South China Sea Intelligence Briefings
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South China Sea Intelligence Briefings
Weekly Briefing: March 14th
At The Open Source Briefing, we remain committed to providing the public with ongoing
developments around the globe.
United States
Author: Kevin O’Connell
Courtesy of USNI News
This week saw significant naval activity by the United States in the Indo-Pacific. On
March 8th-10th, the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and USS Russell (DDG-59) were
spotted transiting through Indonesia and entering the Indian Ocean.[1] While making this
transit, the carrier strike group was escorted by the Indonesian Pari-class patrol boat KRI
Escolar (871). Also, on March 10th, the USS John Finn (DDG-113) transited the Taiwan
Strait.[2]
The Open Source Briefing 1
Courtesy of @n_morse9927
Following this operation, the USS John Finn (DDG-113) was observed operating in
the vicinity of Taiwan's Orchid Island. Also spotted in the same satellite imagery were
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052C destroyer Jinan (152) and what appears
to be a PLAN Type 054A frigate. The range between the vessels at the time of the
observation was approximately 5.2 nautical miles.[3] Taiwan's state-sponsored Central
News Agency confirmed the presence of USS John Finn (DDG-113) and PLAN Jinan (152)
but made no mention of the third ship visible in the imagery.[4]
Courtesy of @duandang
The Open Source Briefing 2
At the strategic level, this week saw three noteworthy developments. First, on March
10th, at the end of a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the Biden administration's
foreign policy agenda, and while responding to a statement by Representative Young Kim
(R-CA) on Taiwan's response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Secretary of State (SecState)
Antony Blinken said that Taiwan is "a country that can contribute to the world, not just its
own people. COVID is a very good example of that."[5] Secretary of State Blinken's
reference to Taiwan as a country runs contrary to longstanding U.S. norms and will likely
be met with displeasure in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Whether Blinken's
reference marks a change in U.S. policy or was simply a slip of the tongue is unclear
currently but bears monitoring.
The second strategic development this week was the holding of the first
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) heads of state summit. While the meeting was
virtual, this marks the first time that the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United
States have met as part of this forum. This meeting is further evidence that The Quad
appears to be taking on an increasingly important role in Indo-Pacific security and
diplomacy.
The third strategic development this week is the beginning of Secretary of Defense
(SecDef) Lloyd Austin's international tour of the Pacific. Secretary of Defense Austin will
visit Hawaii, Japan, South Korea, and India in the coming days to meet with U.S. troops
and senior government leaders. In Japan, SecDef Austin will join SecState Blinken and
their Japanese counterparts in a 2+2 format meeting of the U.S. Japan Security
Consultative Committee. In South Korea, SecDef Austin will again join SecState Blinken
and their South Korean counterparts in a 2+2 format meeting of the U.S.-ROK Foreign and
Defense Ministerial. Finally, in India, SecDef Austin will meet with the Indian Minister of
Defence Rajnath Singh to discuss deepening the U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership.[6]
These bilateral ministerial meetings appear to represent the Biden administration's most
significant effort to date to establish its brand of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. For
those interested, SecDef Austin is traveling aboard an E-4B Nightwatch for the duration of
the trip.[7]
China and Taiwan
Author: Tad Unruh
The week of Monday, March 8 to Sunday, March 14, was packed to the gills of
activity in the South China Sea (SCS), political maneuvering, and solidifying alliances in
Cross-Strait Indo-Pacific relations. Due to these events’ interconnected nature, the Taiwan
and China portions of the SCS brief will be combined. Also, some sections have been
reduced to bullet points to provide concise coverage of the week.
