Issue 1380 23 August 2019 - Defense.gov
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Issue 1380 23 August 2019
// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1380 //
Feature Report
“Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization”. Published by Congressional
Research Service; Aug. 5, 2019
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf
Relations between the United States and Russia have shifted over time—sometimes reassuring and
sometimes concerning—yet most experts agree that Russia is the only nation that poses, through its arsenal
of nuclear weapons, an existential threat to the United States. While its nuclear arms have declined sharply in
quantity since the end of the Cold War, Russia retains a stockpile of thousands of nuclear weapons, with more
than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory. The United States
has always viewed these weapons as a potential threat to U.S. security and survival. It has not only
maintained a nuclear deterrent to counter this threat, it has also signed numerous arms control treaties with
the Soviet Union and later Russia in an effort to restrain and reduce the number and capabilities of nuclear
weapons.
The collapse of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the possible expiration of the
2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2021 may signal the end to mutual restraint and
limits on such weapons. The 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies the reemergence of long-term,
strategic competition with Russia and China as the “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security.” It
notes that Russia seeks “to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle
East security and economic structures to its favor.” It argues that the challenge from Russia is clear when its
malign behavior is “coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal.”
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) amplifies this theme. It notes that “Russia has demonstrated its
willingness to use force to alter the map of Europe and impose its will on its neighbors, backed by implicit and
explicit nuclear first-use threats.” The NPR describes changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine and catalogues
Russia’s efforts to modernize its nuclear forces, arguing that these efforts have “increased, and will continue
to increase, [Russia’s] warhead delivery capacity, and provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its
deployed warhead numbers.”
Congress has shown growing concern about the challenges Russia poses to the United States and its allies. It
has expressed concerns about Russia’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear modernization programs and has held
hearings focused on Russia’s compliance with arms control agreements and the future of the arms control
process. Moreover, Members have raised questions about whether U.S. and Russian nuclear modernization
programs, combined with the demise of restraints on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, may be fueling an arms
race and undermining strategic stability.
Issue No. 1320
22 June 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The New Deterrent (Airman)
[Col. Jason M.] Brown believes AI deterrence will soon be on par with the mission of nuclear deterrence.
Columbia, Ohio Subs on Schedule, Despite Missile Tube Problems (Breaking Defense)
Work is slated to kick off in 2021, with deliveries starting in 2030 — just in time to begin replacing the
Cold War-era Ohio-class subs as the Navy’s leg of the nation’s nuclear triad.
New Supercomputer Will Help Prevent Nuclear Weapon Testing (C4ISRNET)
The Department of Energy’s newest supercomputer will be capable of conducting 1.5 quintillion
calculations per second, making it more powerful than the world’s current second most powerful
supercomputer.
US COUNTER-WMD
US Army Nears Decision on Who Will Build New Missile Defense Radar Prototypes (Defense
News)
Replacing the Patriot radar has been a long time coming. The radar was first fielded in the 1980s …
DOD Tanks Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program for Homeland Defense Interceptor (Defense News)
The RKV would have replaced the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) on the Ground-Based
Interceptor, which makes up the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) designed to protect the
homeland from ballistic missile threats from North Korea and Iran.
US ARMS CONTROL
Pompeo, Unlike Trump, Concerned about North Korea Missile Tests (VOA)
Kim has said talks with the U.S. about the denuclearization of North Korea could resume once the military
drills end later this month, but has balked at new negotiations with South Korea.
Pentagon Tests First Land-Based Cruise Missile in a Post-INF Treaty World (Defense News)
The INF was a 1987 pact with the former Soviet Union that banned ground-launched nuclear and
conventional ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,000 kilometers.
Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missiles Are a Terrible Idea. Russia’s Test Explosion Shows Why
(Defense One)
The biggest challenge: nuclear reactors are fragile things. Putting one in a cruise missile would require a
design that could withstand three types of stress that no previous reactor had needed to endure.
COMMENTARY
A More Realistic and Restrained US Policy Toward North Korea (38 North)
The liberal internationalist proclivities of the Obama years and the neoconservatism of the Bush era both
centered on a similar combination of economic pressure on North Korea, measures to strengthen
deterrence against North Korean aggression and the US-South Korea alliance, and denuclearization talks …
China Must Reduce Its Nuclear Arms to Reassure the World (The Hill)
Unfortunately for international peace and the security of its neighbors, China’s rapid growth of its nuclear
arsenal — doubling its nuclear arsenal in about the past decade and on a trajectory to double it again in the
next decade — is deeply troubling.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Airman (Fort George G. Meade, Md.)
The New Deterrent
By Bennie J. Davis III
July 1, 2019
Nations like China and Russia are making significant investments in AI for military purposes,
potentially threatening world norms and human rights.
This year the Defense Department, in support of the National Defense Strategy, launched its
Artificial Intelligence Strategy in concert with the White House executive order creating the
American Artificial Intelligence Strategy.
The DoD AI strategy states the U.S., together with its allies and partners, must adopt AI to maintain
its strategic position, prevail on future battlefields and safeguard order.
“The (executive order) is paramount for our country to remain a leader in AI, and it will not only
increase the prosperity of our nation but also enhance our national security,” said Dana Deasy, DoD
chief information officer.
Deasy also launched the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center in February to transform the DoD by
accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI to achieve mission impact at scale. The goal is to use AI
to solve large and complex problem sets that span multiple services; then, ensure the services and
components have real-time access to ever-improving libraries of data sets and tools.
