Clausewitz's Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity - NDU Press

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Clausewitz's Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity - NDU Press
Marine with 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense
Battalion Counter–Unmanned Aerial
Systems Detachment, attached to Special
Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis
Response–Central Command, conducts
functions check on Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicle, Southwest Asia, February
17, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jack C. Howell)

                                                                                      n On War, Carl von Clausewitz intro-

Clausewitz’s                                                                       I  duces readers to widely recognized
                                                                                      axioms such as how the simplest
                                                                                   things become hard in war and how

Wondrous Yet                                                                       the fog and friction of war transform
                                                                                   minor difficulties into major, nearly
                                                                                   insurmountable obstacles. Within many

Paradoxical Trinity                                                                of these axioms, Clausewitz describes
                                                                                   the nonlinear nature of war. It is,
                                                                                   however, the last five paragraphs of his

The Nature of War as a                                                             first chapter that holistically describe
                                                                                   the nature of war as a nonlinear system.
                                                                                   His description and understanding of
Complex Adaptive System                                                            the social dynamics of war give complex
                                                                                   meaning to the interaction of various
                                                                                   social elements in war, characterizing it
By Brian Cole                                                                      as a complex adaptive system. Political
                                                                                   and military leaders and policymakers
                                                                                   should be mindful of the nonlinear
             But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by            nature of the social interactions in war.
                                                                                   In doing so, they will be more prepared
         looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere
                                                                                   and adaptable to unpredicted yet mate-
               the part and whole must always be thought of together.              rial developments throughout a conflict.
                                                            —Carl von Clausewitz

                                                                                   Brian Cole is the Director of the Joint Warfare
                                                                                   Department at the Marine Corps War College.

