Contestations of the Liberal International Order. From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism - Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn ...
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Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn
Contestations of the Liberal International Order.
From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational
Liberalism
SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 3
Contestations of the Liberal ScriptCLUSTER OF EXCELLENCE “CONTESTATIONS OF SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE LIBERAL SCRIPT ‒ SCRIPTS”
SCRIPTS analyzes the contemporary controversies about The SCRIPTS Working Paper Series serves to disseminate
liberal order from a historical, global, and comparative the research results of work in progress prior to publi-
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sciences and area studies, collaborates with research discussion and generate further feedback. All SCRIPTS
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ties with major political, cultural and social institutions. www.scripts-berlin.eu and can be ordered in print via email
Operating since 2019 and funded by the German Research to office@scripts-berlin.eu.
Foundation (DFG), the SCRIPTS Cluster of Excellence unites
eight major Berlin-based research institutions: Freie Series-Editing and Production: Dr. Anke Draude,
Universität Berlin, the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, the Dr. Gregor Walter-Drop, Cordula Hamschmidt,
Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), as well as the Hertie Paul Geiling, and Carol Switzer
School, Berlin, the German Institute for Economic Research
(DIW), the Berlin branch of the German Institute of Global Please cite this issue as: Börzel, Tanja A. / Zürn, Michael:
and Area Studies (GIGA), the Center for Eastern European Contestations of the Liberal International Order. From Liberal
and International Studies (ZOiS), and the Leibniz-Zentrum Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism, SCRIPTS Working
Moderner Orient (ZMO). Paper No. 3, Berlin: Cluster of Excellence 2055 “Contestations
of the Liberal Script – SCRIPTS”.
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Twitter: @scriptsberlin
Facebook: @scriptsberlinTABLE OF CONTENTS
Authors
Abstract
1 Introduction 3
2 Predominant Explanations 5
3 An Alternative Account: Liberal Intrusiveness and Varieties of Contestations 7
4 Empirical Probe 11
4.1 Liberal Intrusiveness 11
4.2 Varieties of Contestations of the New Security-Regime Complex 13
4.2.1 From LIO I to LIO II: Cases of Humanitarian Intervention 14
4.2.2 A Differentiated Wave of Contestations 14
4.3 Varieties of Contestations of International Refugee Law: The European Migration Crisis 17
4.3.1 The EU’s Growing Liberal Intrusiveness 17
4.3.2 Contesting the EU’s Growing Liberal Intrusiveness 18
5 Conclusion 20
ReferencesSCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
AUTHORS
Prof. Dr. Tanja A. Börzel is professor of political Prof. Dr. Michael Zürn is Director at WZB Berlin So-
science and holds the Chair for European Integra- cial Science Center and Professor of Internation-
tion at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, al Relations at the Freie Universität Berlin. Since
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Since 2019, she 2019, he is director of the Cluster of Excellence
is director of the Cluster of Excellence “Contes- “Contestations of the Liberal Script – SCRIPTS”,
tations of the Liberal Script – SCRIPTS”, funded funded by the German Research Foundation, to-
by the German Research Foundation, together gether with Prof. Dr. Tanja Börzel, as well as leader
with Prof. Dr. Michael Zürn, as well as leader of of the DFG research group “Overlapping Spheres
the H2020 Collaborative Project “EU-LISTCO – Eu- of Authority and Interface Conflicts in the Glob-
rope’s External Action and the Dual Challenges of al Order” (OSAIC). He is a member of the Ber-
Limited Statehood and Contested Orders”. Her re- lin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissen-
search focus and teaching experience lie in the schaften and the Academia Europeana. His work
field of institutional theory and governance, com- focusses on the emergence and functioning of
parative regionalism, and diffusion. inter- and supranational institutions and orga-
nizations as well as on their impact on the glob-
tanja.boerzel@fu-berlin.de al political order.
michael.zuern@wzb.eu
2SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
Contestations of the Liberal International Order
From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational
Liberalism
Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn
ABSTRACT
The 1990s saw a systemic shift from the liberal post- to increase. Postnational liberalism is substan-
World War II international order of liberal multilater- tially more intrusive than liberal multilateralism
alism (LIO I) to a post-Cold War international order of and, therefore, creates unresolved legitimation
postnational liberalism (LIO II). LIO II has not only been
problems. State as well as non-state actors from
rule-based but openly pursued a liberal social purpose
both the Global North and the Global South con-
with significant authority beyond the nation state.
