Long-Term Deception: The Rearmament of the German Air Force, 1919-39 - CIA
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Strategic Deception
Long-Term Deception: The Rearmament of the
German Air Force, 1919–39
Brian J. Gordona
In March 1935, British and Ger- tailed as chancellors of the Weimar
man officials scheduled a meeting of Republic claimed in the 1920s nor as
Adolf Hitler with several members of formidable as Hitler bragged in 1935.
the British cabinet to discuss Lon- That both claims were plausible can
don’s continuing apprehension over be attributed to policies of decep-
Frequent public expres- German rearmament. Though Prime tion pursued by successive German
sion of British fears of Minister Stanley Baldwin had assured governments, beginning immediately
his government and the public that after the signing of the Versailles
growing German air- the arms restrictions imposed after Treaty in 1919 and into the Nazi
power had revealed to World War I provided Britain an ad- regime. Frequent public expression
Berlin the vulnerability vantage in aerial capability over Ger- of British fears of growing German
many, British concerns had exponen- airpower had revealed to Berlin the
of its former enemies to tially grown as Hitler’s foreign policy vulnerability of its former enemies to
deception. became increasingly belligerent. such deception.2
The meeting never took place. The Its effects were felt not only in
release of a British Foreign Office intelligence analysis of German
white paper critical of German poli- strength but also in the political
cies prompted Hitler to cancel, using debates and policy formation partially
the pretext that he had a cold. Shortly fed by that analysis. For example,
thereafter, the German government as tensions between Germany and
announced not only that military Britain increased with Hitler’s rise to
conscription in Germany had been power, the Germans repainted Ju-52
reinstituted, but that it had rebuilt a transports to appear as if they were
functioning and powerful air capabil- newly built and had bomb bays, then
ity superior to the Royal Air Force.1 flew them in massive aerial demon-
How could the Germans have built strations.3 Joining the transports
up an effective air force seemingly were impressive He-51 and Ar-65
under the nose of the British Empire fighters that exceeded the capabil-
so quickly and so quietly? ities of British fighter technology.
But unbeknown to British observers,
The answer, apparent in hindsight, these aircraft did not yet have suitable
was that Germany had not. Germa- weapons.4
ny’s airpower was neither as cur-
a. For a more in-depth discussion of frameworks to analyze long-term deception, as well as
deception in German rearmament, see: Gordon, Brian J., Deception in Covert Nuclear Weapons
Development: A Framework to Identify, Analyze, and Mitigate Future Long-Term Deception
Efforts (RAND Corporation, 2016). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertatio ns/
RGS D370.htmI.
The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not
be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual
statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any compo-
nent of the United States government.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) 1
Strategic Deception
Inflated estimates of German capabilities resulting from
these deceptions may have made policymakers reluctant any possession of Fokker D.VIIs.5
to contemplate the use of force to counter German actions. These biplane fighters were the
only category of equipment specif-
Inflated estimates of German back as Hitler’s installation as ically mentioned in the Versailles
capabilities resulting from these de- chancellor, because the actual story restrictions, a testament to Allied
ceptions may have made policymak- of German air force development fear of German airpower.
ers reluctant to contemplate the use stretches at least as far back as the
Arms Control Evasion (1919–26)
of force to counter German actions. Versailles Treaty. Though this type
The new post-war government in
From the view of the historian, it of deception may not always be
Berlin was initially assisted in its air-
appears British policymakers and a coherent or perfectly executed
power deception by private interests.
analysts accepted low estimates of effort, its cumulative effect compli-
Anthony Fokker, the Dutch manufac-
German air strength for years and cates analysis and can lure govern-
turer of several successful German
then, seamlessly, accepted inflated ments into incorrect or ineffective
WWI aircraft, including the D.VII,
estimates in just a matter of months. action—or no action at all. Rec-
was among the first to aggressively
ognizing this long-term effort as
As more recent events have circumvent Versailles restrictions. He
a distinct type of deception builds
shown, long-term deception of the and his company hid aircraft in barns
upon the work of Whaley and other
type involved in masking and then and buildings throughout the German
scholars and can help analysts
exaggerating German military de- countryside, covertly put airframes
identify, understand, and mitigate
velopment continues to be common on trains under tarps and rigging
deception in long-term efforts.
