The New (Dis)Orders: Envisioning the Complex Futures of Geopolitics
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MAY 2019
The New
(Dis)Orders:
Envisioning the
Complex Futures
of Geopolitics
DAVID BARGUEÑO
DARSHANA M. BARUAH
CAROLINA COSTA
AMBRE EYOUM
LIANA FIX
LIANA LIM HINCH
YUHO NISHIMURA
CYRIL PRINSLOO
HANG ZHOU
WOLFGANG REINICKE
Supported by GGF Partners
Table
of Contents
04 About the Program 21 Policy Project 1:
Cape Town Safer Tech Initiative
05 Introduction
24 Policy Project 2:
06 Scenario 1: The Aftermath of
Democratizing Policymaking at the
China’s Death Kiss to the IMF and
World Bank Group Through Diversity
the Dawn of a New Bipolar Order
27 Policy Project 3:
11 S cenario 2: A Grand Development
Global Futures Dialogue
Bargain
31 Methodology
16 S cenario 3: The Indo-Pacific and
the New Great Game 32 Acknowledgments
20 From Scenarios to Policy Projects 33 Fellows of the Futures of Global
Order Working Group
1 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 2
ABOUT THE PROGRAM ABOUT THE PROGRAM
About
the Program
The Global Governance Futures program (GGF) Using strategic foresight instruments, including
brings together young professionals to look ahead scenario planning and risk assessment, the work-
10 years and think of ways to better address glo- ing groups produced scenarios for their respective
bal challenges. Building on a decade of successful issue areas. Based on their findings, the fellows put
rounds of the GGF program, GGF 2030 convened together a range of products that outline scenarios
27 fellows from Brazil, China, France, Germany, In- of potential global governance challenges of the
dia, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, and the United coming decade and ways to address them.
States (three from each country). Over the course
of 2018 and 2019, the fellows participated in four In addition to learning about and implementing
dialogue sessions, which took place in Washington, the scenario planning methodology, our fellows
DC, New Delhi, São Paulo, and Paris and Berlin. met with leading policymakers and experts from
each participating country, whose insights helped
The GGF 2030 fellows – selected from the public, shape the scenarios.
private and non-profit sectors – formed three work-
ing groups, each focusing on one key global issue. The findings, interpretations and conclusions ex-
For this round, they focused on the futures of glo- pressed in this report are those of the authors and
bal order, the global migration and refugee chal- do not represent the views of the organizations they
lenge, and the role of cities in global governance. work for.
3 THE NEW (DIS)ORDER: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 4
INTRODUCTION SCENARIO 1: THE AFTERMATH OF CHINA’S DEATH KISS TO THE IMF AND THE DAWN OF A NEW BIPOLAR ORDER
Introduction Scenario 1:
Global order refers to the systems and mecha- ›› How will technology and multinational compa-
nisms of interaction between states and non-state nies transform politics between nation states?
The Aftermath
of China’s Death
actors based on power, strategic interest, cooper- ›› To what extent will geography, regional politics
ation, and competition. and/or identity politics influence global order in
2030?
FOCAL QUESTIONS ›› What will be the new institutional framework of
Kiss to the IMF
a shifting global order (which sees tensions be-
›› How will economic development and inequality tween the Western-led, neo-liberal, multilateral
play into the global order in 2030? institutions and emerging parallel institutions)?
Key Variables
and the Dawn of
a New Bipolar
THE RELEVANCE OF BRETTON WOODS changing national policy, and dissent over exist-
INSTITUTIONS: A weakening of the existing ing orders fuels nationalism/populism – with spill
order due to the decline of Western power, which over effects domestically, regionally, and inter-
leads to an emergence of new actors (the rise of nationally.
Order
parallel/competing institutions, such as the New
Development Bank 1, the Asian Infrastructure In- TECHNOLOGY AS A MAJOR DISRUPTER: Big
vestment Bank, or the BRICS Contingent Reserve data, artificial intelligence, robotics, and drones
Arrangement). contribute to both the diffusion and centralization
of power, depending on domestic contexts.
RACE TO MEET RESOURCE DEMANDS
(FOOD, WATER AND ENERGY): Potential con- DECLINING DOMINANCE OF THE US ECO-
flicts fueled by competition for resources, move- NOMY: The decline of the US dollar as a reserve
ment of people, disruptive technology, climate chan- currency, the rise of alternative systems (such as A China-led versus US-led political and economic institutions, there was further decline of Bretton
ge, the growing role of multinational companies, the China International Payment System, China order emerges in 2030: China is viewed as the Woods institutions such as the World Trade
etc., leading to contagion and spillover effects. Union Pay, and cryptocurrencies), the rise of new world’s economic and financial center, 2 as well as Organization (WTO).
financial centers and credit rating companies the leader in fighting climate change, spearhead-
IMPLICATIONS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS (e.g., the Universal Credit Rating Group). ing the New Global Green Deal negotiations. It But GSM loans were handed out without strict
IN THE G20 COUNTRIES: ‘Black swan’ leaders, all started in the early 2020s, when China exited governance conditionalities, which in turn em-
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Like- powered illiberal regimes and authoritarian
minded countries and distressed economies leaders throughout these regions. In parallel, the
followed its exit, and joined the China-led mone- Chinese were successful in spreading their gover-
tary fund: the Global Stability Mechanism (GSM). nance model based on tech-authoritarianism
With China creating its own parallel set of global combined with a state-led capitalist system.
