Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016

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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
Issue 12
                                                                    1st Issue 2016
                                                                   ISSN: 2242-439X

                                         nmiotc
NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL

                                         Maritime Interdiction Operations
                                                     Journal
          TRAINING CENTRE

                                                                                 1
Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
NATO
    Maritime Interdiction Operational
            Training Centre

       1 Conference
          st

            on
       Cyber Security

      CYBER SECURITY
           IN THE
      MARITIME DOMAIN
     04 - 05 OCTOBER 2016
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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
CONTENTS                                                           nmiotc
COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL
                                                                                        MARITIME INTERDICTION
03             Editorial by Georgios Tsogkas
               Commodore GRC (N)
                                                                                             OPERATIONS
                                                                                              JOURNAL
               Commadant NMIOTC

ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE AND SECURITY
                                                                                      Director
                                                                                      Commodore G. Tsogkas GRC (N)
06            Energy Secyrity in the Maritime Environment Challenges and Oppor-
              tunities emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean
                                                                                      Commandant NMIOTC
              by Dr Marina Skordeli

13             Illicit Trafficking at Sea Training opportunities at NMIOTC
               by Ioannis Arguriou Lieutenant Commander GRC (CG)
                                                                                      Executive Director
                                                                                      Captain C. Campana ITA (N)
                                                                                      Director of Training Support

15
               Trends in Global Energy Economics and Their Implications for Mari-
               time Energy Infrastucture Secutity and Related Interdiction Training
               by Stephen L. Caldwell
                                                                                      Editor

24             Risks and Interdependencies in the LNG Supply Chain
               by David Incertis
                                                                                      Lt Commander N. Tiantoukas GRC (N)
                                                                                      Head of Transformation

MARITIME SECURITY
                                                                                      Layout Production
                                                                                      CPO E. Miskou GRC (N)
34             Cyber Security within Maritime Domain
               by Lt Commander N. Tiantoukas GRC (N) and                              Journal Assistant Editor
               Lt Commander D. Megas GRC (N)

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

36
               Unerstanding & Mitigating Cyber Threats in the Maritime Domain.
               Lessons Learned From Others Sectors
               by Robert Hayes

41            Energy Saving Measures for Naval Operations
              by G. Gougoulidis, PhD.
                                                                                      The views expressed in this
                                                                                      issue reflect the opinions of
                                                                                      the authors, and do not nec-
                                                                                      essarily represent NMIOTC's
                                                                                      or NATO’s official positions.
HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS
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52             VIP visitors to NMIOTC                                                 Copyright Legislation.
                                                                                      Pictures used from the web
                                                                                      are not subject to copyright
                                                                                      restrictions.
NMIOTC TRAINING                                                                       You may send your comments to:
                                                                                      tiantoukasn@nmiotc.nato.int

56              Photos from NMIOTC Training Activities

                                                                                                                           3
Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
NMIOTC
       Commandants Editorial 12th edition

During the last two years from Whales          Alliance Maritime Strategy, along with        framework of cooperation with NATO.
to Warsaw Summit, concrete deci-               Partners’ involvement and broad col-          Its operational capacity has been rec-
sions were reached for the adapta-             laboration in the areas of training, in-      ognized by those who have been fol-
tion of the Alliance. The maritime             formation exchange and others such            lowing its evolution since its establish-
domain holds a significant part of this        as energy security and illicit trafficking,   ment. NMIOTC stands ready to better
adaptation effort. The way though              would empower all stakeholders to be          support NATO’s partners following rel-
from Whales to Warsaw is paved by              prepared to face these challenges in a        evant decisions, in addition to existing
new security challenges. Conditions            timely manner and at further out dis-         programs and synergies.
are set in order to cope with potential        tances.
emerging challenges to our collective          NATO’s adaptation calls for enhanced          Emerging security challenges, such
security proactively. The environment          opportunities for training. It is antici-     as Critical Infrastructure Protection,
has fundamentally changed as re-               pated that the Warsaw Summit out-             Countering Proliferation of Weapons
gards Alliance’s Eastern and Southern          comes would call for enhanced train-          of Mass destruction, C-IED in the Mari-
flanks security. At the same time, USA         ing opportunities with security provider      time domain, illicit activities and orga-
is shifting its interest to the Pacific, and   partners. This is exactly why NMIOTC          nized crime at sea, interdiction at range
NATO members are requested to take             is more relevant than ever. In its ca-        and cyber defense in the maritime do-
over increased responsibilities in and         pacity as a NETF, awarded by ACT              main, has been timely identified and
around Europe. This burden, regard-            with a Quality Assurance Accredita-           are tackled in a comprehensive man-
less how heavy it could be, it creates         tion, focused on the maritime domain,         ner by both NMIOTC’s training and
opportunities for collaboration espe-          offers education and training opportu-        transformation departments. Having
cially in the maritime domain. NATO’s          nities to Allies and Partners within their    said that and referring to this journal, I

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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
wish to draw your attention to the fact      ply Chain” refers to the maritime part      Nikolaos Tiantioukas GRC (N) and Lt
that it presents articles focused on cur-    of the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas)          Cdr Dimitrios Megas GRC (N) at their
rent and future challenges to maritime       supply chain, identifying its main links,   article present the content and the
security. In particular;                     their interdependencies and related         mentality of our Centre in its efforts to
                                             risks which could hamper the normal         provide effective and efficient training
           In the lead article, Dr. Marina   flow of this very energy source. Dr         to counter cyber threat in the maritime
Skordeli on “Energy Security in the          George Gougoulidis within his article       environment through cyber security
Maritime Environment Challenges and          “Energy-saving Measures for Naval           awareness. Last but not least Lt Cdr
Opportunities emerging in the Eastern        Operations”, examines the feasibility       Ioannis Argiriou GRC (CG) presents
Mediterranean” articulates the par-          and application of various operational      NMIOTC efforts regarding countering
ticular importance that energy secu-         and technical measures aiming out en-       Illicit trafficking at sea.
rity in the maritime environment of the      ergy saving for maritime vessels.
Eastern Mediterranean region has for                                                     Finally, taking this opportunity, I would
the Euro-Atlantic community. On the          The remaining part of the Journal           like to announce with great pleasure,
same spot Stephen L. Caldwell within         deals with the maritime sector’s vul-       the 7th Annual NMIOTC Conference
his article‘’ Trends in Global Energy        nerability to cyber-attacks. Mr Robert      which will be held at our premises
Economics, and Their Implications for        Hayes article “Understanding &Miti-         (Souda Bay – Crete) from 7th to 9th
Maritime Energy Infrastructure Secu-         gating Cyber Threats in the Maritime        June 2016, with topic “Challenges to
rity and Related Interdiction Training”      Domain’’ describes how organizations        Maritime Security Derived from Trans-
analyzes trends in energy econom-            can develop an effective strategic ap-      national Organized Crime at Sea” and
ics and their impact on the security of      proach to cyber-security, and discuss       the 1st Conference on Cyber Security
maritime energy infrastructure. David        how examples of global best practice        in the maritime domain, which will also
Incertis within his article “Risks and       from other industry sectors can help        take place at our premises, from 4th to
Interdependencies in the LNG Sup-            the maritime sector. Finally Lt Cdr         5th October 2016.