42   JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity                                          JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020
Clausewitz's Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity - NDU Press
Clausewitz describes war in holistic       nonlinear nature of war, explains how his     to understand the nature of war, and
terms as a paradoxical trinity comprised       trinity is a complex adaptive system, and     the wondrous trinity can be used as a
of the tendencies of the people, the           illustrates how complexity theory can be      methodological starting point to study-
commander and his army, and the gov-           applied as a framework to examine his         ing post–19th-century war.9 Ultimately,
ernment. In war, the most violent of           observations of the interactions among        war is characterized by a combination
social interactions—the three elements of      chance, politics, and passion in unity.       of the three tendencies of the trinity
the Clausewitz’s trinity—interact within                                                     with varying influences dependent on
and among the other elements to create         Clausewitz’s Trinity                          conditions such as the state of weapons
a pattern of behavior that is understand-      Clausewitz argues that war is a phe-          technology and the historical relation-
able yet difficult to predict. Clausewitz      nomenon consisting of three central           ships between opponents.10
warns that while it is hard enough to un-      elements or dominant tendencies.                  War is an act of violence, of that there
derstand the nature of each of the three       This triad, or trinity, is a paradoxical      is no question, but it is first an extension
elements of war’s paradoxical trinity, a       relationship “composed of primordial          of policy, a rational and purposeful act of
“theory that ignores any one of them or        violence, hatred, and enmity . . . chance     violent means used to forcefully compel
seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship be-     and probability . . . and of its element      one’s opponent to its will. The primacy of
tween them would conflict with reality to      of subordination, as an instrument of         politics may start as the most influential
such an extent that for this reason alone      policy.”4 It is paradoxical because while     tendency of war, but the nature of the
it would be totally useless.”1 John Miller     war is an extension of policy—a ratio-        conflict will be determined by the initial
and Scott Page echo Clausewitz’s senti-        nal tendency—it is propelled at times         conditions and the subsequent interac-
ments by exclaiming that to understand a       by primordial violence and hatred—            tion of the trinity’s three elements.11 The
complex adaptive system, we must know          irrational tendencies—or by chance.           combatants’ subordination of rational
both the nature of each element and the        Primordial violence is the blind natural      policy may be usurped by chance and
meaning of their interactions.2                force, whereas the subordinated nature        luck, or by the primordial tendencies of
    Clausewitz uses still-contemporary         of war as a political tool is what makes      hatred and enmity.
ideas and terms in his manuscript, but         it subject to pure reason, and chance is
his descriptions of the trinity, its at-       always a factor under extremely violent       Three Levels of the Trinity
tributes, and its emergent behavior are        and dangerous conditions.5 Each of            Thomas Waldman establishes a typol-
what complexity theory describes as a          the three elements are “manifested in         ogy for the trinity’s elements. The
complex adaptive system. Complexity            a corresponding subject within society:       typology is defined as the objective,
theory was originally developed for the        respectively, the people, the commander       subjective, and contextual levels of the
natural sciences, but social scientists find   and his army, and the government.”6           trinity. Passion, chance, and politics
it useful to understand social systems.        Clausewitz’s trinity is a compressed          constitute the primary or objective
Complexity theory provides a framework         concept of a number of central ideas          trinity. The primary trinity is manifested
to help us understand the root causes          that are integrated by a logic of inter-      into the societal elements of the people,
of phenomena—not replace traditional           acting contrasts.7 The trinity is a social    the commander and his army, and the
theories—and to help us understand the         system that exhibits complex interac-         government, respectively. The societal
nature of war.                                 tions and adaptive, emergent behavior.        elements, Waldman explains, make
    Modern military strategists, com-          The system is sensitive to initial condi-     up the secondary or subjective trinity,
manders, and staff officers must be            tions, and chance and luck can always         whereas context constitutes a third level.
familiar with the abstract conception of       alter the system’s behavior in unpredict-     Context is not a trinity, but it is the
war and be willing to release the con-         able ways.                                    conditions under which the other two
crete, tangible tactics for the operators.                                                   levels of the trinity exist and interact.
War must be considered as a whole or,          The Nature of War Is Constant                 The trinity as a system is highly sensi-
as Michael Handel writes, a gestalt, to        Clausewitz wrote On War in a time             tive to its conditions, and thus context
appreciate the complexity and nonlin-          when wars were interstate conflicts           is vital to explaining changes that occur
ear nature of war. Handel argues that          fought by clearly defined armies. War         at the secondary level and provides an
“because of its infinite complexity and        was confined to battlefields and uni-         understanding of the inherent flexibility
non-linear nature, war can only be under-      formed combatants. The characteristics        of the trinity.12
stood as an organic whole, not as a mere       of war have changed since the 19th                The third level, context, influences
compendium of various elements.”3              century, but its nature has not. It is con-   the system the most. Context provides
    This article provides an overview of       structive to challenge the relevance of       the setting in which “the three primary
Clausewitz’s wondrous yet paradoxical          Clausewitz to modern war, and doing           tendencies—passion, chance, and poli-
trinity, complexity theory, and complex        so forces one to revisit his nonlinear        tics—are manifested in reality through
adaptive systems. In the end, it revisits      theories of war.8 The first book in On        secondary level subjects.”13 Clausewitz
Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity and the       War is a conceptual framework created         explains context by showing that

JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020                                                                                                       Cole   43
Clausewitz's Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity - NDU Press
historically, societies tend to conduct wars   to the economic theory of increasing               Aggregation of Agents. A complex
in their own particular ways, using differ-    returns, making it difficult to predict        adaptive system is an aggregation of
ent methods and pursuing different aims        its behavior. The theory of increasing         agents within a given environment. The
than their opponents.14 He describes con-      returns relies on a principle of inde-         modeler decides what to focus on and
text in the opening sentence of his section    terminacy and accounting for random            what to avoid. Aggregation is a build-
on the trinity, writing, “War is more than     events affecting markets. The properties       ing block approach in which aggregates
a true chameleon that slightly adapts          of complex systems also make them              act like agents at a higher level, or as
its characteristics to the given case.”15      capable of self-organizing and adapting        meta-agents. Modeling is an art form,
Waldman argues that Clausewitz uses            without a central authority.                   and what is aggregated is dependent
the chameleon to demonstrate how war               Complex Adaptive Systems. Complex          on what a modeler wishes to examine.
is connected to its surroundings.16 Justin     systems are found in many places. In the       Aggregation is also about the actions of a
Kelly and Mike Brennan write that war          natural world, such systems include the        complex adaptive system. In aggregation,
must be viewed as a complex system that        brain, immune systems, ecologies, cells,       a modeler can identify and understand a
emerges from “infinitely small changes         developing embryos, and ant colonies. In       system’s emergent behavior as a whole,
in its environment, truly ‘more than a         the human world, they include cultural,        which is commonly different than the
chameleon.’”17 Initial conditions are too      economic, and social systems such as           behavior of the individual agent.
varied to apply a single methodology on        political parties or scientific communities.       Tags. Boundaries can be defined for
which to approach a conflict. The context      Complex systems are everywhere in all          specific aggregations of agents or popula-
constructs the initial relationships, acting   sorts of contexts, but complex systems         tions. When one defines the boundaries
as a catalytic force of emerging, largely      that adapt share central properties.20         of an aggregation, it is referred to as
unpredictable behaviors among and be-          A complex adaptive system consists of          tagging. For example, a flag or guidon is
tween elements of the trinity. The hope,       a network of agents acting in parallel.        used to unite in effort an army or group
as Kelly and Brennan remind us, is not to      Agents, depending on the context, can          of people under a political system. Billiard
achieve absolute control but to influence      be nerve cells, individuals, firms, or even    balls on a table are a population of billiard
tendencies toward desirable outcomes           whole nations. In a complex adaptive           balls, but adding stripes to half the balls
and away from undesirable ones.18              system, “Each agent finds itself in an         manipulates the symmetry and tags the
                                               environment produced by its interac-           aggregations into stripes and solids. In
A Review of the Inherent                       tions with other agents in the system. An      the field of complexity theory, tags are
Properties of Complex Systems                  agent is constantly acting and reacting        used to manipulate symmetries in order
What makes a system complex and not            to what the other agents are doing.”21         to study certain details while ignoring
complicated? Complicated systems may           As a result, nothing in a complex adap-        others. Tagging manipulates symmetry by
seem complex, but they are not unless          tive system is fixed, and control is highly    creating boundaries and thus defining the
they possess certain inherent properties       decentralized.22                               system or a particular aggregation that we
of a complex system. Complex systems               In Harnessing Complexity, Robert           seek to observe that might otherwise be
come in a wide variety of forms, and           Axelrod and Michael Cohen describe             hidden.24 Clausewitz tags the elements of
at times they can be difficult to recog-       a complex adaptive system as the inter-        the second level of the trinity by delineat-
nize or distinguish from complicated           locking sets of processes that generate        ing the objective level of passion, chance,
systems. A complex system is an open           productive actions in a world that can-        and politics to designated aggregates.
system that interacts with its environ-        not be fully understood. The three key         Those aggregates are the population, the
ment, whereas complicated systems are          processes that constitute a complex            military, and the government. The divi-
usually closed systems. A complicated          adaptive system are variation, interac-        sion is not an arbitrary device; rather, it
system is reducible; its parts can be dis-     tion, and selection. The framework by          is meant to isolate and study the interac-
aggregated, and by understanding the           which Axelrod and Cohen study complex          tions both within a particular system and
nature of its parts, one can determine         systems is made up of three elements           between the systems.
the nature of the system in the aggre-         called agents, strategy, and population. An        Flows. The concept of flows is impor-
gate. A complex system is irreducible.         agent interacts with its environment and       tant to understanding complex adaptive
One cannot determine the nature of the         with other agents. It can respond to what      systems. For example, flow can refer to
system in the aggregate by understand-         happens around it and can act, to some         the movement of goods into or out of an
ing its disaggregated parts because the        extent, purposefully. A strategy is the way    economy, or flow could refer to informa-
elements of a complex system interact in       an agent responds to its surroundings          tion or transportation with networks and
developing ways that give rise to emer-        and pursues its goals. Populations are part    connectors. Tags can be used to define
gent behavior.19 Unlike a complicated          of an agent’s environment.23 The agent-        the system and the networks that con-
system, a complex system often exhibits        strategy-population framework is known         nect and direct flows. Two properties can
nonlinear characteristics that can lead to     as the population approach to complex          affect flows. The first is the multiplying
positive feedbacks and instability, similar    adaptive systems.                              or multiplier effect, which is common in