“The United States needs to drive the development of AI otherwise our adversaries will and we
can’t rely that certain adversaries or rivals out there won’t develop AI that meets our standards
when it comes to ethics, safety and surety,” said Col. Jason M. Brown, the Air Force lead for the JAIC.
For the DoD that also means working hand in hand with partners and industry leaders in
technology and innovation to get smarter, faster.
At the 2019 Air Warfare Symposium, Mark Cuban, renowned entrepreneur and investor, spoke
about the world industry competition in AI.
“It’s scary,” Cuban said. “AI is not just important—it’s everything. That’s how the battles (of the
future) will be fought.”
Cuban explained China has a huge advantage because they are doing things the U.S. won’t and they
have made AI a national focus over the last couple of years.
“In order to do AI it’s not just about capturing data, which is important, it’s not about algorithms
and research into AI; it’s how fast can you process,” Cuban said. “If there’s somebody that has a
(fabrication facility) in China that’s building more advanced processors that’s just as important as
keeping track of warheads.”
Brown believes AI deterrence will soon be on par with the mission of nuclear deterrence.
“If our adversaries see us moving at a speed and scale because it’s enabled by AI, that will clearly
get their attention,” Brown said. “I’d much rather be in the driver seat as we develop these
capabilities than to play catch up.”
https://airman.dodlive.mil/2019/07/01/the-new-deterrent/
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Breaking Defense (Washington, D.C.)
Columbia, Ohio Subs on Schedule, Despite Missile Tube Problems
By Paul McLeary
Aug. 15, 2019
PENTAGON: After problems with welding on missile tubes for two classes of Navy submarines, and
uncertain about future work, Virginia-based military contractor BWX Technologies warns it may
leave the missile tube business behind. The move would leave only one US supplier standing who
can deliver the critical systems as the Navy kicks off an ambitious schedule to build three to four
subs per year.
The president and CEO of BWX, Rex Geveden, told analysts on an earnings call earlier this month,
“there is a pathway to stay in the (missile tube) business if we want to do it. I think the ultimate
customer, the Navy and NAVSEA would want more than one supplier.” But he added, “we’re not
interested in the future orders unless we do have a way to make money on these orders.”
The revelation that BWX could leave the missile tube business segment is yet another warning light
for watchers of the Pentagon’s industrial base, who have been warning of disruptions in the supply
chain as suppliers continue to walk away from military work after years of start and stop
procurement binges and budget cuts driven by the Budget Control Act.
If BWX, a company that also makes nuclear reactors for the Navy’s subs and aircraft carriers, pulls
out of the missile tube business, it would do so after paying tens of millions from its own coffers to
correct issues with the new Columbia submarines and Virginia modernization effort.
The company says it “self-diagnosed” the welding issues before sending the tubes to the Navy, and
according to spokesman Christopher Dumond, “all repairs on the VPM tubes have been completed
as of the end of the second quarter. We are in constant contact with both our customer and the
Navy to minimize delivery schedule delays.” The Virginia and Columbia issues were first reported
last August, but some of us missed that it applied to the tubes on both submarine classes.
Last year, the company paid $27 million to fix the Columbia issues, after the Navy discovered
incorrect welds during inspections. The company has been working as a subcontractor to Electric
Boat on the $128 billion Columbia program, which the Navy has long said is its No.1 modernization
priority. The fixes are not expected to impact the Columbia’s extremely tight schedule. Work is
slated to kick off in 2021, with deliveries starting in 2030 — just in time to begin replacing the Cold
War-era Ohio-class subs as the Navy’s leg of the nation’s nuclear triad. The subs will carry 70
percent of the warheads allowed by the New Start treaty with Russia.
The plan for the missile tubes as it currently stands is for BWX deliver three of four tubes to Electric
Boat, followed by a fourth tube made by BAE Systems for the first Virginia Payload Module. BAE will
then build the remaining tubes for the rest of the upgraded submarines.
“At this point, we have not received any incremental orders for missile tube continuous
production,” Geveden said on the analyst call. “In the absence of any additional orders we plan to
reallocate most” of the company’s industrial capacity to the nuclear side of its Navy business, saving
the company about $10 million.
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The Navy is walking a razor’s edge on its Virginia and Columbia programs, and any slip on one
program will affect the other. “One of the biggest risks to Columbia is if Virginia gets out of its
cadence,” James Geurts, the Navy’s acquisition chief, told reporters earlier this year.
Both programs share a single industrial base, and their interwoven schedules present a difficult
issue that the Navy is working hard to keep moving forward. Beginning in the early 2020s, both sub
classes will be under construction at the same time, churning out one Columbia and two to three
Virginia subs per year. That makes getting the Virginia right a core national security issue. The Navy
says for now the tube mishaps won’t affect it’s timelines. But for both programs, this is just the start
of a long and complicated build process.
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/weld-problems-spread-to-second-navy-sub-program/
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C4ISRNET (Vienna, Va.)
New Supercomputer Will Help Prevent Nuclear Weapon Testing
By Nathan Strout
Aug. 14, 2019
The Department of Energy’s newest supercomputer will be capable of conducting 1.5 quintillion
calculations per second, making it more powerful than the world’s current second most powerful
supercomputer.