                                                                                                              Georgios Tsogkas
                                                                                                            Commodore GRC (N)
                                                                                                            Commadant NMIOTC

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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                   AND SECURITY

        Energy Security in the Maritime
                  Environment
    Challenges and Opportunities emerging
         in the Eastern Mediterranean
                                                     by Dr Marina Skordeli
                            Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of
                         Excellence, National and Kapodistrian University of
                               Athens, Greece, jmcenter-athens@pspa.uoa.gr

Abstract                                 emergence of enhanced risks in the        context, the Euro-Atlantic community
                                         maritime environment is increasingly      should pay special attention on the
In recent years, technological advanc-   raising the issue of securing the ex-     Eastern Mediterranean, due to the im-
es have drawn attention on the extrac-   traction as well as the transfer of en-   mense geopolitical importance of the
tion of energy from the sea, while the   ergy via maritime routes. Within this     region and the particular challenges it

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                                               AND SECURITY

is facing. A traditionally volatile envi-   towards risks at sea is becoming more      ies, oil storage depots), of off-shore
ronment in the Eastern Mediterranean,       systematized both by NATO and the          oil and gas rigs and of Energy related
as was defined in the past by both con-     EU.                                        assets are particularly vulnerable,
ventional and asymmetric threats, has       The identification of the numerous EU      especially when they extend beyond
now been further aggravated by new          interests and policies related to the      borders and attacks on them by hos-
developments. The maritime dimen-           sea, as codified in its Integrated Mari-   tile states, terrorists or hacktivists can
sion of the Eastern Mediterranean, in       time Policy (Commission of the Euro-       have repercussions across regions.
particular, is its basic feature, which     pean Communities, 2007), pointed to        Political instability or conflict, in areas
involves special risks that need to         the need to explore the military aspect    where these assets are being devel-
be better analyzed and addressed.           of protecting these interests. The         oped, is a main source of concern.
Nevertheless, a collective approach         collective surveillance and manage-        As regards Europe’s energy security
toward risks can also bring new oppor-      ment of maritime areas was set as a        policies in particular, the EU Maritime
tunities to the fore.                       first step for the EU (ibid; European      Security Strategy stresses that energy
                                            Council 2008). The European Parlia-        security largely depends on maritime
Keywords                                    ment’s study The Maritime Dimension        transport and infrastructures. Accord-
                                            of CSDP (European Parliament, 2013)        ing to the document, the strategic
Eastern Mediterranean; energy; mari-        raised the need to strengthen the          maritime security interests of the EU
time security; NATO; European Union.        maritime dimension of the Common           and its Member States include the
                                            Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)         preservation of the freedom of naviga-
1. Introduction                             and develop more synergies between         tion, the protection of the global EU
                                            CSDP and the Integrated Maritime           supply chain and of maritime trade, the
This paper will explore the particular      Policy. Once more, this development        right of innocent and transit passage
importance that energy security in the      marked a growing awareness of the          of ships and the security of their crew
maritime environment of the Eastern         interconnection between maritime se-       and passengers. The protection of the
Mediterranean region has for the Eu-        curity and increasing global economic      EU’s economic interests, in particular,
ro-Atlantic community. It will present      interests. All these culminated in the     include the safeguarding of maritime
shortly the respective NATO and EU          recent Maritime Security Strategy of       energy resources, the sustainable
policies on maritime and energy secu-       the EU, adopted in June 2014 (Euro-        exploitation of natural and marine re-
rity. Subsequently, it will analyze the     pean Commission 2014). NATO, for           sources in the different maritime zones
geopolitical importance of the East-        its part, adopted the Alliance Maritime    and the high seas, the delimitation of
ern Mediterranean and it will examine       Strategy (NATO 2011), which identifies     maritime zones, which presents a po-
the risks and challenges emanating          four roles for NATO’s maritime forces:     tential for growth and jobs, the protec-
from this region in the maritime envi-      deterrence and collective defence, cri-    tion of off-shore installations (e.g. gas
ronment, as well as how they could          sis management, cooperative security       or oil platforms), of port infrastructures
threaten vital Euro-Atlantic interests      and aritime security.                      (e.g. LNG facilities), of energy supply
related to energy security. Finally, it     Maritime security and energy security      by the sea and of underwater pipelines.
will explore the opportunities arising      are closely interrelated in the sense      Maritime security threats to these in-
for a collective approach toward these      that a safe maritime environment and       terests, as identified by the Strategy,
challenges with a view to safeguarding      safe lanes of communication ensure         include threats or use of force against
energy supply and security.                 the security of energy extraction from     Member States’ rights and jurisdiction
                                            the sea and shipments via the sea.         over their maritime zones, threats to
2. The Euro-Atlantic                        Energy security in the maritime envi-      the security of European citizens and
Approach toward Maritime                    ronment includes the protection of the     to economic interests at sea.
and Energy Security                         vessels themselves (e.g. tankers), of      As regards NATO’s role in energy
                                            ports, of energy related infrastructure    security, the 2010 Strategic Concept
In recent years, a collective approach      near ports (e.g. pipelines, oil refiner-   (NATO 2010) calls for a capacity to

