Background of Kim Jong Un's Declaration of a East-West Grand Canal Project and Review of Possible Routes
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Background of Kim Jong Un’s
Declaration of a East-West Grand
Canal Project and Review of
Possible Routes
Hwang, Jin-Tae
2022.
2022.09.
09.30.
30.| |CO
CO22-27
22-27 (Research Fellow, North Korean Research Division)
In his speech at the 14th session of the Supreme People’s Assembly on September
8, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un first announced his plan to construct a grand
canal connecting the East and West Sea. Specifically, Kim remarked, “We need
to make scientific calculations and accurate plans for long-term economic projects,
including the construction of a grand canal linking the East and West Sea. And
once underway, we need to mobilize our national strength to ensure its success.”
It may be premature to initiate a full-fledged discussion on this project as further
details including its pathways and schedule have yet to be disclosed. However,
given the lack of in-depth analysis to satisfy the keen interest of domestic and
foreign media as well as the geopolitical and geoeconomic impact a new logistics
transportation route may have on Northeast Asia, including South Korea, it is
meaningful to undertake a reasonable assessment of North Korea’s grand canal
project. In particular, this paper will review the rationale behind Kim Jong Un’s
announcement of a grand canal project, where such an initiative came from,
potential routes for a grand canal in North Korea, and the feasibility of such a
project from a physical geography standpoint. Finally, this paper will briefly discuss
the possibility of participation of other countries and future prospects.
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Why a Grand Canal and Why Now?
In response to a series of complex crises facing North Korea, Chairman Kim Jong
Un has made the presence of crisis management capabilities and leadership felt
among North Korean citizens. In particular, the North Korean leader has garnered
much esteem based upon his declaration of the regime’s successful response to
COVID-19 at the National Emergency Quarantine Conference in August 2022 and
the enactment of a law concerning nuclear weapons in September 2022 at the
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). As such, the necessary next step for Chairman
Kim to stabilize the regime is to move beyond defensive responses to crises and
present an ambitious vision to North Koreans to proactively shape the state’s future.
As part of this vision, Chairman Kim appears to have chosen creating a grand canal,
a large-scale infrastructure construction project to connect the East and West Sea.
The construction of a large-scale canal is a policy option that has long been favored
by autocratic and authoritarian countries, including North Korea. According to
sociologist Karl Wittfogel’s concept of a hydraulic society, the construction and
management of large-scale irrigation facilities (canals, dams, etc.) require a strong
state enabling a concentration of power. Oriental despotism in ancient China is often
cited as a representative illustration of hydrosocialism. However, the close relations
between autocratic or authoritarian countries and irrigation facilities can be also
demonstrated through a variety of other examples. These include China’s
construction of the Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest hydropower plant by
capacity in modern China (completed in 2003) and a large-scale South-to-North
water transfer project (partially completed in 2013, projected to be fully completed
in 2050). Other such projects by authoritarian countries include Spain’s large-scale
water infrastructure construction under the Francoist dictatorship (1936-1973) and
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (construction started in 2011, projected to
be fully completed in 2023).
Such projects have long served to complement the weak political legitimacy of
autocratic and authoritarian countries as they projected national, ethnic, and
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development ideologies. It is still unknown exactly what the North Korean authorities
expect to gain from the construction of a grand canal. However, given the penchant
for other contemporary autocratic and authoritarian countries to pursue large-scale
water resource development, it is certainly a viable policy option for Chairman Kim
to consider at any time.
Although the construction of a grand canal is related to the political objectives
of a national leader, there is also an important economic element to the project.
Specifically, despite such resource-intensive infrastructure investments during their
early stages, its outcomes may generate an economic stimulus both nationwide and
in local areas in the event of an economic crisis as such a project facilitates the
circulation of goods and people in the short term (by utilizing idle equipment and
manpower). In addition, as was the case for the Suez Canal, the logistics industry
can create new growth engines and make long-term contributions to the national
economy.