practice, having been seen in efforts that hid the outlines of the aircraft,
to mask nuclear weapons programs, and created diversions as the trains
military research and development crossed the German-Dutch border
Reexamining German Re-
(R&D), and foreign policy ini- into Holland, all to save 120 D.VIIs,
armament (1919–39) 400 engines, and an estimated $8
tiatives by multiple governments
over the years. This deception is The three periods of German million of material.6 They also left
often treated as a series of discrete rearmament Whaley proposed remain a handful of airframes in Germany
events, matched to the deceiver’s useful, however. But rather than for Allied arms inspectors to find, to
policies and specific goals. survey broad policies and R&D avoid the suspicion that anything had
initiatives in each as Whaley does, been removed. Fokker’s motivation
In his definitive research on the this article presents a very brief sum- may have been largely personal in
case of German rearmament, the mary of one particular R&D thread, ensuring he could continue his busi-
late Barton Whaley, a foremost airpower development, to show how ness, but after his departure for the
scholar on denial and deception, deception can evolve and continue United States in 1923, the German
divided the period between the First independent of changes in govern- government continued to benefit in
and Second World Wars into three ment and foreign policy. air R&D from both planes and design
distinct phases, each with distinct information that should have been
German foreign policy goals and Intent on preventing the German destroyed under Versailles.
approaches to strategic deception. aggression they held to have caused
For the historian or researcher seek- World War I, the Allies in 1919 Those inspectors were from the
ing to understand this period or the imposed stringent restrictions on Inter-Allied Control Commission
qualities of deception better, this is Germany’s military capabilities as (IACC), a group of military offi-
an entirely appropriate approach. part of the Versailles Treaty. Most cers headquartered in Berlin, whom
But the intelligence analyst can- were general in nature, including the Allies had designated to ensure
not afford to be so discriminating those limiting conscription and the German compliance with the treaty
in evaluating evidence. A British manufacture of rifles and artillery. restrictions. The inspectors were
analyst assessing German airpower But the Allies were particularly not idle, conducting more than 800
in 1938 would have been unwise concerned about German aviation, inspections over a six week peri-
to look at information only as far as evidenced by the prohibition of od alone between September and
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018)
Strategic Deception
The Army Peace Commission, a liaison group within the
October 1924. Their efforts and
7
German Defense Ministry, was responsible for much of
frustrations would be familiar to any the work of undermining the IACC’s efforts.
who followed arms control inspec-
tions in Iraq almost 70 years later.
was not in Germany at all, but in an Ministry in Berlin that were not
IACC inspectors spent a significant
unexpected place the IACC could not detected by the IACC. The aviation
amount of time inspecting facilities
reach, the newly established USSR. staff was designated the “Army
that had been warned in advance of
Command Inspectorate of Weapons
their arrival as well as chasing down In 1922, Germany and the Soviet Schools” and immediately absorbed
meaningless rumors, such as that Union concluded secret military 120 former army and navy pilots into
baby carriages were being manufac- agreements. One agreement estab- the newly established state-owned
tured that could be reassembled into lished an aircraft testing and training airline, Lufthansa, or into several
machineguns.8 center in Lipetsk, Russia, where Ger- “advertising squadrons.” It did so
man pilots and plane designs would through false job descriptions and
The Army Peace Commission,
be developed away from the prying secret training pipelines.