While postnational liberal institutions have helped in- test LIO, although they pursue different strate-
crease overall well-being globally, they worked in fa- gies. To account for the variety of contestations
vor of Western societies and elites and regularly violat- observed, we focus on the contestant’s view to-
ed the principle of treating like cases alike. We argue wards postnational liberalism and its position
that these institutional features of postnational LIO II within the contested institution.
led to legitimation problems, which explains both the
current wave of contestations and the strategy chosen
The initial set-up after World War II with the Unit-
by different contestants. We develop our argument by
first mapping the growing liberal intrusiveness of in- ed Nations (UN) system and the Bretton-Woods
ternational institutions. Second, we demonstrate an in- institutions was rule-based multilateralism with
crease in the level and variety of contestations in in- the social purpose of promoting free trade while
ternational security and international refugee law. We protecting the capacity of states to regulate their
show that increased liberal intrusiveness has led to a economies to reduce unemployment. This “em-
variety of contestation strategies, influenced by a con-
bedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1983) in the economic
testant’s preference for postnational liberalism and its
realm was limited to the Western world and com-
power within the contested institution.
plemented by global, but comparatively weak in-
stitutions, notably the UN human rights regime
1 INTRODUCTION and the UN Security Council charged with the
maintenance of international peace and securi-
The liberal international order (LIO) has come un- ty. While human rights institutions were part of
der pressure (Lake et al. 2021). We argue that the political dynamics in Western societies and on
tide of LIO contestations is driven by the increase the transnational level (Keck/Sikkink 1998; Risse
in liberal authority that set in after 1989. The move et al. 1999), they had less traction in the Eastern
from liberal multilateralism – the type of LIO which Bloc of socialist states in world politics. Overall,
emerged after World War II – to postnational lib- it seems fair to consider the post-World War II or-
eralism – the post 1990s version of LIO – caused der as a thin liberal order, which was only some-
the degree and the variety of LIO contestations what liberal but quite effective.
3SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
With the end of the Cold War, we saw – in addi- of China, anti-globalization movements as well as
tion to the ongoing entrenchment of liberal insti- the proliferation of right-wing populism and na-
tutions in the decades after WWII – a new thrust tionalism in Europe and the US, have emerged as
towards LIO. It included a significant rise in the new (or renewed) challenges for liberal societies
authority of international institutions, a strength- and their relationships at the international level.
ening of decisively liberal features, such as hu- These contestations have converged into a cri-
man rights, the rule of law, democracy, and the tique of the universal understanding of individual
free movement of people, and an extension of rights backed by strong institutions and the “un-
states joining these institutions. These liberal healthy” diversity of lifestyles (gender relations,
principles have been instantiated and protect- multiculturalism, LGBT+).
