2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO - Department of Homeland Security FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain
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Department of Homeland Security
2IÀFHRI,QVSHFWRU*HQHUDO
FEMA’s Logistics Supply Chain
Management System May Not Be Effective
During a Catastrophic Disaster
OIG-14-151 September 2014
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov
SEP 22 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeffrey J. Dorko
Assistant Administrator for Logistics
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Gary Carter
Executive Director
Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management
FROM: Anne L. Richards
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
SUBJECT: FEMA’s Logistics Supply Chain Management System May
Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster
Attached for your action is our final report, FEMA’s Logistics Supply Chain Management
System May Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster. We incorporated the
formal comments from the FEMA’s Logistics Management Directorate and DHS’ Office
of Program Accountability and Risk Management in the final report.
The report contains 11 recommendations aimed at improving the FEMA Logistics Supply
Chain Management System. Your offices concurred with all recommendations. We
consider recommendation #11 resolved and closed. The OIG considers
recommendations #3, #4, and #6 unresolved and open. As prescribed by the
Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for Office
of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this
memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1)
agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date
for the recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other
supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the status of the
recommendation. Until we receive and evaluate your response, we will consider the
recommendation unresolved and open.
Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider
recommendations #1, #2, #5, and #7 through #10 resolved and open. Once your office
has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to
us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The request should be
accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to
OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide
copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and
appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post
the report on our website for public dissemination.
Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact John E. McCoy II, Deputy
Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100.
Attachment
www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-14-151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
TableofContents
ExecutiveSummary.............................................................................................................1
Background.........................................................................................................................2
ResultsofAudit...................................................................................................................4
ManagementandOversightoftheLSCMSAcquisition..........................................4
OtherObservations.................................................................................................9
Recommendations...............................................................................................12
ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis.........................................................13
Appendixes
AppendixA: Objectives,Scope,andMethodology...........................................20
AppendixB: ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport..............................22
AppendixC FEMASourcingMatrixforEmergencyDeclarations.....................27
AppendixD: FEMAPartnerCapabilities............................................................28
AppendixE: FYs2011to2014DisasterResourceSupportComparison..........30
AppendixF: FEMADisasterSupplyChainPriortoLSCMS...............................31
AppendixG: FEMAPlanned2011LSCMSSystemsandInterfaces....................32
AppendixH: TimelineofKeyLSCMSAcquisitionEvents...................................33
AppendixI: MajorContributorstoThisReport...............................................34
AppendixJ: ReportDistribution.......................................................................35
Abbreviations
DHS DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
DLA DefenseLogisticsAgency
FEMA FederalEmergencyManagementAgency
FY fiscalyear
IV&V independentvalidationandverification
LSCMS LogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystem
NRF NationalResponseFramework
OIG OfficeofInspectorGeneral
www.oig.dhs.gov OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
ExecutiveSummary
WeauditedtheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency’s(FEMA)LogisticsSupply
ChainManagementSystemprogram.AccordingtoFEMA,theLogisticsSupplyChain
ManagementSystemreplaceditsearlierlogisticsoperationssystemstoautomateand
trackdistributionbetteranddeliveremergencysuppliesmoredependably.FEMAalso
intendedforthesystemtohelptracksuppliesprovidedbypartnersinotherFederal
agencies;nongovernmentalorganizations;state,local,andtribalgovernments;andthe
privatesector.OurauditobjectivewastodeterminewhetherFEMA’sLogisticsSupply
ChainManagementSystemisabletosupportFederallogisticsoperationseffectivelyin
theeventofacatastrophicdisaster.
Afterspendingabout$247millionover9years,FEMAcannotbecertainthatitssupply
chainmanagementsystemwillbeeffectiveduringacatastrophicdisaster.FEMA
estimatedthatthelifecyclecostofthesystemwouldbeabout$556million—$231
millionmorethantheoriginallifecyclecostestimate.AccordingtoFEMA,theLogistics
SupplyChainManagementSystembecamefullyoperationalinJanuary2013,whichwas
about19monthsbehindschedule.However,thesystemcouldnotperformasoriginally
planned.Specifically,itcannotinterfacewiththelogisticsmanagementsystemsof
FEMA’spartners,nordoesFEMAhaverealͲtimevisibilityoverallsuppliesshippedbyits
partners.AsofMarch2014,theLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystemstillhadnot
achievedfulloperationalcapability.Weattributethesedeficienciestoinadequate
programmanagementandoversightbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)
andFEMA.Asaresult,FEMAmaynotbeabletoefficientlyandeffectivelyaidsurvivors
ofcatastrophicdisaster.
WemadethreeadditionalobservationsrelatedtotheLogisticsSupplyChain
ManagementSystem.FEMAmaynothavetheappropriatenumberoftrainedand
proficientstafftooperatethesystemduringadisaster.Inaddition,FEMAhasnot
publishedsystemoperatingproceduresorguidanceonusingotherprocessesshouldthe
LogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystemnotbeavailable.Finally,theprogramoffice
responsiblefortheLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSysteminaccuratelyreportedat
leastthreeprogramperformancemeasurestotheOfficeofManagementandBudget.
Wemade11recommendationstoaddressthesedeficienciesandobservationsand
improvetheeffectivenessoftheLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystemprogram.
DHSandFEMAconcurredwithallrecommendations.
www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Background
FEMAsupportstheAmericanpeopleandfirstresponderstoensurethatwework
togethertobuild,sustain,andimproveourcapabilitytopreparefor,protectagainst,
respondto,recoverfrom,andmitigateallhazards.
TheDHSNationalResponseFramework,SecondEdition(NRF)ofMay2013guidesthe
Nation’sresponsetoalltypesofdisastersandemergencies.AnannextotheNRF,
EmergencySupportFunction#7–Logistics,describescentralizedmanagementofsupply
chainfunctionstosupportlocal,state,tribal,territorial,insulararea,andFederal
governmentsforanactualorpotentialincident.1FEMAandtheGeneralServices
Administrationaretheprimarycoordinatingagenciesforthefunctionsidentifiedin
EmergencySupportFunction#7.