A leading example is the basin development project of the Tennessee Valley (the
construction of 26 large-scale dams), which was at the core of the New Deal project
undertaken by then US President Roosevelt to overcome the Great Depression in
the 1920s. The expected routes of North Korea’s grand canal are underdeveloped
areas in the inland, which will be further discussed later on in this paper. Chairman
Kim has emphasized full-scale socialist development based on a vision of balanced
regional development as well as socialist rural development with a view to promoting
growth in rural areas even amid the COVID-19 crisis. As such, he may expect the
construction of a grand canal to serve as a momentum for the development of
underdeveloped areas.
Against this backdrop, it is necessary to examine the process of how Chairman
Kim came to understand the potential political and economic impacts that a grand
canal can bring about. In this day and age, ideas for national policies do not simply
stem from political leaders at the top, but are contrived through consultations with
the political elite as well as the policy discourse environment surrounding the leader.
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Where Did Kim Jong Un’s Grand Canal Initiative Come From?
Chairman Kim Jong Un’s plan to build a East-West Sea grand canal is largely
influenced by his grand father, Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung first introduced this idea
during a speech at Kim Il Sung University on April 13, 1952.1)
“Whenever I gaze upon a map of our country, I often think about connecting the
East and West Sea by constructing a grand canal between the upper regions of the
Taedong River and the Yongheung River,2) or the upper regions of the Imjin River
and the Deokji River.3) If ships in the East and West Sea can traverse freely through
such a canal, this will bring about great political, economic, and military significance”
(excerpt from a speech delivered in front of faculty and students at Kim Il Sung
University on April 13, 1952).4)
Kim Jong Il also made the following remarks as early as in the 1960s regarding
the development of the water transportation system considering the geographical
characteristics of North Korea.
“In particular, as the DPRK is surrounded by seas on three sides and is home
to a number of rivers and streams, the development of water transportation is of
1) South Korean media outlets, which reported Chairman Kim Jong Un’s graso stated that this
initiative was first proposed by his grand father Kim Il Sung. According to these reports, Kim Il
Sung’s speech was dated April 27, 1954. However, there isn’t any record related to Kim Il
Sung’s speech on the date. The exact date of Kim Il Sung'’s speech at Kim Il Sung University
that referred to a East-West Sea grand canal was April 13, 1952. South Korean media did not
reveal the source of the date of April 27, 1954, but they may have taken this incorrect date
from a report by a national policy think tank published a few years ago.
2) The Yongheung River is currently called the Geumya River in North Korea, and its estuary
that meets the sea is about 20km away from Wonsan (see ).
3) It is a stream within a distance of 200m from the Geumya River, and both waters flow into
the same estuary.
4) Il Sung Kim, “The Prospect of the War of the Liberation of the Fatherland and the Tasks of
the General University (Speech in front of the faculty and students at the Kim Il Sung
University on April 13, 1952),” Kim Il Sung’s Works. vol. 7 (Pyongyang: Chosun Labor Party
Press, 1980), p. 158-159.
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the utmost importance. Water transportation is highly economical compared to rail
or road transport. Indeed, it is for this reason that some countries without oceans
and rivers build canals to develop their water transportation”
(excerpt from Kim Jong Il’s remarks in front of officials responsible for
transportation by land and sea on July 19, 1968).5)
As such, North Korea’s top leaders occasionally expressed their willingness and
emphasized the necessity of building a canal in the 1950s and 1960s. However, a
canal connecting the East and West Sea had still not seen any progress two decades
later in the 1980s. Nevertheless, Kim Il Sung never completely abandoned his
interest. In 1981, Kim hinted at the possibility of constructing a different type of
grand canal by referring to the West Sea Lock Gate a few months after its
construction began in 1981 (completed in 1985), although it is not a coast-to-coast
grand canal.
“If the Nampo Lock Gate (citation: the current West Sea Lock Gate) is constructed,
we can address issues related to industrial and drinking water in the lower region
of the Taedong River. In addition, the Taedong River and the Chaeryong River will
increase in depth, allowing large and small boats to freely navigate their waters.