The department announced Aug. 13 that it had inked a $600 million deal with Cray Inc. to build its
third exascale-class supercomputer. Among other responsibilities, the Energy Department is
charged with maintaining the United States’ stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Dubbed “El Capitan,” the supercomputer is part of the Exascale Computing Project, a DOE effort to
increase computing power so that the department can run highly advanced simulations and
modelling of the United States’ nuclear arsenal. These simulations help alleviate the need for
underground testing. El Capitan is expected to be used by the department’s National Nuclear
Security Administration’s weapons design laboratories to run 3D simulations that are too difficult
for today’s state-of-the-art supercomputers.
“NNSA is modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise to face 21st century threats,” said Lisa
Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA administrator and the department’s under secretary for nuclear
security, said in a release. “El Capitan will allow us to be more responsive, innovative, and forward-
thinking when it comes to maintaining a nuclear deterrent that is second to none in a rapidly-
evolving threat environment.”
El Capitan will be located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The
department’s two other supercomputers, Aurora and Frontier, are located at Argonne National
Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, respectively. All three supercomputers are being
built by Cray.
El Capitan is expected to be delivered in 2022.
https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2019/08/14/new-supercomputer-will-help-prevent-
nuclear-weapon-testing/
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US COUNTER-WMD
Defense News (Washington, D.C.)
US Army Nears Decision on Who Will Build New Missile Defense Radar Prototypes
By Jen Judson
Aug. 20, 2019
WASHINGTON — The Army is nearing a decision on who will build its Lower-Tier Air-and-Missile
Defense Sensor, or LTAMDS, which will provide the sensing capability for the future Integrated Air-
and-Missile Defense System the service is developing.
The service is planning to award a contract no later than the end of the fiscal year to one of the
three vendors that participated in a “sense-off” competition at White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, over the spring, Daryl Youngman, the deputy director in charge of Army AMD
modernization, told Defense News in a recent interview.
According to other sources, that decision is expected next month.
The radar is part of a new AMD system that will replace the Army’s Raytheon-made Patriot system.
Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and a Lockheed Martin-Elta Systems team all brought radars to the
White Sands sense-off and subsequently submitted proposals for the prototype competition in July.
The winner will build six prototypes by the end of FY22 to prove whether the radar can be built and
then fielded to a unit for evaluation. A follow-on contract for 16 additional radars is expected if all
goes well.
The plan leaves an opening for other radar solutions to get back in the game if the prototyping
effort does not pan out.
While the Army has dropped its long-prioritized requirement for a radar capable of detecting
threats from 360 degrees, it now seeks a broader baseline requirement to “expand the battle space
beyond what the current Patriot radar has,” Youngman said. And the system will ideally have a lot
of growth potential baked in, he added.
Replacing the Patriot radar has been a long time coming. The radar was first fielded in the 1980s,
and the Army previously attempted to replace the system with Lockheed Martin’s Medium
Extended Air Defense System through an international co-development effort with Germany and
Italy. But that program was canceled in the U.S. after closing out a proof-of-concept phase roughly
six years ago.
Since then, the Army has studied and debated how to replace the Patriot radar while Raytheon
continues to upgrade its radar to keep pace with current threats. It is acknowledged that there will
come a point where radar upgrades will be unable to keep up with future threats.
Taking years to decide, the service moved forward on a competition to replace the radar in 2017
and chose four companies to come up with design concepts for the capability — Raytheon,
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Technovative Applications.
Toward the end of 2018, Raytheon and Lockheed were chosen to continue technology development
under that program.
Defense News first broke the news last fall that the Army was attempting to hit the reset button on
the LTAMDS program, deciding to host a “sense-off” to identify available radar capabilities.
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While LTAMDS is considered the fourth priority out of four major lines of effort with which the
Cross-Functional Team in charge of AMD has defined, it is not because it’s the least important,
Youngman noted, but more related to schedule — where the system is in the development and
fielding timeline.
The AMD CFT’s top priority is its command-and-control system — the Integrated Battle Command
System — for its future IAMD architecture. Limited user testing will occur next spring with a
decision to move into production in the fourth quarter of FY20. Manuever-Short-Range Air Defense
— or M-SHORAD — is the second priority as the Army . The service is set to begin development
testing of its prototypes this fall.
The Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2 program is ranked third as the Army
prepares to take receipt of its interim cruise missile capability — two Iron Dome Systems — soon.
The Army is in the midst of coming up with a new strategy for the IFPC system that will ultimately
defend against rockets, artillery and mortar as well as cruise missiles and drone threats. The IFPC
system will have to tie into the Army’s IBCS system as well.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/08/20/us-army-nears-decision-on-who-will-build-
new-missile-defense-radar-prototypes/
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Defense News (Washington, D.C.)
DOD Tanks Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program for Homeland Defense Interceptor
By Jen Judson
Aug. 21, 2019
WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has moved from taking a “strategic pause” on the Redesigned Kill
Vehicle (RKV) program to outright killing it.
DOD decided to terminate the current Boeing contract to develop the RKV — effective August 22 —
“due to technical design problems,” according to an August 21 Pentagon statement.
The RKV would have replaced the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) on the Ground-Based
Interceptor, which makes up the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) designed to
protect the homeland from ballistic missile threats from North Korea and Iran. It would have also
been fielded on all future GBIs — a total of 64 ultimately.
The EKV is designed to destroy targets in high-speed collisions after separating from the booster
rocket.
The EKV required technical changes in the past several years due to issues in tests and the Missile
Defense Agency decided to initiate a program to redesign the kill vehicle. In the meantime, MDA has
had several successful tests of the GMD system with the EKV following some engineering changes.