2 Enda Curran, January 8, 2019, ‘These Could Be The World’s Biggest Economies by 2030,’ Bloomberg, available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-08/world-s-biggest-economies-seen-dominated-by-asian-ems-by-2030?cmpid%3D=
1 See https://www.ndb.int/ socialflow-twitter-economics&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_content=economics&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social
5 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 6
SCENARIO 1: THE AFTERMATH OF CHINA’S DEATH KISS TO THE IMF AND THE DAWN OF A NEW BIPOLAR ORDER SCENARIO 1: THE AFTERMATH OF CHINA’S DEATH KISS TO THE IMF AND THE DAWN OF A NEW BIPOLAR ORDER
As a response to China’s rising economic and po- relationship between the US and its allies had been Although China managed to come out stronger nomination was perceived by the Chinese as a ma-
litical dominance, the US pressured its allies to severely damaged by years of volatile and reckless from the trade war started in 2018 5 by former jor political defeat since Beijing had spent a great-
choose sides. But the US-led attempt failed as the US international policy under the Trump era. President Trump (through further diversifying deal of political capital lobbying for a Chinese can-
its market access and ensuring a greater role for didate. The IMF’s move symbolized the tipping
the Yuan in global trade), the commercial dispute point in the competition between the US and China
further enhanced the economic and political over the governance of international financial in-
animosity between the US and China. In reaction stitutions. Having previously expanded the reach
to the trade war, China reduced its holdings of US of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement
treasuries, which in turn decreased its economic (CRA) beyond its founding members (Brazil, India,
exposure to the US dollar. Combined with that, a Russia and South Africa), China chose the ‘death
number of initiatives have been implemented to kiss option’: in 2022, it announced its exit from
decrease the dollar’s dominance (such as an alter- the IMF as well as the establishment of an alter-
Former German
Illiberal leaders empowered native to the SWIFT payment system), which led to native monetary fund based on the BRICS CRA,
by imported Chinese
Chancellor Angela Merkel
named head of IMF
surveillance technology the strengthening of the Yuan as an international called the Global Stability Mechanism (GSM). By
2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029
currency. doing so, China not only strengthened an ecosys-
tem of China-centered organizations but it also
2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 In 2021 former German Chancellor Angela Merkel greatly weakened the role of the Bretton Woods
2030
was named Managing Director of the IMF. This organizations.
China & BRICS+
establish
Global Stability
Mechanism (GSM)
as alternative
monetay fund
IMF China asser ts global
China’s demands for IMF fails to stabilize climate leadership
ates
reform & new candid struggling economies
d
for director rejecte
History of the Future
China’s exit from the IMF, which took place in ment to forge ahead with its dominance of the
2022, and the emergence of a bipolar political global financial system. Leveraging its growing
and economic order resulted from a decade-long economic influence, China demanded significant
dispute between China and the US over the global reforms to the IMF’s structure, including a re-
economic governance structure. In the years prior vised quota system, changes to the candidates
to 2022, China’s economic power became stronger considered for the job of the body’s director, and
and more influential, with its share of global GDP a change in its assistance programs to rely less
rising significantly. 3 China’s corporations active 4 on market-based reforms and equal treatment.
in key strategic sectors, such as high-tech, IT, data However, the Chinese demands were repeatedly
management, and the ‘green economy’, have been rejected by key IMF member states, most notably In 2021, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel was named Managing Director of the IMF, a nomi-
the domestic drivers pushing the Chinese govern- the US. nation that was perceived to be a major political defeat by the Chinese. Source: European Council
3 Statista, 2019, ‘China: share of global gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for purchasing-power-parity (PPP) from 2012 to 2023,’
available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/270439/chinas-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/
4 European Chamber of Commerce in China, 2017, ‘China Manufacturing 2025,’ available at 5 Dorcas Wong and Alexander Chipman Koty, May 6, 2019, ‘The US-China Trade War: A Timeline,’ China Briefing, available at
http://docs.dpaq.de/12007-european_chamber_cm2025-en.pdf https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/
7 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 8
SCENARIO 1: THE AFTERMATH OF CHINA’S DEATH KISS TO THE IMF AND THE DAWN OF A NEW BIPOLAR ORDER SCENARIO 1: THE AFTERMATH OF CHINA’S DEATH KISS TO THE IMF AND THE DAWN OF A NEW BIPOLAR ORDER
Against the background of major global economic In parallel, Chinese technologies that function as emitting country in the late 1990s and the 2000s,11in renewable technologies12 and green infrastruc-
turmoil, a series of like-minded countries and Belt platforms for data collection, surveillance and this shift has been positively acknowledged by tures, supported by technologies made and sold
and Road Initiative 6 (BRI)-dependent stakehold- internal repression were increasingly exported Western civil society actors. by Chinese companies, the narrative has begun
ers – including a significant share of Latin Ameri- to other illiberal regimes. As a result, these states’ to change in favor of China. In 2030, experts are
can nations (Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, leaders have become deeply intertwined with The New Global Green Deal, behind which China raising the question: is China the new benign he-
and Argentina) as well as Ukraine, Poland, Hun- China for their hold on to power. A new, and seem- is the leading force, serves as the positive exam- gemon in international affairs, succeeding the
gary, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, ingly effective governance model of tech-author- ple that puts into question the US-held idea that United States in providing common goods to the
and Iran – were the first set of states that agreed itarianism and state-led capitalism has emerged, China is the adversary of the West and of West- international community?
to side with China. Over the course of 2022 and challenging the Western model of liberal democra- ern values. By providing investment capacity
2023 these countries exited the IMF and became tic market economy.
members of the GSM. In 2024, a new global finan-
cial crisis erupted, driven by global debt unsus- In retaliation against the new bipolar economic
tainability,7 a series of ill-conceived financial order that emerged after China’s exit from the
deregulation policies in the US, super-inflated IMF, the US demanded that its allies – among
“Tether’s valuation,” 8 and the burst of the crypto- them the UK, Canada, France, Germany, and
currencies bubble. The IMF, which was weak- Japan – refrain from any affiliation with the GSM.
ened by the exit of countries that followed China, Moreover, the US asked that they join forces to
did not have the economic resources or political counter China through a political and economic
weight to bail out economies hit hard by the 2024 containment strategy. Scholars call this dynamic
crisis. The distressed economies – including the new ‘Velvet Curtain’.
