belgium is around 700,000. See Azinović (2018: 5).Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
In Bulgaria it is not possible to provide the exact number of individuals who have joined violent
movements abroad, since such information is gathered by security authorities and is subject to
classification. However, according to the Mirotvorets Center established by the pro-Western Ukrainian
government, five Bulgarian citizens have either fought in Donbas or aided pro-Russian separatists in
Ukraine (Club Z, 2016). North Macedonia is the only country under consideration that has not reported
any foreign fighter to be in the war zone in Ukraine, although the country officially refused to apply
sanctions and restrictive measures on Russia for annexing Crimea in 2014 (Beslin and Ignjatijevic, 2017).
It is worth mentioning that, although countries in the Western Balkans consider foreign fighting as a
criminal act regardless of the destination, returnees from the Middle East face a robust security-based
response in their countries of origin, whereas those returning from Ukraine usually remain exempt from
prosecution and severe sanctions (Beslin and Ignjatijevic, 2017).
ISLAMIC RADICALISATION VERSUS OTHER FORMS OF RADICALISATION
As already mentioned, the disintegration of the Daesh-controlled territory has basically ended the
departure of foreign fighters from the four countries to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. However,
as Azinović has pointed out, the end of Daesh as the world has known it “does not mean the end of
the radicalisation and recruitment into extremism and violence in the region” (Azinovic, 2018: 4). In
fact, representatives of state institutions in all four countries have continued to view violent extremist
threats mainly through the prism of radical Islam. Other forms of radicalisation and extremism, despite
15
being more prevalent and resulting in more violence in comparison to the highly publicised instances
of so-called Islamist radicalisation, have not received as much public attention and have not been
subject to any sustained efforts at assessment or counteraction. In Kosovo, the government has
underlined the additional risk of violent extremism in North Kosovo among ethnic Serbian Kosovars. It
has cautioned that these Serbian extremist groups might engage in “various acts of violence against
[Kosovan citizens of Albanian ethnicity], institutions as well as local and international presence in [the
north] of the country” (Goshi and Van Leuven, 2017: 22). Still, neither have any concrete preventive
actions been taken by the government, nor have any specifically focused studies been conducted. On
the other hand, a study that assessed eventual possible violent extremist threats in Kosovo has
suggested that violent extremist threats in Kosovo were mainly politically motivated. The study points
out that around 80% of executed (actions taken) violent extremist threats were political in nature, while
of the unexecuted (actions not taken) threats, close to 70% were religious in nature (Kursani, 2017: 6).
The situation is similar with the far-right and ultra-nationalist groups in Bulgaria that have been
associated with numerous completed violent acts (including by political party members) (Nova, 2015),
as opposed to violent manifestations of Islamist radicalisation. Members of such far-right groups and
movements that operate within the country are mainly ethnic Bulgarians, and their actions are enabled
by an environment of widespread prejudice towards minorities like the Roma (Галъп Интернешънъл,
2015) and worsening attitudes towards other minorities like homosexuals (Дневник, 2019). In North
Macedonia one can also hardly speak of any serious tendency towards voicing radical Islamic views in
a political framework, since such views are predominantly confined to the private sphere and individual
religious practice (North Macedonia Country Report, 2020: 123). Consequently, it can be said that in
North Macedonia no real religious rhetoric has been established in public discourse, although thisRegional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
discourse does have greater religious content than before (Savevski and Sadiku, 2012). However, within
the country there are several fringe organisations, which sometimes evoke certain violent symbols and
use militant discourse and hate speech. The March 2019 case of the arrest of the leader of the
Macedonian Christian Brotherhood, a far-right formation, after his public threats to the former
Macedonian Prime Minister is one of the most prominent examples (Mkd.mk, 2019).
In BiH, some media and civil society organisations (CSOs) are often reported as radical, or their followers
as radicalised, Serb and Croat groups being driven by ethnic nationalism and Orthodox and Catholic
extremism. These are right-wing groups that often identify themselves as followers of the Serbian
Chetniks and the Croatian Ustasha who were active during the Second World War. The Serb
organisations and groups, working on an “extremist Orthodox agenda”, are often supported by Russia,
whilst the Croatian formations are often backed by the “radical elements of the Catholic Church and
some political elites” (Becirević, 2018) It is not uncommon for these groups to display neo-Nazi
characteristics, engage in violent acts, and call for separation of territories inhabited by their respective
ethno-religious groups from the state of BiH (Kapidžić, Dudić, Kadić et al., 2020).