Furthermore, industrial and agricultural areas stretching from Nampo to Suncheon,
Deokcheon, and Chaeryong will be connected by a grand canal, ushering in a new
era of water transportation development”
(excerpt from Kim Il Sung’s address at the 4th Plenary Session of the 6th Central
Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on October 5, 1981).6)
5) In the same speech, Kim Jong Il strongly insisted on the need for the inland water
transportation, saying “There are a number of large rivers and streams in our country, which
can be used for water transportation, including the Taedong River, the Chongchon River, and
the Chaeryong River.” He added, “Some people regard water transportation as insignificant,
but we must wage a strong fight against this phenomenon.” (Jong Il Kim, “Let’s further
develop the land and shipping business in accordance with the situation of our country
(Meeting with officials responsible for transportation by land and sea on July 19, 1968),”
Complete Collection of Kim Jong Il’s Works. vol. 11 (Pyongyang: Chosun Labor Party Press,
2015), p. 150, p. 153).
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In contrast to his speech in 1952, which emphasized only the transportation
function of a canal, the above remarks by Kim Il Sung hinted at subtle changes in
his thinking by picturing the establishment of a kind of urban network through a
canal that connects various regions (Suncheon, Deokcheon, Chaeryong, etc.). In other
words, Kim expected that areas serving as hubs through which a canal passes would
play more active roles (urbanization through a canal), and no longer be relegated
to being a passive space going beyond the single purpose of logistics transportation.
In addition, Kim envisioned Nampo as the starting point of this urban network, where
the construction of Nampo Lock Gate was undertaken.
“We intend to vastly expand Nampo City into a city with a population of 500,000,
making it a second Pyongyang”
(excerpt from Kim Il Sung’s address at the Nampo Lock Gate Construction
Association on May 22, 1981).7)
The population of Nampo City is about 360,000 (according to Statistics Korea as
of 2008). Contrary to Kim Il Sung’s prediction, the city has not been able to attain
an equivalent status of the “Second Pyongyang.” However, his initial idea regarding
the establishment of an urban network through the construction of a canal is similar
to the form of urban development taking place in China centering around its grand
canal (Jing-Hang Grand Canal, Sui-Tang Grand Canal, and Eastern Zhejiang Canal).
As may be expected, the importance of canals underscored by the remarks of
past leaders in the DPRK must have had a significant impact on Kim Jong Un’s
6) Il Sung Kim, “Let the whole party, the whole state, and the whole people come together to
strongly embark on a natural renovation project to reclaim tidelands and explore new lands,”
(October 5, 1981) Kim Il Sung’s Works. vol. 36 (Pyongyang: Chosun Labor Party Press,
1990), pp. 266~267.
7) Il Sung Kim, “Let’s push for the construction of the Nampo Lock Gate (Speech at the Nampo
Lock Gate Construction Association, May 22, 1981),” Kim II Sung’s Works. vol. 36 (Pyongyang:
Chosun Labor Party Press, 1990), p. 114.
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initiative. Although these are not direct quotations from Chairman Kim, North Korea’s
propaganda outlets lauded the West Sea Lock Gate as a “miracle of the 20th century”
and “a victory in the battle to reform mother nature.” Furthermore, construction
of the West Sea Lock Gate project was extolled8) for taking only five years, whereas
the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal took 11 years and 10 years, respectively.
This implies that the authorities currently adopt a positive view of infrastructure
projects undertaken by past regimes. Given that the decision-making process of the
top political leader is largely influenced by consultations with political elites, it is
also worth examining such elites in North Korea as well as the state’s policy-making
discourse environment.
Until the present day, most media in North Korea have continuously reported on
canals in other countries, abeit in brief. Given that these media reports cover such
details as their economic impact,9) it is evident that the North Korean authorities
have a keen interest in canals. The DPRK media’s interest in overseas canals has
led to visits by high-ranking North Korean officials to foreign countries in which
canals have been constructed. Earlier in 1964, Choe Yong-gon, then Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the SPA, visited Egypt to inspect the Suez Canal. In 2015
during the Kim Jong Un regime, Kim Young-nam, the North Korean Chairman of
the Presidium of the SPA, travelled to Egypt to participate in the opening ceremony
of a new Suez canal. Despite the modest number of visits, they nevertheless signify
the interest of top North Korean leaders from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Un in canals.
