TRAIN WRECKERS AND GHOST KILLERS - Allied Marines in the Korean War - Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series
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TRAIN WRECKERS
AND GHOST KILLERS
Allied Marines
in the Korean War
by Leo J. Daugherty III
Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series
About the Author
L eo J. Daugherty III, is a mem-
ber of the Marine Corps
Reserve and is currently com-
mand historian, U.S. Army THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
Accessions Command, Fort Korean War era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Monroe, Virginia. He previously Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance of
served with the 2d Amphibious the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part
Assault Battalion, Headquarters by contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.
To plan and coordinate the Korean War commemorative events and activi-
Battalion, 2d Marine Division, ties of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have
and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, formed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee, chaired
by the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about the Sea Services’
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. During Desert commemorative effort, please contact the Navy-Marine Corps Korean War
Shield/Desert Storm he was the intelligence chief of the Commemoration Coordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX 433-7265
(DSN288-7265), E-Mail: HonorAndRemember@hqmc.usmc.mil, Website:
3d Battalion, 25th Marines, 4th Marine Division. He www.history.usmc.mil.
holds a BA and MA in history from John Carroll KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
University, Cleveland, Ohio, and recently completed his DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS
Ph.D. in military history at The Ohio State University. He Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)
has published numerous articles and book reviews in GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
Armor, Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette, Journal of Charles R. Smith
EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
Slavic Military Studies, and Joint Forces Quarterly. He is
W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist
the author of The Fighting Techniques of A U.S. Marine, Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist
1941-1945 (London: Amber Books Ltd., 2000). He is
U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center
presently writing a history of the Marine Security Guard
1254 Charles Morris Street SE
Battalion for the History and Museums Division and a Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-5040
book on Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, at Normandy dur- 2003
ing World War II. PCN 190 00410 700
Sources Operations during the Korean War
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000);
indebted to Col James W. Guy, USMC (Ret),
who supplied him with the biographic infor-
Sources used in the preparation of the Callum MacDonald, Britain and the Korean mation on LtGen General Shin Hyen Jun, as
section on the 41 Independent Royal Marine War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Jeffrey well as the “Brief History of the ROKMC,” by
Commando include the British Official Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Col Bruce M. Maclaren, USMC (Ret). Colonel
History by Gen Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Korean War: An Alliance Study (Manchester: Guy is presently writing a full length history
The British Part in the Korean War: Volume I: Manchester University Press, 1988); and Roy A. of the KMC; see also HQROKMC, ROK
A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990); Appleman, Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army Marine Corps Short History; MajGen John
Republic of Korea, Ministry of National X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950 (College T.Selden, “Type C. Report; 1st KMC Regiment
Defense, Volume I & II: The History of The Station, Texas A& M Press, 1990); Brig C. N. and its Relationship to the 1st Marine
United Nations Forces in the Korean War Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division: Division, September 1950 through May
(Seoul: Republic of Korea, 1972, 1973); Task The Story of the British Commonwealth Land 1952,” dtd 27 Jun 1952; Oral History tran-
Force Drysdale Oral Transcript of Interviews Forces in Korea (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, script of Col Kim Gun Yun, KMC, dtd 22 Dec
with Sgt Charles W. Dickerson, SSgt James B. Ltd., 1954); and Tim Carew, Korea: The 1957; Col Charles W. Harrison, “KMC
Nash, TSgt Charles L. Harrison, Sgt Morris L. Commonwealth At War (London: Cassell & Operations, 1951”; Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon:
Estess, and Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Jul 1951, Company, 1967). Eighth Army Special Operations in the
and the interview with LtGen John N. From the U.S. Marine Corps’ perspectives Korean War (Annapolis: Naval Institute
McLaughlin, USMC, (Ret) (1980); LtCol Peter on the roles of both the Royal Marine Press, 1995); LtGen Kang Ki-Chun, KMC,
Thomas, RM, 41 Independent Commando Commandos and the ROK Marine Corps, see “Republic of Korea Marine Corps,” (Marine
Royal Marines, Korea 1950 to 1952 (Royal the official history series U.S. Marine Corps Gazette, Nov 1966); Sgt Harvey Hall,
Marine Historical Society, Publication No. 8), Operations in Korea, 1950-1953: Lynn A. “Marines of the Far East,” (Leatherneck, Nov
and an unpublished typescript “Relationship Montross and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, The 1963); Lynn Montross, “Advance to the
Between the United States Marine Corps and the Inchon-Seoul Operation (1955), and The Punchbowl,” (Marine Corps Gazette, Aug
Royal Marines,” (History and Museums Chosin Reservoir Campaign (1957); Lynn 1953).
Division, Washington, D.C., Reference Folder Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and The author is indebted to BGen Edwin H.
“Royal Marines”; Fred Hayhurst, Green Berets Norman J. Hicks, The East Central Front, and Simmons, USMC (Ret), for his first-hand
in Korea: The Story of 41 Independent LtCol Pat Meid and James M. Yingling, account on Task Force Drysdale’s arrival at
Commando Royal Marines (Cambridge: Operations in West Korea. Malcolm W. Cagle, Hagaru-ri in Dec 1950; Dr. Allan R. Millett, who
Vanguard Press, 2001); LtCol Douglas B. and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea provided a critical overview of a first draft of
Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” (Marine (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957), pro- this monograph; Maj Park Il-Sung, ROKA,
Corps Gazette, Aug 1953). Secondary sources vides an excellent overview of the Navy’s and Capt Geijung Sung, KMC, for their assis-
that provide excellent background on role in the Korean War with specific mention tance on the history of the Korean War, and the
Britain’s involvement in the Korean War and of the clandestine missions along Korea’s KMC from the South Korean perspective; and
their interactions with the U.S. Marines coastlines. Ms. Doris T. Chang for her assistance in the
including the Royal Marines include Michael E. For material specifically related to the proper pronunciation of the Chinese and
Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Republic of Korea Marine Corps, the author is Korean names and places found in the text.