a liaison group within the German
eyes of the IACC. The deceptive
Defense Ministry, was responsible
measures necessary to protect this After initial training at a new-
for much of the work of undermining
effort were complex. German officers ly established (1922) Commercial
the IACC’s efforts. German officials
sent to train there were “discharged” Flying School, the new pilots were
and the commission’s commander,
for the duration of their training. A brought to Lipetsk for specialized
Gen. August von Cramon, had been
customs office was established at military training.11 The entire enter-
shocked that the Allies had permitted
Lipetsk to clear parts and schedule prise was financed through the state
the formation of such a liaison group,
shipments away from normal points budget. Each year the chancellor’s
assuming the IACC would just travel
of entry in Germany that might be office and Defense Ministry would
and inspect whatever it wished and
under observation, and aircraft were submit budget requests with inflated
without warning. The Germans used
flown to Lipetsk disguised as “mail estimates for items such as parts and
the peace commission to obstruct and
planes.”10 labor. When legislators approved this
thwart the IACC’s efforts at every
budget, the excess funds were then
opportunity.9 Arguably, however, the These efforts complemented bu- diverted to secret programs such as
real story the Allies were interested in reaucratic actions within the Defense air training and the Lipetsk facility.12
This effort, simple in description,
must have involved significant work
and coordination among the various
offices and individuals responsible
for budget formulation in the Weimar
Republic.
Not all efforts to develop the Ger-
man air force were so clandestine,
and in fact some were taken with the
concurrence of the Allies themselves.
The Commercial Flying School was
established publicly and eventually
did feed into Lufthansa. German
arguments that they should not be
denied the benefits of aircraft for
mail delivery, advertising, and sports
led to a relaxation on restrictions of
Feared Fokker D.VIIs in front of a hangar at the secret Reichswehr flight center in Lipetsk, limited-performance aircraft. Perhaps
USSR, 1925. Photo: © Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo / Alamy Stock Photo even more significant, the Paris Air
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) 3
Strategic Deception
Though the commission was no longer a barrier to rear-
mament, the German government continued to take steps was likely caught by the IACC as it
to ensure its covert buildup would remain undetected. toured the country. But following the
disestablishment of the commission,
Agreement of 1926 granted Germany the Germans were able to rapidly
Rearmament (1927–35)
the ability to build high-performance construct airfields and other facilities
Though the commission was no
aircraft to compete in air shows and in parts of the country less frequent-
longer a barrier to rearmament, the
set speed records.13 These aircraft ly traveled and hence unlikely to
German government continued to
designs would be the foundation for be toured by military attachés.16 A
take steps to ensure its covert buildup
aircraft tested at Lipetsk and other budget of 10 million reichsmarks ear-
would remain undetected. In 1932,
facilities throughout the 1920s and marked for the aviation office through
the Defense Ministry classified its
1930s. what was known as the “blue” budget
officer lists for the first time. Two
financed the construction. These
secrets would have been revealed
This period of German rearma- funds were diverted from the Defense
had the Allies been able to review
ment came to a close on 31 January Ministry’s public budget in secret and
these lists. The first was that the total
1927, when the Allies officially with- administered by a special branch of
number of officers in the army and
drew the IACC. Any observation of the Reich Audit Office that dealt with
navy exceeded the number permitted
German military development would these covert programs.17
under the Versailles restrictions. The
now rest solely with military attachés, second was that through the secret
generally controlled and monitored in The rise of the Nazi Party brought
training programs in Lipetsk, fed by about more aggressive deception to
their travels around the country. The the commercial training pipeline, the
commission’s final report stated that match this increase in activity. Two
Germans had managed to train a suf- events are notable. The first is an
Germany had never had any intention ficient number of pilots to man their
of disarming and had done everything announcement in 1933 that foreign
rapidly expanding air force.15 bombers had flown over Berlin and
in its power to circumvent the work of
the commission.14 But with no “smok- dropped leaflets. Though no evidence
That air force would be built in
ing gun” proving German deceit, the was provided, the German Foreign
factories and based at airfields almost
report apparently fell on deaf ears in Ministry insinuated that the bombers
completely unknown to the Allies.