Another person worth noting is Choi Hee-tae, the current chairman of the
Pyongyang City People’s Committee. In 2011, when Kim Jong Il was in power, Choi
headed a delegation to participate in the 5th World Canal Cities Forum in Yangzhou,10)
8) “The West Sea Lock Gate tells today as well,” DPRK Today, April 23, 2019.
9) For example, when DPRK media introduced Egypt’s economic achievements, they mainly
focused on the Suez Canal, unlike their reports of other allies.
10) Since 2006, the Chinese government has sought to register historically old canals, including
the Gyeonghang Grand Canal, as World Heritage sites, and this forum was designed for such
registration. Even after the registration of the forum was confirmed in 2014, the World Canal
Cities Forum continued to be held in Yangzhou every year, establishing the city’s image as a
canal city and leading the international discourse on canal cities.
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China. Yangzhou, located in Jiangsu Province, East China, is a major stopover for
the Jing–Hang Grand Canal (about 1,700km in length) connecting Beijing and
Hangzhou, which was built during the Sui Dynasty. The city is now widely known
as a canal city. During Choi’s visit, his delegation would have had ample opportunity
to garner much information related to canal cities. Choi Hee-tae then served as the
chairman of the People’s Committee of the Moranbong District of Pyongyang
(2013-2020) under the Kim Jong Un regime. He was elected as a deputy to the
14th SPA in 2019, and has served as the chairman of the Pyongyang City People’s
Committee since September 2020.
Although further details regarding Choi Hee-tae are difficult to come by, he has
presumably expanded his career related to the urban management of Pyongyang
from the Kim Jong Il era to the present. For example, the reason he was chosen
as a debater on a spate of legislation on urban and regional planning (Socialist Rural
Development Act and Garden Greening Act) at the recent SPA meeting may have
been due to his past career. As such, it is possible that Choi, who has held key
positions in the area of urban management under both the Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong
Un regimes, may have had a significant influence on Chairman Kim’s plan for a grand
canal.
In short, judging by remarks made by North Korea’s past leaders, overseas visits
by political elites to countries with canals and continuous reports on canals by DPRK
media outlets, it is evident that North Korea’s grand canal plan may not have been
the brainchild of Chairman Kim alone. However, what sets Kim apart is his public
proclamation of a grand canal initiative, expressing his determination to “make it
a sucess” in an official setting.
Possible Pathways and Feasibility of a Grand Canal in North Korea
An internal review on possible locations for a grand canal may already have been
completed given Chairman Kim’s official announcement of the project. As such, there
is little use in speculating on the project’s details based upon such limited information
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as there has since been no further update from North Korea. That being said, this
paper will examine potential pathways for a grand canal in the North from a physical
geography standpoint. By doing so, this simulation will help identify possible issues
and challenges involved in the construction of a grand canal in North Korea.
Ever since the Kim Il Sung era, the West Sea Lock Gate has been regarded as
the starting point of North Korea’s grand canal initiative. In this context, this
paper will review two routes that link the West Sea Lock Gate and Wonsan in
the East Sea.11) Before reviewing each route, it is worth examining the
topographical characteristics of the North’s inland areas located between the
West Sea and the East Sea as both routes will be commonly affected by these
geographical conditions. The Korean Peninsula is characterized by lowlands in
the West and high mountain ranges in the East, where vertical motion of the
Earth’s crust is thought to have uplifted the Nangrim and Taebaek mountain
ranges during the 3rd period of the Cenozoic era. In addition, the lava plateau
formed as a result of numerous eruptions around Mount Paektu has been widely
developed around the Ryanggang Province. In other words, the altitude of the
land on the Korean Peninsula increases in the West to East and South to North
direction.