The Open Source Briefing 3
(Taiwan News)
Monday, March 8
Starting Monday, OSINT researchers identified that the Longtian and Huian air force
bases had renovated and expanded their airbases runways in Fujian Province, the SE
coast of China.[1] This is not because of their proximity to Taiwan, with Longtian only
170km away and the Huian base only 190km.[2]
Later that day, on the third day of the annual National People’s Congress, Chinese
top Foreign Affairs Diplomat Wang Yi (王毅) explained to the National People’s Congress
that the US must drop sanctions and restrictions from the Trump administration for relations
to get back on track.[3] Other issues he raised were about Chinese “internal affairs” of
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea. His comments about Taiwan
explained that there was only “one China” and that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of
Chinese territory, and it must be unified” because there is no room for compromise on the
issue, with no room for concessions.”[4]
Wednesday, March 10th
The Observer Research Foundation, an independent Delhi-based think tank,
released a report outlining the adverse effects that China’s actions have had on the SCS
marine ecosystem. The policy brief explained that “through island construction, drilling
activities, and overfishing,” the Chinese have destabilized the ecosystem. Among the most
damaging activities are dredging and hydrofracking, depletion of fisheries through
dangerous cyanide and dynamite fishing, destruction of coral reefs, and unsafe drilling
practices.[5]
The Open Source Briefing 4
Thursday, March 11
Thursday saw the US Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John Finn
(DDG 113) conduct a freedom of navigation operation and Taiwan Strait transit.6 This is
the third FONOP of 2021 and also of the Biden Presidency, “on Feb. 4 and Feb. 24, the
USS John S. McCain and the USS Curtis Wilbur, both Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile
destroyers, sailed through the Taiwan Strait, marking the first two such passages since
Biden took office on Jan. 20.”7 It became known later in the week that the Jinan, a People's
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052C destroyer appeared nearby and shadowed the
Finn through the strait but caused no issues.8
The news media has been abuzz about an announced meeting between US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Minister Wang Yi, and Yang Jiechi, China’s most senior
foreign policy official in Alaska early next week.9 The meeting will consider several ongoing
issues between the two countries, including sanctions, ongoing situations with Taiwan,
Hong Kong, the SCS, Xinjiang, and others. It also bears mentioning that Sec. Blinken
referred to Taiwan as a country in a House Foreign Affairs committee meeting on
Wednesday.10
Saturday, March 13
(SCMP)
On Saturday, at the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) meeting, US President
Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison talked virtually about many issues. However,
the most pressing is China and its actions in the SCS, Taiwan, Indo-Pacific, and others.11
The Open Source Briefing 5
In response, China began 3 days of military drills in the SCS, and next week’s briefing will
cover the outcomes of these drills.12
Philippines
Author: Bang Tongco
During the week, the Philippine Navy (PN) clarified that the government-to-government
purchase of the Russo-Indian BrahMos anti-ship missile is the most ideal candidate for its
Shore-based Anti-Ship Missile System. In coast guard developments, the Asia Pacific
Defense Journal reported that the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is seeking to purchase
two additional 84-meter Gabriela Silang-class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). Meanwhile,
the Philippine province of Palawan--whose jurisdiction covers Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
in the Manila-claimed West Philippine Sea (WPS)--held a plebiscite to divide the province
into three.
Philippine state media on 10 March reported that PN Flag Officer-in-Command VAdm.
Giovanni Bacordo clarified that the BrahMos supersonic missile was judged by a PN-led
Technical Working Group to be the most ideal candidate for its Shore-based Anti-Ship
Missile System [1]. Bacordo’s comments come a week after Manila signed an agreement
to pave the way to purchase BrahMos missiles from New Delhi. Bacordo stated that the
acquisition was part of the PN’s thrust to develop a credible defense posture but made no
mention of the WPS. Bacordo disclosed that the acquisition is still pending the approval
and funding of President Rodrigo Duterte. Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana
previously revealed that the PN will only buy one battery equipped with three launchers
alongside tracking and support systems. The anti-ship missile system is part of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Horizon 2 modernization program slated for completion by
2022 [1].
The Asia Pacific Defense Journal on 10 March reported that PCG Commandant Adm.
George Ursabia announced that the Service intends to acquire two more Gabriela
Silang-class OPVs from French shipbuilder OCEA [2]. Ursabia said that the OPVs will allow
the PCG to extend its patrols further into Manila’s EEZ to conduct maritime patrols, search
and rescue, and disaster response. Ursabia admitted that the BRP Gabriela Silang was
not enough to patrol the vast EEZ, adding that the vessel was engaged in COVID-19 relief
operations but has already conducted missions to the WPS since its arrival in April 2020
The Open Source Briefing 6
[2]. To recall, the PCG is scheduled to receive two 94-meter Multirole Response Vessels
(MRRVs) currently being built by Japan’s Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co. Ltd [3].
The BRP Gabriela Silang, a 44-meter Parola-class MRRV is sailing in the background with
another PCG ship. Image courtesy of the PCG.
The BRP Gabriela Silang, a 44-meter Parola-class MRRV is sailing in the background with another PCG ship.