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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                          AND SECURITY

contribute to energy security, includ-       of powers in the region and threaten its    litical importance. Especially in cur-
ing by the protection of critical energy     stability even further: the Arab Spring     rently crises-ridden areas, pending on
infrastructure and transit areas and         and the recent offshore energy find-        developments, such pipelines could
lines, cooperation with partners, and        ings. As a result, the risk factor at sea   end up at Turkish, Syrian or Israeli
consultations among Allies on the            has been augmented in this region,          shores, in the future. For example,
basis of strategic assessments and           thus jeopardizing the transit use of the    with the normalization of the situation
contingency planning. NATO seeks             wider area.                                 in Iraq, much of the oil there will most
to increase its competence in sup-           More specifically, the economic and         likely be transported to the Eastern
porting the protection of critical energy    energy security importance of the           Mediterranean through pipelines end-
infrastructure, mainly through training      Eastern Mediterranean is strongly           ing in its shores. Another parameter
and exercises. Protecting energy in-         connected with its value as a key tran-     adding to the importance of this region
frastructure is considered primarily a       sit route. The Eastern Mediterranean,       is its own oil and gas reserves. The
national responsibility, hence NATO’s        together with the Red Sea, plays a          EU already covers a great part of its
contribution focuses on areas where it       crucial role for international and, es-     energy demand from sources in the
can add value, notably the exchange          pecially, European shipping by facili-      Middle East and North Africa and Eu-
of best practices with partner countries     tating easy access between Western          ropean states seek to rely more on the
and with other international institutions    markets, on the one hand, and those         Mediterranean states, in order to avoid
and the private sector. With its mari-       of the Far East, the Middle East and        dependence on Russia. The recent
time presence, through Operations            the Black Sea, on the other. Conse-         offshore energy findings in the Eastern
Active Endeavour and Ocean Shield,           quently, the Mediterranean is one of        Mediterranean could add significantly
NATO is also making an indirect con-         the most used maritime corridors glob-      to its importance. As a consequence,
tribution to energy security.                ally, as a significant part of the world    the EU and NATO are now increas-
                                             shipping activity flows through it.         ingly exploring the potential future role
3. Geopolitical Importance of                What enhances the region’s impor-           of the Mediterranean for transatlantic
the Eastern Mediterranean                    tance dramatically is that a remark-        energy security. Recently, the Italian
                                             able percentage of the energy re-           Presidency of the EU and the Com-
The Eastern Mediterranean is an area         sources traded internationally, almost      mission announced the promotion of
of major geopolitical and geostrategic       1/3, flows through the Mediterranean,       a Mediterranean gas hub, taking into
importance. In economic terms, the           whether via ships or through pipe-          consideration that the region is a stra-
location of the Eastern Mediterranean        lines. Energy resources coming from         tegic gas supplier to the EU and to its
makes it a crucial transit point for trade   the Persian Gulf and Russia pass            Mediterranean neighbours, it has im-
in general and for vital energy resourc-     mainly through this region. Oil is be-      portant gas reserves and it is located
es directed to Europe and the United         ing transferred from the Persian Gulf       in the midst of the world’s busiest wa-
States in particular. This transit aspect    primarily to Europe, but also to the        terways for global shipping.
of the Eastern Mediterranean has a           US, through the Suez Canal. Rus-            The EU has also expanded its renew-
strong maritime dimension. In po-            sia is attempting to transfer its energy    able energy plans towards the south.
litical and security terms, for the past     resources through southern corridors,       Producing electricity from renewable
decades, the Eastern Mediterranean           in order to avoid what it perceives as      sources in countries of the South-
has been characterized by a complex          hostile neighbors, such as Ukraine.         ern Mediterranean is indeed a viable
security context made up of all sorts        The flow of natural gas and oil from        option. Submarine connections for
of conventional risks as well as what        the Caucasus and Central Asia via this      electric power transmission have
we call asymmetric threats. On top           region is also expected to increase.        been proposed and such a grid could
of those, in the past few years, we          The number of pipelines already ex-         transmit to Europe significant shares
have been witnessing the emergence           isting in the Eastern Mediterranean,        of electricity produced from renewable
of a couple of new developments that         but also those expected to be con-          sources in the future.
could ultimately lead to a rebalancing       structed there is adding to its geopo-      While the region’s importance for

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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
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                                               AND SECURITY

Euro-Atlantic energy security is be-        severe risks to maritime traffic and         attempts to damage tankers or disrupt
ing increasingly enhanced, in political     energy flows could be posed. Hence,          loading operations in or near overseas
and security terms, the Eastern Medi-       Europe and the US demonstrate a              ports, such as the attack of a small
terranean has long been known for a         renewed attention toward this region,        ship with explosives on the French
list of conventional and asymmetric         since such issues can threaten the           tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen,
threats that could potentially affect vi-   security of their citizens and their vital   in October 2002.
tal interests of the EU and the US, in      interests.                                   As regards the Mediterranean, the
addition to their energy security. The      We can conclude that stability in the        disclosure of a number of attempted
gravity of these threats made many          Eastern Mediterranean is of particular       terrorist attacks on ships leads to the
scholars, as well as numerous EU and        importance for the Euro-Atlantic and         conclusion that such scenarios are
NATO policy documents, characterise         global economic interests in general,        becoming increasingly possible for the
the Mediterranean as the new security       since it allows for the flow of energy       Eastern Mediterranean. Organiza-
front for the West after the end of the     resources from areas in the periphery        tions, such as Hezbollah, the Jemaah
Cold War. Conventional threats in the       of Europe, such as Russia, the Middle        Islamiyah, the Popular Front for the
Eastern Mediterranean take the form         East, Caucasus and Central Asia, but         Liberation of Palestine, have long tried
of a significant number of rivalries,       also from the region itself and, there-      to develop capabilities, in order to un-
regional crises and high intensity con-     fore, it allows for stability of the world   dertake similar action.
flicts (e.g. the Arab-Israeli wars), as     economy. Thus, it must be ensured,           Cargo ships crossing the Mediter-
well as what until recently was charac-     in order to safeguard uninhibited and        ranean could either be placed under
terised as rogue states (Syria, Libya)      cost-effective shipping and the smooth       the control of terrorists or suffer from
and dangerous non-state actors (e.g.        operation of energy infrastructure.          attacks on their journey. Energy infra-
Hezbollah). Stability in this region has                                                 structure at sea, such as oil and gas
also been threatened by asymmetric          4. Challenges to Energy Se-                  rigs, could be damaged or hijacked.
threats, such as terrorism and the use      curity in the Maritime Envi-                 Terrorists could, also, use the sea to
of Weapons of Mass Destruction.             ronment of the Eastern Medi-                 infiltrate and attack land-based tar-
Today, the security environment in the      terranean                                    gets. Pipelines, refineries, pumping
Eastern Mediterranean is being fur-                                                      stations have been among terrorists’
ther aggravated. Political transforma-      The maritime dimension of the Medi-          targets in recent years. In the Mediter-
tions in Egypt and Libya, the on-going      terranean is its special feature that in-    ranean, possible attacks on tankers,
turmoil in Syria and frozen relations       volves special risks. These risks could      terminals or pipelines flowing there
between Turkey and Israel are re-           be associated both with conventional         would have a significant impact on a
shaping longstanding balances and           as well as with asymmetric security          global scale. The same is true for at-
correlations, causing uncertainty and       concerns.                                    tacks at crossing points to and from
instability. With the emergence of the      Starting with asymmetric threats, pre-       the Mediterranean. The morphology
so-called Islamic State (ISIS), terror-     venting the entry of terrorists into the     of the Mediterranean, which requires
ism emanating from this region takes        territorial waters of Western states,        passage through straits, such as the
a new form, the dimensions of which         as well as terrorist attacks at sea and      Suez Canal, the Bosporus and Gibral-
cannot be assessed in full, yet. The        from the sea, is a major European and        tar, makes ships particularly vulner-
possibility of the loss of state control    American concern. This is not a new          able. Such scenarios include the risk
over coastal areas and of the creation      threat. To date, there have been inci-       of a potential environmental terrorism,
of lawless maritime zones, as a result      dents of terrorist attacks on American       affecting the environment and, there-
of state collapse in the Mediterranean,     or European warships, tankers or pas-        fore, tourism, which is one of the big-
could have an immediate impact on           senger ships. Such incidents demon-          gest sources of income in the region.
maritime security. In case that non-        strate that maritime terrorism is a fact     These scenarios become even more
state actors are able to take hold of       and that it is one of the most serious       nightmarish, if there was an attack
these coastal and maritime areas,           security threats. These have included        with a ship trapped with a weapon of