11) Some media drew two points of the Taedong River and the Yongheung River in a straight
line on the North Korean map based on Kim Il Sung’s remarks about connecting the two
rivers as the pathway of a canal connecting the East and West Sea. Such a crudely drawn
route, however, prevents further discussion as this project would be considered not feasible
due to such challenges as height differences and mountainous areas. As for routes passing
through the Taedong River, there are two possible routes. One is a route using lock gates
(Mirim Lock Gate, Bonghwa Lock Gate, etc.) located in the upper region of the Taedong
River while the other is a route passing through the Taedong River in Pyongyang and going
backward along the Namgang River. In addition, the central area of North Korea centering
around Pyongyang is called the Pyeongnam Basin. It may be much easier to construct tunnels
in this area, which is composed of sedimentary rocks. However, given that such a
large-scale tunnel construction to link the Taedong River and the East Sea is unprecedented
in the world, there are countless issues to be considered geologically and in terms of civil
engineering technologies. This paper will explore the shortest route from the West Sea Lock
Gate, which is a gateway to the West Sea, to the East Sea, giving primary consideration to
its use by Chinese ships. Of course, there is possibility that the North Korean authorities
may carry out simultaneous construction of multiple routes, including through the Taedong
River, or tunnels, but that aspect was not discussed here due to the space limitation.
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In order to ensure transportation is effective and affordable, it is important that
canals are built on flat terrain. If a canal is to be constructed on terrain with
varying altitudes such as the Korean Peninsula, certain technologies are
required to overcome the differences in height. One leading technology in this
respect is the building of a lock gate. Indeed, the construction of a single lock
gate has the ability to overcome a height gap of about 12 meters.12) North
Korea has experience when it comes to building lock gates on the West Coast,
including the West Sea Lock Gate. As such, the North’s construction of lock
gates should not prove difficult provided sufficient funds and resources are
available. However, in the case of a height difference greater than 12 meters, a
ship lift needs to be used in the same manner as a person using an elevator.
The Canal du Centre in Belgium has a lift that can move ships (vessels with a
weight of 1,350 tons up to a maximum of 2,000 tons) between two canals with
a height difference of 73 meters.13) An even larger lift is located in China’s
Sansha Dam. This lift can carry a ship weighing up to 3,000 tons between
canals with a height difference of 113 meters. Based upon our understanding of
the characteristics of the Korean Peninsula and the technological advancements
necessary to tackle such height differences, this paper will now begin exploring
two possible routes for North Korea’s grand canal project.
12) Jin-Tae Hwang, “Critical Review of a Grand Canal between South and North Korea,” Creation
and Critique, no. 145 (2009), p. 429.
13) “[Reading Science] ② Ship lifts make the operation of canals easier,” Asia Economy,
February 4, 2020, (Accessed
September 20, 2022). The construction cost of the ship lift in the Canal du Centre is known
to be about $450 million.
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Two Routes between the Taedong River and Singye-Koksan Lava Plateaus
Source: Google Earth (Accessed September 20, 2022)
The first route (Route A) passes through Songlim City, Hwangju County, and Lake
Yeontan to reach Singye County (Singye-Koksan Lava Plateaus) in North Hwanghae
Province, while the second route (Route B) starts at the Chaeryong River to pass
through Sarirwon City, and ends up at Singye County (Figure 1). There is a certain
point on Route A in which there is an altitude difference of 50m due to a dam (located
on Lake Yeontan), which requires a ship lift. Furthermore, the construction of a canal
may encounter difficulties owing to security reasons as a military airport is located
roughly 100m away from the river near Hwangju County. When it comes to Route
B, since there is a dam (located in Lake Seoheung) with a height difference of about
30m, the construction of a canal alongside major rivers and streams requires a lock
gate or a lift. However, a gate is unnecessary if a waterway is built using a tributary
that flows through the northern flatland. The two routes have a similar length of
about 90km when measured from the reference point (☆) in .
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Meandering Streams in Route A Meandering Streams in Route B
Source: Google Earth (Accessed Sept. 20, 2022) Source: Google Earth (Accessed Sept. 20, 2022)
Consideration also needs to be given to the ubiquitous meandering streams that
surround both routes, as shown in and . As the navigation
of ships through curved passages increases fuel consumption and delays their
operating hours, meandering streams require additional work to strengthen stream
channels.14) Such work, however, is politically sensitive due to higher construction
costs and considerable potential impact on communities and ecosystems in adjacent
areas. Although some cities may benefit by emerging as canal cities, that same canal
may result in the dismantlement of other cities or towns.