London and Paris. were Soviet. In fact, this incident
British and French officials had a
was completely manufactured—no
good understanding of the location
flyover had occurred. But Hitler
of German air facilities built during
used it to claim that aggressive and
the war, and what little construction
technologically superior adversaries
occurred immediately following
Heinkel He. 111, in passenger mode, ca. 1940 on the left. In this configuration, the interior was designed in such a way that it could readily
be converted from a comfortable passenger compartment, as in the image on the right from another aircraft, into a bomb bay. Photo: ©
Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo / Alamy Stock Photo
4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018)
Strategic Deception
surrounded Germany and that the large numbers of deceptively paint- Among them was Charles Lindbergh,
country was completely, and unrea- ed transport aircraft and fighters who was granted special permission
sonably, defenseless against them.18 that were actually still inoperable as to tour German facilities and even
The second event, far less dramatic, wartime aircraft. Other aircraft were fly German aircraft. Lindbergh was
was the quiet formation of the Central shown more selectively. The Do-17 convinced the Germans had not
Bureau for German Rearmament in “Flying Pencil” bomber concerned only designed superior aircraft but
1934. This group was formed to co- the Allies because it had outpaced that they could mass-produce them.
ordinate what were by then numerous several foreign-built fighters during He reported to Allied officials that
complex efforts throughout the De- air trials and shows and presumably Germany was strong enough to make
fense Ministry to increase Germany’s would outrun any British or French any British and French military action
military capabilities in violation of fighter. But the Germans had con- against it foolhardy. Prime Minister
Versailles restrictions.19 structed the demonstration model by Neville Chamberlain carried this
hand, and mass production of that assessment to the Munich Conference
Rearmament and Bluff (1935–39) quality was impractical. The fol- in 1938.22
Hitler’s 1935 announcement of the low-on aircraft had smaller engines
existence of the Luftwaffe is unlikely and considerably less speed.20 The Luftwaffe continued its
to have caught the British and French buildup of highly trained and skilled
completely by surprise, though they Allied military officials had more personnel during this period as well,
were not certain of the strength of to fear from the He-111. This aircraft through training more realistic than
German airpower. The confusion had entered commercial service with that conducted at Lipetsk. Despite
experienced in London and Paris was Lufthansa and accommodated 10 pas- the Versailles Treaty’s continuing
also felt in the Air Ministry in Berlin, sengers with a compartment amid- prohibition against committing forces
which, judging by its later actions, ships used as a smoking lounge. The to combat in foreign lands, Germany
appeared not to have been ready to go lounge’s true purpose was to provide sent a significant number of “vol-
public. To reinforce Hitler’s sudden space in future military construction unteers” from its armed forces to
claims of aerial superiority, creativity for a bomb bay; the military version take part in the Spanish Civil War,
would be required. went into mass production soon after providing them false papers, Spanish
the Luftwaffe announcement.21 currency with which to travel, and
Luftwaffe officials began to Spanish uniforms. While the partic-
conduct large exhibition flyovers to The German government sup- ipation of Germans in the conflict
impress both the German population plemented this selective showing was well known, perhaps the Allies
and foreign observers. As previously of new aircraft by targeting certain underappreciated the effects. By
noted, these demonstrations included experts to deliver the message. Whaley’s estimation, 32 months of
combat in Spain provided Germany
with more than 14,000 pilots with
combat experience, validation of
aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf-
109, and practice with such tactics as
saturation bombing.23
All this required resources. As
in other periods, the German gov-
ernment was compelled to go to
extraordinary bureaucratic lengths
to disguise the funding of Luftwaffe
development. The Nazi bureaucracy
was similar to that of the Weimar
The He. 111 depicted in its wartime mode on a cigarette card produced during WWII. Pho- Republic and in the years leading up
to: © SIconographic Archive/Alamy Stock Photo to World War II maintained a policy
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) 5
Strategic Deception
of making budget data public. The ational denial and deception. Some way of categorizing such data using
publicized portion was known as the authors—including Whaley, Michael two aspects of deception. First, de-
“white” budget, and it should have Mihalka, and Abram Shulsky, among ceivers must take two types of actions:
provided clues to attentive military others—specifically address strategic revealing information or concealing
attachés about German military R&D deception. Others, such as Robert it. Second, there are two types of
and procurement. The white budget Jervis and Michael Handel, have information: factual and fictitious.