AccordingtoitsAllHazardsConceptofSupportPlan,FEMAintendstoprovidesupplies
tosupport1.75milliondisastersurvivorsfor3days.FEMAhasdistributioncenters
stockedwithinitialresponsesuppliesandcommonlyusedshelteritems.However,
FEMAreliesoncontractedvendorsanditsFederalpartnerstoprovidethequantityof
suppliesneededtomeettherequirementsin ItemsProvidedbyDLADuringThe
itsAllHazardsConceptofSupportPlan.Other HurricaneSandyResponse,
Federalagenciesprovidesuppliesduringa asofNovember2012
responsetoadisaster,includingtheGeneral
x Meals:6.2million
ServicesAdministration,DefenseLogistics
x Palletsofwater:48
Agency(DLA),andU.S.ArmyCorpsof x Blankets:172,500
Engineers.AccordingtoFEMA,upto75 x Cots:4,000
percentofalldisastershipmentsarefromits x Generators:51
vendorsorFederalagencypartners.For
Source:DHSOIGanalysisofDLAdata
example,contractedvendorsandFederal
agencypartnersprovidedmorethan60percentofsuppliesduringtheHurricaneSandy
response,includinggasoline,food,water,cots,blankets,andgeneratorsprovidedby
DLA.
SeeappendixCforsourcesofinitialresponsesuppliesduringemergencydeclarations
andappendixDforFEMA’spartners’capabilities.ThechartsinappendixEshow
suppliesprovidedbyFEMA’spartnersfordisastersoverthelast3years.
FollowingtheFederalGovernment’sresponsetoHurricaneKatrina,theadministration
andtheUnitedStatesSenatereportedthatFEMAwasnotabletoprovidethelogistics
1
TheNRF’sEmergencySupportFunctionannexesdescribetheFederalcoordinatingstructuresthatgroupresources
andcapabilitiesintofunctionalareasmostfrequentlyneededinanationalresponse.
www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIGͲ14Ͳ151
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
supporttorespondeffectivelytoamajordisaster.2AccordingtotheSenate’sSpecial
ReportoftheCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs,FEMAcould
nottracksuppliesenroutetodestinations.ToimproveFEMA’sdisasterresponse,both
reports’recommendationsincludeddevelopingalogisticsmanagementsystemand
trackingthemovementofsupplies.TitleVISection636ofthePostͲKatrinaEmergency
ManagementReformActof2006(PublicLaw109Ͳ295)requiresFEMAto“developan
efficient,transparent,andflexiblelogisticssystemforprocurementanddeliveryof
goodsandservicesnecessaryforaneffectiveandtimelyresponsetonaturaldisasters,
actsofterrorism,andothermanͲmadedisastersandforrealͲtimevisibilityofitemsat
eachpointthroughoutthelogisticssystem.”
In2005,FEMAbegantoimplementitsLogisticsSupplyChainManagementSystem
(LSCMS).3LSCMSisbasedoncommercial,offͲtheͲshelfsupplychainmanagement
softwareandisaccessedviatheFEMAintranetoraninternetconnection.Accordingto
FEMA,theLSCMSreplaceditsearlierlogisticsoperationssystemstoautomateandtrack
distributionbetteranddeliveremergencysuppliesmoredependably.FEMAplanned
thatLSCMSwouldautomateitsinternalprocessesandbeintegratedwithitspartners’
systemstoreplacemanualprocessesforordering,tracking,anddelivery.FEMAalso
intendedforthesystemtohelptracksuppliesprovidedbyotherFederalagency
partners;nongovernmentalorganizations;state,local,andtribalgovernments;andthe
privatesector.AppendixFcontainsinformationonFEMA’spreͲLSCMSdisastersupply
chainmanualprocesses;appendixGcontainsinformationonFEMA’s2011planned
LSCMSsystemsandinterfaces.
InFEMA'sLogisticsManagementProcessforRespondingtoCatastrophicDisasters,(OIGͲ
10Ͳ101,July2010),wereportedissueswithFEMA’searlierlogisticsmanagement
system.Atthattime,wedeterminedthattheremightnotbesufficientqualitycontrols
toevaluatewhetherFEMAwasdevelopingthesystemaccordingtospecifications,and
whetherthesystemwoulddeliverwhatthecomponentneeded.
TheOfficeofLogisticsSystems(LSCMSprogramoffice)inFEMA’sLogisticsManagement
Directorateisresponsibleformanagement,maintenance,andexpansionofFEMA’s
supplychaintechnology,includingtheacquisitionofLSCMS.DHS’acquisitionpolicy
categorizedFEMA’sLSCMSasalevel2acquisition.Level2acquisitionsarethosewith
lifecyclecostsofmorethan$300millionandlessthan$1billion.Forlevel2
acquisitions,priortocontinuingtothenextphase,acquisitionmanagersarerequiredto
presentplanningdocuments,suchasanalternativesanalysis,aprogrambaseline,and
2
TheWhiteHouse,TheFederalResponsetoHurricaneKatrina,LessonsLearned,February2006;UnitedStatesSenate,
SpecialReportoftheCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs,HurricaneKatrina:ANationStill
Unprepared,S.Rept.109Ͳ322,2006
3
TheLSCMSprogramwasknownastheTotalAssetVisibilityprogram,butinreferringtoFEMA’sacquisitionofa
logisticssupplychainmanagementsysteminthisreport,wewilluseLSCMS.