Now that the RKV is dead in the water, the Pentagon is planning to move forward with a new, next-
generation interceptor competition, the statement says.
According to a defense official, no more GBIs will be built and all future interceptors fielded as part
of the GMD system will be the new interceptor.
“Ending the program was the responsible thing to do,” Dr. Michael Griffin, under secretary of
defense for research and engineering, said in the statement. “Development programs sometimes
encounter problems. After exercising due diligence, we decided the path we’re going down
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wouldn’t be fruitful, so we’re not going down that path anymore. This decision supports our efforts
to gain full value from every future taxpayer dollar spent on defense.”
With the blessing of the under secretary of defense, Griffin made the decision to terminate the
program on August 14, just a week after he told reporters at the Space and Missile Defense
Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to expect a decision on the way forward for RKV soon.
MDA and Boeing, in December 2018, deferred a critical design review of the RKV “due to the failure
of certain critical components to meet technical requirements as specified in the development
contract,” the statement notes.
And after MDA assessed the issues, it issued a stop work order on the contract in May in order to
analyze alternative options.
“The department ultimately determined the technical design problems were so significant as to be
either insurmountable or cost-prohibitive to correct,” the statement says.
The DoD plans to take data garnered from research and testing of the RKV prior to its cancellation
to inform the next-generation interceptor program, “which will include a new kill vehicle,”
according to the statement.
There are 44 GBIs in place at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, with
plans to add 22 additional missile silos at Fort Greely to support 20 more GBIs.
The defense official said the Pentagon is still working through all of the details of a new next-
generation interceptor competition including when it will be initiated and the pace at which it will
be developed and fielded.
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-
program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/
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US ARMS CONTROL
VOA (Washington, D.C.)
Pompeo, Unlike Trump, Concerned about North Korea Missile Tests
By Ken Bredemeier
Aug. 20, 2019
WASHINGTON - U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Tuesday he is concerned about the spate
of short-range missile tests North Korea has launched in recent weeks, disagreeing with President
Donald Trump, who has shrugged off their significance.
"I wish that they would not" launch the missiles, the top U.S. diplomat told CBS News.
North Korea has carried out six short-range ballistic missile tests since late last month, with North
Korean leader Kim Jong Un saying they were in response to ongoing joint U.S.-South Korean
military exercises that North Korea considers as a threat to its existence.
The two latest projectiles, fired last Friday, flew 230 kilometers into the waters off North Korea,
but, aimed differently, could reach South Korea, as well as American troops and civilians living
there.
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Kim has said talks with the U.S. about the denuclearization of North Korea could resume once the
military drills end later this month, but has balked at new negotiations with South Korea.
Trump has voiced his discontent as well, not about North Korea's missile tests, but about the costs
of the military drills with Seoul.
Asked about the missile tests, Trump told reporters, "I have no problem. These are short-range
missiles."
Trump called the missiles "smaller ones." He said earlier this month that Kim had sent him "a really
beautiful letter" that included a "small apology" for conducting the missile tests.
The U.S. leader has held out hope that he can bring about Pyongyang's denuclearization by the time
his first term in the White House ends in January 2021.
Pompeo acknowledged in the CBS interview, however, that the United States and North Korea
"haven't gotten back to the table as quickly as we would have hoped" to continue the nuclear
weapons talks.
Pompeo said the U.S. knew "there will be bumps along the way" in the negotiations.
"We hope Chairman Kim will come to the table and get a better outcome" than by maintaining
North Korea's nuclear arsenal, he said.
"It will be better for the North Korean people," Pompeo concluded. "It'll be better for the world."
https://www.voanews.com/usa/pompeo-unlike-trump-concerned-about-north-korea-missile-tests
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Defense News (Washington, D.C.)
Pentagon Tests First Land-Based Cruise Missile in a Post-INF Treaty World
By Aaron Mehta
Aug. 19, 2019
WASHINGTON — The United States has tested a new ground-based cruise missile that is capable
covering 500 kilometers in range, less than three weeks after officially exiting an arms treaty that
banned such systems.
The test occurred 2:30 PM Pacific time Sunday at San Nicolas Island, California, according to a
Pentagon announcement. The missile “exited its ground mobile launcher and accurately impacted
its target after more than 500 kilometers of flight,” the release said. “Data collected and lessons
learned from this test will inform the Department of Defense’s development of future intermediate-
range capabilities.”
The United States exited the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty Aug. 2, following
through on a decision made late last year that the treaty no longer benefited American interests.
The INF was a 1987 pact with the former Soviet Union that banned ground-launched nuclear and
conventional ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,000 kilometers. However, the
United States and NATO allies have for years declared Russia in violation of the agreement.
American officials have stressed they do not plan on building a nuclear ground-based cruise missile
capability, but Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has said his department will “fully pursue the
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development of these ground-launched conventional missiles as a prudent response to Russia’s
actions and as part of the joint force’s broader portfolio of conventional strike options.”
Imagery of the test shows the weapon was launched from a Mark 41 Vertical Launch System, the
same launcher used in the Aegis Ashore missile defense system. That is notable, as Russia has often
claimed the Mk41 presence in Europe as a violation of the INF treaty, with the belief that the Aegis
Ashore systems in Poland and Romania could be converted to offensive systems.