Image courtesy of the PCG.
Meanwhile, Palawan residents on 13 March went to polls to vote on splitting the
province into three amid the COVID-19 pandemic and growing assertiveness of China in
the WPS [4]. Voters will decide to keep the province as is or divide it into North Palawan,
Palawan Oriental, and South Palawan--the latter will include Philippine detachments in the
WPS like the Pag-asa (Thitu) Islands. However, the city of Puerto Princesa, which also the
headquarters of the AFP’s Western Command--similar to US combatant commands and in
charge of the WPS--will be exempted from the possible division due to its status as a highly
urbanized city [4].
The Open Source Briefing 7
Contributor’s Analysis
As mentioned in the previous report, the PN’s purchase of BrahMos anti-ship
missiles may progress slowly given Manila’s notoriously glacial pace of
government-to-government arms purchases. A case in point is the AFP’s Horizon 2
modernization program--set to be completed in 2022--which includes the purchase of two
conventional attack submarines. At the time of writing, the PN has yet to acquire any
submarines despite reportedly selecting a variant of French Naval Group’s Scorpene-class
subs [5]. Furthermore, it is not yet known if the AFP will acquire the necessary systems to
complete the BrahMos’ kill-chain, which may include air and naval tracking and targeting
systems.
The PCG’s announcement of its intent to purchase two more Gabriela Silang-class
OPVs comes after Ursabia revealed that only one 44-meter MRRV is assigned to patrol the
WPS due to difficulties caused by COVID-19 [6]. The PCG’s acquisition of more vessels to
patrol the Philippines’ vast EEZ is a step in the right direction and could also be used to
counter China’s use of non-government militia forces and, if needed, to confront China
Coast Guard ships in the WPS [7]. However, the PCG’s inventory of ships are increasingly
diverse and may cause maintenance difficulties in the long-term. The PCG operates US,
Australian, Japanese, and now French-built vessels of various sizes [8]. Regardless, the
shift to larger and more capable OPVs and MRRVs will allow Manila to better assert its
sovereign rights in its EEZ and counter China’s use of “gray-zone” warfare in the WPS.
The Palawan Plebiscite may improve the Philippines’ focus on its detachments in the
WPS. If approved, South Palawan may be able to pour more resources into developing the
Pag-asa (Thitu) Islands to improve the quality of life of its residents and troops stationed
there. Conversely, the Plebiscite might also reduce funding available to develop the nine
Philippine features in the WPS as the new South Palawan government will have to pay for
the upkeep of said detachments.
Vietnam
Author: Giulia Croce Butler
In recent weeks, we learned that Vietnam has been revamping its defense systems
and updating facilities on the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos. This move was not only
advisable to counter China’s increased offensive measures, but also to maintain some
independence from the U.S. in terms of security needs. [1] Professor Pankaj Jha, teaching
The Open Source Briefing 8
at the Jindal School of International Affairs, stated that “This adroitness and deft diplomacy
are likely to give Vietnam the benefit of better trade relations with China, while at the same
time engaging the U.S. in terms of its market and large-scale investment.” [2] Another point
to consider is that although Vietnam’s economic growth is very promising this year, Hanoi
may need some aid from either country post-pandemic.
Vietnam has been consistently firm on its commitment to preserve the Cam Ranh Bay, to
work on enforcing the UNCLOS, and to strive for great cooperation among ASEAN nations.
Derek Grossman’s recent RAND report, titled “Regional Responses to U.S.-China
Competition in the Indo-Pacific”, argued that China has a much tighter grip on Vietnam than
the U.S does. The report holds that Beijing is dominant in Vietnam’s economic
superstructure and maintains that the ties between Washington and Hanoi could become
stronger only if tensions between China and Vietnam escalate to the point of armed
conflict. At the same time, though, Vietnam is arguably one of the most important partners
in the Indo-Pacific region for the United States, specifically because Hanoi embodies the
“free and open” values found in the American Indo-Pacific strategy. Vietnam is deeply
rooted in the preservation of its sovereignty and independence from China’s intrusive
military and economic power. Washington should focus on proposing an alternative
scenario to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, while also aiming to improve many layers of
diplomatic relations, spanning from trade and commerce, to politics, to military cooperation,
to everything in between. Nonetheless, Vietnam’s strategic autonomy may avoid the
escalation of tensions in the South China Sea and could also grant it more credibility in
multilateral negotiations, namely with ASEAN members.