ed by specific institutional arrangements that
emerged mainly in the 1990s and early 2000s. The massive challenges to the liberal script, con-
The arrangements comprised conditionally sov- ceptualized as shared understandings about the
ereign states, which gained legitimacy by enforc- organization of society (Börzel/Zürn 2020), have a
ing and guaranteeing liberal rights, rules, and strong international dimension. LIO provides the
decisions. Externally, the cooperation of states international scenery for liberal societies to blos-
was promoted by international institutions exer- som. With the liberal script being under fire, bor-
cising authority regulated by international law. ders are emphasized again, and the free move-
Moreover, open markets and supranational bod- ment of capital, goods, services, and people is
ies maintaining the rules for an economic order increasingly challenged. All this is accompanied by
pushed economic policies towards further liber- a growing rejection of political authority beyond
alization. In other words, the initially weak liber- the nation-state. The legitimacy of multilateral
al international institutions set up by the US and institutions protecting and promoting economic
its Western Allies after World War II appeared to freedom, security, human rights, democracy, and
prevail around the globe, to gain in strength, and the rule of law is called into question by auto-
to become more liberal over time. In our view, cratic regimes as well as nationalist and populist
the 1990s saw a systemic shift from a thin liber- forces on the right and leftist movements target-
al post-World War II international order of liber- ting neoliberal policies in those Western states
al multilateralism (LIO I) to a post-Cold War inter- that have built and sustained LIO. Some of these
national order of postnational liberalism (LIO II), contestations are directed against the move to-
which was not only rule-based but openly pur- wards postnational liberalism in the 1990s and
sued a liberal social purpose with significant au- early 2000s; others address LIO in general. While
thority beyond the nation state (Zürn 2018: ch. 5). these challenges and contestations have accumu-
lated into a wave, or even a tide, different types
This transformation towards postnational liber- of actors target different components of LIO and
alism has led to contestations of LIO, which have choose different strategies. We therefore speak of
been more and more visible since the late 1990s a differentiated wave of contestations. Our con-
(Lake et al. 2021). Many of the postnational liberal tribution aims to provide an understanding of the
institutions worked in favor of Western societies wave and variety of contestations.
and elites, had a neoliberal flavor with significant
distributional effects, regularly violated the prin- We argue that the institutional features of the
ciple of treating like cases alike, and institution- new, postnational liberal international order ex-
alized state inequality. The surge of Islamic fun- plain both the current wave of contestations and
damentalism, revisionism in Russia, and the rise the strategy chosen by different contestants and
4SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
develop our argument in three steps. We start by 2 PREDOMINANT EXPLANATIONS
discussing four theoretical explanations for LIO
contestations which dominate the debate in Inter- How can we account for the increased level and
national Relations (IR). We then present our own variety of contestations in a time of few interstate
account as a more powerful explanation of the wars, continued growth rates and poverty reduc-
timing, levels, and types of LIO contestations. The tion in many countries in the Global South, mod-
empirical part of the paper first maps the grow- est average unemployment rates in most of the
ing political authority of international institutions consolidated economies of the Global North, and
and their increasing liberal intrusiveness. It goes a significant improvement in the Human Devel-
on to illustrate that this has led to a rise of dif- opment Index? Why is the LIO that helped make
ferent contestations which are pre-determined by these accomplishments possible increasingly
the contestant’s preference or support for post- contested and how can we account for the dif-
national liberalism and its power within the con- ferences in contestants’ strategies?
tested institution. In two case studies, we illus-
trate our arguments on the increased level and There are four lines of current IR theory that
variety of contestations in separate issue-areas: have especially sought to deal with these ques-
the contestations of the UN-based internation- tions. First, power transition theories focus on a
al security regime complex and of internation- changed distribution of power in the internation-
al refugee law in the European migration crisis. al system. There is a cross-theoretical consensus
In both instances, we aim to show that increased that power shifts pose challenges for existing in-
liberal intrusiveness has led to a variety of con- ternational institutions, especially since some of
testation strategies the choice of which is af- today’s rising powers have also been long-stand-
fected by the preferences and the power of the ing critics of the established order. Hegemonic
contestant. We conclude by discussing the chal- stability theorists have traditionally seen liberal
lenges that our findings pose for the study of IR.1 economic order as the product of the dominance
of a leading economic power, which may be erod-
ed when the power of the hegemon wanes (Gilpin
1987; Layne 2012). To the extent that “catch-up”
developmental states rely upon interventionist
industrial policies, they challenge the competi-
tive advantages of the dominant powers (Calden-
1 This is an earlier version of an article forthcoming in the 75th
tey 2008; Wade 2003). Similar thinking leads oth-
Anniversary Issue of International Organization “Challenges to the ers to conclude that rising powers challenge the
Liberal International Order”, edited by David Lake, Lisa Martin,
most liberal aspects of the international order
and Thomas Risse. We would like to thank the participants of the
seminar of the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal that are incompatible with their domestic orders
Script (SCRIPTS)” and the participants of the International Orga- (McNally 2012; Kupchan 2012). In any event, pow-
nization workshops in Madison, Wisconsin, and Berlin for useful
discussions of earlier versions of this contribution. Our special er transition theories expect a strong and grow-
thanks for extensive comments go to David Lake, Lisa Martin, Abe ing degree of revisionism by rising powers, mostly
Newman, Judy Goldstein, Thomas Risse, Alexandros Tokhi, Eric
Voeten, Gregor Walter-Drop, and two anonymous reviewers. The playing out on the international level as a chal-
research assistance of Joia Buning, Maria Dellasega, Lukas Müller- lenge to the existing order as such. Most power
Wünsch, Phuong-Ha Nguyen, Johannes Scherzinger, and Felix
Vosse is gratefully acknowledged. Research for this contribution
transition theories thus see those states that are
is part of the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal the winners of globalization as the most import-
Script” (EXC 2055), funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany´s
ant challengers of LIO.
