Taliban Framing of the Peace Process - 15 February - 10 March 2021 18 March 2021 - USAID
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Taliban Framing of the
Peace Process
15 February – 10 March 2021
18 March 2021
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 1
Contents Key Findings 4
Introduction 7
Theme 1: Celebrating the Peace Deal 9
Theme 2: Victory over America 15
Theme 3: The Taliban’s Governance Offer 23
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 2
Key Findings © 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 3
Graph Name
Key Findings This study is the first in a series of monthly reports tracking how This report considers the array of materials that were distributed
the Taliban has been framing the peace process in its official com- via the Taliban’s official communication hubs between the dates in
munications output. The time period with which it is concerned is question. It has three sections, one for each of the thematic clusters
15 February to 10 March 2021. around which these communications revolve: (i) celebrations of the
peace deal; (ii) claims of victory over the US; and (iii) ruminations
Because the period in question coincided with the first anniversary on the implications of ‘Islamic’ rule.
of the United States’ (US) conditional peace deal with the Taliban,
the negotiations process was the core focus of much of the content
published in the course of it. Interestingly, and significantly, much
of it included speeches and anthems in Dari as well as Pashto.
Usually, Taliban videos are Pashto only, so the addition of Dari
content could be an attempt to show that the Taliban has a broad-
based political agenda and is attempting to represent all Afghans,
not just the Pashtuns that have historically formed the majority of
its support base.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 4
Key Findings
Celebrating the Peace Deal Ruminating on the Implications of ‘Islamic’ Rule
The first cluster of materials celebrated, in highly triumphalist The last, smallest cluster of materials revolved around setting
terms, the fact that the peace deal was still largely on track, one out what a Taliban government would mean for Afghanistan. It
year on from its being agreed in Doha. This content reflected on focused in particular on the immediate effect it would have on
what peace would mean for both the Taliban and the US. It was reducing corruption in the country. It was deployed with a view to:
deployed with a view to: • Differentiating between the ills of secular rule and the bene-
• Emphasising the Islamic and nationalist credentials of peace fits of an ‘Islamic’ system; and
process; and • Establishing what ‘Islamic’ rule would mean for corruption
• Explaining why all parties should welcome the negotiations in Afghanistan.
process.
Asserting Victory Over the US
The second cluster of materials was levelled specifically at Taliban
supporters and commanders. It was generally geared towards fram-
ing the peace deal as a victory, not a loss, for the Islamic Emirate
project. It was deployed with a view to:
• Framing peace as the only logical option for US
policymakers;
• Addressing the concerns and agenda of the new presidential
administration;
• Making accusations of duplicity regarding treaty violations.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 5
Introduction © 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 6
Introduction This study is the first in a series of monthly reports tracking how agreement‘s significance for the Taliban and the Afghan nation
the Taliban has been framing the peace process in its official com- while simultaneously accusing the US and internationally recog-
munications output. The time period with which it is concerned is nised Afghan government of violating it. While the statements of
15 February to 10 March 2021. The next report will focus on the Mutaqi, Wasiq, and Hakimi were markedly more diplomatic than
period between 11 March and 10 April 2021, and so on. Haqqani’s abovementioned speech, they too contained thinly veiled
threats against the Afghan government and US. For their part, the
Because the period in question coincided with the first anniversary religious scholars and mid-level officials in attendance at these con-
of the United States’ (US) conditional peace deal with the Taliban, ferences were more focused on explaining the significance of the
which was signed on 29 February last year in Doha, Qatar, the deal and establishing its religious and nationalist credentials, and
negotiations process was the core focus of much of the content the poets were focused on paying tribute to fallen leaders—among
published by the Taliban over the last month. On 26 February, for them the likes of the Taliban’s founding amir Mullah ‘Umar and
example, it published a half-hour-long video speech of Mawlawi his successors Haibatullah Akhunzada and Akhtar Muhammad
Sirajuddin Haqqani in which he raised a number of concerns sur- Mansur, as well as other senior leaders like Jalaluddin Haqqani.
rounding the US’s approach to the deal while calling on mid-level
Taliban commanders in particular not to violate it. At the same One of the most interesting and significant aspects of the videos
time, he used highly threatening language against the US, noting that documented these festivities was the fact that they included
that the consequences would be grave if it does not withdraw its tro- speeches and anthems in Dari as well as Pashto. Usually, Taliban
ops from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021 (the date of US withdrawal, documentaries are Pashto only, so the addition of Dari content
per the original Doha agreement). could be an attempt to show that the Taliban has a broad-based
political agenda and is attempting to represent all Afghans, not just
On the day of the treaty anniversary itself, the Taliban held a series the Pashtuns that have historically formed the majority of its sup-
of commemorative conferences. Members of its leadership and port base.