Brazil, Italy, Spain, South Africa, Nigeria, Indo-
nesia, Thailand, and Malaysia – turned toward However, disappointed and distrustful of the US
China and its GSM for economic assistance. after years of volatile and reckless international
policy under former President Trump,9 the allies re-
Starting in 2024 and for the next few years, the mained ambiguous and in a hedging policy against
GSM bailed out distressed economies without or in support of the US and China.
setting a framework of specific conditionalities,
such as good political governance, plans for In 2030, China has managed to secure a break-
poverty reduction, public account transparency, through on how it is perceived by outside actors.
or improvement of financial operations. It announced the so-called New Global Green
Deal, which is hailed as one the most important
While GSM loans provided short-term financial initiatives of the last decade that helps reverse
relief to distressed economies, in the medium-to- the global warming trend. Domestically, since Since 2018, China has been making a significant shift toward renewable technologies and low carbon
long term, the lack of good governance conditionali- 2018 China has been making a significant shift investments. Source: Hahaheditor12667 / Wikimedia Commons
ty and social distress strengthened various populist towards renewable technologies10 and low carbon
and authoritarian leaders rise to the political scene. investments. Having been labeled as the top CO2
6 The World Bank, March 29, 2018, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative’, The World Bank, available at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative
7 Matt Phillips and Karl Russell, September 12, 2018, ‘The Next Financial Calamity Is Coming. Here’s What to Watch,’ The New York Times,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/12/business/the-next-recession-financial-crisis.html
8 Sylvain Ribes, ‘Tether’s hold on Bitcoin’s liquidity: A risk assessment,’ Medium,
https://medium.com/@sylvainartplayribes/tethers-hold-on-bitcoin-s-liquidity-a-risk-assessment-c677c9eb5c3c
9 Nick Wadhams, David Wainer and Toluse Olorunnipa, September 27, 2018, ‘How an Isolated Trump Insulted Allies and Dismissed
the World at UN,’ Bloomberg, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-27/isolated-trump-insults-allies-dismisses-
the-world-at-un-meeting 11 Robert Rapier, July 1, 2018, ‘China Emits More Carbon Dioxide Than The U.S. and EU Combined,’ Forbes, available at
10 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), January 6, 2017, IEEFA Report: China Set to Dominate U.S.
in Global Renewables Boom; $32 Billion in Overseas Investments in 2016 Alone,’ IEEFA, available at 12 Tim Buckley and Simon Nicholas, 2017, ‘China’s Global Renewable Energy Expansion,’ Institute for Energy Economics and Financial
http://ieefa.org/ieefa-report-china-set-dominate-%E2%80%A8global-renewable-energy-boom-expands-lead-u-s/ Analysis (IEEFA), available at http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Chinas-Global-Renewable-Energy-Expansion_January-2017.pdf
9 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 10
SCENARIO 2: A GRAND DEVELOPMENT BARGAIN SCENARIO 2: A GRAND DEVELOPMENT BARGAIN
Scenario 2: History of the Future
A Grand THE NEW “NEW NORMAL”
The trade war between the US and China has put
a significant drag on China’s economy. China’s
in Cape Town, and predicted a flood of investment
from other global firms into the country and the
continent.
Development
GDP growth slowed down from 6.6 percent in At the same time, developments in other parts of
2018 13 to 4.1 percent in 2022. Private consump- Africa spurred further investment from tech
tion, which generated approximately 40 percent giants. The continent had one of the highest rates
of GDP in 2017,14 decreased by one quarter in 2020 of connectivity in the world, largely due to its
Bargain
due to the rising price of imported goods and stag- burgeoning youth who are early adopters and
nant wages. Following the US mid-term elections heavy users of technology (and whose share of
in 2018, Democrats took control of the House of the population had increased by 42 percent in
Representatives15 and kicked off a protracted im- 2030). An innovative, multi-purpose, mobile-based
peachment effort against Trump. The US increas- application merging e-commerce, e-payment and
ingly withdrew from the world, leaving a huge other financial and public services on one platform
vacuum in the global order. Dealing with a con- called Wildfire – invented by software develop-
tinuing refugee crisis and in an attempt to stem ers from Kigali and backed by Google – spread
the rise of populist candidates, European coun- across the continent due to its ease of use. This
tries decided to cut development aid for Africa by further facilitated the integration of personal,
70 percent, with the funds to be redirected to theireconomic, and social data of the whole conti-
own citizens. nent’s population into a single platform. Within a
few years, these tech giants were sitting on big
AFRICA RISING data with unparalleled insights into the habits
and preferences of nearly every single African
Cyril Ramaphosa’s election as South Africa’s pres- who is connected to the internet (at 1.7 billion
World Bank faces existential ident in 2019 heralded a new era for the country: people, they represent almost 20 percent of the
crisis after massive
corruption scandal his radical economic transformation plan, already world’s population).
2019 2027 2029
initiated ahead of his inauguration, created an in-
2021 2023 2025
vestment-friendly environment. As South Africa In Lagos, a start-up biotech company success-
2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 looked to increase its value-added trade profile, fully developed a low-cost technology that rever-
2030
it targeted high-tech firms. Google, long having ses declining agricultural productivity in Nigeria,
• App hits 50 million users struggled to get a foothold in the country due to which was Africa’s largest rice importer16 until
• Wildfire devours South Africa
the difficult enabling environment and political several years ago. Investment started to pour
instability, heralded the new policy as “a big win into Africa from all over the world to tap into this
Africa tr
a
for the country and the continent” while announc- new technology and scale it to a global level.