“The launcher used in Sunday’s test is a MK 41; however, the system tested is not the same as the
Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System currently operating in Romania and under construction in
Poland," Lt. Col Robert Carver, a Pentagon spokesman, said. “Aegis Ashore is purely defensive. It is
not capable of firing a Tomahawk missile. Aegis Ashore is not configured to fire offensive weapons
of any type.”
The weapon itself is a variant of the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile, and was made by
Raytheon, Carver said.
During a recent trip to the Pacific, Esper also said he would like such weapon systems to end up in
Asia as a deterrent to China. The governments in both Australia and South Korea quickly denied
that any discussions about such a deployment had occurred, and Esper later downplayed his
comments as a future objective.
Congress will have a say in how such systems are developed or deployed. On Capitol Hill, a
flashpoint in the fight is $96 million the administration requested to research and test ground-
launched missiles that could travel within the agreement’s prohibited range.
The Democrat-controlled House passed a spending bill that would deny the funding ― and a
defense authorization bill that would deny it until the administration shares an explanation of
whether existing sea- and air-launched missiles could suffice. Senate Republicans are expected to
fight that language during the reconciliation process.
Joe Gould and Jeff Martin in Washington contributed to this report. This story was updated at 5:35
PM EST with more information on the weapon system.
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/19/pentagon-tests-first-land-based-cruise-
missile-in-a-post-inf-treaty-world/
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Defense One (Washington, D.C.)
Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missiles Are a Terrible Idea. Russia’s Test Explosion Shows Why
By Patrick Tucker
Aug. 14, 2019
When President Donald Trump heard that Russia’s experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile
had exploded, killing seven scientists and causing a major radiological incident less than 300 miles
from the Finnish border, he fired off a boastful tweet. “We have similar, though more advanced,
technology,” he said.
This is…not accurate. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States pursued a less advanced
version of a similar technology but abandoned the effort before ever launching an actual test
vehicle. Nuclear-powered cruise missiles, the Pentagon concluded, are a bad idea.
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But the concept still appeals to Vladimir Putin, who last year revealed his pursuit of an “unlimited-
range” missile that Russia calls the 9M730 Burevestnik (Storm Petrel) and which NATO has dubbed
the SSC-X-9 Skyfall. A missile powered by a small nuclear reactor could cruise about its target for
days, giving it a wide range of potential targets it could strike upon command.
In 1957, the U.S. Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission launched Project Pluto to build the
Supersonic Low-Altitude Missile. The work proceeded at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory
(today, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), in Berkeley, California, under the supervision of
Charles “Ted” Merkle, a hard-driving physicist. In 1959, Merkle reported to the Air Force on the
feasibility of the project, noting a number of enormous technical challenges but also “some
interesting and exciting possibilities to discuss.”
Like the makers of Skyfall, Merkle decided on a ramjet design. Powered into the sky atop a
conventional rocket booster, the ramjet would compress incoming air in a uniquely shaped
chamber, superheat it with a small nuclear reactor, and expel it as exhaust, propelling the missile
almost three times faster than sound.
The biggest challenge: nuclear reactors are fragile things. Putting one in a cruise missile would
require a design that could withstand three types of stress that no previous reactor had needed to
endure.
“There are the stresses associated with the pressure drop through the ‘reactor’ and, as indicated
earlier, this stress is of the order of hundreds of psi [pounds per square inch] when spread over the
entire reactor,” Merkle wrote. “When concentrated at various support points, it contributes loads
like thousands of psi. Next in order: to transfer heat from the fuel to the air stream, there must be a
temperature drop in the fuel-bearing materials and, for typical ceramics and power densities that
would be of interest for possible missile applications, stresses of many thousand psi result as a
consequence of these temperature differences.”
Then there were the inertial stresses of flight. “Since in principle such ramjet power plants can
operate from sea level to quite high altitudes, rather large ‘gust loadings’ must be anticipated,” he
wrote.
Undaunted, the lab went to work creating a 500-megawatt reactor that could operate at 2,500
degrees Fahrenheit. Four years later, after much experimentation with different materials and the
careful assembly of 500,000 small fuel rods, they had an engine called Tory-IIA.
On May 14, 1961, they tested it at an 8-square-mile facility in a desolate area of Nevada called
Jackass Flats. But they wouldn’t be able to fly it, not yet, since it was potentially a nuclear bomb.
Instead they used a flatbed rail car.
In a 1990 article for Air and Space Magazine, Gregg Herken writes that “the Tory-IIA ran for only a
few seconds, and at merely a fraction of its rated power. But the test was deemed a complete
success. Most importantly, the reactor did not catch fire, as some nervous Atomic Energy
Commission officials had worried it would.”
But as Herken tells it, Washington was already beginning to cool to the idea of a nuclear-powered
cruise missile. The biggest reason: the missile’s unshielded nuclear reactor would spew radiation
along its flight path, potentially irradiating its own ground crew and everyone else between the
launch pad and the target.
Anticipating this, Merkle downplayed the danger in his initial 1959 report, using language that
sounds ripped directly from Dr. Strangelove. “One problem that bothers the design of reactors to be
used near people is the necessity of confining all the fission products to the reactor fuel element,”
he wrote. “A typical mission might produce some-what less than 100 grams of fission product. Of
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these it might be expected that some large percentage would naturally remain in fuel
elements…Consequently the fission activity introduced locally into the atmosphere is minute
compared with even the most minute atomic weapon.”
Phew.