political establishment addressed these meetings along with pro-
Taliban poets, religious scholars, and academics. Among the leaders This report considers these diverse materials, as well as other con-
featured were the likes of Supreme Council member and Director tent published between 15 February and 10 March, in detail. It has
of the Islamic Emirate’s Media, Propaganda, and Recruitment three sections, one for each of the thematic clusters around which
Commission, Mawlawi Amir Khan Mutaqi, his deputy Mawlawi these communications revolve: (i) celebrations of the peace deal;
Ahmad Wasiq, and the former Taliban spokesman, Mufti Lutfullah (ii) claims of victory over the US; and (iii) ruminations on the
Hakimi. Generally, these speeches set out to explain the Doha implications of ‘Islamic’ rule.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 7
Theme 1 Celebrating the Peace Deal © 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 8
Graph Name Theme 1: Celebrating the Peace Deal The first cluster of materials celebrated, in highly triumphalist terms, the fact that the peace deal was still largely on track, one year on from its being agreed in Doha. This content reflected on what peace would mean for both the Taliban and the US. Screenshot of Mawlawi Amir Khan Mutaqi’s speech from an Al Emarah Studio video. Published 1 March 2021. Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 14 March 2021. © 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 9
Graph Name
Theme 1: Celebrating the Peace Deal
Legitimising the Peace Process
A large amount of content was geared towards setting out why the
peace deal mattered in the grand scheme of things. This came as
a direct response to the Taliban’s detractors, who, it is worth not-
ing, are explicitly addressed in an op-ed published on the Taliban’s
website on 1 March, which describes them as one of ‘two kinds of
people, the first that is jealous of the Taliban, and second that is
sincere but taken in by the enemies’ propaganda.’1
One of the most emblematic examples of this legitimization
focused content was a video documenting the Taliban’s commemo-
rative conference at which was present Amir Khan Mutaqi, a mem-
ber of its Supreme Council and Director of its Media, Propaganda,
and Recruitment Commission.2 In the video, Mutaqi sets out the
significance of the deal, and, in the course of doing so, attempts
to assure his audience (both online and off-) that the Taliban had
only agreed to sign it on the basis that it was a legitimate Islamic
act. Among other things, he also highlighted the fact that some
5,000 Muslims would be freed as a result of it, not to mention that
it would end the foreign invasion and result in the establishment of
a ‘pure Islamic system’ in Afghanistan.
Screenshot of Al Emarah-published op-ed. Published 18 February 2021. Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 5 March 2021.
1 ‘What we achieved from the Doha peace deal,’ Al Emarah, March 2021.
2 ‘Seminar on the Occasion of the First Anniversary Doha Agreement, Part-3,’
Al Emarah Studio, 1 March 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 10Graph Name
Theme 1: Celebrating the Peace Deal
Other key implications of the deal, as outlined in an op-ed separate In other, similarly themed content, the Taliban attempts to explain
to Mutaqi’s speech were: why the peace deal was a victory for all Afghans, not just its direct
• Protection for civilians against night-time raids conducted by supporters. Its officials hold that such a deal is the only way to
the US and its allies; sustainably end the war in Afghanistan and establish a strong and
pure nationalist government that has the power to restore its peo-
• A reduction in hostile Afghan military influence across the ple’s dignity.4
country, especially in rural areas under Taliban control;
• The polarizing impact it has had on the internationally rec- Essentially, then, the Taliban’s official position is that the deal
ognized Afghan government, which has led some 13,561 offi- should be considered a win-win situation, one that sees it liber-
cials to defect; ating prisoners, ousting Americans, and establishing a shari’ah
government.5
• The international legitimacy that it has bestowed upon the
Taliban, which now has formal diplomatic relations with sev-
eral states;
• The burgeoning popularity of the Taliban among the Afghan
masses, swathes of which now consider it a legitimate, not
terrorist, actor; and
• The fact that it has caused the US military presence in
Afghanistan to contract to just 2,500 (and, soon, zero)
soldiers.3
4 ‘Seminar on the Occasion of the First Anniversary Doha Agreement, Part-1,’ Al Emarah
Studio, 1 March 2021.