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Nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal - Issue 12 1st Issue 2016
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                         AND SECURITY

mass destruction. While previous at-        infrastructure and vessels.                    get ships passing through the Suez
tacks have used ships loaded with           Piracy is another dimension of mari-           Canal. Closure of the Suez Canal
explosives, one could also imagine an       time risks and some acts of piracy             would have significant financial impli-
attack using aircraft.                      have targeted oil shipments. The               cations, one example of which would
The consequences from energy-relat-         vast majority of pirate attacks against        be the addition a time-consuming and
ed maritime terrorism in the Mediter-       energy vessels occur against oil tank-         more costly detour around the Cape of
ranean can include human casual-            ers. Pirates have also demonstrated            Good Hope.
ties, a blow on the economy and an          the ability to attack LNG carriers and         Finally, technological advances now
environmental impact. As regards the        offshore drilling platforms successfully.      allow new opportunities to emerge
implications for the global economy in      There have been a few notable cases            related to the exploitation of various
particular, these could be huge. Apart      where tankers have been hijacked and           maritime resources. The sea can offer
from jeopardizing the safe flow of oil      the crews held for ransom. It should,          almost one third of the oil and natural
and gas, implications could include ris-    also, be noted that many of the mod-           gas worldwide consumption. It is esti-
ing oil prices, disruption of trade, the    ern times pirates are terrorists coming        mated that 40% of the oil and 60% of
use of more time-consuming detours          from Islamic extremist groups. Inter-          the gas currently consumed in Europe
that would increase the cost of trans-      national efforts to freeze financial re-       are drilled offshore. Gradually the sea
portation, crowded passage points           sources of terrorist organizations have        also provides more renewable energy
and ports, more expensive insurance         led such groups to piracy as an alter-         resources.
premiums, environmental disasters           native means for their financement.            The ability of coastal states to protect
and a blow on tourism. The straits, in      Today, piracy is being addressed by            their territorial integrity and ensure
particular, could be blocked for several    the international community in the Gulf        their sovereignty on their maritime
days, depending on the size of the          of Aden, around the Somali coast and           zones is, therefore, expected to be-
damage caused and controls or safety        in the Indian Ocean. However, piracy           come increasingly important in the
measures taken, and therefore cross-        is being spread worldwide. It appears          future. The anticipated growth of hu-
ing them would slow down, with again        already in the Red Sea and it could be         man activity in the seas and the need
financial implications. The same goes       extended to the Mediterranean. Eu-             to produce energy from the sea will
for hits on ports and oil terminals.        ropean officials have recently been            contribute to this. This can cause con-
A very alarming scenario is posed by        alarmed by the possibility of ISIS also        flicts at sea between state, but also
the possibility of ISIS securing terri-     bringing Somali-style piracy to the            non-state, actors, because of competi-
tory on Libya’s Mediterranean coast.        Mediterranean. While ISIS is gaining           tion for these scarce resources. As a
ISIS has recently been making in-           control of ports and vessels in Libya,         consequence, the majority of states to-
roads along the coast of Libya tak-         it could launch pirate attacks in the the      day extends or wishes to extend their
ing control of the port city of Derna       Mediterranean.                                 territorial waters to 12 n.m. and their
and nearby Sirte, just a few hundred        Political instability in the region can        Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 n.m.,
miles across the water from mainland        also cause the disruption of energy            which creates vast maritime surfaces
Europe. Greater ISIS access to the          flows. Conflicts or hostile action can         for surveillance and protection and dis-
Mediterranean would be deeply trou-         impede the freedom of navigation or            putes with neighbouring countries on
bling to the region and a large strategic   they can cause damage on infrastruc-           the delimitation of these zones.
advance for the terrorist group. Such       ture. Recent instability in Egypt, for         One such great challenge is posed by
a development could increase ISIS’s         example, has caused concern, since             the energy factor in recent develop-
potential for attacks in Italy, Greece      the country has been struggling to             ments in the Eastern Mediterranean.
and elsewhere in Europe. With the           keep the peace in the area around the          The discovery of gas implies that the
use of small boats, ISIS could launch       Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula.            region will remain an important energy
terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean      A recent rocket attack on the Cosco            provider for Europe in the foreseeable
that could expose it to hijacking, kid-     Asia, a giant container ship, was not          future and that it can also provide in-
nappings and damage of vital energy         the first time that terrorists tried to tar-   digenous resources (in the case of

10
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                              AND SECURITY