Edwin Lyman, senior scientist and acting director of the nuclear safety project at the Union of
Concerned Scientists, offers some perspective. “I suppose that at a time when the nuclear weapon
states were still engaged in atmospheric testing, there wasn’t a whole lot of concerns about
releasing additional radioactivity into the environment. Merkle’s cavalier attitude seems in tune
with the era. But such a system should be considered completely unacceptable today,” Lyman told
Defense One in an email.
“One thing is that to characterize radiation releases in terms of ‘grams’ is misleading. Chernobyl
released only a few hundred grams of iodine-131 yet it resulted in thousands of thyroid cancers
among children.” He noted that the Pluto tests ejected not only radioactive gases but far more
dangerous radioactive particle matter as well.
The team tested a modified version of the engine once more in 1964 and the project was canceled.
The high fallout, both politically and literally, mean that nuclear-powered cruise missiles remain a
terrible idea, says Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the
Arms Control Association. “If you think the current excessive U.S. plans to replace the U.S. nuclear
arsenal are controversial, imagine the negative domestic and international reaction to a U.S. effort
to renew R&D on nuclear cruise missile powered by an unshielded nuclear reactor,” said Reif.
“Russia should abandon development of this grotesque, unnecessary and almost certainly
unworkable weapon immediately.”
Added Lyman, “if the missile was shot down, the fuel would overheat and you’d have a 500-
thermal-megawatt reactor meltdown — about one-sixth the size of a large power reactor — but
without any containment. Also, the lack of radiation shielding would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for emergency responders to approach it.”
That’s similar to the problem Russia is grappling with right now.
https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/08/nuclear-powered-cruise-missiles-are-
terrible-idea-russias-test-explosion-shows-why/159189/?oref=d-mostread
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COMMENTARY
38 North (Washington, D.C.)
A More Realistic and Restrained US Policy toward North Korea
By Daniel R. DePetris
Aug. 12, 2019
The Washington foreign policy establishment—what Ben Rhodes, former President Barack
Obama’s deputy national security adviser derisively dismissed as “the Blob”—is apprehensive and
befuddled over what policies would be most effective in eliminating the threat posed by a hostile
North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. US administrations of both political parties have tried
several different tactical approaches over the past twenty years. But the policy framework—
complete, immediate and fully verifiable denuclearization first; peace, reconciliation, normalization
of relations, sanctions relief and stability on the Korean Peninsula later—has largely stayed the
same, with predictable results: little progress in achieving any of these outcomes. An
unconventional president who is desperate for a foreign policy win on North Korea, the persistent
failure of US policy toward North Korea and the upcoming presidential election will hopefully spur
a debate on whether a less establishment-oriented paradigm would be more successful in achieving
US national security objectives on the Korean Peninsula.
The Central Flaw of US Policy
The liberal internationalist proclivities of the Obama years and the neoconservatism of the Bush era
both centered on a similar combination of economic pressure on North Korea, measures to
strengthen deterrence against North Korean aggression and the US-South Korea alliance, and
denuclearization talks—and both failed to blunt North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in any meaningful
way. Both administrations entered office with a woefully misinformed view of how quickly North
Korea’s denuclearization could be achieved, in large part because they failed to internalize the
reasons the North chose to go nuclear: a preternatural fear of external attack; distrust of US
intentions on the Korean Peninsula; and a concern that any peace with the US would be short-lived.
Both Bush and Obama entered office believing that they were uniquely situated to resolve the North
Korean nuclear issue once and for all. Throughout his two terms, Bush was highly skeptical about
the utility of negotiations with the North Koreans and remained convinced that a carrot-and-stick
approach would ultimately compel Pyongyang to embrace nuclear disarmament. Obama promised
dramatic reform to his predecessor’s diplomacy with the DPRK. Yet like Bush, he underestimated
the Herculean objective Washington was trying to accomplish and overestimated his power to
achieve it. After the collapse of the 2012 Leap Day Deal, the Obama administration spent the
remainder of its tenure wary of any dealings with North Korea.
To this day, there is a stubborn unwillingness by US policymakers to accept the reality that they are
chasing an unrealistic and unattainable policy objective. Never in history has a country devoted so
much intellectual, financial and political capital to acquire a fully operational nuclear arsenal of as
many as 60 nuclear warheads, only to give them away in exchange for vague promises of future
normalization, sanctions relief and security assurances. The reality that the North Korea nuclear
problem can only be managed and contained rather than solved never sat comfortably with either
administration. What we see instead from the Trump administration, especially from US Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo, is a lot of whistling past the graveyard.
A North Korea Policy Based on Realism and Restraint
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Realists accept the world as it is and construct policies that are most appropriate to the
circumstances, opportunities and constraints at hand. Policy is crafted with a steely-eyed
understanding of what national security objectives are realistically achievable at a reasonable cost
and which are highly unlikely given the circumstances. Realists also seek to understand the
motivations, concerns, fears and desires of the other party, whether an ally, friend, partner or
adversary. Unlike liberal internationalists or neoconservatives, realists understand that weak
states, in particular, are inherently concerned about their own self-preservation in a highly
competitive and unforgiving world. Equally important, a realist foreign policy aligns means with
ends and values prudence and pragmatism over grandiose, pie-in-the-sky proclamations that are
typically unattainable absent a transformational change in the geopolitical environment.