5 ‘The Islamic Emirate statement on the first anniversary of the Doha agreement,’ Al Emarah,
3 ‘What we achieved from the Doha peace deal,’ Al Emarah, 1 March 2021. 28 February 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 11Graph Name
Theme 1: Celebrating the Peace Deal
Why Peace is Progress
The Taliban complemented these explicitly supporter-focused com-
munications with a stream of content that was (at least nominally)
geared towards providing the US government with advice about
why it was in its interests to leave Afghanistan and what would
happen if it did not.
The first set of materials comprised a series of op-eds published on
the Taliban’s website. One urges US citizens to push their elected
officials to demand the full withdrawal of the American military
from Afghanistan.6 Not only would it save them money, the author
contends, it would undermine the corrupt financial practices that
are currently underway in Afghanistan and costing the US tax-
payer money.
Another op-ed sets out the purportedly unsustainable military
costs of the US’s involvement in Afghanistan. It holds that, in 19
years of war, it had failed to secure even one meaningful victory
against the Taliban. This was, the author notes, a humiliation:
‘[The US and its allies] used all possible military power at their
disposal [in Afghanistan] but could not succeed in defeating the
Screenshot of two of the Taliban’s monthly magazines, Shariat
and Srak, in Urdu and Pashto respectively. Source: ExTrac. mujahidin and, what’s more, the mujahidin are now much stronger
than they were before the war.’7
6 ‘If the Doha agreement is broken,’ Al Emarah, 18 February 2021.
7 ‘Conspiracies against the peace deal,’ Shariat 9:12, February 2021, p.2.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 12Graph Name
Theme 1: Celebrating the Peace Deal
In Srak, one of the Taliban’s regular analysts strikes a similar tone, In an op-ed published on 18 February, for example, one Taliban
writing that the US may as well withdraw because its soldiers official draws attention to the fact that Afghanistan has not been
cannot stay in Afghanistan in perpetuity.8 The official warns that used as a launchpad for expeditionary terrorism against any west-
there is no way that any country, not even the US, can keep up a ern interests in decades.10 They also claim that all foreign indi-
military presence in another faraway land without one day giving viduals that posed any danger to the US and its allies had left the
up due to the costs associated with it. He says that this is especially country in the immediate aftermath of the US’s invasion in 2001,
the case in the context of Afghanistan, which has always histori- specifically writing that:11
cally been ‘a graveyard for foreign invaders.’ The article concludes
‘The US and its allies should not worry about
by stating that the US should cut its losses and immediately forget
about winning a military victory in Afghanistan. Instead, it should whether any foreign militants will attack them from
follow the path set out in the peace deal and withdraw safely and Afghanistan because the Taliban takes full responsi-
securely. As the author notes, ‘it will be best for the US to leave bility of its security. If there was the possibility of any
Afghanistan as soon as possible before it turns into another shame- threat from Afghan soil to the US and its allies, the
ful story in its history, one similar to that of Vietnam.’ Notably, in Taliban would never have taken such bold action as
his interview with Shariat magazine, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah pledging in the Doha deal that they will not let any-
Mujahid similarly explains that, ‘If [the US] fails to take advantage one use the Afghan soil against the foreign states.’
of this [peace deal] opportunity, it will face a miserable fate similar
to that of the former Soviet Union.’9 It is worth noting that Mawlawi Amir Khan Mutaqi also empha-
sised this in his 28 February speech, in which he said that ‘the [US
Separately, the Taliban tried to make assurances to the US that it and its allies] should understand that the Taliban have full control
would be leaving Afghanistan in safe hands and that it would not in Afghanistan. One year on from the deal, it did not allow anyone
become a safe haven for anti-US terrorist groups. These assurances to attack US or NATO forces in the country.’12 The second clus-
appeared to be an attempt to play down fears that groups like ter of materials was levelled specifically at Taliban supporters and
al-Qa’ida would take advantage of the US’s withdrawal. commanders. It was generally geared towards framing the peace
deal as a victory, not a loss, for the Islamic Emirate project.
10 ‘If the Doha agreement is broken,’ Al Emarah, 18 February 2021.