Last week, the China Central Television (CCTV) network aired a documentary that
showed the country’s armed forces participating in an illegal drill on Triton Island, while the
voiceover explained that the drill aimed at exploring the tactics and methods of joint
warfare. Although the broadcaster did not specify the date of the drill, experts speculated
that it took place recently. On March 1, the Chinese army confirmed the month-long drill
that took place on the Leizhou Peninsula and included landing crafts, tanks, and aircrafts.
The Open Source Briefing 9Triton Island in the Paracel Islands. Photo by Google Maps.
In response to this drill, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hang said in a
statement last Thursday that activities taking place in the Paracel and Spratly Islands
without Vietnam’s consent are violation of its sovereignty, and further undermine the
security, peace, and freedom of navigation of the region in the air and on sea. Despite
repeated warnings from the international community, China continues to conduct illicit
activities such as building artificial islands, militarizing said archipelagos, and conducting
drills. Spokeswoman Hang once again stated that Vietnam has complete legal basis to
assert its dominance over China.
Japan
With coronavirus tracing and tsunami memorial ceremonies being the primary
occurrences on the mainland, some rather important developments have occurred outside
of Honshu. For the 30th day in a row, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been spotted
sailing near the Senkaku Islands. [1] As a result, the discussion has continued in Tokyo
over whether troops would be needed to be stationed on the island as a deterrent. [2] With
both China and Japan claiming the Senkakus and the ability to defend their sovereign
territory, it is easy to see how the dispute over the islands could escalate. China has
recently released a statement indicating that their current actions around the Senkakus are
The Open Source Briefing 10them “using restraint”. [3] A statement like this indicates not only a potential for an increase
in Chinese activity in the area, but also shows that China has no interest in backing down.
Photograph of the Senkaku Islands, Courtesy of JapanTimes
Diplomatic responses have normally been key to both addressing and de-escalating
potential conflicts. However, diplomatic responses over Chinese claims in the surrounding
area may seek to escalate the situation even further as both the U.S and Japan plan to
“explicitly express those concerns” and “single out China” at the upcoming 2-plus-2
diplomatic meeting. [4]
With China controlling a large percentage of the rare earth mineral market, it has
become apparent that nations who are concerned about China's growing influence are
attempting to become self-sustaining in this area. On 12 March, members of the QUAD
announced that they would be cooperating with each other on securing rare earth materials
that are crucial from the production of automobiles to computer chips. [5]
On a final note in what will be a strong statement about Japanese-American
relations, PRime Minister Suga announced that he will be visiting President Biden in
mid-April and will be the first foreign leader to do so with the current administration. [6]
The Open Source Briefing 11Aircraft Monitoring
PLAAF Y-8 03/08 - Southwest Taiwan [3]
03/10 - Southwest Taiwan [5]
03/11 - Southwest Taiwan [7]
03/12 - South China Sea [10]
03/12 - Southwest Taiwan [12]
03/14 - Southwest Taiwan [14]
Shaanxi Y-8 Surveillance Aircraft: Has many variants that
include anti- submarine warfare, ISR, cargo, troop transport.
P-8 03/12 - South Taiwan [13]
Anti-submarine and anti-surface maritime/wartime patrol
aircraft. Its sensitive instruments can pick up enemy ground and
ship movement in addition to also carrying armaments.
P3-C Orion 03/12 - South Taiwan [11]
P3-C Orion: Provides advanced threat detection for both
surface surveillance on both land and sea.
The Open Source Briefing 12TU-95MS Bomber 03/11 - Sea of Japan [8]
Intercontinental strategic bomber of the Russian Air Force
designed to travel 6,400 KM without refueling and can carry a
wide variety of payloads ranging from heavy ordinance to
anti-ship missiles.
U.S Global Hawk 03/12 - South China Sea [9]
“Global Hawk's mission is to provide a broad spectrum of ISR
collection capability to support joint combatant forces in
worldwide peacetime, contingency and wartime operations. The
Global Hawk provides persistent near-real-time coverage using
imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and
moving target indicator (MTI) sensors.”
MQ-4C Triton 03/11 - South Taiwan [17]
MQ-4C Triton: Supports ISR and signals intelligence
operations. Northrop Gruman capabilities: “The aircraft can fly
over 24 hours at a time, at altitudes higher than 10 miles, with
an operational range of 8,200 nautical miles.”