It might be concluded that, although other forms of radicalisation and violent extremism also exist in
all four countries, representatives of state institutions have continued to view violent extremist threats
mainly through the prism of radical Islam. These other forms of radicalisation and extremism related to
far-right extremism, especially hate crime, despite being much more numerous, have received much
less attention both by law enforcement and the media. The same is true of the emergence of foreign
16
fighters in Ukraine, which despite being spotted from media reporting in BiH, Kosovo and Bulgaria, did
not receive the attention of state institutions and researchers. Moreover, as Perry points out, “other
forms of extremism, such as domestic right-wing extremism, are noted as a secondary concern or even
not acknowledged at all” (Perry, 2016: 4).Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
PUBLIC POLICIES ON PREVENTION AND
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (P/CVE)
PUBLIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES
The four Balkan countries included in this report show some general commonalities, in terms of their
policies and programmes on P/CVE, but they also differ on some particular aspects. The overall approach
of the four countries is shaped by the security-oriented paradigm that puts Islamic religious fundamentalism
at the centre of attention and perceives terrorism as its most aggravated manifestation. The other forms
and factors that nurture radicalisation and violent extremism assume less attention, if any, in policies and
programmes on P/CVE. This includes extremist political ideologies, ethnic nationalism or Christian religious
fanaticism.
In a practical realm, the four Balkan countries have adopted National Strategies for Countering
Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (hereafter: National Strategies) and implemented Action Plans.
The leading role in coordinating multi-agency efforts for implementation of National Strategies is played
by the security sector institutions, particularly ministries of interior. The degree of involvement of non-state
actors in drafting the National Strategies is higher, as compared to the process of their implementation.
17 Some of these countries have adopted special legislative acts to buttress policies and programmes to
counter radicalisation and violent extremism (e.g., Kosovo has adopted special law), and other countries
have either amended their Criminal Codes (BiH and Bulgaria) or have not taken any special legislative step
(North Macedonia).
PRODUCING P/CVE KNOWLEDGE
There are two general categories of analysis and documents, pertaining to the P/CVE, which are produced
in the four countries of the Balkans included in this report. First, official documents such as national
strategies, action plans, various public data, and analysis. The second category includes a vast and diverse
array of research and other publications produced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
international organisations, media, academic community and other non-state actors.
In line with the dominant perception mentioned above, the majority of official and non-official documents,
and other publications, focus on the nexus between radicalisation and violent extremism with Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism. In this context, although the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism started to
attract the attention of the security institutions as well as think tanks and academic pundits very early,16 the
16
Bulgaria, for example, imposed a more restrictive regime on the operations of externally-funded Muslim organisations and foundations, since
the mid-1990s. See Троева (2012: 7). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the origins and sources of radicalisation and violent extremism, along ethnic
and religious lines, is a reflection of the war and post-war situation of the first half of 1990s. See on this, Azinovic (2017).Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
publications related to this issue were scarce before the mid-2010s. Thus, in Kosovo, for example, one of
the early studies was published in 2005, by KIPRED, with the title: “Political Islam among the Albanians: Are
the Taliban coming to the Balkans?” (KIPRED, 2005). In BiH, as Bećirević emphasises, the terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001, and particularly the rise of Daesh, have increased the research and publications on
radicalisation, extremism, violent extremism, and terrorism (Bećirević, 2016: 5). However, as the country
reports show, the majority of the research and publications by the non-state actors have been conducted
since the mid-2010s and this is related to the rise of Daesh and the problem of foreign fighters from the
Balkans who joined terrorist organisations in Iraq and Syria.
Most of the studies and reports produced by the non-state actors investigate the socio-political, economic
and historic context and factors that nurture radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism – in addition
to providing facts and data. They advocated a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to
radicalisation and violent extremism. An approach that, as Stojanovski and Kalajdžioska assert, embraces
a “soft approach”, as opposed to a “top-down” approach (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovska, 2018: 7). Or, as
Azanovic argues, an approach that avoids the logic of “one-size-fits-all” (Azanovic, 2017: 7).