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Department of Homeland Security
operationalrequirements,toanAcquisitionReviewBoardandAcquisitionDecision
Authority.TheDHSUnderSecretaryforManagementhadAcquisitionDecisionAuthority
fortheLSCMSprogramuntilJuly2011,whenatFEMA’srequest,authoritywas
delegatedtotheFEMAComponentAcquisitionExecutive.UpontheFEMAComponent
AcquisitionExecutive’sretirementinMarch2012,authorityrevertedtoDHS,whereit
remains.AppendixHshowsatimelineofkeyLSCMSacquisitionevents.
ResultsofAudit
Afterspendingabout$247millionover9years,FEMAcannotbecertainthatitssupply
chainmanagementsystemwillbeeffectiveduringacatastrophicdisaster.FEMA
estimatedthatthelifecyclecostofthesystemwouldbeabout$556million—$231
millionmorethantheoriginallifecyclecostestimate.AccordingtoFEMA,theLSCMS
becamefullyoperationalinJanuary2013,whichwasabout19monthsbehindschedule.
However,thesystemcouldnotperformasoriginallyplanned.Specifically,itcannot
interfacewiththelogisticsmanagementsystemsofFEMA’spartners,nordoesFEMA
haverealͲtimevisibilityoverallsuppliesshippedbyitspartners.AsofMarch2014,the
LSCMSstillhadnotachievedfulloperationalcapability.Weattributethesedeficiencies
toinadequateprogrammanagementandoversightbyDHSandFEMA.Asaresult,FEMA
maynotbeabletoefficientlyandeffectivelyaidsurvivorsofcatastrophicdisaster.
WemadethreeadditionalobservationsrelatedtotheLSCMS.FEMAmaynothavethe
appropriatenumberoftrainedandproficientstafftooperatethesystemduringa
disaster.Inaddition,FEMAhasnotpublishedsystemoperatingproceduresorguidance
onusingotherprocessesshouldLSCMSnotbeavailable.Finally,theprogramoffice
responsiblefortheLSCMSinaccuratelyreportedatleastthreeprogramperformance
measurestotheOfficeofManagementandBudget.
ManagementandOversightoftheLSCMSAcquisition
AsofMarch2014,LSCMSwasnotperformingasoriginallyplanned.Morethan
twoandahalfyearsafterFEMAplanneditwouldbefullyoperational,LSCMS
hasnotyetmetallmissionͲcriticalperformancerequirements.Thelifecyclecost
estimateforLSCMShasalsoincreasedby$231millionmorethantheoriginal
2009estimate.Weattributedeficienciesintheschedule,performance,andcost
ofLSCMStoDHS,FEMA,andtheLSMCSprogramoffice’sinadequate
managementandoversightoftheLSCMSacquisition.Inaddition,FEMAreliedon
contractorstoperformkeyfunctionsoftheLSCMSprogramanddidnotproperly
testandverifythesystem.Asaresult,FEMAmayhaveexpendedtimeand
moneytoacquireasystemthatmaynotmeetitslogisticsmanagementneeds
www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
and,duringdisasterrecovery,maylimititsabilitytodeliverthecorrect
quantitiesofemergencysuppliestotherightlocationsattherighttime.
Cost,Schedule,andPerformance
In2013,FEMAestimatedthatthelifecyclecostforLSCMSwouldbeabout$556
millionor$231millionmorethanthe$325millioncostestimateinthe2009
LSCMSAcquisitionProgramBaseline.FEMAattributedthecostincreasetoan
extensioninthelifetimeoftheinvestmentfromfiscalyear(FY)2018toFY2024.
Programofficeofficialsalsoindicatedthattheydidnotbasetheplannedlife
cyclecostsreportedintheLSCMSAcquisitionProgramBaselineonvalidcost
estimatesoradjusttheestimatedcostsforriskandconfidencelevel.The
programofficedidnotfollowDHSguidanceforreportingincreasesinthe
program’slifecyclecosttothecomponentacquisitionexecutiveandtheDHS
AcquisitionDecisionAuthorityforreviewandapproval.
AccordingtotheLSCMSAcquisitionProgramBaseline,thesystemwouldreach
fulloperationalcapabilitybyJune2011.InJanuary2013,FEMAreportedthat
LSCMSwasfullyoperational,whichwasabout19monthsbehindschedule.
However,aFEMAofficialsaidthatthesystemhadnotyetmettherequirements
establishedintheOperationalRequirementsDocument.AsofMarch2014,
LSCMSstillwasnotperformingasFEMAhadoriginallyplanned,whichisabout
2yearsand8monthsbehinditsscheduledfulloperationalcapability.
PriortoLSCMS,FEMAreliedonmanualprocesses,suchasspreadsheets,to
managethedisasterlogisticssupplychain.Thesemanualprocesseshindered
FEMA’sabilitytoviewinrealtime,track,andmonitorsuppliesthatwerein
transit.ThelackofrealͲtimevisibilitymadeitdifficulttopredictthearrivalof
supplyshipments,planfordistributiontothoseaffectedbydisasters,anddivert
suppliestomeetchangingdemands.AccordingtoFEMA,LSCMSautomatesand
tracksdistributionsbetterthanitspreviouslogisticsoperationssystemsandhas
moredependabledeliverymechanismsforemergencysupplies.
However,LSCMSdoesnotinterfacewiththelogisticsmanagementsystemsof
FEMA’spartners,nordoesFEMAhaverealͲtimevisibilityintothetransitofall
suppliesshippedbyitspartners.FEMAcontinuestorelyonmanualprocessesfor
informationonshipmentsofsuppliesbyitspartners.FEMAofficialssaidthat
fullyintegratingLSCMSwithitsexternalpartners’logisticssystemsisnotcost
effectivebecauseFEMAwouldhavetopayforchangestoitspartners’systems.
AccordingtoFEMA,becauseitdoesnothaverealͲtimevisibility,itisconducting
amarketstudytodeterminepartnershipmenttrackingrequirementsandthe
mostcostͲeffectivewaytomeettherequirement.Giventhelargepercentageof
www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
suppliesthatFEMA’spartnerscontributetodisasterrelief,nothavingan
integratedlogisticssystemortheabilitytotrackpartners’supplyshipmentsin
realtimecouldlimitFEMA’sabilitytorespondtodisasterseffectively.