digital a nsformed into
nd finan
cial hub ing the opening of its southern global headquarters
• China’s economic slowdown – causing temporary disengagement from Africa
• EU’s refugee crisis – aid resources diverted for their citizens to stem the rise of populism • WB Existential Crisis
• US adopts self-imposed isolation (minimal engagement with the world to focus on internal affairs)
13 Huileng Tan, January 20, 2019, ‘China’s economy grew 6.6% in 2018, the lowest pace in 28 years,’ CNBC, available at
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/21/china-2018-gdp-china-reports-economic-growth-for-fourth-quarter-year.html
14 Martin Wolf, May 29, 2018, ‘Consumption to replace investment as key to China growth,’ Financial Times, available at
https://www.ft.com/content/627ab75c-4256-11e8-97ce-ea0c2bf34a0b
15 BBC, November 7, 2018, ‘Mid-term elections: Democrats win House in setback for Trump,’ BBC News, available at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46120373
16 Ruth Olurounbi, November 14, 2018, ‘Nigeria Seen as Biggest Rice Buyer in 2019, Behind China,’ Bloomberg, available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-14/usda-sees-nigeria-rice-imports-increasing-to-3-4m-tons-in-2019
11 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 12
SCENARIO 2: A GRAND DEVELOPMENT BARGAIN SCENARIO 2: A GRAND DEVELOPMENT BARGAIN
In 2022, President Kenyatta of Kenya, the acting In 2023, Amazon announced the creation of Afro- THE WORLD BANK’S EXISTENTIAL CRISIS into a poster child of what’s possible when devel-
chairman of the African Union, announced the Pay, an e-payment platform for Amazon’s business opment is driven by big data. Previous develop-
implementation of the African Continental Free across Africa. In addition to e-payment technol- In 2019, Jim Young Kim announced his resignation ment efforts have failed partly because of the lack
Trade Agreement, allowing for free movement of ogy, Afro-pay also provided credits to its consu- from the World Bank Group (WBG) to join a pri- of big data. The big data now driving the strate-
goods, services, capital, and people across the mers in an effort to increase financial inclusion. vate infrastructure investment firm, three years gies and operations of most global value chains is
continent. Migration flow from Africa to Europe Within two years, top e-commerce platforms all ahead of the end of his term. In a note to the staff, the missing link that will turbocharge develop-
slowed down significantly due to new opportuni- over Africa, including Wildfire, Jumia, Kilimall, Kim mentioned that working with the private sec- ment impacts by ensuring development inter-
ties across the continent. Long suffering from the Takealot, Konga, Bidorbuy, and many brick-and- tor “is the path through which I will be able to ventions are tailor-made and laser-focused.” The
restrictive nature of trade in goods and services, mortar businesses, began to use Afro-pay as the make the largest impact on major global issues amount of available digital data was projected to
the private sector welcomed the announcement. main form of payment. Africa, the last frontier of like climate change and the infrastructure deficit increase by 40 percent annually. This approach
The private sector has always viewed African global capitalism, had been transformed into the in emerging markets.” Kim’s abrupt departure trig- stood in stark contrast to the one-size-fits-all
countries as its ‘last frontier’ with significant fu- new digital and financial hub of the South. gered a soul-searching journey for an institution development policy prescriptions employed by
ture potential growth, considering demographic that had long struggled to maintain its legitimacy many multi- and bilateral development partners.
trends and the sheer size of the continent. and relevance within an expanding universe of de-
velopment banks. His successor, nominated by the The Amazon Foundation was focused on ensur-
Trump administration, lacked broad-based sup- ing financial inclusion for the poor in Africa. For
port from key stakeholders. In 2024, despite strong example, in 2025 real-time feedback from users
advocacy for substantial reforms in the Bank’s of Afro-pay (such as late payment or default) in
internal governance – particularly its voting struc- Lagos provided the Foundation with early warn-
ture – by China and other developing countries, the ing on financial distress among its consumers,
Board of Directors re-appointed David Malpass which enabled it to provide relevant assistance
who insisted on doing business as usual. just in time. The success of this new development
model led other mega private foundations (such
In 2023, there were a series of unprecedented cy- as Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative and Google Foun-
berattacks against the Bank, which resulted in a dation) to flock to Africa in the ensuing years.
leak of 20 million confidential documents detail- These tech foundations were acutely aware that
ing in myriad ways how top officials at the World ensuring Africa’s prosperity and continued devel-
Bank had embezzled $100 million in development opment was in line with their strategic interests
aid intended for fragile and conflict-affected coun- (and those of their corporate parents). A prosper-
tries. Faced with unrelenting criticisms and calls ous Africa was not only an effective public rela-
for its dissolution, the management of the World tions campaign but also a necessary precondition
Bank Group was determined to ensure that the for their corporate parents’ bottom line. Having
institution would become relevant again by em- noticed the outsized role of these new titans of
barking on the most ambitious reform initiative development, the African Union unveiled a new
undertaken in its history. Public-Private Partnership for Development to
pool the resources of these private foundations
RISE OF THE TECH TITANS OF DEVELOP- under a common development agenda.
MENT
NEW WINE IN AN OLD BOTTLE
In Lagos, a start-up biotech company successfully developed a low-cost technology that reverses declin- In 2020, Jeff Bezos announced the establishment
ing agricultural productivity in Nigeria. of the Amazon Foundation with an initial endow- At the World Bank’s Spring Meeting in 2030, Jeff
ment of $75 billion, making it the largest private Bezos, the WBG’s new president who retired
foundation in the world. Bezos, in his announce- from Amazon in his quest for a new challenge, an-
ment, highlighted the ongoing big data revolu- nounced that a major reform proposal that was
tion on the African continent, which could be har- submitted to the Board of Governors a year later
nessed to generate actionable insights for public had been unanimously approved. The Bank’s Ar-
goods, as a key driver for this initiative. ticles of Agreement, which were last amended in
1989, divides the majority power between govern-
“Tech companies are sitting on a mountain of big ments and the private sector, both of which con-
data that has the potential to transform Africa stitute a supermajority. No major decisions can
13 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 14SCENARIO 2: A GRAND DEVELOPMENT BARGAIN SCENARIO 3: THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE NEW GREAT GAME
Scenario 3:
be undertaken without the consent of either party. member countries, thus effectively doubling the
All powers of the Bank are vested in the Board of WBG’s capital. The five largest capital contributors
Governors, who delegate its duties to 25 Execu- from the private sector (led by the tech compa-
tive Directors: 12 directors shall represent member nies) each appoint an executive director while the
The Indo-Pacific
countries, 12 directors shall represent the private remaining executive directors will be elected by
sector, and 1 director shall represent non-govern- the remaining private sector representatives. The
mental civil society. Bezos, as quoted by the Wa- civil society representative acts to provide checks
shington Post, said: “Development without big data and balances while ensuring the interests of other
is impossible. To truly make an impact, the public relevant stakeholders are taken into account. The
and the New
and private sectors need to be an equal partners, executive director representing civil society orga-
not an estranged couple.” nizations is elected by all participating civil soci-
ety organizations at five year intervals.
The five largest sovereign shareholders (calcu-
Great Game
lated as a share of capital contributions) each ap- For the first time in the history of the Bank, the
point an executive director, while other member private sector is on an equal footing with govern-
countries are represented by executive directors ments in driving the development agenda. The
elected every five years. The private sector provi- ‘New’ World Bank Group has been reborn with the
des an equal amount of capital contribution with scale, capacity, and resources to match its ambition.