However, most studies and reports that have been produced in the four Balkan countries have leaned
towards case-study and descriptive methodologies, more than towards empirical and/or comparative
methodological approaches. In relation to this, Kursani noted that “up until 2016 research on violent
extremism in the Western Balkans was not thoroughly grounded on evidence-based research” (Kursani,
2019: 7). The same conclusion has been underlined by Kapidžić, Dudić, Kadić, Turčalo in their country
18
report on BiH. They underline that there is a lack of empirical studies in radicalisation and violent extremism
in BiH and most research uses secondary sources from security services and agencies or rely on a limited
number of expert interviews (Kapidžić, Dudić, Kadić et al., 2020).
The overall importance of analytical studies on the issue of radicalisation and violent extremism lies in the
fact that they raise public awareness and boost professional knowledge and expertise on this issue.
However, only the documents adopted by the public institutions serve as a framework within which the
state/institutional policies towards P/CVE are implemented.
In this regard, the most important official document adopted by all countries included in this study are their
respective National Strategies, which were adopted between 2015 and 2018. Before highlighting the major
components of these National Strategies, it is important to bring to attention two slight differences
between the four countries of the Balkans that are subject of this study.
First, these countries have not used standard titles to name their National Strategies and this is a reflection
of their conceptual approach to the junction between violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. Thus,
in BiH, it is called the “Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Prevention and Combating Terrorism for
2015–2020”; in Bulgaria, the “Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism (2015-2020)”; in Kosovo,
the “Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020”;
and in North Macedonia, the “National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia for Countering Violent
Extremism 2018-2022”. Furthermore, North Macedonia has also adopted a separate “National Strategy
for Countering Terrorism 2018-2022”. Kosovo has adopted complementary strategic documents,Regional Perspectives on Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Balkans
including the “National Strategy for Reintegration of Repatriated Persons in Kosovo 2014-2016”, the
“National Strategy and Action Plan for Community Safety 2011-2016”, the “National Strategy of the
Republic of Kosovo for the Prevention and Combating of Informal Economy, Money Laundering,
Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes 2014-2018”.
The second difference has to do with the fact that, apart from North Macedonia where the two National
Strategies were adopted by the parliament in 2018, in the other three countries, namely Bulgaria, BiH
and Kosovo, their respective National Strategies have been adopted by the governments. National
Strategies have been supplemented by the Action Plans in all these countries.
MAPPING THE ACTORS
The four countries included in this report have adopted multi-agency approach towards P/CVE. Their
National Strategies and Action Plans envisage involvement of a broad range of institutions and actors.
This includes state institutions and mechanisms (central and local), religious communities, NGOs,
media, and schools. In general, National Strategies in all four countries of the Balkans anticipate
involvement of three categories of actors: first, national/public institutions at central and local level
(with a leading role of the security institutions); non-state actors (NGOs, media, other CSOs); and
religious organisations. These institutions and actors have been involved, in various degrees, in the
phase of drafting of National Strategies, and they are supposed to play a key role in their
19
implementation (mostly through the Action Plans).
From the country reports, it transpires that the only visible difference in this context is the involvement
of international actors. Thus, in Kosovo, BiH and North Macedonia, international organisations and
donors play an important role in supporting and influencing national policies and programmes on
P/CVE (particularly through financial donations and expertise). This is not the case in Bulgaria, as the
respective country report does not indicate any meaningful role of the international organisations or
actors in supporting P/CVE policies and programmes.
TARGETED POPULATION
In a broader sense, the targets of the strategies and efforts towards radicalisation and violent extremism
are persons and groups that are exposed to the risk of radicalisation and those that have already
radicalised. In concrete terms, in each of the four countries this includes primarily youngsters and also
persons who are socioeconomically and psychologically vulnerable, former foreign fighters, religious
leaders (particularly radical imams), and far-right and ethno-nationalist ideological groups. The above
groups are primary targets, as they are more likely to become radicalised and get involved in violent
extremism and terrorism. In addition, the target group includes parents and teachers, journalists, police and
prison officers and other law enforcement officials, local communities and specific regions/locations that
are more exposed to the risk of radicalisation. This targeted group is in a position to play an important role
in preventing and combating radicalisation and violent extremism.You can also read
