2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain

 
2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
Department of Homeland Security
     2IÀFHRI,QVSHFWRU*HQHUDO

          FEMA’s Logistics Supply Chain
      Management System May Not Be Effective
          During a Catastrophic Disaster

OIG-14-151                          September 2014
2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                            Department of Homeland Security
                             Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

                                    SEP 22 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR:              Jeffrey J. Dorko
                             Assistant Administrator for Logistics
                             Federal Emergency Management Agency

                             Gary Carter
                             Executive Director
                             Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management

FROM:                        Anne L. Richards
                             Assistant Inspector General for Audits

SUBJECT:                     FEMA’s Logistics Supply Chain Management System May
                             Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster

Attached for your action is our final report, FEMA’s Logistics Supply Chain Management
System May Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster. We incorporated the
formal comments from the FEMA’s Logistics Management Directorate and DHS’ Office
of Program Accountability and Risk Management in the final report.

The report contains 11 recommendations aimed at improving the FEMA Logistics Supply
Chain Management System. Your offices concurred with all recommendations. We
consider recommendation #11 resolved and closed. The OIG considers
recommendations #3, #4, and #6 unresolved and open. As prescribed by the
Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for Office
of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this
memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1)
agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date
for the recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other
supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the status of the
recommendation. Until we receive and evaluate your response, we will consider the
recommendation unresolved and open.

Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider
recommendations #1, #2, #5, and #7 through #10 resolved and open. Once your office
has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to
us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The request should be
accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions.
2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                Department of Homeland Security

   Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to
   OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

   Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide
   copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and
   appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post
   the report on our website for public dissemination.

   Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact John E. McCoy II, Deputy
   Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100.

   Attachment

www.oig.dhs.gov                               2                                      OIG-14-151
2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                               Department of Homeland Security
                                          
   TableofContents
   
   ExecutiveSummary.............................................................................................................1
   
   Background.........................................................................................................................2
   
   ResultsofAudit...................................................................................................................4
   
          ManagementandOversightoftheLSCMSAcquisition..........................................4
          
          OtherObservations.................................................................................................9
          
          Recommendations...............................................................................................12
          
          ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis.........................................................13
          
   Appendixes
   
              AppendixA:          Objectives,Scope,andMethodology...........................................20
              AppendixB:          ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport..............................22
              AppendixC          FEMASourcingMatrixforEmergencyDeclarations.....................27
              AppendixD:          FEMAPartnerCapabilities............................................................28
              AppendixE:          FYs2011to2014DisasterResourceSupportComparison..........30
              AppendixF:          FEMADisasterSupplyChainPriortoLSCMS...............................31
              AppendixG:          FEMAPlanned2011LSCMSSystemsandInterfaces....................32
              AppendixH:          TimelineofKeyLSCMSAcquisitionEvents...................................33
              AppendixI:          MajorContributorstoThisReport...............................................34
              AppendixJ:          ReportDistribution.......................................................................35
   
   Abbreviations
   
              DHS                  DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
              DLA                  DefenseLogisticsAgency
              FEMA                 FederalEmergencyManagementAgency
              FY                   fiscalyear
              IV&V                 independentvalidationandverification
              LSCMS                LogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystem
              NRF                 NationalResponseFramework
              OIG                 OfficeofInspectorGeneral
              

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                                                                               OIGͲ14Ͳ151
2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                              Department of Homeland Security
                          
ExecutiveSummary

WeauditedtheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency’s(FEMA)LogisticsSupply
ChainManagementSystemprogram.AccordingtoFEMA,theLogisticsSupplyChain
ManagementSystemreplaceditsearlierlogisticsoperationssystemstoautomateand
trackdistributionbetteranddeliveremergencysuppliesmoredependably.FEMAalso
intendedforthesystemtohelptracksuppliesprovidedbypartnersinotherFederal
agencies;nongovernmentalorganizations;state,local,andtribalgovernments;andthe
privatesector.OurauditobjectivewastodeterminewhetherFEMA’sLogisticsSupply
ChainManagementSystemisabletosupportFederallogisticsoperationseffectivelyin
theeventofacatastrophicdisaster.

Afterspendingabout$247millionover9years,FEMAcannotbecertainthatitssupply
chainmanagementsystemwillbeeffectiveduringacatastrophicdisaster.FEMA
estimatedthatthelifecyclecostofthesystemwouldbeabout$556million—$231
millionmorethantheoriginallifecyclecostestimate.AccordingtoFEMA,theLogistics
SupplyChainManagementSystembecamefullyoperationalinJanuary2013,whichwas
about19monthsbehindschedule.However,thesystemcouldnotperformasoriginally
planned.Specifically,itcannotinterfacewiththelogisticsmanagementsystemsof
FEMA’spartners,nordoesFEMAhaverealͲtimevisibilityoverallsuppliesshippedbyits
partners.AsofMarch2014,theLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystemstillhadnot
achievedfulloperationalcapability.Weattributethesedeficienciestoinadequate
programmanagementandoversightbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)
andFEMA.Asaresult,FEMAmaynotbeabletoefficientlyandeffectivelyaidsurvivors
ofcatastrophicdisaster.

WemadethreeadditionalobservationsrelatedtotheLogisticsSupplyChain
ManagementSystem.FEMAmaynothavetheappropriatenumberoftrainedand
proficientstafftooperatethesystemduringadisaster.Inaddition,FEMAhasnot
publishedsystemoperatingproceduresorguidanceonusingotherprocessesshouldthe
LogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystemnotbeavailable.Finally,theprogramoffice
responsiblefortheLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSysteminaccuratelyreportedat
leastthreeprogramperformancemeasurestotheOfficeofManagementandBudget.

Wemade11recommendationstoaddressthesedeficienciesandobservationsand
improvetheeffectivenessoftheLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystemprogram.
DHSandFEMAconcurredwithallrecommendations.
                              

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2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                     Department of Homeland Security
                                               
Background

FEMAsupportstheAmericanpeopleandfirstresponderstoensurethatwework
togethertobuild,sustain,andimproveourcapabilitytopreparefor,protectagainst,
respondto,recoverfrom,andmitigateallhazards.