Cyprus). The new energy resources          companies for that, private security       community makes it imperative that
of the region overall could comple-        guards might be able to prevent rigs       these challenges be properly ad-
ment the Southern Corridor in the          from being taken over, but are unlikely    dressed.
medium term. This challenge will only      to help them withstand an outright at-
be reinforced by existing plans to con-    tack. A more remote threat scenario is     5. Energy Security in the
struct large-scale solar projects in the   posed by the possible future transfer      Maritime Environment of the
Southern Mediterranean, as well as by      of energy from renewable sources via       Eastern Mediterranean as an
possible future plans on new forms of      undersea cables, which are much less       Opportunity
renewable energy from the sea, such        vulnerable to attacks. Nevertheless,
as wave energy, floating photovoltaic      this possibility has also been referred    The fact that the seas are associated
panels and biofuels produced from al-      to. For the purpose of protecting such     with critical economic interests that
gae.                                       installations off-shore and along the      require protection by military means
The risk implications of the offshore      coast, Israel recently launched a plan     is not new. All major trading powers
energy findings in the region add a sig-   of adding new warships and subma-          have always protected their interests
nificant new security dimension in this    rines to it’s naval fleet and of deploy-   with powerful Navy. What is new is
maritime environment. Disputes of the      ing hundreds of soldiers in the area,      the collective approach and coopera-
riparian states over maritime zones        in order to protect above and beneath      tion among partners in this field that
and possible asymmetric threats            the water. In addition, Israel Air Force   now acquires a central role in interna-
against energy assets in the region        “Shoval” drones will patrol the area       tional strategic planning. NATO and
reinforce fears. Turkey, Israel, Cy-       and intelligence-gathering and radar       the European Union are in a process
prus, Greece, Lebanon, the Palestin-       equipment will be installed on the plat-   of developing a particular strategy on
ians have already entered the fray and     forms. Also, intelligence efforts have     maritime security. They have also pri-
Egypt, Libya and Syria could follow.       been refocused toward threats to the       oritized energy security within this con-
Moreover, drilling platforms, expected     maritime facilities. The threat is quite   text and in their overall policies.
to be built at sea, and other related      real, since, given the situation in the    Modern challenges in the maritime
installations or transfer means are po-    region, advanced weaponry fired from       environment are particularly demand-
tential targets. Recently, Israel called   Lebanon, the Gaza Strip or the Sinai       ing for one country to face alone. The
on the EU to support the East Med          Peninsula could threaten offshore fa-      threats are common and the interests
pipeline project that would connect the    cilities. For example, Hezbollah has       that need to be safeguarded are mu-
natural gas fields in Israel and Cyprus    threatened to protect the maritime         tual. Moreover, this is a costly un-
to the EU via Greece. An LNG termi-        assets of Lebanon warning Israel not       dertaking, especially at this time of
nal at the coastal area of Vassilikos in   to try to steal Lebanon’s resources.       financial strain. It will, therefore, take
Cyprus is a complementary project of       The organisation is thought to have        a greater part of the financial burden
extreme importance that is still on the    an arsenal of thousands of rockets,        to be undertaken jointly. For all these
table. These energy assets could be        midget submarines, exploding boats         reasons, collective approaches are
highly vulnerable in case of a terrorist   and armed private planes, which could      deemed NATO and the EU should fo-
attack or during an armed conflict. A      potentially reach targets in the Eastern   cus on three main areas, namely the
possible attack on the rigs, for exam-     Mediterranean.                             operational, the relevant infrastructure
ple, could include missiles launched       Both the conventional and asymmet-         and maritime diplomacy. The overall
from tens of kilometres away, proxim-      ric challenges described above draw        aim would be to prevent threats, such
ity attacks by frogmen, a collision with   a rather complex and alarming pic-         as terrorism, piracy, proliferation, and
an approaching boat or the intentional     ture as regards energy security in the     to ensure a safe environment for the
crashing of manned or unmanned air-        maritime environment of the Eastern        extraction and transport of energy.
crafts. While the drilling companies       Mediterranean. The importance of the       Maritime operations in the region are
are responsible for security within        region for the economic and energy-        important. NATO’s Operation Active
the rigs and they hire private security    related interests of the Euro-Atlantic     Endeavour is considered of utmost

                                                                                                                             11
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                          AND SECURITY

importance for monitoring maritime           time environment for energy transfer         is now enhanced by its possible se-
communications in the Mediterranean.         and production in the Eastern Medi-          lection for the transit of future energy
The operation has proved valuable            terranean and by cultivating a trust-        resources from the periphery of Eu-
for the safe transportation of energy        ing and cooperative environment with         rope, by the increasing use of gas and
resources, but also for securing eco-        Euro-Atlantic partners in the region,        oil from the countries of North Africa
nomic activity in the Mediterranean in       NATO and the EU could tap into the           and the Middle East, as well as by its
general.                                     multiple opportunities that the area         own energy reserves. At the same
Infrastructure, such as the NATO Mari-       can provide as regards energy secu-          time, the Eastern Mediterranean has
time Interdiction Operational Training       rity.                                        been the scene of longstanding secu-
Centre (NMIOTC), plays an important                                                       rity challenges, while in recent years
role in enhancing maritime security by       6. Conclusions                               many more have emerged. These
providing expertise in boarding tech-                                                     challenges have a strong maritime
niques, by contributing to counterter-       Energy security in the maritime envi-        component and they could threaten
rorism missions in the Mediterranean         ronment is one area that NATO and            energy security in the maritime envi-
and by offering the relevant training.       the EU are increasingly including in         ronment. Due to the importance of the
Maritime diplomacy and multilateral          their strategic planning, threat asses-      region for Euro-Atlantic energy secu-
defense cooperation in the Eastern           ments and policy making. The East-           rity, a robust collective approach to the
Mediterranean should bridge inter-           ern Mediterranean in particular is now       security challenges emanating from
ests and threat assessments between          emerging as a region, which requires         the Eastern Mediterranean is required,
Euro-Atlantic institutions and the coun-     special attention in this regard. The        so that opportunities arising from this
tries of the region and it would cultivate   geopolitical importance of the Eastern       area can be better exploited.
trust with Euro-Atlantic partners.           Mediterranean, a key maritime route
By ensuring collectively a safe mari-        for the transfer of energy resources,

                   Marina Skordeli

                   Dr Marina Skordeli is the Director of the Jean Monnet European
                   Centre of Excellence of the University of Athens. In 2004-2009, she
                   served as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Greece,
                   Kostas Karamanlis. In 2002-2004, she held the position of Political
                   Advisor on European security and enlargement at the European
                   People’s Party, in Brussels. She holds a PhD on “The CSDP and
                   security in the Eastern Mediterranean”. She has been teaching,
                   lecturing and publishing in Greece and abroad on European defence,
                   security in the Eastern Mediterranean, maritime security and Greek foreign and defence policy.