Excellence Strategy.
5SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
Our explanation focuses on the institution- to see contestations especially from rising pow-
al structure of LIO II. We therefore expect rising ers directed against the specific contents of giv-
powers to contest not necessarily the order as a en regimes rather than the postnational liberal
whole, but specific aspects of this order. More- order in general.
over, we envisage that rising powers adopt dif-
ferent strategies depending on their position to- Contrary to such theories, we expect that it is not
wards and within LIO II. Finally, in our account, only liberal policies but institutional and sta-
contestants can also be located within Western tus-generating features of LIO that are contest-
societies. ed. Moreover, our explanation can also account
for the rejection of international liberal authority
Second, rational institutionalism focuses on in general within both the Global South and those
the effectiveness of international institutions Western societies that were crucial in creating
in managing the relations between interdepen- and sustaining the institutions in the first place.
dent states so that they serve the interests of the
member states. Rule-based cooperation in multi- Third, sociological institutionalist approach-
lateral institutions has thus facilitated the open- es warn against overestimating the contesta-
ing of markets, the establishment of collective tion of LIO. They emphasize the embedding and
security systems, and the protection of human socialization of rising powers into the (liberal)
rights. However, they have failed to effectively norms and principles espoused by established
address new challenges, including the stabiliza- powers and enshrined in international organi-
tion of financial markets, the fight against climate zations (Johnston 2007; Ikenberry 2011). Social-
change, the proliferation of weapons of mass de- ization describes a process by which governing
struction, and the rise of Islamic terrorism (Acha- elites of states come to accept and internalize the
rya 2016). In this view, their lack of performance norms and principles that support the structure
and problem-solving capacity fuels contestations of existing international organizations. This sug-
of liberal international institutions. At the same gests that emerging powers may be brought into
time, changes in the distribution of power may line with existing normative structures of LIO, via
affect the underlying constellation of interests mechanisms such as arguing and persuasion, ha-
leading to demands for adapting international bitualization, and social integration (Finnemore
institutions to new interests. These demands for 1996; Checkel 2005). However, socialization does
change are, however, channeled by existing in- not necessarily mean acquiescence to every ex-
ternational institutions that mitigate the effects isting rule. It includes the habit of questioning the
of international anarchy and provide benefits to interpretation and application of existing prin-
both rising and established powers rendering the ciples and norms, especially those which have
liberal international order more robust than re- turned out to be counter-productive. In this way,
alists acknowledge (Ikenberry 2011). Consequent- sociological institutionalists can account for con-
ly, rising powers are seen as reformist, advocat- testations of those (neo)liberal norms that have
ing a change of policies and institutional reforms turned out to be normatively indefensible in lib-
rather than a demise of the liberal international eral terms.
order. Different forms of “counter-institutional-
ization” (Zürn 2018: 173) allow states that are crit- While some of the current contestations of LIO
ical of the status quo to press for change with- are indeed reformist in the sense that the de-
out rejecting the institutional order as such. In mands for change are justified with principles
sum, rational institutionalist approaches expect that are compatible with postnational liberalism,
6SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
our explanation emphasizes that other demands contestations of LIO. We need an explanation not
fundamentally challenge liberal principles that only for the current wave of contestations but al-
are constitutive for LIO. so for the variety of contestations that differ with
regard to the contestants and their strategies.