The Bargain In this scenario, we foresee a clear shift toward fewer treaty-based, legally binding agreements
militarization and conflict across Asia due to and a proliferation of makeshift security, politi-
uncertain patterns of economic, political, and cal, and economic relationships. Water conflict
military multi-polarity, combined with a diver- in South Asia turns up the heat on a new great
gence in opinion on the ‘appropriate’ distribution game with Asian countries (e.g., the India-Paki-
Private Sector of power in the region and multilateral fora. The stan nexus, China, and Japan) as the primary
World Bank traditional alliance system is challenged, with protagonists.
(Led by Tech Companies)
Access to WBG Policymaking Access to Big Data
Prestige & Legitimacy Bigger Development Impact
US & NATO withdraw
from Afghanistan Non-western
Pakistani institutions paralyzed
Data Sharing Board Seats agricultural/
economic crisis
2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029
2020 2022 2024 2026 2028
2030
India’s invetment in
Quad+
technology catalyzes
Coalitions
growth
formed
China-Pakistan
Economic
Corridor
militarized
gins to
tes army, be
Japan reinsta y in Indo-Pacific,
m ili ta ril
engage by US
suppor ted
15 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 16SCENARIO 3: THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE NEW GREAT GAME SCENARIO 3: THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE NEW GREAT GAME
The Indo-Pacific is a Military Balancing Powers
Theater for the India-China
Rivalry
A preponderance of power concentrated in either joint ‘development cooperation’ projects across
India or China’s hands threatens the economic sub-Saharan Africa, which often yield more
and security interests of high-income countries, publicity than concrete results when compared
Investments in cybersecurity, combined with ac- in construction, have sustained economic growth each of which pursue piecemeal negotiations and to Chinese investments. Meanwhile, Russia has
celerated domestic development and overseas in- and domestic consumption. With the increased partnerships on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, searched for opportunities to partner with India
vestments in raw commodities across Africa has economic parity between India and China, re- the United States, Australia, Japan, France, and or China to secure new energy and defense con-
made India the world’s second largest economy, gional tensions flare and each country’s involve- other countries in the European Union (especially tracts for Russia’s own state-owned companies.
after China. From Bangalore to Hyderabad, Mum- ment in third countries in the Indo-Pacific lead Germany) have prioritized continued parity be- Russia acts in concert and competition with the
bai to Chennai, India has harnessed tech hubs to to military standoffs, such as over water disputes tween China and India. In lieu of multilateral fo- United States, the European Union, Australia,
drive growth, expand jobs, and increase access to in Pakistan and China’s military use of the port in ra, bilateral engagements and military exercises and Japan (who also compete against one another).
education and healthcare, as well as become the Sri Lanka. An arms race between China and India among a narrow sub-group of countries like the Despite their former roles on the world stage, as
global pioneer of technological innovations in the has escalated, both in cyberspace and conventio- Quad 4 (Japan, Australia, the US, and India), have well as their continued political and economic
defense sector. China’s domestic growth rate has nal arms. become the primary modus operandi of coopera- strengths, the United States, the EU and Russia
slowed but its overseas investments, particularly tion. Simultaneously, other groups of countries display neither the capacity nor the political will
have emerged (like China, Russia, Pakistan, and to play a decisive role in resolving the proxy
Iran). Outside the Indo-Pacific, the United States, conflicts that flare in Asia, given the critical roles
the European Union, Japan, and India engage in of India and China.
Stalemate of ‘Reformed’
Multilateral Institutions
History of the Future
After significant lobbying efforts, India assumed reducing the shares of countries in Europe (Italy,
a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Spain, Belgium, and Poland) and the Western Pakistan secured economic and military assis- In 2023, a rogue Pakistani group attacked Indian
Council – as have Germany, Brazil and Japan. Hemisphere (Canada, the Caribbean Islands, and tance from China, and Beijing has entered the dams on its eastern border, ostensibly to secure
The so-called G4 nations supported each other’s even the United States – though the US remains India-Pakistan nexus by 2030. China formalized the water necessary for farming. In response,
bids for a permanent seat, with the support of the the largest single shareholder). As a result of the its security partnership with Pakistan in 2026, India conducted narrow, surgical attacks along
United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the United more inclusive governance, as well as the regio- thereby militarizing an economic partnership, the Pakistan’s borders. For the preceding three years,
States. They also fractured the so-called Uniting nal rivalries concentrated in Asia, international China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). With an extended drought combined with a financial
for Consensus coalition, once composed of re- institutions and multilateral negotiations result Chinese boots on the ground, Pakistan called for crisis paralyzed Pakistan’s agriculture, the second
gional rivals to the G4. India has also significantly in more acrimony than achievements. Growing – and received – greater investment in construc- largest sector of its economy. Between 2019 and
increased its quotas in Bretton Woods Institu- distrust between India and China paralyzes even tion from China; enclave cities of skyscrapers 2022, India built elaborate dams on the Indus
tions, not enough to block votes on its own, but non-Western blocs, such as the New Develop- emerge in Pakistan’s remote southwestern prov- River, upon which Pakistan’s agriculture depends,
enough to align with other countries to block ment Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Invest- ince of Balochistan. (As many of these skyscrap- thus compromising the Indus Water Treaty17 that
projects proposed by China in the World Bank ment Bank. Opportunities for consensus are ers lack occupants, a Pakistani woman publishes had secured a fragile peace since 1960. At the
and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the limited to those few geographic areas and issue a novel about the province’s new “Ghost Cities” same time, China has sponsored and built dams
IMF, India increased from three percent of all areas that fall outside their respective spheres of before being exiled to London.) To stabilize the re- on the Brahmaputra River, which originates on
voting shares in 2019 to ten percent in 2023, thus interest. gion for further development, China has engaged the northern side of the Himalayas in Tibet and
in trilateral cooperation with Pakistan and defense flows through China, India and Bangladesh. To
initiatives in Afghanistan, filling the void left by halt the escalation of conflict over water resources
the United States as it withdraws from the region’s across the region, the World Bank (which brokered
most conflict-ridden areas. the original Indus Water Treaty) advocated for a
17 See https://www.britannica.com/topic/Indus-Waters-Treaty
17 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 18SCENARIO 3: THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE NEW GREAT GAME FROM SCENARIOS TO POLICY PROJECTS
From Scenarios