TheDHSNationalResponseFramework,SecondEdition(NRF)ofMay2013guidesthe
Nation’sresponsetoalltypesofdisastersandemergencies.AnannextotheNRF,
EmergencySupportFunction#7–Logistics,describescentralizedmanagementofsupply
chainfunctionstosupportlocal,state,tribal,territorial,insulararea,andFederal
governmentsforanactualorpotentialincident.1FEMAandtheGeneralServices
Administrationaretheprimarycoordinatingagenciesforthefunctionsidentifiedin
EmergencySupportFunction#7.

AccordingtoitsAllHazardsConceptofSupportPlan,FEMAintendstoprovidesupplies
tosupport1.75milliondisastersurvivorsfor3days.FEMAhasdistributioncenters
stockedwithinitialresponsesuppliesandcommonlyusedshelteritems.However,
FEMAreliesoncontractedvendorsanditsFederalpartnerstoprovidethequantityof
suppliesneededtomeettherequirementsin               ItemsProvidedbyDLADuringThe
itsAllHazardsConceptofSupportPlan.Other                HurricaneSandyResponse,
Federalagenciesprovidesuppliesduringa                       asofNovember2012
responsetoadisaster,includingtheGeneral                                 
                                                         x Meals:6.2million
ServicesAdministration,DefenseLogistics
                                                         x Palletsofwater:48
Agency(DLA),andU.S.ArmyCorpsof                    x Blankets:172,500
Engineers.AccordingtoFEMA,upto75                  x Cots:4,000
percentofalldisastershipmentsarefromits          x Generators:51
vendorsorFederalagencypartners.For
                                                     Source:DHSOIGanalysisofDLAdata
example,contractedvendorsandFederal
agencypartnersprovidedmorethan60percentofsuppliesduringtheHurricaneSandy
response,includinggasoline,food,water,cots,blankets,andgeneratorsprovidedby
DLA.

SeeappendixCforsourcesofinitialresponsesuppliesduringemergencydeclarations
andappendixDforFEMA’spartners’capabilities.ThechartsinappendixEshow
suppliesprovidedbyFEMA’spartnersfordisastersoverthelast3years.

FollowingtheFederalGovernment’sresponsetoHurricaneKatrina,theadministration
andtheUnitedStatesSenatereportedthatFEMAwasnotabletoprovidethelogistics


1
 TheNRF’sEmergencySupportFunctionannexesdescribetheFederalcoordinatingstructuresthatgroupresources
andcapabilitiesintofunctionalareasmostfrequentlyneededinanationalresponse.

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2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                     Department of Homeland Security
                            
supporttorespondeffectivelytoamajordisaster.2AccordingtotheSenate’sSpecial
ReportoftheCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs,FEMAcould
nottracksuppliesenroutetodestinations.ToimproveFEMA’sdisasterresponse,both
reports’recommendationsincludeddevelopingalogisticsmanagementsystemand
trackingthemovementofsupplies.TitleVISection636ofthePostͲKatrinaEmergency
ManagementReformActof2006(PublicLaw109Ͳ295)requiresFEMAto“developan
efficient,transparent,andflexiblelogisticssystemforprocurementanddeliveryof
goodsandservicesnecessaryforaneffectiveandtimelyresponsetonaturaldisasters,
actsofterrorism,andothermanͲmadedisastersandforrealͲtimevisibilityofitemsat
eachpointthroughoutthelogisticssystem.”

In2005,FEMAbegantoimplementitsLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystem
(LSCMS).3LSCMSisbasedoncommercial,offͲtheͲshelfsupplychainmanagement
softwareandisaccessedviatheFEMAintranetoraninternetconnection.Accordingto
FEMA,theLSCMSreplaceditsearlierlogisticsoperationssystemstoautomateandtrack
distributionbetteranddeliveremergencysuppliesmoredependably.FEMAplanned
thatLSCMSwouldautomateitsinternalprocessesandbeintegratedwithitspartners’
systemstoreplacemanualprocessesforordering,tracking,anddelivery.FEMAalso
intendedforthesystemtohelptracksuppliesprovidedbyotherFederalagency
partners;nongovernmentalorganizations;state,local,andtribalgovernments;andthe
privatesector.AppendixFcontainsinformationonFEMA’spreͲLSCMSdisastersupply
chainmanualprocesses;appendixGcontainsinformationonFEMA’s2011planned
LSCMSsystemsandinterfaces.

InFEMA'sLogisticsManagementProcessforRespondingtoCatastrophicDisasters,(OIGͲ
10Ͳ101,July2010),wereportedissueswithFEMA’searlierlogisticsmanagement
system.Atthattime,wedeterminedthattheremightnotbesufficientqualitycontrols
toevaluatewhetherFEMAwasdevelopingthesystemaccordingtospecifications,and
whetherthesystemwoulddeliverwhatthecomponentneeded.

TheOfficeofLogisticsSystems(LSCMSprogramoffice)inFEMA’sLogisticsManagement
Directorateisresponsibleformanagement,maintenance,andexpansionofFEMA’s
supplychaintechnology,includingtheacquisitionofLSCMS.DHS’acquisitionpolicy
categorizedFEMA’sLSCMSasalevel2acquisition.Level2acquisitionsarethosewith
lifecyclecostsofmorethan$300millionandlessthan$1billion.Forlevel2
acquisitions,priortocontinuingtothenextphase,acquisitionmanagersarerequiredto
presentplanningdocuments,suchasanalternativesanalysis,aprogrambaseline,and

2
  TheWhiteHouse,TheFederalResponsetoHurricaneKatrina,LessonsLearned,February2006;UnitedStatesSenate,
SpecialReportoftheCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs,HurricaneKatrina:ANationStill
Unprepared,S.Rept.109Ͳ322,2006
3
  TheLSCMSprogramwasknownastheTotalAssetVisibilityprogram,butinreferringtoFEMA’sacquisitionofa
logisticssupplychainmanagementsysteminthisreport,wewilluseLSCMS.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                  3                                   OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                           
operationalrequirements,toanAcquisitionReviewBoardandAcquisitionDecision
Authority.TheDHSUnderSecretaryforManagementhadAcquisitionDecisionAuthority
fortheLSCMSprogramuntilJuly2011,whenatFEMA’srequest,authoritywas
delegatedtotheFEMAComponentAcquisitionExecutive.UpontheFEMAComponent
AcquisitionExecutive’sretirementinMarch2012,authorityrevertedtoDHS,whereit
remains.AppendixHshowsatimelineofkeyLSCMSacquisitionevents.