A realist North Korea policy would, therefore, treat denuclearization as a long-term aspiration
prospect rather than an implausible short-term goal that the Kim regime may never accept due to
its turbulent history with the United States and its own legitimate insecurities. Nuclear negotiations
for the Kim regime are not just a discussion about the technical details of a nonproliferation
agreement, but rather an existential matter that simply can’t be dictated by Washington’s calendar
or fabulist thinking. It stretches credulity to believe that Kim would rip apart a security blanket his
grandfather and father stitched together at considerable cost, no matter how much he claims that
economic development is now a higher priority than nuclear weapons.
The Trump administration, although unconventional in its rhetoric and diplomacy toward North
Korea, is largely following the same all-or-nothing playbook of its predecessors: if Pyongyang
wishes to become a full-fledged member of the international community, it must first abandon its
nuclear deterrent as quickly as possible. Realists understand that this is a poison pill for Kim—one
that would kill a diplomatic process capable of producing significant, albeit incremental progress.
From this perspective, complete and immediate denuclearization should no longer be the sole goal
by which diplomatic success or failure is judged, but instead one goal among many —and not even
the most important one in the short-to-medium term. While pursuing less ambitious objectives is
anathema for the proponents of maximalist diplomacy, it is absolutely necessary if Washington
hopes to stabilize and improve upon a historically adversarial bilateral relationship.
Washington’s entire negotiating strategy with the North is in desperate need of pragmatism and
incrementalism. If the US expects North Korea to abandon its nuclear deterrent, it will have to offer
political and economic concessions and ironclad security guarantees that are commensurate with
nuclear disarmament. In addition, the diplomatic process will need to proceed in multiple stages,
with parity and reciprocity in concessions the rule rather than the exception. The substantial lack of
mutual trust will kill any agreement prefaced on an all-for-all grand bargain, which in turn would be
used by hardliners in both Washington and Pyongyang to adopt a more confrontational strategy.
Trust will need to be built slowly, with both sides testing one another’s intentions.
Similarly, the United States needs a heavy dose of restraint in what it aims to accomplish during
each stage of the process. With immense patience and the right package of concessions, North
Korea’s complete and verifiable denuclearization may still be possible on a longer time horizon. But
it won’t be accomplished in weeks or months. Washington must focus instead on creating an
environment where denuclearization becomes more conceivable over the long term because Kim
has decided that the disadvantages of possessing nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits. Success
should not be judged on the final resolution, but on whether realistic progress is achieved at every
step in the process. A freeze on North Korea’s production of nuclear fuel, warheads and long-range
missiles; international verification of any caps and freezes; a gradual rollback of the Yongbyon and
Kangson facilities; and a general state of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula would be
significant accomplishments.
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A US strategy toward North Korea based on the twin pillars of realism and restraint would make
the following adjustments to the current USG approach:
Normalization and Denuclearization
Establishing a more constructive, long-term US-DPRK relationship should no longer be a reward for
the North’s complete nuclear dismantlement but would be treated as an explicit US security
objective in its own right. Communication between US and DPRK officials at the senior and working
levels would be encouraged and broadened to include more issues of mutual interest, with possible
agreements focused around small but tangible issues that put the bilateral relationship on a more
solid footing. In lieu of formal normalization of diplomatic relations—the political climate in
Washington is highly unlikely to support granting the Kim regime such status until denuclearization
is finalized and other aspects of its behavior, such as its egregious human rights violations, are
addressed—the US and North Korea would agree to open liaison offices in one another’s capitals
with the specific purpose of regularizing bilateral contact; increasing understanding about one
another’s intentions and positions; solving issues as they arise; and diminishing the chances of a
miscalculation turning into a crisis. All of these measures would occur before, not during or after,
denuclearization is achieved.
End the Korean War
Despite a 69-year-old armistice of hostilities, the US and North Korea are still technically in a state
of war. While the armistice has prevented a return to large-scale conventional hostilities, the
hostility and antagonism underlying the US-DPRK and North-South relationships are very much
alive and well. Replacing the armistice with a peace treaty would be the most dramatic way to
erode that hostility. Such an initiative is low cost for the United States and would demonstrate to
the Kim regime that Washington is serious about transforming the bilateral relationship (the South
Koreans, who have been advocating an end-of-war resolution or peace treaty, would be quick to
support such a move). While concern about a peace treaty’s impact on the US force presence in
South Korea is understandable, a drawdown would prompt an entirely different conversation
between Washington and Seoul and a decision to proceed would be unlikely absent a consensual
decision.
Denuclearization Should Not Obstruct Inter-Korean Reconciliation
Currently, the stagnation in US-DPRK nuclear talks poses an insuperable obstacle to the separate
inter-Korean peace track initiated by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim. The
Moon administration’s attempts to decrease military tension along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),
enhance North-South relations through cross-border economic projects and formalize sustained
political contact are all complicated by a US and UN Security Council sanctions regime that
obstructs its work. As long as Kim is not getting the sanctions relief and security assurances he
seeks, South Korea’s room to maneuver will be limited and its ability to improve the inter-Korean
relationship will be hostage to the pace of denuclearization talks. The Trump administration,
uninterested in relaxing its policy of maximum sanctions pressure on North Korea, possesses a veto
over the inter-Korean peace process. Without US agreement to carve-outs and exemptions to the
sanctions regime, South Korea is virtually helpless to proceed with even minor joint economic
projects with the North. A central precept of a more realistic strategy would delink North-South
talks and accept the notion that South Korea has as much right as any other sovereign nation to
improve diplomatic relations with any government it so chooses.