44 JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity                                                    JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020
Commander Task Force 51 Marine Major General Carl E. Mundy III addresses Sailors and Marines during all-hands call on flight deck of USS Essex, Pacific
Ocean, February 26, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Jason M. Graham)

economics when discussing circular flows;           points out, it is easiest to understand             complex adaptive system must work to
the second is the recycling effect.                 by using an example. A steel producer               increase or decrease the variety of agents
    The multiplier effect is the overall            sells some fraction of his steel to a car           in a population, but not simply by ac-
increase in returns for every unit of               manufacturer. The cars are built, then              commodating variety. A population with
currency spent. For example, as John                driven and sold repeatedly to the point             varying types of agents creates a system
Holland explains, if you were to contract           that they are no longer useful and finally          that gives rise to events that unfold in
someone to build a house, you would pay             given up for scrap metal in a junkyard.             often unpredictable ways.
the contractor, who in turns pays varying           The junkyard then recycles a portion of                 Interaction. Interaction is essential
subcontractors. Those subcontractors use            the steel used to make the cars and sells it        to Axelrod and Cohen’s framework
part of that money to buy food and other            for some other use. In the end, each cycle          because the events of interest within a
things, and so on. By taking a fraction of          traps resources to be recycled again and            system come from the interactions of
the original contract and using that same           again, creating a multiplying effect on the         agents with other agents and artifacts.
fraction at each subsequent phase, we               original resource sold to the car manu-             For example, trade occurs when a buyer
can determine the multiplying effect. For           facturer.26 This cycle can occur several            meets a seller, strategies of bidding and
instance, if the fraction to be applied to          times over, depending on the system and             offering take place, and eventually goods
each step in the spending process is r = 80         resource.                                           change hands. Most complex adaptive
percent, we can calculate 1 + r + r2 + r3 +              Variation. Variation of a population           systems have distinctive interaction pat-
r4 + . . . or using the equation 1/(1 – r),         is an essential attribute of a complex              terns, which are “neither random or
we get a multiplying effect on the overall          adaptive system. Variation, Axelrod and             completely structured.”29 Axelrod and
system of 1/(1 – 0.8) = 5.25 The result             Cohen write, “provides the raw material             Cohen provide two examples: asymmetric
in this example is that for every $1 spent,         for adaptation.”27 There are, however,              interaction and uniform interaction.
the effect to the overall economy is $5.            limits to the extent variation in a popula-         Asymmetric interaction occurs, for ex-
    The other property of flows is the              tion will facilitate adaptation.28 Those            ample, when a leader is able to broadcast
recycling effect. Once again, as Holland            who want to shape the behavior of a                 messages simultaneously to many who

JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020                                                                                                                       Cole   45
Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School student racks billiard balls before match during Single Marine Program’s weekly pool tournament held at
5th Street Zone, Twentynine Palms, California, July 16, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Levi Schultz)

likely do not have the same capabil-               complexity of global life as interaction           and amplification or some change of fre-
ity to broadcast information back to a             complexity, or the condition in which the          quencies of type.31 Natural selection relies
leader. This type of highly asymmetric             effect of a factor on a social system is de-       on the selection of the agent, but a more
interaction is different from symmetric            pendent on the state of other factors.30           direct method of adaptation is the selec-
interactions, in which all agents can                   Selection/Adaptation. The properties          tion of the strategy. Instead of waiting for
interact equally with all others. Uniform          described so far are necessary for a system        agents to reproduce, a good strategy can
interaction is established when, for ex-           to be complex, but for such a system to            achieve successful results much faster.
ample, there is a neighborhood in which            become adaptive, it must have a mecha-                 In either the agent or strategy level of
there are stores, schools, and churches. In        nism for selection. Axelrod and Cohen              selection, to retain effective adaptation
all these places, people are able to meet          use evolutionary biology’s concept of              reproduction needs to occur. Natural
and develop a network with a strong                natural selection to understand the na-            selection occurs in the absence of central-
local bias. People know many others near           ture of complex adaptive systems. While            ized control and authority. The absence
where they live and very few people, in            not identical to the process of natural            of central authority is what allows a com-
comparison, who live elsewhere around              selection, complex adaptive systems do             plex system to adapt. However, defining
the globe. Interactions, the authors write,        operate in a similar way. Natural selection        criteria for success is essential to harness-
are what make complex adaptive systems             requires a means to retain agents’ essen-          ing complexity, as the title of Axelrod and
come alive. David Earnest describes the            tial characteristics, a source of variation,       Cohen’s book implies. The framework