The Open Source Briefing 13KJ-500 03/07 - Southwest Taiwan [1]
Chinese KJ-500: is an AEW aircraft that has the capability of
short takeoff and landings.
RC-135S Cobra Ball 03/11 - Okinawa Airspace [15]
The RC-135S Cobra Ball is a rapidly deployable aircraft, which
flies Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed missions of national priority to
collect optical and electronic data on ballistic targets.
RC-135 03/07 - South China Sea [2]
03/08 - South China Sea [4]
03/10 - South China Sea [6]
03/11 - South Taiwan [16]
RC-135W Rivet Joint: Provides real-time detection capabilities
for military personnel. Range is 1,500 miles.
The Open Source Briefing 14United States
[1] https://twitter.com/n_morse9927/status/1370480868008022021
[2] https://twitter.com/US7thFleet/status/1369768114108264453
[3] https://twitter.com/duandang/status/1370225492071047168
[4] “U.S. and Chinese Warships Appeared on the 11th at the Same Time.” Central News
Agency, March 12, 2021. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202103125003.aspx.
[5] Everington, Keoni. “US Secretary of State Calls Taiwan 'Country': Taiwan News:
2021/03/12.” Taiwan News, March 12, 2021.
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4148761.
[6] “Secretary Austin Travels to Hawaii, Japan, Republic of Korea, India.” U.S. Department
of Defense, March 10, 2021.
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Advisories/Advisory/Article/2531379/secretary-austin-t
ravels-to-hawaii-japan-republic-of-korea-india/#.YEjAZiULCzQ.twitter.
[7] https://twitter.com/AircraftSpots/status/1370831533028769794
China and Taiwan
1. Everington, K. (2021, March 08). China expands its 2 air Force bases closest To taiwan:
TAIWAN NEWS: 2021/03/08. Retrieved March 14, 2021, from
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4145038
2. Seidel, J. (2021, March 13). Satellite images expose China's plan. Retrieved March 14,
2021, from
https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/satellite-images-reveal-massive-ex
pansion-at-chinese-airfield-near-taiwan/news-story/4803c0529a55a924694f061f75d73871
3. Davidson, H. (2021, March 07). China calls on us to drop TRUMP-ERA sanctions and
warns against 'BULLYING'. Retrieved March 14, 2021, from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/07/china-calls-on-us-to-drop-trump-era-sancti
ons-and-warns-against-bullying
4. Everington, K. (2021, March 10). Taiwan tells CCP to ACCEPT 'cross-strait REALITY':
TAIWAN News: 2021/03/09. Retrieved March 14, 2021, from
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4146183
5. China's military expansionism in South China sea Threatens marine ecology. (2021,
March 9). Retrieved March 14, 2021, from
https://in.news.yahoo.com/chinas-military-expansionism-south-china-054416451.html
6. Chung, L. (2021, March 11). China protests after latest US NAVY transit THROUGH
Taiwan Strait. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
The Open Source Briefing 15https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3125026/china-protests-after-us-navys-lat
est-transit-through-taiwan
7. Lim, E., & Yu, M. (2021, March 11). U.S. warship transits Taiwan STRAIT, third Under
Biden administration. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202103110007
8. Everington, K. (2021, March 12). US, Chinese warships patrol same area NEAR taiwan:
TAIWAN News: 2021/03/12. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4148830
9. Delaney, R., Fromer, J., & Churchill, O. (2021, March 11). US confirms high-level
meeting with Chinese officials in ALASKA next week. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3124923/us-china-relations-us-state-department-
confirms-top-level-meeting-alaska
10. Everington, K. (2021, March 12). US Secretary of state calls Taiwan 'country': TAIWAN
News: 2021/03/12. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4148761
11. Delaney, R., & Fromer, J. (2021, March 12). 'Quad' backs 'democratic' INDO-PACIFIC
region, CITES Chinese 'aggression'. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125290/us-president-joe-biden-opens
-quad-summit-calling-alliance
12. Strong, M. (2021, March 14). China launches military drills on the eve Of 'Quad'
meeting: TAIWAN News: 2021/03/12. Retrieved March 15, 2021, from
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4149280
_____________________________________________________________________
Vietnam
[1] Pankaj Jha. “Vietnam’s deft diplomacy amid China versus US tensions.” Modern Diplomacy, Mar
12, 2021.