AcquisitionRequirements
FEMAandDHSdidnotprovidethenecessaryoversightandenforceacquisition
policiestoensurethattheLSCMSprogramofficemanagedtheacquisitionofthe
systemeffectively.Althoughbothentitiesperiodicallyreviewedthestatusofthe
LSCMSacquisition,neitherensuredthattheLSCMSprogramofficeidentifiedall
missionneedsbeforeselectingitsalternativetoaddressthelogisticscapability
gap,andneitherenforcedcompliancewithacquisitionrequirements.
LSCMSisalevel2acquisition(withalifecyclecostofmorethan$300million,
butlessthan$1billion).Assuch,beforecontinuingtothenextphase,LSCMS
acquisitionmanagerswererequiredtopresentplanningdocuments,suchasan
alternativesanalysis,anAcquisitionProgramBaseline,andanOperational
RequirementsDocument,toanAcquisitionReviewBoardandanAcquisition
DecisionAuthority.
Between2009and2011,DHSandFEMAeachheldatleasttwoAcquisition
ReviewBoardmeetingsfortheLSCMSacquisition.DHSandFEMAdidnotensure
thattheLSCMSprogramofficecompliedwithacquisitionguidanceby
completingarequiredalternativesanalysistodeterminehowbesttoclosethe
gapinFEMA’slogisticscapability.Instead,FEMAreliedonanOctober2007
assessmentforexistinglogisticssystems.InMay2009,althoughtheLSCMS
programofficedidnotcompletethealternativesanalysis,DHSallowedthe
acquisitiontoproceed.
Additionally,DHSidentifiedactionitemsFEMAneededtocomplete,suchas
updatingprogramdocumentation,aswellasdeadlinesforcompletion.DHSheld
FEMAandtheLSCMSprogramofficeresponsibleforcompletingtheaction
items,butdidnotenforceFEMA’scompliance.FEMAalsodidnotensurethe
LSCMSprogramofficecomplied.
Furthermore,in2011,DHSnotedinanAcquisitionDecisionMemorandumthat
theLSCMSprogramofficedidnothaveupdatedandapproveddocumentation.
Specifically,accordingtothememorandum:
TheLSCMSprogramdoesnothaveaDHSapproved[Operational
RequirementsDocument,IntegratedLogisticsSupportPlan,Systems
EngineeringLifeCycle,TailoringPlan,orAcquisitionProgramBaseline].
www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Thestatusoftheacquisitiondocumentationwasalsodiscussedatthe
prior2009[AcquisitionReviewBoard]andtheprogramofficewasasked
toupdatethedocumentsandresubmitforapproval.
TheLSCMSacquisitioncontinuedtomoveforward,eventhough,accordingto
theLSCMSprogramoffice,whenFEMAbecametheAcquisitionDecision
Authorityin2011,theprogramofficeendeditseffortstocorrectandobtain
approvalofacquisitiondocumentation.
Duringtheacquisitionprocess,theLSCMSprogramofficedidnotformallyreport
LSCMSprogramcost,schedule,orperformancedeficienciestooversight
authoritiesasrequired.AccordingtotheDHSInstructionManual102Ͳ01Ͳ001
AcquisitionManagementInstruction/Guidebook,programmanagersmust
notifythecomponentacquisitionexecutiveandtheDHSAcquisitionDecision
Authorityviamemorandum,whenaprogramdoesnotmeetcost,schedule,or
performancethresholdsintheAcquisitionProgramBaseline.Programmanagers
arealsorequiredtodeveloparemediationplantocorrectthecost,schedule,or
performancedeficiencies,forreviewandapprovalbytheAcquisitionDecision
Authority.Becausetheprogramofficedidnotreportprogrambreachesas
required,theAcquisitionDecisionAuthority’sabilitytooverseetheprogramwas
impaired.
LSCMSProgramOfficeStaffing
FEMAdidnotensurethattheLSCMSprogramofficehadasufficientnumberof
experiencedFederalstafftooverseeLSCMSandreliedoncontractorsforkey
servicessuchasacquisitionsandprogrammanagement.Byrelyingon
contractors,theprogramofficeriskedlossofcontrolforprogramdecisions.
AccordingtoOfficeofManagementandBudget(OfficeofFederalProcurement
Policy)guidance,whencontractingforspecializedortechnicalservices,agencies
shouldensurethereareasufficientnumberoftrainedandexperienced
governmentofficialstomanageandoverseecontractadministration.4A2007
GovernmentAccountabilityOfficereport,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity;
RiskAssessmentandEnhancedOversightNeededToManageRelianceon
Contractors,identifiedtheuseofcontractorsforservicessuchasacquisition,
policydevelopment,reorganization,andplanning,ashighrisk.5
4
OfficeofManagementandBudget,OfficeofFederalProcurementPolicy,PolicyLetterNo.93Ͳ1
(Reissued):ManagementOversightofServiceContracting,May18,1994
5
GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,DepartmentOfHomelandSecurity:RiskAssessmentandEnhanced
OversightNeededtoManageRelianceonContractors,October17,2007,GAOͲ08Ͳ142T
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FEMAreliedoncontractorsanddidnotprovidetheLSCMSprogramofficewitha
sufficientnumberofFederalstafftomanageandoverseeitscontractors.
Between2007and2011,FEMAmainlystaffeditsLSCMSprogramofficewithone
FederalGovernmentprogrammanager.Accordingtoa2010programoffice
briefing,limitedFederalstaffaffectedprogramoversightinareasincluding
budget,acquisition,andcontractoroversight.AlthoughFEMAbeganhiringsome
Federalstaffinlate2011,theprogramofficedidnottransitioncontractorduties
toitsFederalstaffuntilmidͲ2012.Table1showsLSCMSprogrammanagement
tasksconductedbycontractorstaff.