TRAIN WRECKERS AND GHOST KILLERS
Allied Marines in the Korean War
by Leo J. Daugherty III
n praise of the British Harry S. Truman placed U.S. forces raiding force. Within two weeks of
Royal Marines that in Japan on alert. Within a week’s Lord Fraser’s decision, on 16
had been attached to time, elements of the U.S. Eighth August 1950, a 300-man Royal
his command since Army, then on occupation duty in Marine unit was formed and took
mid-November 1950, Japan, were rushed to South Korea the name 41 Independent Com-
Major General Oliver P. Smith, to stem the North Korean invasion. mando. “Independent” in the unit
Commanding General, 1st Marine As army soldiers, and later Marines designation meant the commanding
Division, wrote that their services in of Brigadier General Edward A. officer had sole responsibility for
the recently concluded Chosin Craig’s 1st Provisional Marine the unit and did not have to consult
Reservoir campaign made “a sig- Brigade, fought the NKPA to the higher British headquarters on
nificant contribution to the hold- outskirts of the port of Pusan, the operational and logistical matters.
ing of Hagaru, which was vital to United Nations undertook a series The commandos were drawn
the [1st Marine] Division.” General of votes that not only condemned mostly from active duty units and
Smith’s comments reflected the the North Korean invasion, but individual Marine reservists
view held by many Marines, both brought thousands of allied troops preparing to depart for service in
officers and enlisted, of the fighting to the assistance of the belea- Malaya as part of 3 Commando
abilities of both their British guered ROK. Among the troops Brigade. Under the command of
cousins and their Republic of assigned to the Korean theater was Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B.
Korea Marine Corps allies. During a hastily assembled unit of Royal Drysdale, a seasoned Marine vet-
the three years they fought togeth- Marines stationed in Great Britain eran who had served with distinc-
er on the Korean peninsula, the and Malaya, where they were tion as a member of 3 Commando
British, Korean, and U.S. Marines already engaged in a guerrilla war in the Far East during World War II,
forged bonds that still exist today. against Communist terrorists. 41 Independent Commando began
The deployment of Royal preparations for service in Korea.
A Distant War and the Marines to Korea came as the gov- The Marines assembled at the
Royal Marines ernment of Prime Minister Clement Royal Marine Barracks at Bick-
R. Attlee announced its intention leigh, Devon, site of the comman-
In the early morning hours of 25 in the British Parliament to add to do school, where they received
June 1950, mechanized and the forces being sent to Korea. the customary inoculations and
ground units of the North Korean While there was some disagree- issue of uniforms prior to their
Peoples’ Army (NKPA) rolled ment with this decision among the deployment to the Far East.
across the 38th Parallel into the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Initially, 41 Commando drew from
neighboring Republic of Korea Field Marshal Viscount William three separate contingents. The
(ROK). Within 48 hours, President Slim, and Chief of the Air Staff, first, organized from volunteers
Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, both of and reservists in the United
ON THE COVER: Members of the 1st whom argued that “Britain was Kingdom, was flown from
Korean Marine Corps Regiment man a already engaged in active opera- Bickleigh to Japan in civilian
.50-caliber machine gun in fighting tions in Malaya as important ... in clothes to conceal the ultimate
near Hongchon, Korea. National
countering communist expansion destination and employment. The
Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-
A156476
as in Korea,” Admiral Lord Fraser of second group comprised volun-
AT LEFT:Royal Marines take up positions North Cape, the First Sea Lord, teer sailors and Marines drawn
during a raid to destroy enemy supply strenuously advocated for the dis- from the British Pacific Fleet. This
routes near Songjin, North Korea. patch of a brigade-sized force of group already had begun an inten-
National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G- Royal Marines to operate in unison sive period of training even before
428515 with the U.S. Navy as a commando the main body of Royal Marines
1character and proud lineage,
American military officials permitted
the Royal Marines to retain their
unique green berets. As the Royal
Marines trained on weapons famil-
iarization, small unit tactics and
raiding techniques, and conducted
physical fitness exercises, Admiral
Joy decided to use them as a raid-
ing force along the enemy’s long
and vulnerable coastline.
Organization and Training
Like many U.S. Marines sent to
Korea as part of the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, the majority of
men recruited for 41 Commando
were World War II veterans,
although there were a few new
recruits and navy volunteers.
Many, like Sergeant Major Trevor-
Dodds, a European kayaking
champion, were of “superb quality
and spirit” and had volunteered
for service in Korea. Each was a
combat swimmer, demolitions
expert, or heavy weapons special-
ist. These talents proved useful
VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN,
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, a
proponent of amphibious raiding
and other special operations, was
instrumental in the deployment of the
Royal Marines to Korea and their sub-
sequent assignment to the 1st Marine
Division.
National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC352920
arrived from Great Britain and had officials in London and
been organized into a rifle section Washington, D.C. decided the
known as the Fleet Volunteers. Royal Marines would operate with
The third group came from a rein- the U.S. Navy and Marines.
forcement draft destined for 3, 40, After arriving at Camp McGill, a
42, or 45 Commando in Malaya U.S. Army base 50 miles south of
and was on board the British Tokyo at Takehama and near the
troopship HMT Devonshire, which U.S. Navy base at Yokosuka, the
had been diverted to Japan in Commando received a complete
early August. Vice Admiral C. field issue of uniforms, weapons,
Turner Joy, Commander, Naval and equipment supplied by the
Forces, Far East, and Admiralty U.S. Army. To maintain their distinct
241 Commando Weapons and Equipment
W hen the British Royal Marine’s 41 Independent
Commando deployed to Camp McGill, Japan,
in early August 1950, they carried with them
their standard British army issued weapons. To alleviate
any logistical problem, the Commander, Naval Forces, Far
North Korea. The official submachine gun, which the
British disliked, was the M3 .45-caliber “Grease Gun,” sim-
ilar to the 9mm Sten gun the Commando originally car-
ried. A number of old 1926 Thompson submachine guns
were aquired and used during raids. All officers and
East, and British military officials decided 41 Commando noncommissioned officers carried the coveted Colt .45-
would be issued the same weapons as those issued to the caliber pistol.
U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army. This practice not only The standard Bren light machine gun gave way to the
simplified the replacement of damaged weapons and American Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), which fired
supply of ammunition, but enabled the Royal Marines to .30-caliber ammunition from a 20-round magazine and
become familiar with U.S. weapons and facilitated their was organic to the U.S. Marine rifle squad. While the BAR
training activities. became standard issue to 41 Commando, they nonethe-
Personal weapons used by the Commando included the less lamented the loss of their beloved Bren guns.