11 Ibid.
8 ‘If Joe Biden decides to extend the war…,’ Al Emarah, 18 February 2021. 12 ‘Seminar on the Occasion of the First Anniversary Doha Agreement, Part-3,’
9 ‘Shariat interview with Zabiullah Mujahid,’ Shariat 9:12, p. 6-9. Al Emarah Studio, 1 March 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 13Theme 2 Victory Over America © 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 14
Graph Name
Theme 2:
Victory over America
The second cluster of materials was
levelled specifically at Taliban support-
ers and commanders. It was generally
geared towards framing the peace deal
as a victory, not a loss, for the Islamic
Emirate project.
Screenshot of Mawlawi Sirajuddin Haqqani’s speech. Published 26 February 2021. Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 5 March 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 15Graph Name
Theme 2: Victory Over America
Peace as The Americans’ Only Way Out
Just as was the case at the end of 2020 and earlier in 2021, the
Taliban continued to frame the peace deal as a chance for the US
and NATO to accept defeat gracefully and withdraw securely from
Afghanistan.
For example, on 2 March, one of its senior analysts published an
op-ed setting out how the two decades-long war in Afghanistan
has been a significant social, political and economic drain on the
US government.13 The official contends that it had directly precip-
itated the collapse of the US’s global military supremacy and rein-
troduced multipolarity to the world order. With that in mind, he
writes, the US is in no position to bargain. Rather, this is now an
existential thorn in its side, and, accordingly, to avoid total collapse,
the US must accept the Taliban’s invitation to leave peacefully. If it
does not, the op-ed concludes, the Taliban would force it to with-
draw through violence.
Screenshot of Al Emarah-published op-ed on the negotiations. Published 1 March 2021.
Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 6 March 2021.
13 ‘The Doha deal can guarantee security to both the US and Afghanistan,’ Al Emarah,
2 March 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 16Graph Name
Theme 2: Victory Over America
Similarly, the editorial page of the Pashto-language magazine Citing the fact that the US had already been reducing its presence
Srak aims to explain why the peace deal is the only sensible policy in Afghanistan by shipping out its soldiers, closing down bases
option for the US government.14 It notes that: and securing or removing military equipment, the Srak editors
hold that the writing is already on the wall for the US. Clearly, the
‘The Americans, after exhausting all other mili-
Americans want out of Afghanistan, and the process is already long
tary, political and economic options, finally real- in motion.15
ised that negotiations and a peace deal with the
Islamic Emirate are the only option for them. […] Expanding on this was an op-ed published on the Taliban’s web-
They chose the peace process and accepted the Doha site on 19 February that seemingly issues a veiled threat regarding
deal, which was not just a decision of the then-US expeditionary terrorism against Western interests, should the peace
administration or the authorities in the White process fail.16 It warns that the impact of any deal-breaking on the
House. Rather, prominent US army generals and part of the US would not be confined to Afghanistan, but would
CIA and Pentagon officials craved for it. They real- ‘spread throughout the world and result in a global war.’ Whether
or not that is realistic remains to be seen.
ised that peace with the Taliban is the only option
for ending the unwinnable long war in Afghanistan
and for withdrawing, securely, their soldiers from
Afghanistan.’
15 Ibid.
14 ‘Breaking the Doha deal is the US digging its own grave,’ Srak, February 2021, p.1. 16 ‘If the Doha agreement is broken,’ Al Emarah, 18 February 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 17Graph Name
Theme 2: Victory Over America
The New Administration
When it comes to the question of whether (or how) the arrival
of the new Biden administration will alter US interests in
Afghanistan, and affect the peace process more broadly, the
Taliban was clear.
Pointing to the US’s systematic drawdown in the country, it dis-
misses any and all claims—especially those being issued by the
Afghan government—that Biden will walk back on the original
commitments made by the Trump administration, stating that
these are purely rhetorical and not grounded in the material reality
of the US withdrawal.17
Notwithstanding this defiant position, there are some signs that
the Taliban is nervous of the still relatively unknown quantity that
is the Biden administration. In one op-ed, for example, one of its
officials notes, hopefully, that Biden was the first US official to
start negotiations with the Taliban when he was working in the
Obama administration.18 However, the same official notes that it
is still too early to ascertain in any definitive manner the nature of
Biden’s policy agenda.
Screenshot of Al Emarah op-ed on the Biden administration. Published 18 February 2021.
Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 6 March 2021.