Table1:ProgramManagementTasksConductedbyContractorStaff
ContractorProgramManagementTasksTransitionedtoFederalStaff
ProjectManagement RiskManagement
Budget StaffAssistance
Acquisitions TrainingManagement
Contracts Communications
Requirements StakeholderManagement
BusinessProcesses IntegratedMasterSchedule
FinancialManagement SystemsEngineeringLifeCycleManagement
PerformanceManagement TestingManagement
Source:DHSOfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)analysisofFEMAinformation
TestingandVerificationofLSCMS
FEMAdidnotfullytestLSCMStoverifyitmetrequiredcapabilities,norwerethe
LSCMSoperationaltestandevaluationsbasedonapproveddocumentation.By
notmeetingtheserequirements,FEMAincreasestheriskitwillnotbeableto
respondeffectivelytocatastrophicdisasters.
Entitiesperformindependentvalidationandverification(IV&V)testsof
informationtechnologysystemstoensurethatthesystemmeetsuserneedsand
fulfillstheintendedpurpose.DHSdoesnotmandateIV&Vtests,butconsiders
themabestpractice.
FEMA’sQualityAssuranceTestingManagementTeamconductedthreeLSCMS
IV&Vtests.Theteam’sFebruary2013reportindicatedthatLSCMSshould
undergocomprehensivetesting.Withoutthetesting,thereissignificantriskto
FEMA’slogisticsmission.Specifically,accordingtothetestteam:
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Department of Homeland Security
TheLSCMSsystemisa[commercial,offͲtheͲshelf]productthat
hasundergonenumerousconfigurationchangestoallowthis
softwarepackagetomeettheprogramoffice’srequirementsand
toallowthissystemtofunctioncorrectlyintheDHS/FEMA
productionenvironment.[Thetestteam]findsthetestingof
LSCMStobeinadequate,therebyintroducingsignificantriskto
thelogisticsmission.
However,FEMAofficialsdidnotconductacomprehensiveIV&VtestofLSCMS’
abilitytomeetkeyperformancerequirements.Asaresult,LSCMSmaynotmeet
criticalperformancerequirementsnecessaryforFEMAtorespondeffectively
duringacatastrophicdisaster.
TheLSCMSprogramofficebasedsystemtestingonunapproved,improperly
definedrequirements,whichwillreportedlycontinuetochangebecauseofgaps
inthesystem’scapabilities.InOctober2012,FEMAselectedtheDefense
InformationSystemsAgencytotestandevaluateLSCMS’potentialtosatisfythe
documentedoperationalrequirements.Theagency’sNovember2013interim
reportindicatedthatFEMAprovideddraftLSCMSprogramdocumentationfor
testpurposes.AccordingtotheDefenseInformationSystemsAgency,theLSCMS
programofficeprovidedthreedifferentdraftversionsofitsOperational
RequirementsDocument.InFebruary2014,theLSCMSprogramofficereported
itplannedtochangeLSCMS’operationalrequirementsbecausethesystemwill
nevermeetsomerequirementsasoriginallywritten.Forinstance,thesystem
willreportedlyneverprovidetheoriginallevelofvisibilityoversupplyshipments.
OtherObservations
Theprogramofficealsodidnotadequatelyplanandmanageotherkeyaspects
oftheLSCMSprogram.Specifically,FEMAmaynothavetheappropriatenumber
oftrainedandproficientstafftooperatethesystemduringadisaster.FEMAalso
hasnotpublishedsystemoperatingproceduresorguidanceonusingother
processesshouldLSCMSnotbeavailable.Asaresult,FEMAmaybeimpairedin
itsabilitytoefficientlyandeffectivelyaidsurvivorsofcatastrophicdisasters.
LSCMSLogisticsSpecialistStaffingandTraining
Atthetimeofouraudit,FEMAhadfilledslightlylessthanathirdofthe
authorizedpositionsforlogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogisticssystems
managers(logisticsspecialists).Additionally,theLSCMSprogramofficedidnot
haveanadequatetrainingprogram.Asaresult,FEMAmaynothaveenough
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Department of Homeland Security
personnelwhoareproficientonLSCMSandcanoperatethesystemtorespond
effectivelytoacatastrophicdisaster.
AsofJuly2014,FEMAreportedithadfilled33of116logisticsspecialistpositions
authorizedbyFEMA’sIncidentWorkforceManagementDivision.LSCMSprogram
officeofficialssaidthatFEMA’sreorganizationofdisasterresponsepersonnel
resultedinthelossofindividualspreviouslyintheLSCMSprogram,andFEMA
hasnotsolicitednewhirestofillthosevacancies.AseniorFEMAofficial
acknowledgedthatcurrentlogisticsspecialiststaffinglevelsarenotsufficientto
respondtoacatastrophicevent.
TheLSCMSprogramofficealsodidnothaveanadequatetrainingprogramfor
logisticsspecialists.Accordingtotheprogramoffice,logisticsspecialistsareto
completeaninitialLSCMSbasictrainingcourseandeightLSCMSrefresher
courseseachyear,buttheoffice’s2009LSCMStrainingplandidnotspecify
logisticsspecialists’trainingrequirements.Inaddition,FEMA’sQualification
SystemandPositionTaskBooksdidnotidentifyLSCMStrainingrequirements,
criticalbehaviors,activities,andtaskstobecomeaqualifiedlogisticsspecialist.6
Becauseofinadequaterecordkeeping,theprogramofficecouldnotprovide
completetrainingrecordsforpersonnelintheLSCMSprogram.Specifically,we
identifiedfourlogisticsspecialistswithnorecordofhavingcompletedtheLSCMS
basictrainingcourse;yetin2013,theyweredeployedfordisasterresponse.