M1 Garand semiautomatic rifle and M1 Carbines. Despite the problems the Commando had in maintaining
Individual Marines (including their officers) preferred the effectiveness and operability of their M1 Garands
the reliable M1 Garand rifle, which held up reasonably and BARs in the sub-zero cold of Korea, the weapons
well under extreme battlefield conditions in Korea, par- nonetheless proved reliable when properly maintained.
ticularly during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. While Leaving their Vickers machine guns behind, the Royal
many Marines originally preferred to carry the light- Marines employed the air-cooled, bipod-mounted
weight M1 Carbine because of the high volume of fire it M1919A4 light machine gun that came with a booster cup
could deliver, it proved extremely unreliable and was that enabled it to fire 900 rounds per minute. Other
prone to malfunction in the sub-zero temperatures of machine guns used were the air-cooled A4 .30-caliber ver-
National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-438727
3sion and M1917A1 water-cooled version on a heavy tri- “British 31 Set.” The ANG/RC 9 or “Angry 9,” provided 41
pod. The heavy weapons group initially used the M1919 Commando with long-range communications capabilities.
machine guns, although they switched to the M1917, The Angry 9’s most notable characteristic was its ability
which was comparable to their Vickers machine guns. The to be powered by a hand crank.
Marines also employed the Browning M2 .50-caliber Along with the standard U.S. Army fatigues, during the
machine guns for use on the islands in Wonsan harbor and Chosin Reservoir campaign the commandos wore normal
for targets inland. underwear, longjohns, blouse or Angola shirt, a woolen
U.S. Marines issued 41 Commando the standard jersey, fatigue jacket and trousers, a pile-lined parka
60mm mortars without a tripod, as well the 81mm mor- with hood issued to the U.S. Marines, underneath which
tars, which proved far more effective than its standard 3- they wore their traditional green beret, and ski mittens
inch mortar. To battle the thick-armored enemy T-34 with woolen inner liners and leather outers. Of all the
tanks, the Royal Marines received both the 2.36-inch clothing items, the most unpopular was the standard-issue
“bazooka” rocket launchers and the 3.5-inch rocket footwear, or shoepacks, which were rubber-soled and
launcher. The Commando’s heavy weapons group also “gutta-percha, calf-length, lace-up” boots with felt
employed several 75mm recoilless rifles, which they insoles that were prone to become damp and cumber-
used with great effect against enemy emplacements and some. These shoepacks contributed to many cases of frost-
armored vehicles. bite as the feet would perspire and thus freeze when the
Communications gear was U.S. Marine standard-issue, temperatures dipped. Much of the original British-issue
at least a generation ahead of the British equivalent. The cold-weather gear came from stocks used during World
troop net radio was the short range SCR 536, which was War II, which often dated as far back as World War I when
shapped like a large handset with pull out antenna. The British forces briefly intervened on behalf of the pro-
net set was the SCR 300, which they adopted as the Czarist forces in Archangel during the Russian Civil War.
time and again during the raids The unit was organized into Of all the Royal Marine organiza-
along the North Korean coast. The three rifle troops, B, C, and D, and tions, the heavy weapons group
choice of men with such specialized a headquarters troop. Each rifle was the most flexible. The men
abilities reflected Drysdale’s recog- troop numbered approximately 45 assigned to this group were
nition for the need of such combat- to 50 men commanded by a cap- trained on all weapons in compli-
related skills as the Commando tain, while the small headquarters ance with the standard Royal
assembled and prepared for battle. troop consisted of administrative, Marine emphasis on cross-training,
As journalist and Member of motor transport, medical, commu- which was designed to ensure that
Parliament Thomas E. Driberg said nications, and a 20-man heavy if one six-man team went down, the
of the men of 41 Commando in his weapons group. At the outbreak second could fill in without a
20 December 1950 broadcast on of the Korean War, 41 lapse in covering fire. The value of
British Broadcasting Corporation’s Independent Commando consist- such cross-training was evident
Home Service: ed of 300 men of all ranks. Its during the defense of Wonsan
strength fluctuated during the first Harbor when the heavy weapons
These lads grew remark- year of the war as the fighting group assisted the island garrison
ably quickly into the mood became more intense and the by manning the four mortars, four
and outlook that seem to be number of casualties mounted. machine guns, and 75mm recoil-
characteristic of this special While 41 Commando included less rifle on Hwangto-do.
kind of outfit: one might men with different military spe- Since the Royal Marines would
define it as a nonchalant self- cialties, only engineers and sig- be operating primarily with
sufficiency, a debonair assur- nalers continued to perform their American forces, they were issued
ance that is never arrogant, a specific duties. The remainder standard U.S. firearms and other
self-mocking toughness. The fought as riflemen. Unit organiza- field equipment, including what
common idea of Commando tion of the Commando was ad hoc the British called “battle kit,” or
“toughness” is wrong. They prior to joining the 1st Marine individual equipment. This allevi-
are not muscle-bound super- Division in November 1950. The ated the logistics problem of inte-
men. Many of them are quite heavy weapons group, which con- grating British equipment within
slight and trim—physically sisted of mortars, machine guns, the U.S. Navy or Marine Corps
compact, mentally alert. Their and antitank weapons, as well as supply system. The use of
training fits them perfectly for assault engineers, remained at- American uniforms and equipment
such jobs as they had to do. tached to the headquarters troop. made it easier to supply and re-
4National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-421628
Royal Marines line the deck of the USS Perch (ASSP 313) as Korean War. In the 1960s she conducted special operations
the submarine leaves Japan for Korea. Commissioned in in Vietnam and was decommissioned in 1971. The huge
1944, the Perch operated out of Hawaii and Australia dur- cylindrical watertight locker on the afterdeck stored inflat-
ing World War II and was one of only two submarines to able boats and other equipment, prompting the nickname,
receive the Submarine Combat Patrol insignia during the “Pregnant Perch.”