ResultsofAudit

Afterspendingabout$247millionover9years,FEMAcannotbecertainthatitssupply
chainmanagementsystemwillbeeffectiveduringacatastrophicdisaster.FEMA
estimatedthatthelifecyclecostofthesystemwouldbeabout$556million—$231
millionmorethantheoriginallifecyclecostestimate.AccordingtoFEMA,theLSCMS
becamefullyoperationalinJanuary2013,whichwasabout19monthsbehindschedule.
However,thesystemcouldnotperformasoriginallyplanned.Specifically,itcannot
interfacewiththelogisticsmanagementsystemsofFEMA’spartners,nordoesFEMA
haverealͲtimevisibilityoverallsuppliesshippedbyitspartners.AsofMarch2014,the
LSCMSstillhadnotachievedfulloperationalcapability.Weattributethesedeficiencies
toinadequateprogrammanagementandoversightbyDHSandFEMA.Asaresult,FEMA
maynotbeabletoefficientlyandeffectivelyaidsurvivorsofcatastrophicdisaster.

WemadethreeadditionalobservationsrelatedtotheLSCMS.FEMAmaynothavethe
appropriatenumberoftrainedandproficientstafftooperatethesystemduringa
disaster.Inaddition,FEMAhasnotpublishedsystemoperatingproceduresorguidance
onusingotherprocessesshouldLSCMSnotbeavailable.Finally,theprogramoffice
responsiblefortheLSCMSinaccuratelyreportedatleastthreeprogramperformance
measurestotheOfficeofManagementandBudget.

        ManagementandOversightoftheLSCMSAcquisition
        
        AsofMarch2014,LSCMSwasnotperformingasoriginallyplanned.Morethan
        twoandahalfyearsafterFEMAplanneditwouldbefullyoperational,LSCMS
        hasnotyetmetallmissionͲcriticalperformancerequirements.Thelifecyclecost
        estimateforLSCMShasalsoincreasedby$231millionmorethantheoriginal
        2009estimate.Weattributedeficienciesintheschedule,performance,andcost
        ofLSCMStoDHS,FEMA,andtheLSMCSprogramoffice’sinadequate
        managementandoversightoftheLSCMSacquisition.Inaddition,FEMAreliedon
        contractorstoperformkeyfunctionsoftheLSCMSprogramanddidnotproperly
        testandverifythesystem.Asaresult,FEMAmayhaveexpendedtimeand
        moneytoacquireasystemthatmaynotmeetitslogisticsmanagementneeds
        

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                             Department of Homeland Security
                           
       and,duringdisasterrecovery,maylimititsabilitytodeliverthecorrect
       quantitiesofemergencysuppliestotherightlocationsattherighttime.
       
       Cost,Schedule,andPerformance
       
       In2013,FEMAestimatedthatthelifecyclecostforLSCMSwouldbeabout$556
       millionor$231millionmorethanthe$325millioncostestimateinthe2009
       LSCMSAcquisitionProgramBaseline.FEMAattributedthecostincreasetoan
       extensioninthelifetimeoftheinvestmentfromfiscalyear(FY)2018toFY2024.
       Programofficeofficialsalsoindicatedthattheydidnotbasetheplannedlife
       cyclecostsreportedintheLSCMSAcquisitionProgramBaselineonvalidcost
       estimatesoradjusttheestimatedcostsforriskandconfidencelevel.The
       programofficedidnotfollowDHSguidanceforreportingincreasesinthe
       program’slifecyclecosttothecomponentacquisitionexecutiveandtheDHS
       AcquisitionDecisionAuthorityforreviewandapproval.
       
       AccordingtotheLSCMSAcquisitionProgramBaseline,thesystemwouldreach
       fulloperationalcapabilitybyJune2011.InJanuary2013,FEMAreportedthat
       LSCMSwasfullyoperational,whichwasabout19monthsbehindschedule.
       However,aFEMAofficialsaidthatthesystemhadnotyetmettherequirements
       establishedintheOperationalRequirementsDocument.AsofMarch2014,
       LSCMSstillwasnotperformingasFEMAhadoriginallyplanned,whichisabout
       2yearsand8monthsbehinditsscheduledfulloperationalcapability.
       
       PriortoLSCMS,FEMAreliedonmanualprocesses,suchasspreadsheets,to
       managethedisasterlogisticssupplychain.Thesemanualprocesseshindered
       FEMA’sabilitytoviewinrealtime,track,andmonitorsuppliesthatwerein
       transit.ThelackofrealͲtimevisibilitymadeitdifficulttopredictthearrivalof
       supplyshipments,planfordistributiontothoseaffectedbydisasters,anddivert
       suppliestomeetchangingdemands.AccordingtoFEMA,LSCMSautomatesand
       tracksdistributionsbetterthanitspreviouslogisticsoperationssystemsandhas
       moredependabledeliverymechanismsforemergencysupplies.
       
       However,LSCMSdoesnotinterfacewiththelogisticsmanagementsystemsof
       FEMA’spartners,nordoesFEMAhaverealͲtimevisibilityintothetransitofall
       suppliesshippedbyitspartners.FEMAcontinuestorelyonmanualprocessesfor
       informationonshipmentsofsuppliesbyitspartners.FEMAofficialssaidthat
       fullyintegratingLSCMSwithitsexternalpartners’logisticssystemsisnotcost
       effectivebecauseFEMAwouldhavetopayforchangestoitspartners’systems.
       AccordingtoFEMA,becauseitdoesnothaverealͲtimevisibility,itisconducting
       amarketstudytodeterminepartnershipmenttrackingrequirementsandthe
       mostcostͲeffectivewaytomeettherequirement.Giventhelargepercentageof

www.oig.dhs.gov                             5                                   OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                           
       suppliesthatFEMA’spartnerscontributetodisasterrelief,nothavingan
       integratedlogisticssystemortheabilitytotrackpartners’supplyshipmentsin
       realtimecouldlimitFEMA’sabilitytorespondtodisasterseffectively.
       