14) Jin-Tae Hwang, “Critical Review of a Grand Canal between South and North Korea,” Creation
and Critique, no. 145 (2009), p. 428.
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Routes from Singye County to the Imjin River
Source: Google Earth (Accessed September 20, 2022)
Singye County, the area in which Routes A and B in converge, is located
in a basalt lava zone (total area 420㎢) called the Singye-Koksan Lava Plateaus,
along with nearby Koksan County and Suan County. Singye County, which has a
flatland at an altitude of 200-300m, is home to Koksan military airport. Rather than
using existing rivers at the convergence point, it may be more effective to construct
artificial waterways. Further east is the location of the Nangrim Mountains, which
are the most challenging section of the entire grand canal project. Rather than
thinking of mountain ranges as dense barriers of the same height, it should be noted
that terrain at low altitudes exist around rivers between the mountains.
On the right hand side of , there is a waterway that begins at the
lake formed by the construction of Hwanggang Dam and passes through Pangyo Town
→ Beopdong Town → Gowon Town to the East Sea (see Route B in
and Route A in ). By connecting this waterway with the canal section
that ends in Singye County, it is possible to bypass the high mountain range of the
Nangrim Mountains (i.e., Route A in ).15) Although such areas consist
of relatively low terrain compared to the surrounding high mountains, it is still
necessary to install a ship lift to overcome differences of over 100m, or drill a tunnel
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about 10-20km in length16) to connect as shown in Route A in .
The section from Pangyo Town to Gowon Town can again be divided into two
routes. The shorter of these two routes is B in . Route B runs along
the Pyongyang-Wonsan Expressway toward the direction of Wonsan, diverging from
Route A roughly halfway between Beopdong Town and Gowon Town. In this case,
however, there are technical difficulties that require addressing considerable height
differences (about 300m) to move ships from high to low ground as well as the
construction of tunnels (about 20km) that pass through the mountain ranges to reach
Wonsan. As discussed above, given that the Sansha Dam lift in China is the world’s
largest ship lift standing at 113m high, the construction of a grand canal along Route
B presents far greater challenges than Route A that passes through Gowon Town.
15) Regarding and , this paper was not able to present scales and
orientations using 3D maps to make it easier to understand height differences. In ,
the dotted arrow of Route A is about 15km, and in , the dotted arrow pointing to
Route B is about 10km.
16) The world’s longest tunnel is the Gotthard Base Tunnel (57km) that passes through the Alps,
and the Yulhyeon Tunnel (between Pyeongtaek and Suseo) in South Korea is 50.3km long.
Therefore, one may think that it would not be difficult to drill a 20-kilometer tunnel only
considering the length of a tunnel. However, there are numerous civil engineering challenges
that must be taken into account for building tunnels for ships, which must be wider and
bigger than those for trains and automobiles, and require the construction of waterways. In
addition, considering the technology, capital, and equipment necessary for tunnel construction,
the possibility of North Korea completing the grand canal project is even lower.
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Two Routes from Pangyo Town to the East Sea
Source: Google Earth (Accessed September 20, 2022.)
Finally, in terms of the region’s climate characteristics, there exists the possibility
that the waterway may freeze over. The freezing period of the Imjin River basin
in Yeoncheon, South Korea, located adjacent to the North, lasts for about 80 days.
A canal in North Korea, which will likely be built in a mountainous region at higher
latitude than that of Yeoncheon, will therefore be difficult to operate during the
freezing and thawing periods.
This paper examined possible locations for the effective construction of a grand
canal in North Korea, based upon the physical geography of the land. Although the
purpose of this undertaking is to predict potential locations for a canal, this paper
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arrives at the tentative conclusion that such a project is unlikely to be realized due
to advanced technology, equipment, and manpower requirements to address
geographical difficulties, tunneling through mountains and altitude gaps. Indeed, not
one of North Korea’s previous civil engineering projects to date is equivalent in scale
to the construction of a grand canal described above.17)
In the aforementioned speech by Kim Il Sung in 1952, he mentioned that, “It will
never be easy because we have to drill a number of holes and frequently dig up
the ground.” Yet, he added, “It won’t be a big problem as we have gained much
experience in mining projects during the war.” Half a century later, the construction
of an East-West grand canal remains a far more daunting task than any of North
Korea’s past mining projects.