equip when replacements were Believe they can be executed fight was substantiated in the com-
needed. A handful of veteran without serious risk. Sub- ments made in the log of the
Royal Marines had used American marine crew and commandos Perch as the Commando prepared
M1 Garand rifles during World War are keen to fight and gain for its first operation from the sub-
II and were familiar with its oper- experience for evaluation of marine. Leaving Japan on board a
ation. this type of organization. specially outfitted high-speed
As the Commando prepared for transport, the Marines then trans-
battle, General of the Army Joy continued to defend the use ferred to the Perch, which had
Douglas MacArthur questioned the of the Royal Marines as a raiding been assigned to carry them to the
use of British Marines even before force and MacArthur eventually objective area. Even as the Marines
their first taste of combat. In a relented. sailed toward the enemy coastline,
rather terse exchange with Vice they continued an intensive,
Admiral Joy, MacArthur ques- First Actions round-the-clock training program,
tioned not only the necessity and in which they “quickly impressed
security of conducting such raids In the stealth of night, a troop of the Americans with their enthusiasm
along the North Korean coastline, 41 Commando boarded the trans- and skill.” The log of the Perch
but also the use of the Commando port submarine USS Perch (ASSP included more praise, noting:
instead of the Navy’s underwater 313) for its first raid against an
demolition teams (UDT). Joy, an enemy railroad installation and These [Royal Marines] were
admirer of the Royal Marines, supply line. Adhering to Mac- experienced raiders with a
responded: Arthur’s explicit orders forbidding “can do” attitude comparable
the use of no more than 70 indi- to that of the Perch’s. They
The 41 Royal Marine viduals, the 63 Marines of the seemed to enjoy having more
Commando was formed and troop adjusted to life on board the thrown at them than they
trained especially to conduct Perch and continued to train for could possibly assimilate in
commando raids. Plans are combat. the short time available, and
ready for destruction of several Admiral Joy’s statement that rose to the occasion by
key points between latitudes both American submariners and becoming a well-trained, and
40 and 41 on east coast. Royal Marines were “keen” for a coordinated submarine raid-
5ing team in a remarkably the Whitesand Bay and sailed into The Train Wreckers
short time. position off Inchon, where it came
under operational control of With the South Korean capital
Royal Marine Fred Heyhurst was General Smith’s 1st Marine under United Nations control,
even more blunt in his remarks Division on 17 September, two General MacArthur’s attention
when describing the “remarkably days after the Inchon landings. turned to the pursuit of the retreat-
short time” (two weeks) it took for During subsequent actions ashore, ing NKPA. Both U.S. Marines and
American seamen and British Lieutenant Pound’s detachment of Royal Marines were withdrawn to
Marines to become a formidable Royal Marines accompanied their prepare for a subsequent end run
team. Heyhurst stated: “There was U.S. Marine counterparts during against the east coast port of
a tremendous spirit, to learn all we the 1st Marine Division’s push to Wonsan. While the 1st Marine
needed to know and get on with Seoul. Acting as a motorized Division reassembled at the port of
the job. We would get hang of one reconnaissance force, the Com- Inchon, the Royal Marines reem-
[U.S.] weapon and go straight out mando drove as far inland as barked on board their respective
for another, whatever the time Kimpo Airfield. After seizure of the ships and sailed back to Japan for
was. ... It was the best unit anyone airfield, they rejoined other Royal more training and to await further
could have joined.” Originally Marines conducting hit-and-run orders. While in Japan, 41
planned to provide relief for the raids against North Korean railroad Commando participated in two
allied forces, which had been and communications lines. major raids against a section of
pushed into a perimeter around Another team of Royal Marines railway line along the enemy’s
Pusan, the raid was delayed served with a Marine air and naval northeastern coastline between
approximately three weeks be- gunfire liaison officer directing Chongjin and Hungnam.
cause of concerns about enemy naval gunfire from the supporting As the Perch approached the
lines. British warships participating in first target area west of Tachon on
There was, indeed, a short the Inchon landing. the evening of 30 September, she
learning curve, as MacArthur’s
planned Inchon landing drew Royal Marines plant demolition charges under the railroad tracks of enemy sup-
near. Having been in the Far East ply lines along the eastern coast of Korea. During the raid, the Marines demol-
ished a section of embankment under the rail line and concealed explosive
only a month, the British Marines
charges with pressure activated detonators in two adjacent railway tunnels.
crammed weeks of training into National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428242
days as a detachment of 41
Commando on board the British
frigate HMS Whitesand Bay (F
633) prepared for its first action off
the west coast of Korea, which
came on the night of 12 September
1950. Intended to act in unison
with a U.S. Army raiding battalion
that never deployed, the detach-
ment, commanded by Lieutenant
Derek Pound and referred to as
Pound Force, found itself attached
to the 1st Marine Division, which
was only hours away from landing
at the port of Inchon on 15
September. Pound Force, designat-
ed a Special Activities Group by
U.S. Army Major General Edward M.
Almond’s X Corps, launched a
diversionary raid against North
Korean army elements at Kunsan.
At the conclusion of the raid, the
Commando reembarked on board
6was detected by enemy radar. of 125 Royal Marines, under the
With the landing party already in command of 31-year-old Major
the rubber boats, disaster was nar- Dennis L. St. M. Aldridge,
rowly averted when the motor on embarked on board the converted
the skimmer refused to start. American fast destroyer-transports
Enemy activity ashore soon made it USS Bass (APD 124) and USS
clear that a trap had been set and Wantuck (APD 125), each of
the Perch re-embarked the Com- which came equipped with four
mando and withdrew. landing craft that could accommo-
The next morning, the Perch date 162 men. The significance of
rendezvoused with the destroyers the raid was twofold. This was to be
USS Maddox (DD 731) and USS the first raid against the 120-mile
Herbert J. Thomas (DD 883) to stretch of North Korea’s rail line,
develop an alternative plan. The which ran along the northeast
new plan called for the Thomas to coast. It also was the first com-
create a diversion at the original Photo courtesy of the Naval Historical Center mando raid launched from a
target while the Perch carried out Fellow Marines and the ship’s compa- destroyer.
the landing at a second site. On ny gather on the deck of the Perch for Once ashore in the objective
the night of 1 October 1950, 41 the burial of Marine Peter R. Jones. area south of Songjin, approxi-
Commando landed from the Perch For many Marines it was their first mately 80 miles from the North
burial at sea. For some it was their
on the coast above Hungnam and Korean border with the Soviet
first military funeral, but it would not
west of Tanchon, where a day ear- be their last.