17 Ibid.
18 ‘If Joe Biden decides to extend the war…,’ Al Emarah, 18 February 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 18Graph Name
Theme 2: Victory Over America
Elsewhere, the Taliban has adopted an almost complimentary tone
regarding the US, stating that it believes that the new administra-
tion—that is, the whole government, and not just its president—is
not naïve and that it is unlikely to make a decision that ends up
undermining its interests just to spite the previous president.19 As
its spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, says, ‘Our peace deal was with
the US state in which all US authorities and policy-making insti-
tutions were involved. This deal is also in the strategic interests of
the US, so we do not think the new US administration can, or will,
reject it.’ 20
Screenshot of Al Emarah op-ed on the negotiations in Doha. Published 19 February 2021.
Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 6 March 2021.
19 ‘Shariat interview with Zabiullah Mujahid,’ Shariat 9:12, p. 6-9.
20 Ibid.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 19Graph Name
Theme 2: Victory Over America
Accusations of Duplicity
As usual, the Taliban also spent a large amount of time accusing
other parties of failing to fulfil their obligations as part of the deal.
In Supreme Council member Mutaqi’s speech at one of the
Taliban’s summits to celebrate the peace deal, he accuses the
Afghan government of systematically working to sabotage it.
Among other things, he alleges that President Ashraf Ghani and
other senior officials like Hamdullah Muhib and Amaraullah Salih
are deliberately derailing the prospects of a political settlement
between the internationally recognized government and
the Taliban.21
The Taliban did not pull any punches when addressing the US
government, either. For his part, former Taliban spokesman Mufti
Lutfullah Hakimi in his speech accuses the US of violating, more
than 800 times, the Doha agreement.22 According to Hakimi, the
Taliban leadership is only stopping its fighters from responding to
these violations because it is committed to securing a US withdrawal
from Afghanistan, as per the timeline set out in the Doha deal.
Screenshot of Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid’s interview with Shariat magazine.
Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 6 March 2021.
21 ‘Seminar on the Occasion of the First Anniversary Doha Agreement, Part-3,’ Al Emarah
Studio, 1 March 2021.
22 ‘Seminar on the Occasion of the First Anniversary Doha Agreement, Part-2,’ Al Emarah
Studio, 1 March 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 20Graph Name
Theme 2: Victory Over America
Elsewhere, in a daily report published on the Alemarah website on It is worth noting that, in the same speech, Haqqani simultane-
18 February, another Taliban official contends that the US is saying ously commends his audience of mid-level to senior Taliban com-
one thing while doing another: ‘Some US officials and members of manders for not having violated their own commitments to the
allied states have been accusing the Taliban of breaching the Doha deal. As Muslims, he held, such violations would be a grave sin.
peace accord. It seems that these people have not understood the
peace accord or are doing this to further their hidden interests.’23 Doubling down on this idea in an interview with Shariat magazine,
the Taliban’s spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid fervently rejects the
Other materials claim more explicitly that, while the Taliban has Afghan government’s claim that the Islamic Emirate had not kept
been keeping to its side of the deal, NATO and the US have been to its commitments. He asserts that the reverse was in fact true and
ignoring their commitments. It seems, based on this pool of mate- that it had fully implemented all clauses of the peace deal over the
rial, that the Taliban’s principal concern is that they will not with- course of the last year. Per Mujahid, these clauses are: i) no Taliban
draw their troops by 1 May. If this does not happen, its officials attacks against US forces; ii) no exploitation of Taliban-controlled
have stated on multiple occasions now, they will be acting in viola- territories to undermine US forces; iii) commencement of an
tion of the deal and will be reprimanded with violence. intra-Afghan dialogue; and iv) a ceasefire.25 While the first three
conditions had been fulfilled already, Mujahid did note that the
For example, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the deputy leader of the Taliban, ceasefire can and will only be implemented once the third step had
in his address to Taliban commanders on the peace deal on 26 been met with full success. By way of contrast, the US has been
February, warned of attacks on a ‘devastating’ scale if the US does attempting to force the Taliban to break its promises by failing to
not meet its 1 May 2021 deadline.24 Drawing attention to the release all of its prisoners, refusing to remove Taliban leaders from
Taliban’s demonstrated capability in the use of new military tactics its sanctions list, and continuing to bomb Taliban bases and civil-
and technologies, he said, ‘We were resisting the invaders with very ian population centers.26
limited resources 15 years ago, and now we have drones and other
technology. Let us wait and see. If [the US] ends the peace deal, we
will give them an exemplary lesson.’