steadily rose throughout the 1930s to addressed the effects and policy im- These categorizations form the ma-
reach approximately 340 million re- plications of government manipula- trix devised by Bennett and Waltz in
ichsmarks in 1936. But also mirror- tion of information. But these studies figure 1, below.
ing Weimar-era budgets, there was are primarily theoretical and case-
more to the story. A “black” budget, study driven. They provide agencies Bennett and Waltz’s matrix can
which more accurately reflected gov- and analysts few tangible methods be modified in one key area to better
ernment spending, totaled over three by which to organize the massive address long-term deception. As
billion reichsmarks in 1936.24 The amount of data likely to result from shown in figure 1, “Conceal Fiction”
same office within the chancellery investigation of deception efforts actions pertain to actions that protect
compiled and issued these budgets, that span multiple governments and the deception itself. But in cases
meaning that numerous individuals perhaps decades. such as long-term R&D programs,
were knowledgeable of this decep- there is an element of coordination
tion and likely working overtime to Michael Bennett and Edward that we must consider part of this
produce the required documents. Waltz propose a simple but effective effort. Though coordination is also
By the time of the Munich Figure 1: The Deception Methods Matrix25
Conference, the British and French Reveal Fact Conceal Fact
governments found themselves in a
Information: Information:
seemingly unsolvable policy prob-
lem. Having underestimated Hitler’s • Release true information that ben- • Secrecy (clearance programs,
efits the deceiver (e.g., the double physical security, and INFOSEC)
aggressive intentions, they now bluff ruse)
overestimated the armed force with • Withholding information to create a
Physical: false or misleading impression
which he could pursue his policies
and deter any efforts to counter him. • Display real equipment or facilities Physical:
Their estimates during this period (e.g., to build a source’s credibility) • Camouflage, concealment, signal
were driven by ignorance of German reduction (e.g., stealth designs
development in the years following and materials, spread spectrum
communications), disguises,
World War I, belief in demonstra-
dazzling
tions carefully managed by German
officials, and Hitler’s confidence that • Nonverbal deceit
he had a force that could back up his Reveal Fiction Conceal Fiction
policy goals. All of which were sup- Information: Information:
ported by long-term deception, albeit • Disinformation, which includes • Suppress a lie
by different governments and with lying or providing information Physical:
different short-term goals. known to be untrue or dazzling
(e.g., providing large volumes of • Hide a sham
information)
Analyzing Long- Physical:
Term Deception • Decoys, diversions (feints and
demonstrations), duplicates, dis-
A significant amount of literature
guises, dummy positions, equip-
and doctrine is focused on the prac- ment, and facilities
tice and effects of tactical and oper-
• Nonverbal deceit
6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018)
Strategic Deception
important in other types of deception, Employing this framework, the In application, this matrix would
longer term programs such as Ger- categorization of data points will of- of course be of significant size and
many’s rearmament involve signifi- ten be matters of analytical judgment, would likely need to be broken up
cant funds, numbers of participants, which will depend on examining the into lines of effort such as diplomatic
and bureaucratic entities. Managing preponderance of evidence for the actions, budget and finance, etc. But
such programs, and the deception enterprise as a whole and asking how sorting data in this manner and mov-
protecting them, requires an organi- each data point fits into that story. For ing the data points around as new
zation with expertise and clout. The example, the Luftwaffe aerial demon- judgments are made will give an an-
establishment or existence of such strations were clearly intentional gov- alyst an increasingly coherent picture
an organization, and the coordinating ernment revelations of information. of potential long-term deception.
actions required for the deception, An analyst would then need to judge
may provide vital clues to identifying whether that information was factual, Special attention should be paid
long-term deception. and thus represented a previously to any information in the “Conceal
undetected significant capability, or Fiction” category. In the example of
Using the sample of data points whether the German government had Germany organizations, the Army
on German airpower development the means and motive to be deceitful Peace Commission and Central Bu-
already presented, a matrix specific about the number of strategic bomb- reau for German Rearmament were
to this case might look like figure 2, ers it could field. established to manage an inspection
below. regime and coordinate illicit activity
across the government.