Union and even less from the
lier they had been forced to cancel Chinese border, the Marines split
a mission when a pre-landing Perch. With one troop covering into a number of parties. The
reconnaissance of the objective their withdrawal, the British “powder-train” carried explosives
area detected an enemy patrol Marines found themselves in a up to a railway tunnel; demolition
boat guarding the entrance of two furious firefight with the fully experts laid the charges and set
adjoining rail tunnels, which were alerted enemy. In the action that fol- the fuses; others guarded the
the intended targets. Under cover of lowed, they suffered their first beach and boats and checked out
darkness and in a known mined combat fatality as enemy guards the buildings between the beach
area, the Perch drew close to killed Private Peter R. Jones. and railway. All went like clock-
shore. After a quick periscope sur- Later, while the Perch lay to in work.
vey of the coastline, the skipper of the Sea of Japan, a solemn cere- Journalist Thomas Driberg, who
the submarine gave the OK to land mony was held on her afterdeck. accompanied the Marines, de-
the Commando. Numbering 67 On a stretcher covered by the scribed the results:
strong, they boarded 10 black rub- Union Jack rested the body of
ber rafts and paddled ashore. Private Jones. Drysdale read a We “got the hell out of it” as
Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale brief service and the body was the Yanks say, as quickly as
assumed personal command of 41 committed to the deep. Eight we could. It was a terrific
Commando’s first major raid Commando riflemen fired three moment for all the chaps—
against enemy supply lines. volleys in tribute and the two many of whom ... had never
The Commando stepped ashore American destroyers each paid been in anything like it, the
unopposed. While one group of their respects with a full 21-gun real thing, before when,
Drysdale’s force hurriedly planted salute. halfway back to the ship, we
explosives beneath the steel rails of As was the custom, the captain of suddenly saw the sky torn by
the targeted tracks, two other the Perch, Lieutenant Commander a vivid orange flash, and the
groups fanned out along the flanks Robert D. Quinn, arranged for the tremendous roar as the tun-
to stave off enemy attacks. The ensign to be folded and sent to the nel went up in the air and
demolitions were then detonated, next of kin. The ensign and Jones’ knew that our mission had
resulting in a pile of twisted rails medals are now displayed in the been successful.
and a destroyed rail culvert. With Royal Marines’ Museum alongside
the mission completed, the com- the U.N. flag flown by the Perch. Unfortunately, the Marines suf-
mandos were recalled to the Several days later, another force fered two casualties, the group’s
7used landing craft in what they
termed “dry ramp landings.”
In his postwar account of the
services of 41 Commando,
Drysdale noted the techniques
used by his Marines had evolved
from those used by the U.S.
Marines during World War II, par-
ticularly those of Lieutenant
Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s raiders,
and had been adapted in Korea
“to suit the prevailing circum-
stances.” Drysdale, who had been
impressed with the use of sub-
marines in raiding missions, later
wrote: “it is enough to say that all
who took part in the operation
were deeply impressed by the
obvious potential of a new form of
National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-438738 submarine warfare.” He added that
Commandos from the USS Horace A. Bass (APD 124) load an assault boat for what made the raids an even
a raid on installations deep behind enemy lines. Commissioned in 1944, the Bass greater success was the planning,
first saw combat at Okinawa and is credited with sinking a Japanese submarine cooperation between the naval
in the final days of World War II. In addition to carrying out raids in Korea, she
and ground commanders, and the
participated in the evacuation of Chinese Nationalist troops to Formosa and
adequate time for training and
Vietnamese civilians from Haiphong to Cam Rahn Bay in the wake of the
French defeat in 1954. rehearsal prior to launching the
operations.
youngest Marine and a World War train in small unit tactics, cold As U.N. forces pushed toward
II veteran. Both were buried at weather operations, and company the Yalu River and the Royal
sea. Despite the loss, the raid, and battalion weapons. The just- Marines trained at Camp McGill, it
which “involved transporting completed coastal raids would be was suggested the commandos be
quantities of limpert mines and the last in which the commandos attached to the 1st Marine Division
explosives ashore in rubber would use rubber rafts. Following as a reconnaissance force. At first
dinghies through the surf and cur- these two missions, the commandos rejecting such a proposal,
rents,” was highly successful in
A bazooka team from 41 Independent Commando takes its position during a raid
disrupting enemy rail lines and
on enemy rail and supply routes near Songjin. The raids brought this vulnera-
soon gave rise to the nickname the
ble area of North Korea under all forms of naval attack.
Royal Marines proudly adopted as National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428248
a trademark of their mission in
Korea, “the train wreckers.”
As the navies assigned to the
United Nations forces held
supremacy in the waters off the
Korean coast, attention now shifted
inland as MacArthur’s forces drove
further north in what appeared to
be a war-ending offensive against
the retreating NKPA. As the military
situation on the Korean peninsula
rapidly changed, so to did the mis-
sion of the Royal Marines. They
regrouped and headed back to
Camp McGill to reorganize and
8Drysdale, who now foresaw a chief of staff, that the Royal General Smith eagerly wanted the
more limited role for his men as the Marines be attached to their troops, although there was no
prospects for further raids dimin- American counterparts at the earli- reply for 10 days as General
ished, revised the training of the est possible moment. While it was Almond, miffed at being bypassed
Royal Marines with an increased too late to add the Commando to in the chain-of-command, with-
emphasis on conventional warfare the landings at Wonsan, Admiral held final approval. Eventually,
skills rather than commando-type Burke sent the following message after the intervention of Admiral
operations. Hoping to rejoin the to General Smith: “British 41st Burke and the British naval
fighting, Drysdale initiated a Royal Marine Commandos avail- attaché, Commander John “Jock”
request through Rear Admiral able and anxious to join in your M. D. Gray, RN, X Corps, gave
Arleigh C. Burke, USN, who was division earliest. Suggest this grudging approval. Smith was anx-
then Vice Admiral Joy’s deputy excellent unit be employed.” ious to employ Drysdale’s Marines
Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, RM
C olonel Douglas Burns Drysdale was born in
Hampstead, a suburb of London, on 2 October
1916. He spent the majority of his youth in
Argentina, where he developed a life-long passion for
horsemanship, polo playing, and hunting.