12
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                                                            AND SECURITY

           Illicit Trafficking at Sea
      Training opportunities at NMIOTC

                                                               by Ioannis Argyriou
                                                Lieutenant Commander GRC (CG)
                                                      Instructor at NATO Maritime
                                                 Interdiction Operational Training
                                                                 Center (NMIOTC)

Shipping is an important factor for the    where these are committed.                   tion Operational Training Center
world trade as well as for the universal   An imperative prerequisite for the           (NMIOTC), an accredited NATO train-
economy, social cohesion and prosper-      elimination or restriction of illegal acts   ing center located in Crete-Greece,
ity of the people. Its safe conduction,    at sea is to enhance the political and       has proven a very successful tool. In
however, raises issues of maritime se-     economic stability throughout the            this Center, with its high value training
curity, which troubles the international   world. Within this context the global        infrastructure and certified educational
community to a great extent. In order      community in cooperation with inter-         expertise and procedures, a series
to take all the necessary measures         national organizations (e.g. the Inter-      of trainings are conducted as well as
to ensure the safe transportation of       national Maritime Organization - IMO)        training and developing bonds for fu-
people and goods in the marine en-         are undertaking initiatives to eliminate     ture collaboration among personnel
vironment, we have to be aware of a        illegal acts through regional capacity       from very different states. Theoreti-
wide spectrum of illegal actions that      building or multinational allied law en-     cal and practical training provided re-
are committed at sea, such as piracy,      forcement operations. However, apart         spond to a wide spectrum of maritime
armed robbery, human trafficking, drug     from international initiatives or allied     operation issues, while the conduc-
trafficking and the illegal transport of   operations in international waters, a        tion of joint practical exercises help to
weapons and dangerous substances/          key factor for controlling and hinder-       evaluate the effectiveness of proce-
materials that can be used by terror-      ing illegal acts at sea is the role and      dures and any improvements required
ist organizations. The legal evaluation    responsibilities of coastal states in the    thereof. To enable learners to act in
and proper response to such actions        region of their sovereignty.                 a realistic environment, the practical
depends highly on the maritime area        To that aim, the Maritime Interdic-          training takes place on fully equipped

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ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                            AND SECURITY

mock ships as well as perfectly up-to-       issues on Illicit trafficking and inter-        public health, democratic institutions,
date simulators. All current trainings       rogation Tactics. Moreover practical            and economic stability across the
are focused on issues of criminal acts       training is provided on mock up ships           globe.
investigation in the maritime environ-       on the subjects on crew control as well           Global criminal activities are trans-
ment, providing a wide range of knowl-       as on the techniques of searching of            forming the international system,
edge from intracurricular fields, with       area.                                           changing the rules, creating new play-
the participation of officers from US/       The trafficking of human beings is              ers and reconfiguring power in interna-
DEA, the Hellenic Police, the Interpol,      viewed by the international community           tional politics and economics. States
the US National Security Agency/Na-          as a major concern and has been de-             and international organizations have
val Criminal Investigation Service lo-       scribed as amounting to modern day              largely failed to anticipate the evolu-
cated in Chania and the Naval Hospi-         slavery. A large number of men, wom-            tion of transnational organized crime
tal of Crete as subject matter experts.      en and children are victims of human            into a strategic threat to governments,
One of the trainings which is going          trafficking for different reasons (sexual,      civil societies and economies.
to be conducted this year is the “Il-        forced labor and other forms of exploi-         Summarizing we can say that various
licit trafficking at Sea”. The particular    tation). Moreover, drug trafficking is          forms of illegal activities can take place
course covers extensively the need for       another pervasive form of illicit traffick-     in the marine environment. The inter-
training on the suggested subjects and       ing that remains highly profitable and          national community has taken steps to
aims to provide quality, sustainable,        extremely difficult to control, despite         reduce these phenomena by conduct-
and effective training for government        increasing efforts by the international         ing naval allied operations. However,
and state officials and practitioners        community to contain and then reduce            while the presence of coalition forces
who are engaged in policy develop-           it. The mission of the traffickers is to        may have reduced phenomena of il-
ment, law enforcement, intelligence          get the drugs from the suppliers to the         licit trafficking, it has not entirely elimi-
and interdiction operations aimed at         consumer as efficiently as possible             nated them. The coastal states play
countering illicit trafficking. Such traf-   without being detected. In addition the         an important role in this effort. Within
ficking may involve the illegal trade in     illicit trafficking of firearms occurs in all   this context, the NMIOTC is taking ini-
drugs, small arms and light weapons          parts of the globe but is concentrated          tiatives intended to enable the coastal
(SALW) as well as the smuggling of           in areas afflicted by armed conflict,           states to train their staff so as to per-
human beings and/or human organs.            violence and organized crime, where             form their duties more efficiently. Ad-
The objectives of these trainings is to      the demand for weapons is often high-           ditionally, one of the main objective of
improve the knowledge and skills of          est. All of the above issues related            these course is the exchange of views
trainees on human trafficking, drug          with transnational organized crime.             among the staff of these countries in
trafficking, firearms trafficking, Crime     Transnational organized crime (TOC)             order to achieve better and more ef-
Scene Investigation and Evidence             poses a significant and growing threat          ficient cooperation between them to-
Collection, Illicit trafficking related      to national and international security,         wards the common cause of enhanc-
organized crimes, biometrics, legal          with dire implications for public safety,       ing maritime security.

Ioannis Argyriou

Lieutenant Commander GRC (CG)
Instructor at NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC)
In 2001, he joined the Hellenic Naval Academy (Coast Guard Officers’ Cadet School) and in 2002 he
was sworn in as Ensign of the Hellenic Coast Guard. During his career in the Hellenic Coast Guard he has
served in a number of local Port Authorities. In March 2014 he was appointed a National Briefing Officer
and liaison by FRONTEX on issues of illegal immigrants. Since April 2014 he has been serving at NATO
Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC) as an instructor and an officer of primary
responsibility for the conduction of training events by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and
East Africa Standby Force (EASF). Moreover he coordinates the training for various groups from NATO
state members and other affiliated countries.
E-mail: argirioui@nmiotc.nato.int - johnarg00@yahoo.gr Mobile: (0030) 6974014100

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ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                         AND SECURITY

TRENDS IN GLOBAL Energy
Economics, and Their
Implications for Maritime
Energy Infrastructure Security
and Related Interdiction
Training.            byStephen L. Caldwell
                        Member, US National Maritime Security
                                         Advisory Committee