Figure 2: The Deception Methods Matrix–German Rearmament These types of organizations have
been seen in other cases of long-term
Reveal Fact Conceal Fact
deception as well. In Iraq’s pursuit of
• Paris Air Show agreement • Establishment of Lipetsk training nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein
and development center
• Establishment of Lufthansa as a established the Oversight Commit-
state controlled airline • Military training requirement for tee ostensibly to coordinate with
Lufthansa pilots UN weapons inspectors following
• Classification of officer lists starting the first Gulf War, but in reality it
in 1932 was designed to interfere with UN
• Construction of new air facilities in efforts.26 The Iraqis also established
remote areas organizations such as the Special
• Disguising of German air involve- Security Organization and elements
ment in the Spanish Civil War within the Ministry of Industry and
through use of “volunteers” Military Industrialization to manage
Reveal Fiction Conceal Fiction the nuclear weapons development ef-
• The 1933 overflight of Berlin by • Establishment of the Army Peace fort, mirroring Berlin’s establishment
“Soviet” aircraft Commission and its actual mission of the Central Bureau in 1934.27
to hinder lACC inspection efforts
• Mass aerial demonstrations of
bombers and fighters not actually • Creation of the Central German Such information on the internal
operational Rearmament Bureau in 1934 workings of a deceiver’s bureaucra-
cy may be among the most difficult
• Appearance that the Do-17 “Flying • “Blue” budget diversion of funds
Pencil” was in mass production under the Weimar Republic. data to collect, but analysts should be
and the He-111 was a passenger “White” and “Black” budgets of the vigilant for any such information and
aircraft Nazi-era government drive collection efforts to determine
• Information and tours provided whether such organizations exist and
to Charles Lindbergh giving the how they function.
appearance of a more advanced
production capability
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) 7
Strategic Deception
Recommendations throughout the 1930s. She offers one seen. If long-term deception is
and Conclusion very plausible explanation: that plac- suspected, then analysts should be
ing the estimates higher would have looking for evidence of coordinat-
The recognition of long-term
necessitated some form of action on ing organizations and actions. If no
deception as a unique type of decep-
the part of the British government such evidence is seen, it may indi-
tion is of little value without propos-
that officials did not want to take.28 cate no deception or it may indicate
ing practices to mitigate its effects.
Intelligence professionals have no the need to drive collection towards
Numerous analytic techniques, such
role in the formation of policy, and suspected data points.
as backcastinga or identification
strategic long-term deception will
of scenarios and indicators, hold The final recommendation is less
likely be very difficult to “prove,” but
promise to help analysts categorize about analytic technique than ap-
using analytic techniques effectively
evidence and assess the likelihood proach. The deceiver is operating on
will strengthen one’s case that such
that long-term deception is taking a long-term schedule but is deceiving
an effort is taking place. Categorizing
place. The “Reveal/Conceal Fact/ perhaps without a clear idea of the
and displaying data points to show
Fiction” framework presented in target’s level of attention. Therefore,
how the determination was reached
this article provides another tool for though policymakers require time-
will present policymakers with a
analysts to assess the possibility of ly and relevant assessments of the
coherent roadmap of what is known
deception. But in addition to identify- deceiver’s activity, there may be an
about an R&D program and perhaps
ing the likelihood of such deception, opportunity to permit teams of ana-
a more persuasive argument.