renewed treaty and peace talks between the United States, Japan has proactively engaged in
Pakistan and India, but all attempts failed by military operations across the Indo-Pacific region
2026. The Times of India and Dawn repeatedly and strengthened security partnerships among
publish articles entitled “Water Wars,” warning so-called Quad nations. Based on these emergent
to Policy Projects
of imminent nuclear escalations, as well as the security ties, makeshift Quad+Coalitions formed
dire environmental consequences of the dams on in 2027; France often invites Germany and other
the agriculture (and economies) of South Asia. members of the European Union to participate in
joint exercises. Even as India formally maintains
To fulfill his pledge during his re-election cam- its ‘non-alignment’ posture, the Quad+Coalition
paign, newly re-elected President Trump drew does not engage in combat but does conduct joint
down the US presence and NATO investments in military exercises in the Indian Ocean, from
Afghanistan in 2020. Widespread intra-tribal vio- Djibouti to Timor-Leste. Amid a public backlash
lence and violence against women and girls in that to Chinese investments in sub-Saharan Africa, Scenarios are used to make possible future devel- future threats and working towards realizing
country has escalated. The New York Times pub- India also sought to partner with select Quad+ opments imaginable and to define the plausible opportunities that are not yet clearly visible. Our
lished Nicholas Kristof’s column on Afghanistan countries to secure lucrative contracts to natural range of what could happen. Foresighting the policy projects are ideas about how to make
entitled, “The Graveyard of Empires & Women’s resources. In 2025, Sri Lanka’s Daily Times ran futures of global order – however interesting and policy intervention happen by identifying key
Rights.” As part of “regional rebalancing,” and to an article entitled, “India Signals to China Across insightful – was not an end in itself. Our ultimate sponsors, partners, and resources, and creating
encourage India to play a more active role in Afgha- the Bow.” aim was to create concrete policy projects which the political mobilization to make change happen.
nistan, President Trump, with Russia’s support, prepare for the future by avoiding or mitigating
agreed to increase India’s voting shares in the From 2019 until 2030, India has worked with
World Bank and IMF; both countries advocated European countries and Japan to block any
for and secured India’s permanent seat on the World Bank projects involving Chinese state-
United Nations Security Council, as well as the owned construction firms, while China contin-
other members of the G4 (Germany, Brazil and ues to veto India-sponsored resolutions in the
Japan). United Nations. Governance reforms have simul-
taneously increased participation but curtailed
After securing a coveted seat on the UN Security opportunities for consensus; the United States
Council, Japan’s newly elected government in and European countries question the value and
2023 succeeds in abolishing the restrictions on effectiveness of multilateral fora. In turn, high-
its military. Diverse political parties – the Liberal income and low-income countries alike band-
Democratic Party, the Japan Restoration Party, wagon with China and India on a case-by-case
the Democratic Party, the People’s New Party, basis, signing limited bilateral defense and trade
and Your Party – worked together to amend Arti- agreements. In order to describe their continued
cle 9 of the constitution by leveraging popular relevance but increasingly peripheral roles in the
anxiety over China’s expanding military and Indo-Pacific, analysts describe the USA, the EU
economic presence through the Belt and Road (and its member countries) and Russia as ‘balanc-
Initiative, particularly Chinese investments in ing powers’.
South Asia. With support from its closest ally, the
19 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 20POLICY PROJECT 1: CAPE TOWN SAFER TECH INITIATIVE POLICY PROJECT 1: CAPE TOWN SAFER TECH INITIATIVE
Policy Project 1:
Examples of key partners in each category are: The primary goal of the convention is to raise
awareness of the issue, at a global scale, and
›› States (France, the US, Germany, Japan, South create a set of incentives for states to adopt
Korea, Canada, Australia, Singapore, South shared standards and best practices for the good
Cape Town Safer
Africa, Colombia); use of technologies.
›› NGOs (Privacy International, Transparency In-
ternational, Influence Watch); Moreover, the Cape Town Convention represents
›› Think Tanks (The Center for Strategic and In- a ‘Track 1.5’ dialogue platform to discuss parame-
ternational Studies, Council on Foreign Rela- ters for the good use of technology and to lay the
Tech Initiative
tions, Brookings Institute, Centre for European groundwork for the development of a new global
Policy Studies); governance index on the good use of technology.
›› Tech companies (Microsoft, Google, Apple,
Facebook, IBM); As a third step, the Safer Tech Initiative creates
›› Start-ups (Ever AI, Faceter); the Tech Intelligence Unit, composed of an
›› Venture Capital funds (Charles River Ventures independent group of world-leading technology
(CRV), Qualcomm Ventures, Sequoia, Tencent experts and scholars. The group is responsible
The deliverable of this policy project is the Safer Holdings). for producing and publishing the annual Safer
Tech Index, a governance index for the good use Tech Index.
of technology, a new and innovative global moni- As a second step, a group of multi-stakeholder ac-
toring and measuring tool. tors (political, private, and civil society) partici- While the purpose of the index is new and inno-
pate in the Safer Tech Convention, held in Cape vative, its general structure and framework is
Town. The convention is organized and funded by based on existing models of governance indexes,
the three foundations and major tech companies. such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Intervention Indicators.18
As a first step, the project proposes the establish- ›› The Musk Foundation (created in 2002) is re- Deliverables
ment of the Safer Tech Initiative, led and managed spected for science and engineering education.
by a coalition of three powerful foundations (the ›› The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (created in 2006)
Musk Foundation, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, is already recognized for the Ibrahim Index of
and the Obama Foundation). The mandate of this African Governance, and focuses on good gover- The Safer Tech Index becomes the global refer- that encourage the good use and governance of tech-
coalition is aligned with the core missions of the nance in Africa; ence measuring and evaluating states’ gover- nologies at a domestic level. By doing so, states
three groups: ›› The Obama Foundation (created in 2014) fo- nance on the good use of technology within a meet their goals in being highly rated in the Safer
cuses on next generation education and global short period of time. As such, it plays the role of a Tech Index.
challenges. global standard for the good governance of the
use of technology. And although a few illiberal The Tech Intelligence Unit also provides capaci-
democracies contest its validity and relevance, ty-building trainings in several countries for the
the Safer Tech Index serves as a key reference good governance of the use of technology, estab-
Partners point and is included in countries’ ratings. lishing a scholarship scheme for public servants
and students from interested countries to apply
Moreover, the index serves as an important in- so they can pursue academic projects on subjects
centive for states’ policymakers to develop policies relevant to this field.