Commissioned a subaltern in September 1935 in the
Royal Marines, he was given charge of HMS Renown’s
Marine detachment. He remained on board the Renown
during the first three years of World War II. During the
occupation of Iceland, Lieutenant Drysdale served as the
staff officer of “Force Fork,” the combined force consist-
ing of the 2d Battalion, Royal Marines, and a coastal bat-
tery. He was promoted to captain in June 1942 and
assigned to the staff of the British Admiralty Delegation,
Washington, D.C. Here, Captain Drysdale had his first con-
tacts with U.S. Marines when he was attached to
Headquarters United States Marine Corps as a liaison
officer until 1943 when he became brigade major of 3
Special Service Brigade. He remained with the brigade for
the rest of World War II.
In September 1945, during the Burma campaign, 3
Special Service Brigade was assigned to carry out
Operation Zipper, an amphibious operation that was
canceled when the war ended. Major Drysdale was to
serve as the commanding officer of 44 Commando dur-
ing that operation. For outstanding service in that theater,
the British government appointed Drysdale a Member of National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428253
the British Empire (MBE). After the war, Major Drysdale late 1951, when he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel
served on the staff of the British army staff college at Ferris N. Grant. He then served as the Royal Marine rep-
Camberley. He then joined the staff of the Officer’s resentative at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,
School where he was promoted to acting lieutenant Virginia, from 1952 to 1954. After leaving Quantico,
colonel and assigned to command 41 Independent Drysdale was appointed Commandant of the Royal
Royal Marine Commando. Marine’s Noncommissioned Officers School. He was
His command of 41 Commando in Korea was to be the then assigned to the staff of the Commandant General of
highlight of a distinguished career. For his actions at the Royal Marines, where he was promoted to colonel in June
Chosin Reservoir, as well as his leadership of 41 1961. He was selected to command 3 Commando
Commando, Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale was awarded Brigade prior to his medical retirement in January 1962.
two Silver Stars and a Distinguished Service Order. He moved to Norfolk, England, in 1978, where he died
Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale led 41 Commando until on 22 June 1990 at the age of 73.
9as a reconnaissance force in unison each troop was ordered to take up which was three miles north of
with the division’s Reconnaissance defensive positions on the perime- Koto-ri on the east side of the
Company to protect the division’s ter and to dig in. Lieutenant road. These three units, together
flanks. On 16 November 1950, 41 Colonel Drysdale reported to with the subsequent addition of 24
Commando set sail from Yoko- Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, tanks equipped with 90mm guns
suka, Japan, on board the USS the commanding officer of the 1st from the division’s 1st Tank
President Jackson (T-APA 18) to Marines, who informed Drysdale Battalion, and five tanks from the
join the 1st Marine Division at his unit would continue its journey Antitank Company attached to the
Hungnam, North Korea. The Royal on the morrow and that he would 1st Marines, made up the fighting
Marines and their American coun- take command of a combat task component of the task force. In
terparts were about to participate in force to open the road to Hagaru-ri. addition to the combat portion of
one of the fiercest and most mem- Even before 41 Commando the force, there were detachments
orable actions in their respective arrived at Koto-ri on the afternoon from Headquarters Battalion; 1st
institutional histories. of the 28th, elements of the 79th Signal Battalion; 7th Motor
and 89th CCF Divisions had Transport Battalion; Service
Task Force Drysdale slammed into the Marine’s perime- Company, 1st Tank Battalion; mil-
ter at Yudam-ni during the night of itary police; and other groups and
On 20 November 1950, 27 November. Another enemy individuals from the 1st Marine
Drysdale’s 41 Commando arrived at division, the 59th, then completed Division. Also attached to this
Hungnam and prepared to enter an end sweep to the southeast and small but powerful force was a
the lines alongside the 1st Marine moved against the 14-mile stretch of platoon from the U.S. Army’s
Division at the Chosin Reservoir. road south to Hagaru-ri. Road- 377th Truck Battalion, commanded
After a brief period of cold-weather blocks were established between by Lieutenant Alfred J. Catania,
acclimation, the Commando joined Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, and also USA. Named Task Force Drysdale,
the division as an attached unit. Its between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. the composite unit set about to
strength upon arrival was 14 officers Bridges were blown along the break through enemy lines that
and 221 enlisted. On 23 November, route. The enemy now threatened had cut the main road leading to
the division issued Operations the very lifeline of the 1st Marine Hagaru-ri. “It will not be a walk in
Order 23-50, directing the Com- Division. What was to have been an the sun,” Drysdale said at the end
mando to “conduct operations to administrative move for 41 of his pep talk to the Marines of
locate and destroy enemy forces in Commando now became a combat Company G.
the Hagaru-ri, Samdae-pyong, operation. Fifty years before, U.S. Marines
Koto-ri area,” coordinating its activ- Augmented by U.S. Marine and and Royal Marines had fought
ities with the 1st and 7th Marines. Army units, Drysdale’s force was together during the infamous
Three days later, the order was to clear the enemy from the road Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Now they
modified to move the Commando to and surrounding terrain between prepared to do the same against,
Yudam-ni to prepare for operations Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, and then strangely, the same enemy, the
in the direction of Sinpo-ri (eight reinforce the Marines at Hagaru-ri. Chinese.
miles southwest of Yudam-ni) to The force had three primary objec- At 0930 on the cold and snowy
protect the division’s left flank in tives to seize before the final goal morning of 29 November, Task
coordination with the 7th Marines. could be achieved. With 41 Force Drysdale set out from Koto-
The latter order would never be Commando in the lead, the first ri with a 800-man force, of which
carried out. objective was to seize the hill east 235 were from 41 Commando, 205
After enjoying Thanksgiving of the road just outside Koto-ri. from Company G, 3d Battalion, 1st
Day at Hungnam, 41 Commando The second was to permit Captain Marines, 190 from Company B,
moved out by truck on 28 Carl L. Sitter’s Company G, 3d 31st Infantry, and more than 150
November for Koto-ri, its stores Battalion, 1st Marines, with service, headquarters, and miscel-
including heavy weapons still in Captain Charles L. Peckham’s laneous troops. Trucks of the 7th
crates. Progress was slow as the Company B, 31st Infantry (U.S. Motor Transport Battalion supplied
convoy climbed the 4,000 feet to Army) following in reserve, to transportation for the Marines of
Funchilin Pass over the narrow, pass through and strike out against Company G, while the Army’s
twisting road cut out of the rocky Hill 1236 further north. The third 377th Transportation Truck Com-
hillside. Arriving in late afternoon, objective was to seize Hill 1182, pany carried the soldiers of
10National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5320
While waiting to join the 7th Marines at Yudam-ni where they 1st Engineer Battalion at Hamhung. While there, they took
would conduct reconnaissance patrols on the division’s left over some of the night security duties.