                                                           15
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                          AND SECURITY

Abstract

This paper discusses trends in energy       ognizing this, NATO’s Strategic Con-       also exploited tanker vessel vulnerabil-
economics and their impact on the           cept emphasizes the importance of          ities. Somali-based piracy off the Horn
security of maritime energy infrastruc-     emerging threats that include counter-     of Africa rose rapidly in 2008, peaked
ture. After revisiting selected terrorist   terrorism and energy security. The         in 2011, but has fallen to almost zero
and pirate attacks on tankers and off-      Strategic Concept also emphasizes          in recent years. According to GAO,
shore facilities, the paper summarizes      an enhanced awareness of border and        the recent decline in attacks was due
programs to protect such infrastruc-        port security. Related to this, NATO       to broad efforts to protect vessels in-
ture. The paper then discusses more         has a designated organization—the          cluding industry best management
recent trends such as the rise (and         NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation-      practices, private security companies,
subsequent fall) of piracy off the Horn     al Training Centre (NMIOTC)—with           and naval escorts—such as NATO’s
of Africa. More recently in other parts     the mission to train member forces         “Operation Ocean Shield.” However,
of the world pirates and other criminal     for maritime interdiction. This paper,     even during the peak in piracy off the
networks have specifically targeted         developed for the June 2015 NMIOTC         Horn of Africa, the impact on energy
energy infrastructure. Other develop-       6th Annual Conference, examines            tankers was limited because many of
ments, such as sanctions against pa-        several trends in energy economics,        them were not the “slow and low” prey
riah countries provide additional chal-     both long-term and short-term, and         that the pirates preferred. One early
lenges in monitoring and interdicting       discusses their implications for the       exception was the tanker Sirius Star
tankers through international waters.       NMIOTC program of training.                which was slow and low, and reported
The paper also weaves in recent eco-                                                   to have stopped when approached by
nomic trends in energy markets—such         Continued Threats to                       the pirates. But even in that case, the
as the fall in energy prices, the Ameri-    Maritime Energy                            ransom of $3 million paid to pirates to
can Energy Renaissance and the rise                                                    release the tanker was far below the
of Liquefied Natural Gas as both a          One of the long term trends in energy      value of the oil cargo. This is a far dif-
commodity and vessel fuel. The pa-          markets is continued security threats      ferent situation than the more recent
per concludes with the implications of      to maritime energy infrastructure—         pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
these trends for maritime interdiction      both vessels and facilities. Reports of    and Southeast Asia, which will be dis-
and training                                the U.S. Government Accountability         cussed later in this paper.
                                            Office (GAO) have documented that
Key Words                                   for more than 10 years, terrorist have     GAO documented several steps that
                                            exploited the vulnerabilities of energy    have been taken to protect tankers.
Maritime; security; energy; offshore;       tanker vessels. In general, tankers        In response to the terrorist and pirate
piracy.                                     are vulnerable to attack due to their      threats, several protective measures
                                            predictable schedules and routes, and      have been taken at the national and in-
Introduction                                long voyages in open seas and politi-      ternational level. In the United States,
                                            cally unstable waters. As an example       as in other nations, there are regula-
As an alliance that stretches across        of predictable routes, tankers also sail   tions and operations to protect tankers
many oceans and seas—the Atlan-             through well-known choke points such       visiting their ports. These activities,
tic, Baltic, and parts of the Mediter-      as straits and canals. During these        generally led by the U.S. Coast Guard
ranean—the North Atlantic Treaty Or-        voyages, tankers are vulnerable to a       (USCG) ensure that tankers—regard-
ganization (NATO) has the maritime          number of types of attacks, including      less of flag—meet national and inter-
security mission of protecting its sea      suicide attacks, armed assaults, and       national requirements to have security
lanes of communication. And as an al-       stand-off missile attacks. Terrorist       officers and security plans in place.
liance that produces and imports much       have exploited these vulnerabilities,      USCG and other federal agencies
of its oil and gas within and across the    attacking the MS Limburg in 2002, and      run security checks on the crews of
maritime domain, NATO must pay              more recently, the MV Star in 2011.        inbound energy tankers. Within U.S.
particular attention to the maritime                                                   ports, USCG and state and local har-
security of energy commodities. Rec-        In addition to terrorists, pirates have    bor police may escort tankers in and

16
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                               AND SECURITY