46   JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity                                                           JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020
they present offers a way to “analyze          system has a dampening property so             making war most like a game of cards in
institutions and how they shape—and            that the system maintains its essential        which chance is as dominant a force as
are shaped by—the actions of individu-         properties. When the actions of others         calculation.36 Acting courageously in war
als.”32 Complex systems are constantly         in a given population influence others,        is one aspect of unpredictable human
shaped by the interaction of agents. One       as in the Standing Ovation Problem (de-        nature; another is the level of indiscrimi-
agent acts as a result of another’s action.    scribed later), a tipping point may occur      nate violence that people have shown to
In other words, actions are informed by        that could lead to a cascading effect and      be capable of committing.
other actions, and so on.                      undermine system stability. When agents             A complicated system, as mentioned,
     Axelrod and Cohen write that a            do as other agents do, they can become         is one whose individual parts (when
system is complex when there are strong        locked into path-dependent behavior.           broken down) can be studied and under-
interactions among its elements, such that     Path dependency can lead to a nonlinear,       stood. By understanding all the parts, it
“current events” heavily influence the         magnifying effect amounting to a social        is possible to understand and thus predict
probabilities of later events. A change in     tipping point.                                 the behavior of the system in its aggre-
strategy results from a system’s selection          The model of a steel ball suspended       gate. This is possible because the parts
process, which leads to an improvement         above three equally spaced magnets pro-        are actually independent from each other,
according to some measure of success.          vides a good visualization of the trinity.     even when they are in the aggregate.
Axelrod and Cohen call this process            When the ball is pushed in one direction,      A piston rod, when connected to the
adaptation. A complex adaptive system          the magnets all act on the steel ball and      camshaft, does not change the nature of
then, is a system that contains agents, or     the ball reacts to the magnets. The path       the camshaft itself or the piston attached
populations, that seek to adapt.               the ball takes is highly dependent on,         to the other end. These parts behave as
     Nonlinearity. The nonlinear char-         and sensitive to, its initial conditions,      would be predicted given the context in
acteristic of the relationship among the       but the path is difficult if not altogether    which they function. The tendencies of
three tendencies in Clausewitz’s trinity       impossible to predict in real life. There      Clausewitz’s trinity cannot be isolated
is potentially the most significant and        are many variables involved in the initial     because the boundaries among them
dangerous attribute. The nonlinear             conditions, such as wind, temperature,         are indistinct—all three elements help
interaction is analogous to when “a            symmetry of the ball, and strength of the      define the others.37 In complex social
magnet is released over three equidistant      magnets. Once the ball is set in motion,       systems like Clausewitz’s trinity, the parts
and equally powerful magnets, it moves         it is unlikely to gain momentum while          or tendencies are interconnected and
irresolutely to and fro as it darts among      it gyrates wildly. In this model, friction     interdependent.
the competing points of attraction.”33         is one of the moderating forces that acts           Clausewitz writes that war is a human
Predicting the trajectory of such a magnet     to stabilize the ball and prevent it from      social activity. According to him, the fun-
is essentially impossible, even though one     reaching a tipping point. In war, an           damental understanding of war is based
could anticipate its pattern. Any infinitely   unmoderated trinity could manifest in          on the human element. He observes that
small variation in initial conditions can      irrational acts of large-scale violence. The   war is “an activity in which each aspect
cause significant subsequent variations.       violence may continue until it expands         influences and is influenced by others,
Waldman explains that this can occur in        into new boundaries where there are            and this interrelationship extend[s] to the
war because it is an open system that is       moderating forces that will dampen and         social and political matrix of war.”38 In
sensitive to differences in initial condi-     end the violence. It can be difficult to       war, like life, all parts are interconnected
tion and external influences. The magnet       predict under what conditions violence         and constitute a whole. Waldman argues
model analogy captures the complexity of       will extend beyond the rational tendency.      that the trinity is not “simply a combina-
war. As Waldman notes, such complexity                                                        tion of these elements placed side by side.
makes it difficult to make “neat” analyses     The Trinity as a Complex                       It is much more than this and is intended
of war. Clausewitz conceived of the trin-      Adaptive System                                to reflect the incredible complexity of war
ity with complexity in mind, “a fact that      Because of the overarching inherent            in reality.”39 One cannot reduce the ten-
belies its seeming simplicity.”34 No single    element of danger in war, no other             dencies to individual elements and seek
tendency can be understood in isolation        human endeavor is more turbulent,              to understand them—the trinity is a unity
because, as Waldman points out, in war         ambiguous, or reliant on luck than             and must be comprehended as such.
all three tendencies simultaneously inter-     war.35 Human behavior in the face of                Isolating each tendency is not only
act, creating a nonlinear, unpredictable       danger is largely an unpredictable vari-       an insufficient way to attempt to under-
complex system.                                able across a given population. The            stand the trinity as a whole, but it is also
     A moderating tendency can cre-            subjective nature of courage plays dif-        paradoxically impossible to understand
ate a stable system. This means that a         ferently among everyone. No matter the         each element in isolation of the others.
moderating tendency can prevent minor          extent of mathematical calculations in         The scientific approach of reduction-
disturbances from amplifying into major        planning, the roles of luck and chance         ism begins to fail “as we move from the
disturbances. In other words, a stable         interject probabilities into the equations,    realm of complication to complexity, and

JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020                                                                                                        Cole   47
reductionism no longer gives us insight       no adaptive property that emerges as a           be stronger than the other. Intuitively,
into construction.”40 The tendencies do       result of their proximity. Clearly, when         the greater the distance between op-
not exist independently; they are in con-     the two parts are attached as designed,          ponents and their respective use of force,
tinual tension and interaction with each      they physically act and react in accor-          the more likely rationality will predomi-
other. Their interaction is dynamic and       dance to Newton’s laws of motion. But            nate. When in personal contact with the
continually varying over time. Clausewitz     at the macro level, the actions of the parts     enemy, the hatred and enmity for each
creates an image of two wrestlers to illus-   interact linearly (this example is only con-     opponent can lead to excessive aggression
trate the interaction of the tendencies. He   sidered at the macro level because at the        and carry the violence to levels beyond
explains how the actions of one wrestler      quantum level the interacting elements           what are necessary, or legal, to achieve
are dependent on the interaction with the     may, in fact, exhibit complex adaptive           rational political objectives.
other. Not only would the actions of a        characteristics). The Standing Ovation               Proximity can also lead to group-
wrestler seem odd if not in the context of    Problem is based on the premise that fol-        think or mob behavior. If the elements
a match with another; the actions would       lowing a performance, an audience will           of hatred and enmity lie carefully below
be impossible, for they rely on the inter-    respond with applause that may lead to a         the surface, bringing them to the surface
active participation of the other. Much       standing ovation. Each audience member           would not take much effort. If one per-
like in any complex system, the actions of    can choose whether to applaud standing           son or small group is more likely than
agents are dependent on, and a result of,     or remain seated. The social dynamics can        another to act out primordial violence
the interaction of the other agents.          lead an audience member to feel pres-            on another group, it may be enough
     They are not always in competition       sured to stand and join her immediate            to encourage another group to act the
with each other; sometimes they are even      neighbors even if she despised the perfor-       same way though they are at first re-
mutually supportive. The boundaries of        mance, whereas if an audience member             luctant. One act of primordial violence
each tendency are defined by the others.      was farther away from those standing, the        may unleash the hatred and enmity of a
For instance, policy is thought to be the     pressure to stand would be diminished as         population against its opponents. The
rational and goal-oriented attribute in       a function of distance.43 The model can          irrational aspect of base human violence
war. Yet policy cannot define war in isola-   provide interesting insights into how the        toward another may inspire a neighbor, a
tion because war as a whole is “pervaded      irrational tendency of primordial violence       friend, or a family member to act in a like
by great chance, uncertainty and fric-        can predominate actions and reactions in         manner. The violent actions may spread,
tion, while inescapable emotions impact       war.                                             the deviation of laws and norms will soon
behaviour.”41                                      The authors cite Robert Putnam’s            become normalized, and what was once
     War, Clausewitz writes, is never an      1939 writings on social capital as a public      an unthinkable act will become common-
isolated act. Opponents are aware of each     good, where social capital is measured by        place within the context of the tagged
other. Individuals may be strangers, but      the proximity and activation of agents.          system. Once the violence subsides, and
they are not abstract entities. Clausewitz    Putnam believed that social capital is           the conflict ends, a society may look back
points out that war does not spontane-        largely a byproduct of social interaction        on its actions in disgust and disbelief.
ously break out unexpectedly. Each side       that creates ties, norms, and trust within       Under normal circumstances, they would
has an awareness of the others’ motives,      a particular network. Interaction within         not have acted like they did, but the
but an element of uncertainty always          a social network can be measured in              interaction and proximity to the violence
exists. This uncertainty, Clausewitz em-      terms of proximity and activation factors.       created perceived social pressures to act
phasizes, creates a moderating tendency       Proximity factors determine how agents           in a similar way. This is a hypothetical and
on each side that can prevent a tipping       are likely to interact, and activation fac-      theoretical example, yet there are many
point.42                                      tors determine the sequencing of their           examples that demonstrate how probable,
     Space and distance affect the interac-   activity. In addition to physical proximity,     under the right conditions, such actions
tion between opponents and shape the          many other types of relational networks          can occur.
interaction of the tendencies of the trin-    establish proximity. Activation groups
ity. The Standing Ovation Problem that        many processes together that affect the          Conclusion
John Miller and Scott Page created is a       timing of agent activity or the temporal         The question that should arise while
general model that can be used to study       structure of events.44 Social capital, then,     reading Clausewitz’s description
the effect that proximity has on many         is a result of the interaction of the features   of the three tendencies regards the
social issues, such as drug use, schooling    of social organization, such as networks,        extent to which the trinity shapes the
choices, whether to recycle or not, and       norms, and trust, that facilitate coordina-      outcome of war. Of course, the most
a variety of other issues. In the example     tion and cooperation occurring in both           obvious answer is, “It depends.” While
of the piston rod and camshaft, no mat-       time and space.                                  this answer is true, it is not helpful.
ter how close the two parts are moved              Much like the Standing Ovation              However, if we understand what
together, there will be no effect on how      Problem, proximity of opponents in war           Clausewitz defines as the trinity and
they behave toward each other; there is       can influence which tendency will likely         the tendencies that make it a complex