these frameworks must also inform lysts the time and space to undertake
practices to mitigate its effects. Second, analysts and organi- a systematic review of all available
zations need to ensure that every evidence. This is important for two
The first is the essential practice
available channel of information is reasons. First, a group—preferably
of intelligence professionals speak-
utilized and must drive and synthe- made up of specialists in various
ing truth to power. A conclusion that
size the results of collection. The intelligence disciplines—can better
a long-term R&D effort is being
continuous nature of long-term utilize analytic techniques to review
pursued and concealed will often
deception means the deceiver will the evidence, judge the likelihood of
be a problematic development for
need to consistently coordinate a deception, and attempt to develop a
a policymaker. The final report of
complex effort throughout a bu- cohesive picture of the effort. Sec-
the IACC, stating that Germany had
reaucracy. This will both increase ond, temporarily removing analysts
consistently tried to undermine the
the number of individuals aware of from any pressures of immediate pro-
commission and did intend to rearm,
such an effort and necessitate some duction or quick turnaround tasking
is an example of this. The warning
form of coordinating mechanism, will permit the intellectual space to
went unheeded and perhaps, though
such as the Central Bureau for do the “deep dive” on the information
it is difficult to find evidence of this,
German Rearmament or Saddam’s necessary to see these patterns.
the practice of arguing that Ger-
Special Security Organization.
many was continuing to violate the Developments such as interna-
Additionally, the expenditure of
Versailles arms restrictions to senior tional treaties, enforcement regimes,
resources will need to be done in a
British policymakers was abandoned and improvements in intelligence
surreptitious manner but will still
in subsequent years. gathering have complicated the effort
likely result in some detectable
signatures. Each of these necessi- required to pursue long-term R&D
In her work on self-deception,
ties on the part of the deceiver is without detection. Programs to en-
Roberta Wohlstetter points out that
an opportunity for analysts willing hance military capabilities or develop
British estimates of operable Ger-
to perform an exhaustive search of weapons of mass destruction depend
man aircraft were consistently low
available information. Again, the now more than ever on deception to
framework presented in this article conceal them, or at least make them
provides one way of categorizing plausibly deniable for the deceiver.
a. Backcasting is an analytical technique Countering the deception that protects
information. But it also shows
to help identify prerequisites to reaching a these long-term projects requires
given (desired or hypothetical) end state. where expected information is not
8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018)
Strategic Deception
further research on historical exam- of lessons learned and best practices, analysts the time and tools they need
ples of such activities, formulation and organizational flexibility to give to detect and mitigate these efforts.
v v v
The author: Brian J. Gordon is an all-source analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Underground Facility Analy-
sis Center (UFAC). This article is an adaptation of his PhD. dissertation. He earned his doctorate from the Pardee RAND
Graduate School at the RAND Corporation.
Endnotes
1. D. C. Watt, “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment,” The Journal of Modern History 28, no.2
(1956): 155–56.
2. Michael Mihalka, German Strategic Deception in the 1930s (RAND Corporation, N-1557-NA, 1980), 111.
3. Richard Suchenwirth, The Development of the German Air Force, 1919-1939, USAF Historical Studies, ed. Harry F. Fletcher
(Arno Press, 1968), 57.
4. Barton Whaley, Covert German Rearmament, 1919–1939 (University Publications of America, 1984), 57.
5. Barton Whaley, “Conditions Making for Success or Failure of Denial and Deception: Authoritarian and Transition Regimes,” in
Roy Godson and J.J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and Deception in the 21st Century (Transaction Publishers. 2002), 47.
6. Whaley, Conditions, 47.
7. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 9.
8. Ibid., 35.
9. Whaley, Conditions, 44.
10. Suchenwirth, 26–30.
11. Ibid., 26; Whaley Conditions, 53.
12. Whaley, Conditions, 53.
13. Mihalka, 45.
14. Whaley, Conditions, 57.
15. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 51.
16. Suchenwirth, 121.
17. Ibid., 20.
18. Whaley, Conditions, 63.
19. Ibid., 64.
20. Whaley, Conditions, 72.
21. Ibid., 56.
22. Whaley, Conditions, 75.
23. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 62.
24. Suchenwirth, 159–60.
25. Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz, Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security (Artech House, 2007),
52.
26. Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind (John Wiley and Sons,
2004), 144.
27. Ibrahim al-Murashi, “How Iraq Conceals and Obtains Its Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs 7, no. 1 (March 2003): 60.
28. Roberta Wohlstetter, “The Pleasures of Self-Deception,” The Washington Quarterly 2, no.4 (1979): 56.
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