out of port, based on risk, location and    cost almost $40 million in lost revenue.    facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. One
the availability of resources. In addi-     Further, the explosion and sinking of       threat to both tankers and facilities is
tion, based on a risk matrix, USCG          the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the        the so-called “small vessel threat” from
and other federal, state, and local part-   Gulf of Mexico (which was admittedly        anonymous and agile smaller boats
ner agencies may board and inspect          not a terrorist attack) showed that a       that could evade detection and use ex-
high-risk energy tankers arriving at        major incident on an offshore facility      plosives to attack energy infrastructure
U.S. ports. At the international level,     could cause economic and environ-           or other maritime targets. To address
the International Maritime Organiza-        mental consequences in the billions         this threat, the U.S. Department of
tion (IMO) adopted global standards         of dollars. As late as 2011, US intelli-    Homeland Security developed and is
for maritime security (the International    gence reported that Al Qaeda was still      working to implement its Small Vessel
Ship and Port Facility Security Code or     interested in targeting maritime energy     Security Strategy.
“ISPS” code). Also on the international     infrastructure in western countries         These past and ongoing threats to
front, USCG also visits and assesses        (e.g., NATO members). More recently,        maritime energy infrastructure do not
the security at foreign ports that are      terrorist groups such as MEND in the        necessarily indicate that any changes
departure points for vessels (including     Niger Delta have attacked onshore           are needed in NMIOTC interdiction
tankers) coming to the United States.       and offshore energy facilities as part of   training. While the threats to tankers
Finally, and as mentioned earlier, U.S.     their political agenda.                     and facilities remain, protective mea-
and allied navies patrol high-risk inter-                                               sures—such as those against small
national waters, such as piracy-prone       Similar to tanker vessels, several          vessel attacks—have been in place
waters off the Horn of Africa.              steps have been taken to protect facili-    by the United States and other NATO
                                            ties. Of some 4,000 offshore energy         members for several years. The chal-
Energy facilities, both in port and off-    facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, GAO       lenge in past years and continuing into
shore, also have vulnerabilities that       found that about 50 meet the threshold      the present is that military and law
have been exploited by terrorists.          for USCG security regulations. These        enforcement agencies have limited re-
GAO’s report on offshore facilities         50 offshore facilities—as with water-       sources to ensure the security of tank-
noted they are particularly vulnerable      side terminals—must have security of-       ers and facilities against an unknown
due to their location in open waters,       ficers and plans in place. The USCG         threat that could strike in any place
far away from military or law enforce-      approves such plans, and inspects the       at any time. Also, the lack of action-
ment response assets. The locations         facilities once per year to ensure com-     able intelligence or a credible threat to
of these facilities is common knowl-        pliance with their security plans. For      domestic US ports—a situation that is
edge because of their concentration         waterside terminals, and to a lesser        several years old—makes it more dif-
in well-known areas such as the Gulf        extent offshore facilities, USCG and        ficult to justify more resources for mari-
of Mexico and the North Sea. Officials      state and local harbor police conduct       time security programs. But the limits
at some facilities are concerned that       patrols based on risk, location and         on resources to train or conduct pro-
small vessels carrying fishermen or         the availability of resources. For the      tective operations is a separate issue
divers frequently violate safety zones      offshore facilities, USCG also estab-       than whether the current tactical train-
around them and, in some cases, try         lished an Area Maritime Security Com-       ing needs to be changed. Given the
to attach their small vessels to the        mittee for the Gulf of Mexico, to help      long standing nature of these threats,
facilities. Terrorist have targeted and     identify vulnerabilities, share informa-    NMIOTC has already developed and
attacked such facilities, including two     tion, and develop response and recov-       delivered tactical training for these
offshore of Iraq in 2004. In that case,     ery plans. Finally, US agencies have        standard terrorist and piracy scenar-
terrorist using a speed boat with explo-    held major exercises, such as the           ios—and should continue to do so.
sives attacked the Al-Basrah and Kh-        National Law Enforcement exercise in        But the continued existence of these
war Al’Amaya oil terminals, killing three   2009 (also known as “NLE 2009”) to          threats does not indicate that any ma-
U.S. sailors. In addition to the human      test the US response to a terrorist at-     jor change is needed in NMIOTC train-
cost, the loss of two days of operations    tack on, among other things, offshore       ing.

                                                                                                                               17
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
                                           AND SECURITY

Increasing Use of                            of goods throughout maritime termi-         time interdiction mission. One thing to
Technology                                   nals using conveyor belts or pipelines.     monitor might be the development of
                                             These systems are now frequently            more sophisticated Mobile Offshore
Another long term trend in energy eco-       networked to business operations sys-       Drilling Units. It is not hard to think of
nomics is the continued transition to        tems, and remote control centers, thus      a scenario where NATO maritime forc-
new technology, sometimes in ways            creating potential cyber vulnerabilities    es may have to board such a vessel.
that create additional security chal-        for hackers and criminals to exploit.       Cyber technologies also should be
lenges. For several years, industry                                                      monitored, but raise more fundamen-
has worked to become more economi-           Cyber security weaknesses in the            tal questions about their relationship to
cally efficient by using more sophisti-      maritime industry, including the energy     the missions under discussion. While
cated technologies to find, recover,         sector, are now widely recognized.          the cyber threat is real, to what extent
store and distribute energy. Offshore        Several recent studies in the United        is cyber security a maritime interdic-
production continues to use new tech-        States (by the Brookings Institution,       tion issue? For example, is there a role
nology to move to deeper water (e.g.,        and GAO), Europe (By the European           for offensive cyber operations to inter-
beyond 10,000 feet) and operate in           Network and Information Security            dict vessels that are suspected of be-
more harsh environments (e.g., the           Agency), and Australia (by the Office       ing hijacked or carrying contraband?
Arctic). The development of hydraulic        of the Inspector for Transport Security)    Cyber security also raises questions
fracturing (or “fracking”) of shale de-      looked at maritime cyber security is-       about the roles of industry versus
posits has led to significant recovery       sues. The Australia study specifically      government to secure cyberspace.
of oil and gas in previously unproduc-       focused on offshore energy resources,       Currently there is an ongoing debate
tive regions. The more sophisticated         and made specific recommendations           within NATO countries and NATO itself
facilities, and the desire to increase ef-   related to cyber security. The several      about who in their respective govern-
ficiency of operations, has led to more      reports, while differing in their scope     ments or militaries should take the
networked facilities with remote ac-         and methodology, collectively raised        lead for defensive and/or offensive
cess control. As an example, DNV GL          five areas of concern and related rec-      cyber operations. NATO needs to
recently announced its plans for “Soli-      ommendations. These similar con-            plan out its role, and then determine
tude” an unmanned floating LNG con-          cerns were (1) maritime operations          whether NMIOTC also plays a part
cept for remote offshore areas. And          are growing more automated and in-          in that role. If NATO does designate
with the continued trend toward com-         terconnected, (2) stakeholder aware-        cyber security as a role for NMIOTC,
plex technologies, the related regula-       ness of cyber threats and their cyber       then appropriate technical tactics and
tory regimes have also become more           hygiene has been weak, (3) cyber            training would need to be developed.
complex for national governments.            vulnerabilities exist, with potentially     And such cyber training would need to
                                             harmful consequences to ports, (4)          be integrated into the existing training
A key part of the transition to new tech-    risk assessments to date have gener-        program at NMIOC as appropriate.
nology has been the use of automa-           ally focused on physical security and
tion in ways that create cyber vulner-       not cyber security, and (5) threat infor-   Falling Energy Prices
abilities. GAO found there has been a        mation sharing is ad hoc and needs to
continued increase in the use of Indus-      be improved.                                Moving from long-term energy trends
trial Control Systems, which are auto-                                                   to more recent trends, the prices of en-
mated systems used to control indus-         The long term technology trends and         ergy have fallen dramatically in the last
trial processes such as manufacturing,       their implications for security—es-         year. From June 2014 to June 2015,
product handling, production and dis-        pecially cyber security—will require        the market price of benchmark North
tribution. Specifically, these systems       continued monitoring and decisions by       Sea Brent oil fell from $115 to $50
are used to operate motors, pumps,           NATO and NMIOTC. Overall, NMIOTC            per barrel, and looks to continue fall-
valves, signals, lighting, access con-       should monitor the development of any       ing. Some observers, such as energy
trols, and to facilitate the movement        technologies that may impact the mari-      analyst G. Allen Brooks, most observ-

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