PriortoMarch2013,theLSCMSprogramofficehadanLSCMStraining
coordinatortoplan,direct,andcoordinatetrainingforLSCMSusers.According
toFEMA,thetrainingcoordinatorpositionwaseliminatedduetosequestration,
andthedutiesofthepositionarecurrentlyassignedadhoc.AMay2013internal
programassessmentconcludedthatfullytrainingpersonnelonLSCMSisa
challenge.
LSCMSOperatingProcedures
FEMAhasnotpublishedoperatingproceduresthatincorporateusingLSCMSfor
logisticsdisasterresponseprocessessuchasordering,tracking,andreceiving
supplies.FEMAalsohasnotissuedguidanceonusingalternativeprocessesfor
logisticsshouldLSCMSnotbeavailable.SomeFEMAregionalofficestaffwe
6
FEMA’sQualificationSystemcertifiesFEMAemployeesinincidentmanagementandincidentsupportpositions
basedonobtainingrequiredexperience,successfullycompletingrequiredtraining,anddemonstratingperformance.
APositionTaskBookcontainsthecriticalcompetencies,activities,andtasksrequiredtobecomecertifiedforan
incidentmanagementorincidentsupportposition.
www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
interviewedexpressedconcernaboutLSCMS’lackofavailabilitywhenthereis
limitedornointernetconnection.Accordingtostaffmembers,eithersituation
couldoccurduringadisasterresponse,whichresultsinrevertingto
spreadsheetsfortrackinglogisticsoperations.Withoutpublishedoperating
proceduresforLSCMSandcontingencyplans,FEMAmaybelimitedinitsability
torespondtodisasterseffectively.
LSCMSPerformanceReporting
Inadditiontotheseprogrammanagementissues,theLSCMSprogramoffice
inaccuratelyreportedatleastthreeprogramperformancemeasurestothe
OfficeofManagementandBudget.Programperformancereportingprovides
transparencyintoaFederalagency’sinvestmentsininformationtechnology.In
its2013reporting,theLSCMSprogramofficeoverstatedtwomeasuresrelated
toitslogisticssystemstrainingprogram.Theprogramalsomisreportedresults
for2012and2013LSCMScustomersatisfactionsurveys.FEMAreportedresults
for2012butdidnotconductasurveythatyear,anditreportedresultsfora
2013surveythatwasnotyetcompleted.
Conclusion
AfterHurricaneKatrina,CongressmandatedthatFEMAdevelopalogistics
systemtoenableatimelyandeffectiveresponsetodisastersandrealͲtime
visibilityovershipmentsofemergencysuppliesthroughoutthelogisticssystem.
GiventhatFEMAdidnotproperlyplananddocumentacquisitionrequirements,
itmaynothavechosenthebestsolutionforclosingitslogisticscapabilitygap.
Additionally,thecurrentLSCMSmaynotevermeetcriticalperformance
requirements,suchasintegrationwithFEMA’spartners’logisticssystemsand
realͲtimevisibilityovershipmentsfrompartners.Finally,FEMAmaynothavethe
numberoftrainedandproficientlogisticsspecialistsortheproceduresneeded
tooperateLSCMS.Asaresult,thesupplychainmanagementsystemthatFEMA
hasspentabout$247milliontoimplementoverthepast9yearsmaynotbe
effectiveduringacatastrophicdisaster.
www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Recommendations
WerecommendthattheActingAssistantAdministratorforLogistics:
Recommendation#1:
Conductacomprehensive,independentassessmentofthecurrentLSCMS
programstatustodetermineifitmeetsthecapabilitiesnecessarytofulfill
FEMA’scongressionalmandateandreporttheresultstoFEMAandDHS.
Recommendation#2:
ConductanassessmentoftheLSCMSprogramofficetoidentifyresources
necessarytoensureeffectivemanagementandoversightoftheprogram
including:
x programofficeorganizationalstructure;
x keypractices,activities,andcapabilities;
x numberofstaffrequiredtoadministerandmanagetheLSCMS
program;
x oversightofcontractorstaff;and
x performancemeasurestomonitorandimprovekeyprogram
managementactivities.
Recommendation#3:
Developandimplementinternalcontrolsforidentifyingandreportingprogram
breaches,includingthesubmissionofcorrectiveactionplansforreviewand
approvalbytheappropriateoversightofficials.
Recommendation#4:
ConductafullIV&Vtest,todeterminetheextenttowhichtheLSCMSmeetsall
keyperformancerequirements.
Recommendation#5:
Developandimplementaplantodetermineanefficientandtimelymethodto
fillthelogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogisticssystemsmanagervacancies.
www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Recommendation#6:
Designandimplementatrainingprogramtodevelop,track,andenforceLSCMS
trainingrequirements;ensurestaffmembersmeetthosetrainingrequirements
priortodeployment.
Recommendation#7:
AlignFEMA’sPositionQualificationSheetsandPositionTaskBookswithlogistics
positionsthatuseLSCMS.
Recommendation#8:
DocumenttheLSCMStrainingprogramcoordinator’sactivitiestoensure
continuityfortheprogram.
Recommendation#9:
DevelopandimplementoperatingguidanceforwhenLSCMSisavailableand
unavailableduringdisasterresponses.
Recommendation#10:
DevelopaninternalprocesstomonitorandensureaccurateLSCMSreportingto
theOfficeofManagementandBudget.
WerecommendthattheExecutiveDirector,OfficeofProgramAccountability
andRiskManagement:
Recommendation#11:
Developandimplementprocedurestoensurethatcomponentprogramoffices
addressactionitemsidentifiedbytheDHSAcquisitionReviewBoardpriortoand
followingdelegationofAcquisitionDecisionAuthoritytothecomponent.
ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis
DHSandFEMAprovidedaconsolidatedresponsetothedraftreportandacopy
oftheirresponseinitsentiretyisincludedinappendixB.FEMAalsoprovided
technicalcomments,whichweincorporatedasappropriate.
www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
DHSandFEMAagreedwithourrecommendationsforimprovementstothe
managementandoversightoftheFEMALSCMSacquisition.Accordingtotheir
response,theyhavealreadytakenstepstoimprovetheLSCMSprogram,which
includes:
x doublingtheLSCMSprogramofficestaffto12governmentemployees;
x pausingexpansionofLSCMSandrequiringFEMAtorevisitLSCMS
programrequirementsandanalyzealternativestoaddressLSCMS
capabilitygaps,asdirectedbyDHSActingUnderSecretaryfor
Management’sAcquisitionDecisionMemorandum;
x benchmarkingsupplychainmanagementinformationtechnology
systemswiththeDLA,UnitedParcelService,andDefenseCommissary
Agency;and
x commissioninganindependentanalysisofalternativestoevaluateand
addressremainingLSCMScapabilitygaps.
ResponsetoRecommendation#1:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAconductacomprehensive,independentassessment
ofthecurrentLSCMSprogramstatustodetermineifitmeetsthecapabilities
necessarytofulfillFEMA’scongressionalmandateandreporttheresultsto
FEMAandDHS.Accordingtotheirresponse,FEMAhasfundedtheHomeland
SecuritySystemsEngineeringandDevelopmentInstitute,toconductananalysis
ofalternativesstartinginSeptember2014.Thisindependentassessmentwilluse
theexistingcapabilitiesinLSCMSandtheprogramrequirementstodetermine
thegapsinthesystemcapability.Ananalysisofthealternativeswilldetermine
howtoclosethegapsandachievetheprogramrequirements.TheLSCMS
programofficewillarrangeforanindependentoperationaltestandevaluation
andreporttheresultstoFEMAandDHSleadership,asappropriate.The
estimatedcompletiondateisApril30,2015.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
receiptofthefollowing:
x theanalysisofalternativesresults;
x theoperationaltestandevaluationresults;and
x theFEMAandDHSdeterminationofLSCMS’suitabilitytofulfillFEMA’s
congressionalmandate.
www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
ResponsetoRecommendation#2:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAassesstheLSCMSprogramofficetoidentify
resourcesnecessarytoensureeffectivemanagementandoversightofthe
program.Accordingtotheirresponse,theLSCMSprogramofficeisworkingwith
DHS’OfficeofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagement,andFEMA'sOffice
oftheChiefProcurementOfficertoanalyzeitsgovernmentworkforce;
specifically,themanagement,acquisition,andtechnicalexpertiserequiredto
administertheLSCMSprogram.Theworkforcestudyincludestheappropriate
organizationalstructure,workforcenumbers,experience,andprofessional
certificationstoadministeralargelogisticsandinformationtechnology
acquisitionprogram.TheestimatedcompletiondateisDecember31,2014.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
receiptoftheworkforcestudy.
ResponsetoRecommendation#3:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAdevelopandimplementinternalcontrolsfor
identifyingandreportingprogrambreaches,includingthesubmissionof
correctiveactionplansforreviewandapprovalbytheappropriateoversight
officials.Accordingtotheirresponse,FEMA'sActingAssistantAdministratorfor
Logisticswillissueaninterimguidancememorandumtoupdateinternalcontrols
andbreachproceduresfortheLSCMSprogramofficeandOfficeofManagement
andBudgetperiodicsubmissions.Theguidancewillestablishcorrectiveaction
plansformajorbreachesforreviewbytheInternalControlOfficerandthe
LogisticsAssistantAdministrator.FEMAappointedtheSeniorAdvisortothe
LogisticsAssistantAdministratorastheInternalControlsOfficer,whowillreview
thecorrectiveactionplansmonthlyasanindependentevaluatorandreportthe
resultstotheLogisticsAssistantAdministrator.Theestimatedcompletiondateis
December31,2014.
OIGAnalysis:AlthoughDHSandFEMAconcurredwiththerecommendation,the
correctiveactionplandoesnotfullysatisfytheintentoftherecommendation.
TheintentoftherecommendationwasforFEMAtodevelopandimplement
internalcontrolstoensurethereportingofprogrambreachesandcorrective
actionplanstotheComponentAcquisitionExecutiveandtheAcquisition
DecisionAuthorityfortheirreviewandapproval,asrequiredbyDHSInstruction
Manual102Ͳ01Ͳ001AcquisitionManagementInstruction/Guidebook,Appendix
K,October1,2011.Thisrecommendationwillremainunresolvedandopenuntil
FEMAprovidesadditionalinformationthatdemonstratesitsproposedcorrective
actionssatisfytheintentoftherecommendation.
www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
ResponsetoRecommendation#4:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAconductafullIV&Vtesttodeterminetheextentto
whichtheLSCMSmeetsallkeyperformancerequirements.Accordingtotheir
response,theLSCMSprogramofficewillcontractwithanOperationalTest
Agent.TheAgentwillevaluatewhetherLSCMSmeetsoperationalrequirements,
reporttheevaluationresults,andidentifyanyoperationalperformancegaps.
TheevaluationwillbeginnolaterthanMay31,2015.TheLSCMSprogramoffice
willalsoscheduleseparateIV&VtestsformajorupgradestotheLSCMSsystem
toensurechangesarecompatiblewithLSCMSoperationsandinformation
technologysecurity.DHSdidnotprovideanestimatedcompletiondate.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.However,thisrecommendationwillremainunresolvedand
openpendingreceiptofatargetcompletiondateforthecorrectiveactions
identifiedabove.