The initiative also relies on support from a broad
group of stakeholders: like-minded states, NGOs,
think tanks, universities, leading tech companies,
innovative start-ups, and venture capital funds.
18 See https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
21 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 22POLICY PROJECT 1: CAPE TOWN SAFER TECH INITIATIVE POLICY PROJECT 2: DEMOCRATIZING POLICYMAKING AT THE WORLD BANK GROUP THROUGH DIVERSITY
INTERVENTION
SAFER TECH INITIATIVE
led by coalition of global foundations
TECH INTELLIGENCE
UNIT Policy Project 2:
DELIVERABLES
SAFER TECH CONVENTION
SAFER TECH INDEX (published annually)
CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAM
SCHOLARSHIP SCHEME
Democratizing
OUTCOMES
RAISED AWARENESS
INCENTIVE TO DEVELOP POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE GOOD
USE & GOVERNANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
Policymaking at
IMPACT
BETTER USE & IMPROVED GOVERNANCE OF TECHNOLOGY the World Bank
The Cape Town Safer Tech Initiative in a nutshell.
Group Through
Diversity
This policy project is designed to capitalize on the representation of low- and middle-income coun-
the opportunity to revitalize the Bretton Woods tries within the Bank’s staff composition in order
institutions (particularly the World Bank Group) to reshape the Bank into a more inclusive, account-
through a more inclusive management structure able and responsive institution that better reflects
and more democratic policy-making. Management the changing global order.
reform of the World Bank is critical to increase
Objectives
Reform of the World Bank Group (WBG) has long development policy making since they are the
been a contentious issue. Middle and low-income Bank’s core clients and therefore most affected
countries have been seeking greater representa- by its decision-making. 19 Yet, previous reform
tion and influence in the Bank’s lending and efforts have been hampered by political economy
19 The New York Times Editorial Board, May 17, 2015, ‘Past Time to Reform Bretton Woods,’ the New York Times, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/opinion/sunday/past-time-to-reform-bretton-woods.html
23 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 24POLICY PROJECT 2: DEMOCRATIZING POLICYMAKING AT THE WORLD BANK GROUP THROUGH DIVERSITY POLICY PROJECT 2: DEMOCRATIZING POLICYMAKING AT THE WORLD BANK GROUP THROUGH DIVERSITY
constraints within the Bank: countries owning these proposals have not had much success. This should conduct a genuine consultation process tices, SMART (specific, measurable, agreed-upon,
the largest voting shares (and thereby policy- policy project is aimed at increasing the represen- with key stakeholders to create an effective imple- realistic, and time-based) targets, concrete diver-
making power) within the institution have been tation of middle and low-income countries within mentation strategy, which ideally will include a sity parameters (nationalities, gender and skills),
reluctant to cede control to other member coun- the Bank staff to foster a more inclusive, account- thorough review of current HR policies and prac- and an annual monitoring and evaluation process.
tries since doing so could potentially undermine able and responsive institution that better reflects
their strategic interests. However, failure to its client base without amendments to its gover-
reform the institution will further alienate the nance structures. Contrary to other reform pro-
Bank from its core clientele, rendering the insti- posals, this policy project will focus on affecting Partners
tution irrelevant, and will ultimately threaten its change at the Bank at the senior management and
sustainability. staff level, rather than at the board level. This in-
tervention will be financed by a multi-donor trust
Many of the WBG’s reform proposals have been fund sponsored by developing countries paired The approach to implementing this policy project and Scandinavian countries – all of whom have
aimed at its governance structure, voting power with a matching contribution from the Bank’s bud- is three-pronged: first, directly engaging with generally supported reform efforts within the
allocation, and capital contribution. Due to entren- get and is two-fold: key policy makers at the WBG; second, identify- WBG in the past.
ched interests and intense politicization, many of ing and partnering with natural allies within the
Bank (e.g., the staff association); and thirdly, rais- World Bank Group staff association: The
ing awareness through public advocacy. Bank’s staff association will be a key partner in
promoting the proposal internally.
Key policymakers at the World Bank Group:
BOARD
Several of the Bank’s executive directors, repre- Public advocacy: The policy proposal will be
OF senting countries that are more naturally disseminated to the relevant audience in the
DIRECTORS ›› Middle of the pyramid: Launch diversity re- inclined to support the proposed changes and put public sphere (through policy papers and op-eds)
Intervention Target
cruitment campaigns for senior management forward the proposal to the Board, should be to establish a coalition among external stake-
(manager-level and above) with a target of increa- strategically engaged. Potential executive direc- holders, such as civil society, academics, and the
SENIOR
MANAGEMENT sing the percentage of managers from emerging tors will include those representing Brazil, media, who will then pressure the institution
markets (particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa) Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) from the outside and promote this proposal.
Diversity recruitment
from 43 percent in 2018 to 60 percent by 2025.
campaigns
›› Bottom of the pyramid: Provide scholarships
for young professionals and recent graduates
STAFF
from emerging markets to acquire a postgradu-
Scholarships for young professionals from DIVERSITY RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGNS FOR WORLD BANK
ate degree at their top national and regional uni-
emerging markets + employment contracts SENIOR MANAGEMENT
versities combined with an employment con-
tract with the Bank. SCHOLARSHIPS FOR YOUNG PROFESSIONALS & RECENT
INTERVENTION GRADUATES FROM EMERGING MARKETS + EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS
Intervention INCREASED REPRESENTATION OF MIDDLE- & LOW-INCOME
COUNTRIES AMONG WORLD BANK STAFF
OUTCOMES
Promoting change at this scale requires a sus- dency unit, its staff association, the WBG’s coun-
tained commitment from the top, which involves try offices, and developing countries’ finance/ MORE INCLUSIVE, ACCOUNTABLE AND RESPONSIVE WORLD BANK
securing buy-in from the Bank’s board of direc- central bank ministries. The Bank has under- THAT BETTER REPRESENTS A CHANGING WORLD ORDER
IMPACT
tors, president, and senior management. Its gone major internal reforms that were primarily
implementation will also require establishing a imposed from the top and resulted in discontent,
solid partnership between key stakeholders, such mistrust, and resistance from staff. To avoid a
as the Bank’s human resources (HR) vice-presi- similar fate, the board, led by senior management, Proposed management reform of the World Bank Group in a nutshell.