flank, the Royal Marines were billeted for a few days with the
Company B, and the vehicles of several 3.5-inch rocket rounds into advising him that tanks from
the 1st Tank Battalion’s Service the entrenched Chinese forces, Company D, 1st Tank Battalion,
Company hauled 41 Commando. forcing them out of their positions would be available at approxi-
As Drysdale’s task force moved where Sitter’s Marines proceeded mately 1300 that afternoon.
out, a massive artillery barrage to decimate their ranks with small Drysdale decided to wait for the
began while Marine and Navy air- arms fire. The assault on Hill 1236 additional support to minimize
craft plastered enemy troop con- cost Sitter’s company 14 casualties. further casualties before setting
centrations in the hills surrounding The commandos and Company G out again. With less than two miles
the road north of Koto-ri with frag- then moved about a mile up the covered, the impetus of the attack
mentary bombs and napalm. The road toward Hill 1182, the third was now stopped.
Royal Marines seized the first objective. There the enemy put up Two platoons of tanks from
objective with relative ease. But a stout defense with mortars and Company D, reinforced by the
Captain Sitter’s company met well-placed machine gun fire from tank platoon of the Antitank
heavier resistance in its attempt to fortified positions on the high Company from Regimental Com-
seize Hill 1236, about one-and-a- ground. As Company G assaulted bat Team 5, reached Koto-ri at
half miles north of Koto-ri. There, the Chinese positions, Lieutenant noon after moving out from
the defending Chinese forces had Colonel Drysdale ordered Captain Majon-dong. Meanwhile, the tanks
prepared elaborate defenses along Sitter to break off the attack, with- from Company B, 1st Tank
the ridgeline. Fighting his way to draw to the road below, and wait Battalion, less the 2d Platoon,
the top of the summit, Master for new instructions. Prior to the which was attached to 2d
Sergeant Rocco A. Zullo maneu- move, Drysdale had received a Battalion, 1st Marines, departed
vered to within 200 yards and fired message from Colonel Puller Tongjong-ni and arrived at Koto-ri
11about 1500, too late to join of casualties Drysdale had bled for cover behind vehicles or in
Drysdale’s renewed assault. The incurred in such a short advance, ditches along the roadside.
company was ordered to bring up General Smith nonetheless Chinese fire prevented the dis-
Task Force Drysdale’s rear. believed it vital to relieve Hagaru- abled truck from being pushed out
At 1350, Drysdale’s task force ri, and thus ordered the British of the way, which in turn caused a
resumed its advance. Shortly after officer to “push through if at all major delay in the advance of the
moving out, Captain Sitter’s com- possible.” relief column. Nonetheless, the
pany encountered heavy small As his tanks refueled in a dry head of the column, which con-
arms fire from houses along the streambed, Drysdale’s force sisted of Company D, 1st Tanks,
right side of the road. Sitter quick- received overhead fire support as Company G, nearly three-fourths
ly ordered the accompanying air strikes from Marine Fighter of 41 Commando, and a few Army
tanks forward to provide fire sup- Squadron 312, directed by forward infantrymen, continued its ad-
port for his men. The tanks air controller Captain Norman vance toward Hagaru-ri with
opened up with their 90mm guns, Vining, kept the Chinese from Drysdale in command. Left behind
flushing the Chinese from their overwhelming his exposed posi- were the remaining Royal Marines,
fortified positions. The Marines tion. Again more time was lost. most of Company B, 31st Infantry,
then destroyed the enemy soldiers Upon resuming the advance, unit and practically all of the division
as they ran from the buildings. integrity disappeared as the combat headquarters and support troops.
Thereafter, Communist forces troops, who had dismounted from Despite the confusion that ensued
repeatedly sought to delay the their vehicles to refuel, became after the column had been cut off
relief column with harassing fires. intermingled with headquarters from the forward elements of the
In one instance, enemy mortars troops. task force, the remaining troops
and machine guns scored a direct Not far south of the halfway quickly established a defensive
hit on one of the trucks carrying point, increased enemy fire caused perimeter “before it was too late.”
Company G’s 3d Platoon, wound- the column to come to an abrupt As U.S. Marine Sergeant Charles
ing every man in the truck. halt. The terrain was extremely Dickerson later recalled:
Despite these and similar attacks, foreboding and well suited for an
Task Force Drysdale continued to ambush. The high ground rose Two thirds of the column
slowly snake its way along the sharply on the right side of the was cut off, the first third
road from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri. road and, bordered by the going on up the road further.
Further delays ensued while the Changjin River and wooded hills, a The road ran in sort of an “S”
tanks made their way around shell frozen creek wound through a shape, not extreme, and at
craters and roadblocks. For Task plain several hundred yards wide the left there was a small
Force Drysdale, the advance con- on the left. This valley was given ditch. At the right there was
sisted of brief periods of move- the ominous name Hell Fire Valley quite a large ditch, and at the
ment alternated with interludes in by Drysdale. It was an appropriate right of that was a railroad
which everyone scrambled from name, as the Marines, soldiers, and track, then another ditch. And
the trucks to engage in firefights. commandos would discover when further to the right was a
Finally, about 1615 that afternoon, the enemy sprang a well-laid trap in plateau 20 feet higher than
the column came to a complete what became an all-night fight by the road. Then there were
halt about four miles north of half the men of the convoy. rice paddies on further about
Koto-ri. As the men of Task Force 100 to 200 yards, and there
Drysdale piled out of the trucks to was a river; and on the other
In Hell Fire Valley once again return fire against the side of the river was the
well-entrenched enemy, a mortar mountain. The Chinese came
As the last tanks of Company B shell crashed into one of the from the front between the
rumbled out of the Koto-ri perime- trucks at the far end of the valley, hill and this plateau. They
ter to join the convoy, Drysdale creating a roadblock that split the came down the ditch from
questioned the wisdom of contin- column in two. Using small arms the far side of the railroad
uing the advance, given the road and mortar fire, the enemy took track and over the road at the
conditions and the tenacity of the advantage of the confusion caused front of the column. They
Chinese forces opposing him. by the mortar fire and pinned came to the rear out of the
While concerned for the number down the troops who had scram- valley and across a culvert.