ResponsetoRecommendation#5:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAdevelopandimplementaplantodeterminean
efficientandtimelymethodtofillthelogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogistics
systemsmanagervacancies.Accordingtotheirresponse,FEMApostedlogistics
systemsspecialists’vacancyannouncementsinJuly2014.FEMA'sHumanCapital
Officeiscreatingalistofqualifiedcandidates.TheLSCMSprogramofficewill
furtherscreenandinterviewcandidatestofillallofthespecialistpositionsby
December31,2014.TheLSCMSprogramofficewillissuePositionTaskBooksto
themanagementcandidatesinNovember2014.Areviewpanelwillthen
individuallyevaluatethemanagementcandidates.Theestimatedcompletion
dateisDecember31,2014.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
receiptofdocumentationconfirminglogisticssystemsspecialistsandlogistics
systemsmanagers’vacanciesfilledbasedontheplanidentifiedabove.
ResponsetoRecommendation#6:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAdesignandimplementatrainingprogramto
develop,track,andenforceLSCMStrainingrequirements;andensurestaff
membersmeetthosetrainingrequirementspriortodeployment.Accordingto
theirresponse,aworkinggroupisrevisingthecurrentLSCMStrainingprogram
toensureinternalcontrolstracktrainedpersonnelandenforcetraining
requirements.TheLSCMSprogramofficebegandevelopmentofaninternal
databasetoolinSeptember2013tocapturetrainingrequirements,completed
training,andoverduetraining.Theprogramofficeenteredcurrentuser
www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
informationintothedatabaseinJune2014forallLSCMSusers.Theestimated
completiondateisMarch31,2015.
OIGAnalysis:AlthoughDHSandFEMAconcurredwiththerecommendation,the
correctiveactionplandoesnotfullysatisfytheintentoftherecommendation.
FEMA’scorrectiveactionsdidnotaddresshowitwillensurestaffmembersmeet
thetrainingrequirementspriortodeployment.Thisrecommendationwill
remainunresolvedandopenuntilFEMAprovidesadditionalinformationthat
demonstratesitsproposedcorrectiveactionssatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.
ResponsetoRecommendation#7:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAalignFEMA’sPositionQualificationSheetsand
PositionTaskBookswithlogisticspositionsthatuseLSCMS.Accordingtotheir
response,theLSCMSprogramofficeisworkingwiththeFEMAIncident
WorkforceManagementDivisiontoidentifyallreservistpositionsthatwilluse
LSCMS.FEMAwillthenupdateitstrainingdocumentationtoreflectexperience
andLSCMStrainingrequirementsforeachposition.Theestimatedcompletion
dateisNovember30,2014.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
verificationofthealignmentbetweenthePositionQualificationSheetsand
PositionTaskBooksforLSCMSusebylogisticspositions.
ResponsetoRecommendation#8:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAdocumenttheLSCMStrainingprogram
coordinator’sactivitiestoensurecontinuityfortheprogram.Accordingtotheir
response,theLSCMSprogramofficewilldocumenttheLSCMStrainingprogram
coordinator'sactivitiesandtrainingresultsquarterlystartinginJanuary2015.
Furthermore,theLSCSMStrainingplan,currentlyundergoingrevisionand
estimatedtobecompletedbyDecember31,2014,documentstheprogram
coordinator'srequiredactivities.TheestimatedcompletiondateisApril30,
2015.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
receiptoftheLSCMStrainingplandocumentingLSCMStrainingcoordinator
activities.
ResponsetoRecommendation#9:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAdevelopandimplementoperatingguidancefor
www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIGͲ14Ͳ151OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
whenLSCMSisavailableandunavailableduringdisasterresponses.Accordingto
theirresponse,theLSCMSprogramofficewillworkwithusersandstakeholders
toupdatetheSupplyChainStandardOperatingProceduresonhowLSCMSand
FEMALogisticswillfulfillitsmissionwhenLSCMSisavailableorunavailable.The
existingguidancecurrentlylacksoperatingproceduresforwhenLSCMSisnot
available,andwasnotpreviouslyincludedintraining.Theupdatedguidancewill
includeoperatingproceduresandwillbeincludedinformaltraining.The
estimatedcompletiondateisAugust31,2015.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.Thisrecommendationwillremainresolvedandopenpending
receiptoftheSupplyChainStandardOperatingProcedures,whichincorporates
bothLSCMSuse,aswellasproceduresduringperiodsofLSCMSunavailability.
ResponsetoRecommendation#10:DHSandFEMAconcurredwiththe
recommendationthatFEMAdevelopaninternalprocesstomonitorandensure
accurateLSCMSreportingtotheOfficeofManagementandBudget.According
totheirresponse,theLSCMSprogrammanageridentifiedtheSeniorAdvisorto
theLogisticsAssistantAdministratorastheLSCMSInternalControlsOfficer.The
InternalControlsOfficerwillperformamonthlyreviewonreportableitems,and
willcoordinatefindingsandcorrectiveactionswiththeLSCMSprogramoffice
andtheLogisticsAssistantAdministrator.Theestimatedcompletiondateis
October31,2014.
OIGAnalysis:TheactionsproposedbyDHSandFEMAsatisfytheintentofthe
recommendation.FEMAshouldensurethatitsreviewprocessincorporatesa
meanstoidentifyandvalidatereportabledata.Thisrecommendationwill
remainresolvedandopenpendingreceiptofdocumentationconfirming
completionofthecorrectiveactionsidentifiedabove.
ResponsetoRecommendation#11:DHSconcurredwiththerecommendation
thatitdevelopandimplementprocedurestoensurethatcomponentprogram
officesaddressactionitemsidentifiedbytheDHSAcquisitionReviewBoardprior
toandfollowingdelegationofAcquisitionDecisionAuthoritytothecomponent.
AccordingtoDHS,onSeptember4,2014,theDHSExecutiveDirectorforthe
OfficeofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagementsignedamemorandum
implementingatrackingandreportingproceduretocaptureactionitems
documentedintheAcquisitionReviewBoard’sacquisitiondecision
memorandums.TheOfficeofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagement
trackstheactionitemselectronicallyandfollowsuponthemmonthly.TheOffice
ofProgramAccountabilityandRiskManagementcomponentleadworkswith
thecomponentacquisitionexecutivestoreviewandcloseoutactionitems,as
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