48   JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity                                                   JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020
adaptive system, then by using com-             rational and irrational forces from which          at the Edge of Chaos: Reflections on Complexity
                                                                                                   and Global Life, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Albany:
plexity theory as a framework, we can           unpredictable behavior emerges. In other           SUNY Press, 2015), 53–77.
understand how initial conditions affect        words, both Clausewitz and Rosenau are                  20
                                                                                                           M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The
the interactions. Efforts to identify the       stating that to study international rela-          Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and
conditions under which events occur is          tions and war, one must be willing to live         Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992),
often a frustrating endeavor. The Arab          in and with change to come to terms with           145.
                                                                                                        21
                                                                                                           Ibid.
Spring took many by surprise because            the “turbulence of global life.”49 In the               22
                                                                                                           Ibid.
they did not recognize the conditions           end, the trinity is only an abstract model              23
                                                                                                           Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen,
that led to the events. Many other con-         of the complex social structure of society,        Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Impli-
flicts have destabilized entire regions         designed to help political and military            cations of a Scientific Frontier (New York: The
unexpectedly. In 1914, a series of seem-        leaders understand and appreciate the              Free Press, 2000), 3–5.
                                                                                                        24
                                                                                                           John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How
ingly unrelated events inadvertently            decidedly unpredictable, emergent nature
                                                                                                   Adpatation Builds Complexity (New York: Basic
sent European powers spiraling to war.          of war. JFQ                                        Books, 1996), 13.
David Earnest writes:                                                                                   25
                                                                                                           Ibid., 25.
                                                                                                        26
                                                                                                           Ibid., 27.
The spiral theory of inadvertent war            Notes
                                                                                                        27
                                                                                                           Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complex-
                                                                                                   ity, 32.
provides one of the most compelling argu-
                                                      1
                                                        Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
                                                                                                        28
                                                                                                           Ibid.
ments about emergent phenomena in world                                                                 29
                                                                                                           Ibid, 63.
                                                trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret
politics: micro-decisions produced macro-       (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),
                                                                                                        30
                                                                                                           David C. Earnest, “The Gardner and
behaviors that none of the political actors     89.                                                the Craftsman,” in World Politics at the Edge of
desired. One cannot simply reduce the war             2
                                                        John H. Miller and Scott Page, Complex     Chaos, 31–51.
                                                Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Com-
                                                                                                        31
                                                                                                           Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complex-
to preferences of the tsar, Kaiser, emperor,
                                                putational Models of Social Life (Princeton:       ity, 117.
or king. Thirty-seven million people died.45                                                            32
                                                                                                           Ibid., 159.
                                                Princeton University Press, 2007).
                                                      3
                                                        Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien:
                                                                                                        33
                                                                                                           Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and the
     World War I resulted from nonlinear        How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Car-        Trinity, 70, 176. Waldman references Alan
and recursive relationships between             lisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,   Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the
                                                September 2009), 6, available at . The authors reference Michael I. Handel,
                                                                                                        34
                                                                                                           Ibid.
individuals to consider the full range of       Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2nd
                                                                                                        35
                                                                                                           Clausewitz, On War, 85.