12On the left rear, they came Marines, and soldiers of the 31st hodgepodge of troops caught
down the mountain to the Infantry waited for the inevitable north of the second fracture in
culvert and the rice paddy Chinese night assaults. Task Force Drysdale’s lines.
area. Strengthening their positions, McLaughlin’s group comprised
the commandos and soldiers approximately 130 to 140 men and
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. established three defensive included the soldiers from the 31st
Chidester, the assistant division perimeters over a distance of 1,200 Infantry, commanded by Captain
logistics officer and the senior yards from north to south. The Charles Peckham, Chief Warrant
Marine officer caught in the cut off northern end of the defensive Officer Loyd V. Dirst and a group of
column, ordered the vehicles perimeter was centered on the vil- U.S. Marine military policemen,
unable to proceed to turn around lage of Pusdong-ni and was the some Royal Marines, various U.S.
and head back to Koto-ri. Before his largest of the three positions. Led by Marine service and headquarters
orders could be carried out, a Major McLaughlin, it contained a personnel, and Associated Press
Chinese attack severed this con-
voy about 200 yards to the north of
him. Other enemy attacks cut the
road to the south. In the ensuing
attack, Chidester was wounded
and eventually captured as the
Chinese troops poured fire into
the exposed Marine column.
One of the problems encoun-
tered by the task force as it
marched through Hell Fire Valley
was the lack of communications.
As X Corps’ assistant operations
officer, Major John N. McLaughlin,
recalled: “There were really no
internal communications in the
column. Drysdale had no commu-
nication with the Marine company
or the Army company or the tank
company. And the tanks were told
to move out and continue to
move.” Despite the lack of internal
communications with his attached
units and external communica-
tions with higher headquarters and
circling aircraft, Drysdale planned to
continue moving forward, fighting
all the way if necessary, to reach
Hagaru-ri.
While portions of Task Force
Drysdale moved forward and
Chidester’s Marines fought off the
attacking enemy, the commandos
and soldiers left in Hell Fire Valley,
with the assistance of Marine air
strikes, continued to fend off prob-
ing attacks by the Chinese, whose
onslaughts began to subside as
darkness set in. With the arrival of
sunset, however, the commandos,
13photographer Frank Noel. They calmed the troops an earlier attempt to break through
McLaughlin said his immediate down and ordered them to enemy lines to gather more ammu-
concern was to organize a defense the proper places where they nition, although it became apparent
to prevent a Chinese breakthrough could give the most firepow- to all that the situation was,
to the main column. er. During the entire fight, indeed, desperate. Turned back by
As Chinese soldiers resumed they both exposed them- a Chinese roadblock, the two
their attack on the night of 29 selves; walking up and down Marines sent to get ammunition
November, the Marines, soldiers, that road directing the fire brought back surrender terms
and commandos put up a spirited and moving troops from one instead, which had been issued by
defense. McLaughlin said the fight- point to another. Warrant a Chinese officer. Major Mc-
ing lasted all night “till about 5 Officer Dirst was seriously Laughlin countered with a few of
o’clock in the morning when we’d wounded during the fight his own terms, as Sergeant
run out of ammunition.” Despite there—it must have been Harrison later remembered:
the hopelessness of their situation, about three-thirty in the
McLaughlin’s group bought morning, I suppose. There The Major [McLaughlin] cir-
Drysdale’s main force precious was heavy fire from both culated amongst all of us and
time. What saved the other ele- sides all night; casualties asked us how we felt about it.
ments of Task Force Drysdale that were high on both sides; We were practically out of
followed behind McLaughlin’s there were several attempted ammunition and casualties
force was the quick thinking of rushes by the enemy—and had been very high, and it
McLaughlin and Chief Warrant that’s just about the size of it. looked pretty evident that
Officer Dirst, the other Marine offi- It went on that way until we’d be completely annihilat-
cer present. This made all the dif- almost dawn when our ed when daylight came. I
ference that night, as Technical ammunition was practically firmly believe that we would
Sergeant Charles L. Harrison gone, and then the negotia- have. Well, the majority of the
recalled: tions for surrender came men, I believe, wanted to sur-
through. render. They thought that
Well, at the start, just after was about the only thing left.
we were pinned down, it was As for the performance of the And so, the Major himself
rather confused. It was quite commandos trapped with Mc- went back this time to the
mixture and a jumble of Laughlin’s force, the U.S. Marines Chinese, but he didn’t agree to
troops. There were British, that served with them had nothing just unconditional surrender.
U.S. Army, and Marines. As but praise for their fighting abilities. He told them that we would
far as I know, there weren’t Sergeant Dickerson said the British stay and fight unless they
over forty or fifty Marines; but Marines “did their job very well. agreed to take care of our
as we were pinned down and On the night of our capture, they wounded—that is, give them
the fire got pretty intense, fought just as well as any of the medical attention and return
and everybody bailed out of other men, and it was good to them to the nearest American
their trucks, there was a cer- have them around.” Sergeant CP. They agreed to do this.
tain amount of confusion. Morris L. Estess added that despite And then the Major came
Now, I’m speaking about the some problems in communica- back and gave us the word
particular area I was in. I tions procedures between the that we were going to surren-
think the organization of the units, everything went smoothly. der.
whole outfit into a fighting By dawn on the morning of 30
team could be accredited to November, the situation had dete- During the ensuing negotiations
Marine officers—Major Mc- riorated as the Chinese pressed with the Chinese, McLaughlin,
Laughlin and Warrant Officer their attacks against the remnants of accompanied by a Royal Marine,
Dirst—that is from my own McLaughlin’s cut-off force. Mc- delayed the actual surrender to
viewpoint. There may have Laughlin called a meeting of his allow more men to either slip out of
been others, but I thought surviving officers and staff non- the perimeter undetected or for a
that Warrant Officer Dirst and commissioned officers to discuss relief force to batter its way
Major McLaughlin were a the remaining options. As Sergeant through. His prolonged negotia-
very good steadying factor. Harrison recalled, there had been tions allowed more men to steal
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