       AcquisitionRequirements
       
       FEMAandDHSdidnotprovidethenecessaryoversightandenforceacquisition
       policiestoensurethattheLSCMSprogramofficemanagedtheacquisitionofthe
       systemeffectively.Althoughbothentitiesperiodicallyreviewedthestatusofthe
       LSCMSacquisition,neitherensuredthattheLSCMSprogramofficeidentifiedall
       missionneedsbeforeselectingitsalternativetoaddressthelogisticscapability
       gap,andneitherenforcedcompliancewithacquisitionrequirements.
       
       LSCMSisalevel2acquisition(withalifecyclecostofmorethan$300million,
       butlessthan$1billion).Assuch,beforecontinuingtothenextphase,LSCMS
       acquisitionmanagerswererequiredtopresentplanningdocuments,suchasan
       alternativesanalysis,anAcquisitionProgramBaseline,andanOperational
       RequirementsDocument,toanAcquisitionReviewBoardandanAcquisition
       DecisionAuthority.
       
       Between2009and2011,DHSandFEMAeachheldatleasttwoAcquisition
       ReviewBoardmeetingsfortheLSCMSacquisition.DHSandFEMAdidnotensure
       thattheLSCMSprogramofficecompliedwithacquisitionguidanceby
       completingarequiredalternativesanalysistodeterminehowbesttoclosethe
       gapinFEMA’slogisticscapability.Instead,FEMAreliedonanOctober2007
       assessmentforexistinglogisticssystems.InMay2009,althoughtheLSCMS
       programofficedidnotcompletethealternativesanalysis,DHSallowedthe
       acquisitiontoproceed.
       
       Additionally,DHSidentifiedactionitemsFEMAneededtocomplete,suchas
       updatingprogramdocumentation,aswellasdeadlinesforcompletion.DHSheld
       FEMAandtheLSCMSprogramofficeresponsibleforcompletingtheaction
       items,butdidnotenforceFEMA’scompliance.FEMAalsodidnotensurethe
       LSCMSprogramofficecomplied.
       
       Furthermore,in2011,DHSnotedinanAcquisitionDecisionMemorandumthat
       theLSCMSprogramofficedidnothaveupdatedandapproveddocumentation.
       Specifically,accordingtothememorandum:
       
               TheLSCMSprogramdoesnothaveaDHSapproved[Operational
               RequirementsDocument,IntegratedLogisticsSupportPlan,Systems
               EngineeringLifeCycle,TailoringPlan,orAcquisitionProgramBaseline].

www.oig.dhs.gov                            6                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                     Department of Homeland Security
                                
                     Thestatusoftheacquisitiondocumentationwasalsodiscussedatthe
                     prior2009[AcquisitionReviewBoard]andtheprogramofficewasasked
                     toupdatethedocumentsandresubmitforapproval.
                     
             TheLSCMSacquisitioncontinuedtomoveforward,eventhough,accordingto
             theLSCMSprogramoffice,whenFEMAbecametheAcquisitionDecision
             Authorityin2011,theprogramofficeendeditseffortstocorrectandobtain
             approvalofacquisitiondocumentation.
             
             Duringtheacquisitionprocess,theLSCMSprogramofficedidnotformallyreport
             LSCMSprogramcost,schedule,orperformancedeficienciestooversight
             authoritiesasrequired.AccordingtotheDHSInstructionManual102Ͳ01Ͳ001
             AcquisitionManagementInstruction/Guidebook,programmanagersmust
             notifythecomponentacquisitionexecutiveandtheDHSAcquisitionDecision
             Authorityviamemorandum,whenaprogramdoesnotmeetcost,schedule,or
             performancethresholdsintheAcquisitionProgramBaseline.Programmanagers
             arealsorequiredtodeveloparemediationplantocorrectthecost,schedule,or
             performancedeficiencies,forreviewandapprovalbytheAcquisitionDecision
             Authority.Becausetheprogramofficedidnotreportprogrambreachesas
             required,theAcquisitionDecisionAuthority’sabilitytooverseetheprogramwas
             impaired.
             
             LSCMSProgramOfficeStaffing
             
             FEMAdidnotensurethattheLSCMSprogramofficehadasufficientnumberof
             experiencedFederalstafftooverseeLSCMSandreliedoncontractorsforkey
             servicessuchasacquisitionsandprogrammanagement.Byrelyingon
             contractors,theprogramofficeriskedlossofcontrolforprogramdecisions.
             
             AccordingtoOfficeofManagementandBudget(OfficeofFederalProcurement
             Policy)guidance,whencontractingforspecializedortechnicalservices,agencies
             shouldensurethereareasufficientnumberoftrainedandexperienced
             governmentofficialstomanageandoverseecontractadministration.4A2007
             GovernmentAccountabilityOfficereport,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity;
             RiskAssessmentandEnhancedOversightNeededToManageRelianceon
             Contractors,identifiedtheuseofcontractorsforservicessuchasacquisition,
             policydevelopment,reorganization,andplanning,ashighrisk.5


4
  OfficeofManagementandBudget,OfficeofFederalProcurementPolicy,PolicyLetterNo.93Ͳ1
(Reissued):ManagementOversightofServiceContracting,May18,1994
5
  GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,DepartmentOfHomelandSecurity:RiskAssessmentandEnhanced
OversightNeededtoManageRelianceonContractors,October17,2007,GAOͲ08Ͳ142T

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                                 Department of Homeland Security
                            
       FEMAreliedoncontractorsanddidnotprovidetheLSCMSprogramofficewitha
       sufficientnumberofFederalstafftomanageandoverseeitscontractors.
       Between2007and2011,FEMAmainlystaffeditsLSCMSprogramofficewithone
       FederalGovernmentprogrammanager.Accordingtoa2010programoffice
       briefing,limitedFederalstaffaffectedprogramoversightinareasincluding
       budget,acquisition,andcontractoroversight.AlthoughFEMAbeganhiringsome
       Federalstaffinlate2011,theprogramofficedidnottransitioncontractorduties
       toitsFederalstaffuntilmidͲ2012.Table1showsLSCMSprogrammanagement
       tasksconductedbycontractorstaff.
       