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/03/12/vietnams-deft-diplomacy-amid-china-versus-us-tensions/
[2] Ibid
[3] Vu Anh. “Vietnam reasserts Paracel sovereignty, slams China transgressions.” Vietnam Express
International, Mar 11, 2021.
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-reasserts-paracel-sovereignty-slams-china-transgressio
ns-4247162.html
The Open Source Briefing 16Japan
[1] https://twitter.com/Sankei_news/status/1370974962022895616?s=20
[2] Wong, Catherine. “Japan Considers Sending in Troops to Help Meet China’s Diaoyu Challenge.”
South China Morning Post, 7 Mar. 2021, www.scmp.com Accessed 15 Mar. 2021.
[3] “China Says It’s ‘Exercising Self-Restraint’ against Japanese Ships near Senkakus.” The Japan
Times, 14 Mar. 2021, www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 15 Mar. 2021.
[4] https://twitter.com/NikkeiAsia/status/1369270991541727242?s=20
[5] Reuters. “With Eye on China, ‘Quad’ Nations to Tie up in Rare Earths: Nikkei.” US News & World
Report, U.S. News & World Report, 2021, www.usnews.com.
[6] “Suga to Visit U.S. In First Half of April for Talks with Biden.” The Japan Times, 12 Mar. 2021,
www.japantimes.co.jp. Accessed 15 Mar. 2021.
Philippines
[1]
Nepomuceno, Priam. “BrahMos ideal weapon for Navy missile project”. Philippine News Agency. 10
March 2021. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1133128 Accessed 13 Mar 2021.
[2]
APDJ Staff. “Philippines interested in acquiring 2 more 84-m Offshore Patrol Vessel from France”. Asia
Pacific Defense Journal. 10 March 2021.
https://www.asiapacificdefensejournal.com/2021/03/philippines-interested-in-acquiring-2.html Accessed 13
Mar 2021.
[3]
PCG News. “PCG acquires its biggest Patrol Ships”. PCG. 9 February 2020.
https://coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/news/news-2019/3687-pcg-acquires-its-biggest-patrol-ships Accessed 7
Mar 2021.
[4]
Peralta, Janine. “Palawan Plebiscite: What you need to know”. CNN Philippines. 12 March 2021.
https://www.cnn.ph/regional/2021/3/12/Palawan-plebiscite-explained.html Accessed 13 Mar 2021.
The Open Source Briefing 17[5]
Grevat, John. “Naval Group opens Manila office in pursuit of submarine deal”. Jane’s. 27 November 2020.
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/naval-group-opens-manila-office-in-pursuit-of-submarine-de
al Accessed 13 Mar 2021.
[6]
Mangosing, Frances. “PH Coast Guard patrols in West Philippine Sea disrupted by pandemic”.
Inquirer.net. 3 March 2021.
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/194147/ph-coast-guard-patrols-in-west-philippine-sea-disrupted-by-pandemic
Accessed 7 Mar 2021.
[7]
Adrien Chorn and Monica Sato. “Maritime Gray Zone Tactics: The Argument for Reviewing the 1951
US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty”. CSIS. 1 October 2019.
https://www.csis.org/maritime-gray-zone-tactics-argument-reviewing-1951-us-philippines-mutual-defense-trea
ty Accessed 7 Mar 2021.
[8]
Wikipedia. Philippine Coast Guard Wikipedia entry. Last edited 26 Februrary 2021.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Coast_Guard#Ships_in_service Accessed 7 Mar 2021.
Aircraft Monitoring
[1] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1368485642909401088
[2] https://twitter.com/KimagureGolf9/status/1368716960385564676
[3] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1368918092030439429
[4] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1368834438692536322
[5] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1369563337588146176
[6] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1369809737366310919
[7] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1370013608843702272
[8] https://twitter.com/AircraftSpots/status/1370123186923171840
[9] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1370371283079290880
[10] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1370324977598275584
[11] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1370320163590049795
[12] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1370344966426218499
[13] https://twitter.com/GDarkconrad/status/1370634116350279680
[14] https://twitter.com/MoNDefense/status/1371093716279070722
[15] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1370188200187199489?s=20
[16] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1370168512245862403?s=20
[17] https://twitter.com/is_keelu/status/1370142377864794114?s=20
The Open Source Briefing 18You can also read