Conclusion
With the notable exception of the Clinton administration’s direct negotiations in the 1990s, US
policy on North Korea has largely remained static and path-dependent. The Kim regime’s full and
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irreversible nuclear dismantlement has been the paramount national security priority for
Washington across four successive administrations, including the present one. The failure to
accomplish this goal has acted as kryptonite to more realistic and achievable objectives that are just
as valuable for US security and the stability of Northeast Asia. A new overarching strategy dictated
by realism and restraint has the potential to do what the mainstream approach has not
accomplished—move the Korean Peninsula towards a more peaceful and stable future; remove the
animus that prompted the Kim regime to become a nuclear weapons power in the first place; and
increase the possibility of North Korea making the decision sometime in the future to cap, roll back
and eventually get rid of its nuclear deterrent entirely.
https://www.38north.org/2019/08/ddepetris081219/
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The Hill (Washington, D.C.)
China Must Reduce Its Nuclear Arms to Reassure the World
By Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han
Aug. 14, 2019
A major objective of arms control is that it can promote stability in the relations between states. By
entering a treaty, or by unilaterally reducing its armaments, a state signals its acceptance of the
status quo. A country willingly limits a class of weapons or the number of its nuclear arms, for
example, to demonstrate to others that its ambitions are limited and it supports strategic stability.
Unfortunately for international peace and the security of its neighbors, China’s rapid growth of its
nuclear arsenal — doubling its nuclear arsenal in about the past decade and on a trajectory to
double it again in the next decade — is deeply troubling. This hurried, dramatic increase suggests
that China’s ambitions are not limited but are expansionistic, and that it rejects strategic stability by
undertaking the secretive and accelerated growth of its arsenal.
Unchecked, this unprecedented growth of armament could compel a response from its nuclear
neighbors and the United States, which has shown remarkable restraint thus far. Additionally,
China’s actions might compel Japan to go nuclear to protect Tokyo’s interests against a formidable
nuclear power. To avoid an arms race, the international community and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) need to consider the strategic consequences of Beijing’s dangerous buildup of its
nuclear forces.
To reassure the global community, China should exercise a moratorium on the production of
nuclear weapons and its development of hypersonic missiles. Second, China should unilaterally
reduce its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and number of ballistic missiles to signal its
interest in strategic stability. Third, China should embrace arms control and enter into transparent
agreements with India, Russia or the United States, to demonstrate its support for strategic stability
in nuclear arms and acceptance of international norms.
Adopting these measures would permit China to demonstrate that it does not want to threaten its
neighbors or commence an arms race, and that it accepts the value of arms control — including the
need to advance confidence-building measures to augment international stability. These major
steps would also convey that China is a status-quo power. Fundamentally, ending nuclear weapons
production, reducing its nuclear arms in a verifiable manner, arresting its development of
hypersonic missiles and forging binding arms control agreements would allow China to signal its
benign intentions.
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In turn, this could have an important stabilizing effect on states concerned with China’s increasing
power. These actions would help address, to a considerable degree, other countries’ security
concerns about China, particularly given Beijing’s widespread human rights abuses, including the
crackdown on its Muslim minority in Xinjiang and its suppression of the popular movement in Hong
Kong.
Reassuring other states of its peaceful intentions and stake in strategic stability is especially
important, given China’s tremendous growth of economic and military power and the demonstrable
concern by states in South, Southeast and East Asia about China’s aims and objectives. China’s
neighbors — Russia, to be sure, but also the ASEAN states, India, Japan and Taiwan — would be
reassured by China’s acceptance of strategic stability and arms control norms. This act would be a
major step forward for China, and would open the door to further arms control agreements and the
possibility of reducing tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
Were China to take these steps, there would be direct costs to China. Its arsenal would be fettered
by its own measures and by potential treaty requirements. Of course, that is precisely the
advantage of taking these steps. The value of demonstrating that China supports the status quo is in
China’s long-term national security interests and will promote stability in international politics. In
turn, this will provide China with more security than could be provided by its military forces.
Conveying that it is a status-quo power — willing to forsake its immediate advantage in a particular
category of weapon system for longer-term security — would be supremely helpful in dampening
the risks of conflict and security competition.
China can demonstrate its increasing acceptance of international norms and acceptance of strategic
stability. Other states would be reassured by these measures, permitting China to recognize that
arms control can play a stabilizing role in its relationship with other states, just as arms control did
during the Cold War. Were China to take these steps, the potential is there for it to contribute to a
stable international order founded on transparent confidence-building measures, rather than arms
races and nuclear competition.
Bradley A. Thayer is a professor of political science at the University of Texas-San Antonio and the
co-author of “How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism and the Balance of Power in International
Politics.”
Lianchao Han is vice president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China. After the Tiananmen Square
Massacre in 1989, Dr. Han was one of the founders of the Independent Federation of Chinese
Students and Scholars. He worked in the U.S. Senate for 12 years, as legislative counsel and policy
director for three senators.
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/457289-china-must-reduce-its-nuclear-arms-to-
reassure-the-world
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ABOUT THE USAF CSDS
The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of
Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders
and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and
Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial
personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation
awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an
information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues;
and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and
nonproliferation.
In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended
"Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military
education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense."
This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME
efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10
and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide
professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working
in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012,
broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also
nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air
War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology.
In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons
Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and
defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security,
major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term
“unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also
includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the
name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior
Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic.
The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The
arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active
defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis
Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United
States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
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