Potential Participation of Other Countries in the Project and Future Outlook
As discussed above, it is by no means easy for North Korea to secure the necessary
capital, equipment, technology, and manpower for such a large-scale infrastructure
construction project. The DPRK is therefore likely to seek assistance through the
participation of other countries. Although there are difficulties when it comes to
procuring heavy equipment and capital from abroad due to strict UN sanctions against
North Korea, the North may request technological and professional manpower from
the Suez Canal in Egypt, which its officials have visited on several occasions in the
past. However, as the Suez Canal was built on flat terrain and Egypt lacks the
technology to resolve height differences in the land, a more feasible option would
17) As another route adjacent to the routes discussed in this paper, the Chugaryeong Tectonic
Valley, a flatland between the water stream of the Imjin River on the South Korean side and
Wonsan, can also be considered. In the late 2000s, the late professor Seok-cheol Kim
proposed the construction of a grand canal between the two Koreas using the the
Chugaryeong Tectonic Valley. However, North Korea may feel the security burden to pass
through South Korea’s territory. Furthermore, there is even lower possibility for this plan to
proceed given the current soured inter-Korean relations. (Seok-cheol Kim, “City Corridor in
the Capital Region and Inter-Korean Grand Canal,” Jin-Tae Hwang, 138 (2007), pp. 415-430;
Jin-tae Hwang, “Critical Review of a Grand Canal between South and North Korea,” Jin-Tae
Hwang (2009), pp. 424-438)
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be the participation of China, which likewise holds on to a long-cherished project
of advancing into the East Sea.
China has acquired the necessary technology to produce the world’s largest ship
lifts and has vast experience in the construction of various large-scale water
infrastructure and technologies such as the Sansha Dam and the South–North water
transfer project. Furthermore, there is sufficient impetus for China to take part in
the construction of a grand canal that provides a direct passageway for Chinese
ships to access the East Sea. Chairman Kim may also have an interest in the urban
network formed around China’s three major canals as a spatial strategy for realizing
his vision of balanced regional development.18) Last but not least, North Korea and
China have developed closer ties over recent years, while relations with South Korea
and the US deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such developments serve
to further enhance the possibility of China’s participation in the construction of a
grand canal in North Korea.
North Korea’s grand canal plan will gradually develop with greater clarity following
updates from the regime going forward. However, with active participation from
China, the construction of a grand canal in North Korea would rapidly emerge as
a new variable in Northeast Asia’s geopolitical and geoeconomic structure beyond
simply creating new sources of income for the state in the fields of logistics and
transportation. In particular, the grand canal plan may induce China to take a more
active interest in the Northeast Asian region, which has thus far been excluded from
the geographic scope of China’s One Belt One Road initiative due to hegemonic
competition with the US. In this regard, North Korea’s grand canal agenda
18) This paper predicted possible routes only from a physical geography standpoint. However, if
Chairman Kim’s plan includes urbanization strategies through a canal, additional work is
necessary to associate information on buildings distribution and land coverage (to figure out
urban areas), population distribution and location information of roads and railways related to
a canal, with major regions subject to North Korea’s economic development policy (Min-jo
Kang et al., Measures to improve the utilization of North Korean land information in
preparation for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation (Sejong: Korea Research Institute for
Human Settlements, 2020)). However, this paper will only point out the necessity of further
research.
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necessitates interdisciplinary analysis and cooperation among national policy think
tanks (Korea Institute for National Unification, Institute for National Security
Strategy, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, Korea Transport Institute,
Korea Environment Institute, Korea Institute of Civil Engineering and Building
Technology, etc.) in the areas of urban and economic geography, politics,
international relations, and geopolitics. ⓒKINU 2022
※ The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and are not to be construed
as representing those of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).
217, Banpo-daero, Seocho-gu, Seoul 06578, Korea Tel. 82-2-2023-8000 l 82-2-2023-8208 www.kinu.or.kr 18You can also read