       Table1:ProgramManagementTasksConductedbyContractorStaff
         ContractorProgramManagementTasksTransitionedtoFederalStaff
         ProjectManagement                       RiskManagement
         Budget                                   StaffAssistance
         Acquisitions                             TrainingManagement
         Contracts                                Communications
         Requirements                            StakeholderManagement
         BusinessProcesses                       IntegratedMasterSchedule
         FinancialManagement                     SystemsEngineeringLifeCycleManagement
         PerformanceManagement                   TestingManagement
       Source:DHSOfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)analysisofFEMAinformation
       
       TestingandVerificationofLSCMS
       
       FEMAdidnotfullytestLSCMStoverifyitmetrequiredcapabilities,norwerethe
       LSCMSoperationaltestandevaluationsbasedonapproveddocumentation.By
       notmeetingtheserequirements,FEMAincreasestheriskitwillnotbeableto
       respondeffectivelytocatastrophicdisasters.
       
       Entitiesperformindependentvalidationandverification(IV&V)testsof
       informationtechnologysystemstoensurethatthesystemmeetsuserneedsand
       fulfillstheintendedpurpose.DHSdoesnotmandateIV&Vtests,butconsiders
       themabestpractice.
                 
       FEMA’sQualityAssuranceTestingManagementTeamconductedthreeLSCMS
       IV&Vtests.Theteam’sFebruary2013reportindicatedthatLSCMSshould
       undergocomprehensivetesting.Withoutthetesting,thereissignificantriskto
       FEMA’slogisticsmission.Specifically,accordingtothetestteam:
                        

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                              Department of Homeland Security
                           
               TheLSCMSsystemisa[commercial,offͲtheͲshelf]productthat
               hasundergonenumerousconfigurationchangestoallowthis
               softwarepackagetomeettheprogramoffice’srequirementsand
               toallowthissystemtofunctioncorrectlyintheDHS/FEMA
               productionenvironment.[Thetestteam]findsthetestingof
               LSCMStobeinadequate,therebyintroducingsignificantriskto
               thelogisticsmission.
       
       However,FEMAofficialsdidnotconductacomprehensiveIV&VtestofLSCMS’
       abilitytomeetkeyperformancerequirements.Asaresult,LSCMSmaynotmeet
       criticalperformancerequirementsnecessaryforFEMAtorespondeffectively
       duringacatastrophicdisaster.
       
       TheLSCMSprogramofficebasedsystemtestingonunapproved,improperly
       definedrequirements,whichwillreportedlycontinuetochangebecauseofgaps
       inthesystem’scapabilities.InOctober2012,FEMAselectedtheDefense
       InformationSystemsAgencytotestandevaluateLSCMS’potentialtosatisfythe
       documentedoperationalrequirements.Theagency’sNovember2013interim
       reportindicatedthatFEMAprovideddraftLSCMSprogramdocumentationfor
       testpurposes.AccordingtotheDefenseInformationSystemsAgency,theLSCMS
       programofficeprovidedthreedifferentdraftversionsofitsOperational
       RequirementsDocument.InFebruary2014,theLSCMSprogramofficereported
       itplannedtochangeLSCMS’operationalrequirementsbecausethesystemwill
       nevermeetsomerequirementsasoriginallywritten.Forinstance,thesystem
       willreportedlyneverprovidetheoriginallevelofvisibilityoversupplyshipments.
       
       OtherObservations
       
       Theprogramofficealsodidnotadequatelyplanandmanageotherkeyaspects
       oftheLSCMSprogram.Specifically,FEMAmaynothavetheappropriatenumber
       oftrainedandproficientstafftooperatethesystemduringadisaster.FEMAalso
       hasnotpublishedsystemoperatingproceduresorguidanceonusingother
       processesshouldLSCMSnotbeavailable.Asaresult,FEMAmaybeimpairedin
       itsabilitytoefficientlyandeffectivelyaidsurvivorsofcatastrophicdisasters.
         
       LSCMSLogisticsSpecialistStaffingandTraining
       
       Atthetimeofouraudit,FEMAhadfilledslightlylessthanathirdofthe
       authorizedpositionsforlogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogisticssystems
       managers(logisticsspecialists).Additionally,theLSCMSprogramofficedidnot
       haveanadequatetrainingprogram.Asaresult,FEMAmaynothaveenough

www.oig.dhs.gov                             9                                    OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                     Department of Homeland Security
                                  
             personnelwhoareproficientonLSCMSandcanoperatethesystemtorespond
             effectivelytoacatastrophicdisaster.
             
             AsofJuly2014,FEMAreportedithadfilled33of116logisticsspecialistpositions
             authorizedbyFEMA’sIncidentWorkforceManagementDivision.LSCMSprogram
             officeofficialssaidthatFEMA’sreorganizationofdisasterresponsepersonnel
             resultedinthelossofindividualspreviouslyintheLSCMSprogram,andFEMA
             hasnotsolicitednewhirestofillthosevacancies.AseniorFEMAofficial
             acknowledgedthatcurrentlogisticsspecialiststaffinglevelsarenotsufficientto
             respondtoacatastrophicevent.
             
             TheLSCMSprogramofficealsodidnothaveanadequatetrainingprogramfor
             logisticsspecialists.Accordingtotheprogramoffice,logisticsspecialistsareto
             completeaninitialLSCMSbasictrainingcourseandeightLSCMSrefresher
             courseseachyear,buttheoffice’s2009LSCMStrainingplandidnotspecify
             logisticsspecialists’trainingrequirements.Inaddition,FEMA’sQualification
             SystemandPositionTaskBooksdidnotidentifyLSCMStrainingrequirements,
             criticalbehaviors,activities,andtaskstobecomeaqualifiedlogisticsspecialist.6
             
             Becauseofinadequaterecordkeeping,theprogramofficecouldnotprovide
             completetrainingrecordsforpersonnelintheLSCMSprogram.Specifically,we
             identifiedfourlogisticsspecialistswithnorecordofhavingcompletedtheLSCMS
             basictrainingcourse;yetin2013,theyweredeployedfordisasterresponse.
                                                          
             PriortoMarch2013,theLSCMSprogramofficehadanLSCMStraining
             coordinatortoplan,direct,andcoordinatetrainingforLSCMSusers.According
             toFEMA,thetrainingcoordinatorpositionwaseliminatedduetosequestration,
             andthedutiesofthepositionarecurrentlyassignedadhoc.AMay2013internal
             programassessmentconcludedthatfullytrainingpersonnelonLSCMSisa
             challenge.
             