25 ‘Shariat interview with Zabiullah Mujahid,’ Shariat 9:12, p. 6-9.
26 ‘The Islamic Emirate’s deputy amir, Mawlawi Sirajuddin Haqqani, addressing a gathering of
mujahid commanders,’ Al Emarah Studio, 26 February 2021; ‘Seminar on the Occasion of
23 ‘Continuation of the occupation is a loss for everyone,’ Al Emarah, 18 February 2021. the First Anniversary Doha Agreement, Part-3,’ Al Emarah Studio, 1 March 2021: ‘Shariat
24 ‘The Islamic Emirate’s deputy amir, Mawlawi Sirajuddin Haqqani, addressing a gathering interview with Zabiullah Mujahid,’ Shariat 9:12, p. 6-9; ‘If the Doha agreement is broken,’
of mujahid commanders,’ Al Emarah Studio, 26 February 2021. Al Emarah, 18 February 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 21Theme 3 The Taliban’s Governance Offer © 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 22
Graph Name
Theme 3:
The Taliban’s
Governance Offer
The last, smallest cluster of materials
revolved around setting out what a
Taliban government would mean for
Afghanistan. It focused in particular
on the immediate effect it would have
on reducing corruption in the country.
Screenshot of Mufti Lutfullah Hakimi’s speech. Published 1 March 2021. Source: ExTrac. Last accessed: 14 March 2021.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 23Graph Name
Theme 3: The Taliban’s Governance Offer
Secular vs. Islamic Politics.
These materials were generally levelled at the Afghan masses and
geared towards making a case for why a Taliban government would
be preferable to the present system.
In Haqiqat, one of the Taliban’s most important periodicals, there
are a number of articles that accuse the internationally recognized
government of using all possible means to undermine the prospect
of peace in Afghanistan.27 These accounts allege that the war has
become the lifeblood of the government and that, for that reason,
its continuation is existentially important to it. For that reason, it
had been entering into negotiations with no intention of achieving
peace; indeed, one of these op-eds notes, throughout the time that
it has been calling for a ceasefire, government security forces have
been attacking ‘civilians’ throughout the country.28 Mutaqi and
Haqqani raised the same point in their speeches to at the com-
memorative conferences on 28 February.
Screenshot of the latest issue of the Taliban’s Dari-Pashto magazine, Haqiqat. Source: ExTrac.
27 ‘An Islamic or Western system?’ Haqiqat, January/February 2021, p. 38-39.
28 ‘The enemy of peace is seeking excuses for war,’ Haqiqat, January/February 2021, p. 22.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 24Graph Name
Theme 3: The Taliban’s Governance Offer
An End to Corruption
Separately, the Taliban has been attacking the government on These claims are followed up with an assertion that Taliban
account of its perceived corrupt practices. Among other things, rule in Afghanistan, which would usher in a period of Islamic,
these claims revolve around its allegations that senior officials are shari’ah-compliant governance, would immediately resolve the ills
stealing from national assets and public funds, something that caused by warlordism and endemic corruption. It is, as Srak’s edi-
the Taliban claims it never did during its pre-9/11 incumbency.29 torial pages claim, only through an Islamic system that the Taliban
They accuse the Afghan government of looting from the public can ensure peace and prosperity for all Afghans and restore the
and locking funds away in other countries, exploiting the flexibility dignity of Afghanistan in the eyes of the rest of the world.33
afforded to it by the ‘Western democratic system.’30
At one point, the Taliban even cites a report from the Economist
Intelligence Unit, which placed the Afghan government near the
top of its list of the world’s worst governments.31 Specifically, it is
quoted as saying, ‘The Ashraf Ghani-led Kabul administration is a
corrupt, incompetent, and illegitimate government. This adminis-
tration does not lack only legitimacy in the country, but even it is
globally recognized a corrupt regime.32’
29 ‘An Islamic or Western system?’ Haqiqat, January/February 2021, p. 38-39;
‘What do public protests and strikes indicate,’ Al Emarah, 21 February 2021.
30 Ibid.
31 ‘The Kabul administration has lost its international credibility,’ Haqiqat,
January/February 2021.e.
32 Ibid. 33 ‘Breaking the Doha deal is the US digging its own grave,’ Srak, January 2021, p. 1.
© 2021 The Global Strategy Network Taliban Framing of the Peace Process 15 February – 10 March 2021 25Restoring Peace & Building Social Cohesion
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