outcomes of their actions.46 Clausewitz         ed. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996),
                                                                                                        36
                                                                                                           Ibid., 86.
does not assert that the interactions of        345.
                                                                                                        37
                                                                                                           Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and the Trin-
                                                        Clausewitz, On War, 89.                    ity, 173.
the elements of the trinity are random                4
                                                                                                        38
                                                                                                           Ibid.
but that those elements self-organize and
                                                      5
                                                        Andreas Herberg-Rothe, “Clausewitz’s
                                                ‘Wondrous Trinity’ as General Theory of War
                                                                                                        39
                                                                                                           Ibid., 172.
create complexity. Self-organization is a       and Violent Conflict,” Theoria: A Journal of
                                                                                                        40
                                                                                                           Miller and Page, Complex Adaptive
phenomenon that Earnest believes is a           Social and Political Theory 114 (December          Systems, 117.
largely ignored reality of world politics.47    2007), 48–73.
                                                                                                        41
                                                                                                           Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and the Trin-
                                                        Thomas Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and       ity, 174.
     Coming to terms with a turbulent                 6
                                                                                                        42
                                                                                                           Clausewitz, On War, 78.
and ambiguous world does not mean               the Trinity (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publish-
                                                ing, 2013), 6.
                                                                                                        43
                                                                                                           John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, “The
giving up on traditional understand-                  7
                                                        Ibid.                                      Standing Ovation Problem,” Complexity 9, no.
ings of international relations. It means             8
                                                        Herberg-Rothe, “Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous     5 (2004), 8–16.
embracing the nonlinear predilection            Trinity’ as General Theory of War and Violent
                                                                                                        44
                                                                                                           Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complex-
                                                Conflict,” 49.                                     ity, 65–66.
and unpredictability of international rela-
                                                      9
                                                        Ibid., 52.
                                                                                                        45
                                                                                                           David C. Earnest, Massively Parallel
tions.48 Understanding both the nature of                                                          Globalization: Explorations in Self-Orgainiza-
                                                      10
                                                         Ibid., 64.
complex adaptive systems and the trinity              11
                                                         Ibid., 54.                                tion and World Politics (Albany: SUNY Press,
allows students of international relations            12
                                                         Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and the Trin-   2015), 3.
to increase their tolerance of ambiguity.       ity, 7.
                                                                                                        46
                                                                                                           Ibid.
                                                         Ibid., 46.
                                                                                                        47
                                                                                                           Ibid.
James Rosenau advised that in order to                13
                                                                                                        48
                                                                                                           Kavalski, World Politics at the Edge of
understand international relations, one
                                                      14
                                                         Ibid., 48.
                                                      15
                                                         Clausewitz, On War, 89.                   Chaos, 16.
must be concerned with probabilities and              16
                                                         Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and the Trin-
                                                                                                        49
                                                                                                           Ibid.
distrustful of absolutes. Rosenau, further-     ity, 53.
more, stressed the need to be genuinely               17
                                                         Kelly and Brennan, Alien, 6.
puzzled by international phenomena                    18
                                                         Ibid.
and open to being proved wrong. The
                                                      19
                                                         Colin Wight, “Theorizing International
                                                Relations: Emergence, Organized Complexity,
Clausewitzian trinity is a paradox, and         and Integrative Pluralism,” in World Politics
it is wondrous in that it is a puzzle of

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