             LSCMSOperatingProcedures

             FEMAhasnotpublishedoperatingproceduresthatincorporateusingLSCMSfor
             logisticsdisasterresponseprocessessuchasordering,tracking,andreceiving
             supplies.FEMAalsohasnotissuedguidanceonusingalternativeprocessesfor
             logisticsshouldLSCMSnotbeavailable.SomeFEMAregionalofficestaffwe


6
 FEMA’sQualificationSystemcertifiesFEMAemployeesinincidentmanagementandincidentsupportpositions
basedonobtainingrequiredexperience,successfullycompletingrequiredtraining,anddemonstratingperformance.
APositionTaskBookcontainsthecriticalcompetencies,activities,andtasksrequiredtobecomecertifiedforan
incidentmanagementorincidentsupportposition.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                 10                                   OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                             
       interviewedexpressedconcernaboutLSCMS’lackofavailabilitywhenthereis
       limitedornointernetconnection.Accordingtostaffmembers,eithersituation
       couldoccurduringadisasterresponse,whichresultsinrevertingto
       spreadsheetsfortrackinglogisticsoperations.Withoutpublishedoperating
       proceduresforLSCMSandcontingencyplans,FEMAmaybelimitedinitsability
       torespondtodisasterseffectively.
       
       LSCMSPerformanceReporting
       
       Inadditiontotheseprogrammanagementissues,theLSCMSprogramoffice
       inaccuratelyreportedatleastthreeprogramperformancemeasurestothe
       OfficeofManagementandBudget.Programperformancereportingprovides
       transparencyintoaFederalagency’sinvestmentsininformationtechnology.In
       its2013reporting,theLSCMSprogramofficeoverstatedtwomeasuresrelated
       toitslogisticssystemstrainingprogram.Theprogramalsomisreportedresults
       for2012and2013LSCMScustomersatisfactionsurveys.FEMAreportedresults
       for2012butdidnotconductasurveythatyear,anditreportedresultsfora
       2013surveythatwasnotyetcompleted.
       
       Conclusion
       
       AfterHurricaneKatrina,CongressmandatedthatFEMAdevelopalogistics
       systemtoenableatimelyandeffectiveresponsetodisastersandrealͲtime
       visibilityovershipmentsofemergencysuppliesthroughoutthelogisticssystem.
       GiventhatFEMAdidnotproperlyplananddocumentacquisitionrequirements,
       itmaynothavechosenthebestsolutionforclosingitslogisticscapabilitygap.
       Additionally,thecurrentLSCMSmaynotevermeetcriticalperformance
       requirements,suchasintegrationwithFEMA’spartners’logisticssystemsand
       realͲtimevisibilityovershipmentsfrompartners.Finally,FEMAmaynothavethe
       numberoftrainedandproficientlogisticsspecialistsortheproceduresneeded
       tooperateLSCMS.Asaresult,thesupplychainmanagementsystemthatFEMA
       hasspentabout$247milliontoimplementoverthepast9yearsmaynotbe
       effectiveduringacatastrophicdisaster.
                            

www.oig.dhs.gov                           11                                 OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                      
       Recommendations
       
       WerecommendthattheActingAssistantAdministratorforLogistics:

       Recommendation#1:
       
       Conductacomprehensive,independentassessmentofthecurrentLSCMS
       programstatustodetermineifitmeetsthecapabilitiesnecessarytofulfill
       FEMA’scongressionalmandateandreporttheresultstoFEMAandDHS.
       
       Recommendation#2:
       
       ConductanassessmentoftheLSCMSprogramofficetoidentifyresources
       necessarytoensureeffectivemanagementandoversightoftheprogram
       including:
       
                 x programofficeorganizationalstructure;
                 x keypractices,activities,andcapabilities;
                 x numberofstaffrequiredtoadministerandmanagetheLSCMS
                     program;
                 x oversightofcontractorstaff;and
                 x performancemeasurestomonitorandimprovekeyprogram
                     managementactivities.
       
       Recommendation#3:
       
       Developandimplementinternalcontrolsforidentifyingandreportingprogram
       breaches,includingthesubmissionofcorrectiveactionplansforreviewand
       approvalbytheappropriateoversightofficials.
       
       Recommendation#4:
       
       ConductafullIV&Vtest,todeterminetheextenttowhichtheLSCMSmeetsall
       keyperformancerequirements.
       
       Recommendation#5:
       
       Developandimplementaplantodetermineanefficientandtimelymethodto
       fillthelogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogisticssystemsmanagervacancies.
                               

www.oig.dhs.gov                           12                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                            Department of Homeland Security
                          
       Recommendation#6:
       
       Designandimplementatrainingprogramtodevelop,track,andenforceLSCMS
       trainingrequirements;ensurestaffmembersmeetthosetrainingrequirements
       priortodeployment.
       
       Recommendation#7:
       
       AlignFEMA’sPositionQualificationSheetsandPositionTaskBookswithlogistics
       positionsthatuseLSCMS.
       
       Recommendation#8:
       
       DocumenttheLSCMStrainingprogramcoordinator’sactivitiestoensure
       continuityfortheprogram.
       
       Recommendation#9:
       
       DevelopandimplementoperatingguidanceforwhenLSCMSisavailableand
       unavailableduringdisasterresponses.
       
       Recommendation#10:
       
       DevelopaninternalprocesstomonitorandensureaccurateLSCMSreportingto
       theOfficeofManagementandBudget.
       
       WerecommendthattheExecutiveDirector,OfficeofProgramAccountability
       andRiskManagement:
       
       Recommendation#11:
       
       Developandimplementprocedurestoensurethatcomponentprogramoffices
       addressactionitemsidentifiedbytheDHSAcquisitionReviewBoardpriortoand
       followingdelegationofAcquisitionDecisionAuthoritytothecomponent.
       
       ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis
       
       DHSandFEMAprovidedaconsolidatedresponsetothedraftreportandacopy
       oftheirresponseinitsentiretyisincludedinappendixB.FEMAalsoprovided
       technicalcomments,whichweincorporatedasappropriate.
       

www.oig.dhs.gov                          13                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                            Department of Homeland Security
                            
       DHSandFEMAagreedwithourrecommendationsforimprovementstothe
       managementandoversightoftheFEMALSCMSacquisition.Accordingtotheir
       response,theyhavealreadytakenstepstoimprovetheLSCMSprogram,which
       includes:
       
           x doublingtheLSCMSprogramofficestaffto12governmentemployees;
           x pausingexpansionofLSCMSandrequiringFEMAtorevisitLSCMS
               programrequirementsandanalyzealternativestoaddressLSCMS
               capabilitygaps,asdirectedbyDHSActingUnderSecretaryfor
               Management’sAcquisitionDecisionMemorandum;
           x benchmarkingsupplychainmanagementinformationtechnology
               systemswiththeDLA,UnitedParcelService,andDefenseCommissary
               Agency;and
           x commissioninganindependentanalysisofalternativestoevaluateand
               addressremainingLSCMScapabilitygaps.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#1:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAconductacomprehensive,independentassessment
       ofthecurrentLSCMSprogramstatustodetermineifitmeetsthecapabilities
       necessarytofulfillFEMA’scongressionalmandateandreporttheresultsto
       FEMAandDHS.Accordingtotheirresponse,FEMAhasfundedtheHomeland
       SecuritySystemsEngineeringandDevelopmentInstitute,toconductananalysis
       ofalternativesstartinginSeptember2014.Thisindependentassessmentwilluse
       theexistingcapabilitiesinLSCMSandtheprogramrequirementstodetermine
       thegapsinthesystemcapability.Ananalysisofthealternativeswilldetermine
       howtoclosethegapsandachievetheprogramrequirements.TheLSCMS
       programofficewillarrangeforanindependentoperationaltestandevaluation
       andreporttheresultstoFEMAandDHSleadership,asappropriate.The
       estimatedcompletiondateisApril30,2015.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
       receiptofthefollowing:
       
           x theanalysisofalternativesresults;
           x theoperationaltestandevaluationresults;and
           x theFEMAandDHSdeterminationofLSCMS’suitabilitytofulfillFEMA’s
               congressionalmandate.
                              

www.oig.dhs.gov                          14                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                            
       ResponsetoRecommendation#2:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAassesstheLSCMSprogramofficetoidentify
       resourcesnecessarytoensureeffectivemanagementandoversightofthe
       program.Accordingtotheirresponse,theLSCMSprogramofficeisworkingwith
       DHS’OfficeofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagement,andFEMA'sOffice
       oftheChiefProcurementOfficertoanalyzeitsgovernmentworkforce;
       specifically,themanagement,acquisition,andtechnicalexpertiserequiredto
       administertheLSCMSprogram.Theworkforcestudyincludestheappropriate
       organizationalstructure,workforcenumbers,experience,andprofessional
       certificationstoadministeralargelogisticsandinformationtechnology
       acquisitionprogram.TheestimatedcompletiondateisDecember31,2014.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
       receiptoftheworkforcestudy.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#3:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAdevelopandimplementinternalcontrolsfor
       identifyingandreportingprogrambreaches,includingthesubmissionof
       correctiveactionplansforreviewandapprovalbytheappropriateoversight
       officials.Accordingtotheirresponse,FEMA'sActingAssistantAdministratorfor
       Logisticswillissueaninterimguidancememorandumtoupdateinternalcontrols
       andbreachproceduresfortheLSCMSprogramofficeandOfficeofManagement
       andBudgetperiodicsubmissions.Theguidancewillestablishcorrectiveaction
       plansformajorbreachesforreviewbytheInternalControlOfficerandthe
       LogisticsAssistantAdministrator.FEMAappointedtheSeniorAdvisortothe
       LogisticsAssistantAdministratorastheInternalControlsOfficer,whowillreview
       thecorrectiveactionplansmonthlyasanindependentevaluatorandreportthe
       resultstotheLogisticsAssistantAdministrator.Theestimatedcompletiondateis
       December31,2014.
       
       OIGAnalysis:AlthoughDHSandFEMAconcurredwiththerecommendation,the
       correctiveactionplandoesnotfullysatisfytheintentoftherecommendation.
       TheintentoftherecommendationwasforFEMAtodevelopandimplement
       internalcontrolstoensurethereportingofprogrambreachesandcorrective
       actionplanstotheComponentAcquisitionExecutiveandtheAcquisition
       DecisionAuthorityfortheirreviewandapproval,asrequiredbyDHSInstruction
       Manual102Ͳ01Ͳ001AcquisitionManagementInstruction/Guidebook,Appendix
       K,October1,2011.Thisrecommendationwillremainunresolvedandopenuntil
       FEMAprovidesadditionalinformationthatdemonstratesitsproposedcorrective
       actionssatisfytheintentoftherecommendation.
       