25 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 26POLICY PROJECT 3: GLOBAL FUTURES DIALOGUE POLICY PROJECT 3: GLOBAL FUTURES DIALOGUE
Policy Project 3:
Global Futures
Dialogue
This policy project is designed to mitigate the and non-governmental organizations, organized
threat of sub-regional conflicts with global spill- by an independent, non-profit think tank with
over effects, which exacerbate disagreements over financial support from diverse funding sources.
power distribution on the world stage. More con- The aim is to bring together young leaders from
cretely, the project addresses the risk of conflict countries that carry considerable weight on the
between India and Pakistan triggered by envi- global stage but currently interact with each
ronmental factors (water scarcity), which would other in limited, narrow ways. The Global Futures
require a sustained engagement with key global Dialogue (GFD) policy project will be a platform
players (such as Iran, Russia, the EU, and the US). facilitating dialogue among emerging voices from
A critical missing link to prevent or minimize conflicting countries and sub-regional groups,
such conflict is trust and social capital among which directly impact the global order. Partici-
diverse actors relevant to the regional conflict in pating countries should include: China, India, The Global Futures Dialogue (GFD) policy project will be a platform facilitating dialogue among emerg-
South Asia, who currently lack opportunities to Iran, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, the United ing voices from conflicting countries and sub-regional groups, which directly impact the global order.
engage. States, and two countries selected from across
the European Union and United Kingdom. Initial
This policy project aims to create an annual, multi- topics could include: climate change, humanitar-
lateral dialogue platform among emerging leaders ianism, and natural resource management.
from government, the private sector, academia, Objectives
1. Cultivate dialogue on pressing geopolitical societies advocating for cooperation and peace-
issues among ten countries that lack track ful conflict resolution across the countries in
I and II level engagements. The professional question, particularly pertaining to natural re-
network will help mitigate the threats of mis- sources.
trust born of limited people-to-people ties
between significant, relevant countries across 2. Empower diverse young leaders with con-
volatile geog raphic regions. In theory, build- crete forecasting tools to apply future
ing these connections will reduce the likeli- cooperation on issues of shared concern.
hood of conflict in the future, by creating more Young leaders will draw on their GFD experi-
obstacles and voices advocating for peace and ences to influence foreign policy, if not in the im-
caution before violence erupts. Currently, there mediate time frame, then in the long term. This
are insufficient voices within the participating may not be quantitatively or readily apparent.
27 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 28SCENARIO 3: THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE NEW GREAT GAME POLICY PROJECT 3: GLOBAL FUTURES DIALOGUE
A Pakistani fellow may pick up the phone to and written); intercultural engagement; and pro-
have a conversation with an Indian fellow in a
moment of crisis, or a Swedish fellow may apply
blem-solving. Young leaders will be able to exert
greater influence in their respective societies if
Proposed Dates
forecasting tools to consider the potential con- they refine these skills. Partners in Iran, Turkey,
sequences of a tense multilateral negotiation on China, or Pakistan may be reluctant to support
the Arctic. any dialogue with the select countries, but fram- Inaugural dialogue: 2021-2022 Global Futures Follow-up dialogues: 2022-2023 Global Futures
ing the dialogue as a professional development Dialogue 2031 (Japan, Turkey, Germany, India) Dialogue 2032 (Spain, China, USA, Pakistan);
3. Provide professional development opportu- opportunity – as opposed to an official exchange 2023-2024 Global Futures Dialogue 2033; 2024-
nities to cultivate concrete skillset of grow- of ideas – could encourage diverse actors to par- 2025 Global Futures Dialogue 2034; 2025-2026
ing importance, including: communication (oral ticipate. Global Futures Dialogue 2035
Format
ANNUAL MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE PROGRAM AMONG
Over the course of four week-long dialogue ses- future of global governance. The three GFD work- EMERGING LEADERS
sions in five countries, thirty fellows in GFD will ing groups will each be supported by a senior INTERVENTION
form three working groups focused on natural fellow who will mentor the fellows by providing
resource management, green technology, and cli- expert input and analysis, acting as an intellec-
mate change negotiations. Consistent with past tual sparring partner, and help translate scenar-
practice, the fellows will meet in four dialogue ios into policy relevant outputs. Each year, the
sessions, where they will have the opportunity to organizers will identify four cities in four coun- EXPANDED, SUBSTANTIAL ENGAGEMENT AMONG DIVERSE
OUTCOMES RELEVANT ACTORS
challenge each other, exchange ideas with experts tries to host the fellows.
and policymakers, and develop scenarios of the
Partners REDUCED THREAT OF SUB-REGIONAL CONFLICTS WITH GLOBAL
IMPACT SPILLOVER EFFECTS
The program will rely upon think tanks, universi- including, for example, the Robert Bosch Stif-
ties, multinational companies, and media houses tung, the Gates Foundation, the Clinton Foun- The Global Futures Dialogue in a nutshell.
as partners to recruit participants. These part- dation, the Obama Foundation, the World Bank
ners will also provide venues, bring in expert Group, and the Tata Group. For its inaugural
views, plan activities for the fellows, and provide a session, GFD can learn from best practices from
platform for the exchange of ideas. Moreover, the Global Governance Futures dialogue, as well
multinational companies and foundations inter- as solicit ideas, projects, and applicants from the
ested in global issues and peace initiatives may be alumni network.
interested in financially supporting the dialogue –
29 THE NEW (DIS)ORDERS: EN VISIONING THE COMPLEX FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FUTURES 2030 30You can also read