www.oig.dhs.gov                           15                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                           
       ResponsetoRecommendation#4:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAconductafullIV&Vtesttodeterminetheextentto
       whichtheLSCMSmeetsallkeyperformancerequirements.Accordingtotheir
       response,theLSCMSprogramofficewillcontractwithanOperationalTest
       Agent.TheAgentwillevaluatewhetherLSCMSmeetsoperationalrequirements,
       reporttheevaluationresults,andidentifyanyoperationalperformancegaps.
       TheevaluationwillbeginnolaterthanMay31,2015.TheLSCMSprogramoffice
       willalsoscheduleseparateIV&VtestsformajorupgradestotheLSCMSsystem
       toensurechangesarecompatiblewithLSCMSoperationsandinformation
       technologysecurity.DHSdidnotprovideanestimatedcompletiondate.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.However,thisrecommendationwillremainunresolvedand
       openpendingreceiptofatargetcompletiondateforthecorrectiveactions
       identifiedabove.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#5:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAdevelopandimplementaplantodeterminean
       efficientandtimelymethodtofillthelogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogistics
       systemsmanagervacancies.Accordingtotheirresponse,FEMApostedlogistics
       systemsspecialists’vacancyannouncementsinJuly2014.FEMA'sHumanCapital
       Officeiscreatingalistofqualifiedcandidates.TheLSCMSprogramofficewill
       furtherscreenandinterviewcandidatestofillallofthespecialistpositionsby
       December31,2014.TheLSCMSprogramofficewillissuePositionTaskBooksto
       themanagementcandidatesinNovember2014.Areviewpanelwillthen
       individuallyevaluatethemanagementcandidates.Theestimatedcompletion
       dateisDecember31,2014.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
       receiptofdocumentationconfirminglogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogistics
       systemsmanagers’vacanciesfilledbasedontheplanidentifiedabove.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#6:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAdesignandimplementatrainingprogramto
       develop,track,andenforceLSCMStrainingrequirements;andensurestaff
       membersmeetthosetrainingrequirementspriortodeployment.Accordingto
       theirresponse,aworkinggroupisrevisingthecurrentLSCMStrainingprogram
       toensureinternalcontrolstracktrainedpersonnelandenforcetraining
       requirements.TheLSCMSprogramofficebegandevelopmentofaninternal
       databasetoolinSeptember2013tocapturetrainingrequirements,completed
       training,andoverduetraining.Theprogramofficeenteredcurrentuser

www.oig.dhs.gov                           16                                   OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                            Department of Homeland Security
                           
       informationintothedatabaseinJune2014forallLSCMSusers.Theestimated
       completiondateisMarch31,2015.
       
       OIGAnalysis:AlthoughDHSandFEMAconcurredwiththerecommendation,the
       correctiveactionplandoesnotfullysatisfytheintentoftherecommendation.
       FEMA’scorrectiveactionsdidnotaddresshowitwillensurestaffmembersmeet
       thetrainingrequirementspriortodeployment.Thisrecommendationwill
       remainunresolvedandopenuntilFEMAprovidesadditionalinformationthat
       demonstratesitsproposedcorrectiveactionssatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#7:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAalignFEMA’sPositionQualificationSheetsand
       PositionTaskBookswithlogisticspositionsthatuseLSCMS.Accordingtotheir
       response,theLSCMSprogramofficeisworkingwiththeFEMAIncident
       WorkforceManagementDivisiontoidentifyallreservistpositionsthatwilluse
       LSCMS.FEMAwillthenupdateitstrainingdocumentationtoreflectexperience
       andLSCMStrainingrequirementsforeachposition.Theestimatedcompletion
       dateisNovember30,2014.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
       verificationofthealignmentbetweenthePositionQualificationSheetsand
       PositionTaskBooksforLSCMSusebylogisticspositions.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#8:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAdocumenttheLSCMStrainingprogram
       coordinator’sactivitiestoensurecontinuityfortheprogram.Accordingtotheir
       response,theLSCMSprogramofficewilldocumenttheLSCMStrainingprogram
       coordinator'sactivitiesandtrainingresultsquarterlystartinginJanuary2015.
       Furthermore,theLSCSMStrainingplan,currentlyundergoingrevisionand
       estimatedtobecompletedbyDecember31,2014,documentstheprogram
       coordinator'srequiredactivities.TheestimatedcompletiondateisApril30,
       2015.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
       receiptoftheLSCMStrainingplandocumentingLSCMStrainingcoordinator
       activities.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#9:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAdevelopandimplementoperatingguidancefor

www.oig.dhs.gov                          17                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                             Department of Homeland Security
                           
       whenLSCMSisavailableandunavailableduringdisasterresponses.Accordingto
       theirresponse,theLSCMSprogramofficewillworkwithusersandstakeholders
       toupdatetheSupplyChainStandardOperatingProceduresonhowLSCMSand
       FEMALogisticswillfulfillitsmissionwhenLSCMSisavailableorunavailable.The
       existingguidancecurrentlylacksoperatingproceduresforwhenLSCMSisnot
       available,andwasnotpreviouslyincludedintraining.Theupdatedguidancewill
       includeoperatingproceduresandwillbeincludedinformaltraining.The
       estimatedcompletiondateisAugust31,2015.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
       receiptoftheSupplyChainStandardOperatingProcedures,whichincorporates
       bothLSCMSuse,aswellasproceduresduringperiodsofLSCMSunavailability.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#10:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
       recommendationthatFEMAdevelopaninternalprocesstomonitorandensure
       accurateLSCMSreportingtotheOfficeofManagementandBudget.According
       totheirresponse,theLSCMSprogrammanageridentifiedtheSeniorAdvisorto
       theLogisticsAssistantAdministratorastheLSCMSInternalControlsOfficer.The
       InternalControlsOfficerwillperformamonthlyreviewonreportableitems,and
       willcoordinatefindingsandcorrectiveactionswiththeLSCMSprogramoffice
       andtheLogisticsAssistantAdministrator.Theestimatedcompletiondateis
       October31,2014.
       
       OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
       recommendation.FEMAshouldensurethatitsreviewprocessincorporatesa
       meanstoidentifyandvalidatereportabledata.Thisrecommendationwill
       remainresolvedandopenpendingreceiptofdocumentationconfirming
       completionofthecorrectiveactionsidentifiedabove.
       
       ResponsetoRecommendation#11:DHSconcurredwiththerecommendation
       thatitdevelopandimplementprocedurestoensurethatcomponentprogram
       officesaddressactionitemsidentifiedbytheDHSAcquisitionReviewBoardprior
       toandfollowingdelegationofAcquisitionDecisionAuthoritytothecomponent.
       AccordingtoDHS,onSeptember4,2014,theDHSExecutiveDirectorforthe
       OfficeofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagementsignedamemorandum
       implementingatrackingandreportingproceduretocaptureactionitems
       documentedintheAcquisitionReviewBoard’sacquisitiondecision
       memorandums.TheOfficeofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagement
       trackstheactionitemselectronicallyandfollowsuponthemmonthly.TheOffice
       ofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagementcomponentleadworkswith
       thecomponentacquisitionexecutivestoreviewandcloseoutactionitems,as

www.oig.dhs.gov                           18                                  OIGͲ14Ͳ151
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