International political economists, finally, focus
on how the neoliberal thinking behind post-1990s
international institutions produced a change in 3 AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT: LIBERAL
the distribution of global wealth, with social in- INTRUSIVENESS AND VARIETIES OF
equalities growing in many parts of the world, es- CONTESTATIONS
pecially in the West. Such reasoning points out
that not everybody has benefitted from econom- Our account of the rise and variety of contes-
ic globalization. Growing inequalities, fear of so- tations focuses on the shift from liberal multi-
cial exclusion, and the volatility of value orien- lateralism to postnational liberalism. We consid-
tation have driven the emergence of populism er thickly liberal international authorities with
and the threat that it may pose to international a high level of intrusiveness as the main driving
institutions, such as the UN, the European Union force behind the current wave of contestations.
(EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Given that the shift from liberal multilateralism to
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Wey- postnational liberalism is at least partially the re-
mouth et al. 2021; Gulotty/Goldstein 2021; Fla- sult of self-reinforcing dynamics triggered by the
herty/Rogowski 2021). A more critical version of post-World War II LIO, our account has affinities
this perspective argues that economic elites de- to historical institutionalism (Zürn 2018). Howev-
signed international institutions to serve their er, we take the rise of liberal intrusiveness prac-
interests and to create stronger links between ticed by international institutions as a major ex-
themselves and state governments. The econom- planatory variable without directly addressing its
ic and social costs of promoting and protecting historical origins.
economic freedom are born by those who are un-
employed or work in sectors that cannot compete After 1945, US-American leadership facilitated the
in global markets (Overbeek/Van Apeldoorn 2012; establishment of a multilateral international or-
Colgan/Keohane 2017). LIO is mainly challenged der with some liberal ingredients. The postwar
from the inside of liberal states by those who per- LIO I was based on state consent and centered
ceive themselves as the losers of globalization. around the competition between two world sys-
tems. It was a weak liberal but quite successful
This perspective is valid in explaining part of the international order. Its self-reinforcing dynamics
current wave of contestations of LIO. It, howev- resulted in the postnational LIO II, which emerged
er, fails to account for the most vivid LIO contes- after the end of the Cold War (cf. Lake et al. 2021).
tations by authoritarian governments of societ- On the one hand, LIO I deepened, broadened, and
ies that have undoubtedly benefitted from the strengthened the liberal elements of its institu-
global redistribution of wealth in recent decades. tions. The deepening of free trade from the 1960s
Globalization winners with authoritarian govern- on and the slow but progressive recognition of
ments that contest LIO include Turkey, Hungary, human rights as universal standards in the global
Brazil, India, and, of course, China. system are indicative of this move towards liber-
alism. On the other hand, the growing attractive-
In sum, none of the predominant explanations in ness of the Western model of society, especially
the IR literature can fully account for the range of its economic success which was at least partially
7SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
owed to LIO I, put pressure on the Soviet Union to become more critical of specific internation-
leading to Perestroika, which enabled the revolu- al institutions.
tions in Eastern Europe and the demise of the So-
viet Empire. These dynamics triggered a process On the other hand, the exercise of international
that led to the rise of contestations and pre-de- authority allows for overruling elected govern-
termined contestants’ choice of strategy. Our ments. Technocratic regulation and dispute-set-
model captures this process in four steps. tlement by independent bodies (delegation) con-
trolled by cosmopolitan liberals trump popular
First, the post-Cold War period saw the rise of sovereignty. Postnational liberalism thus push-
multilateral institutions at the global and region- es states towards respecting human rights, the
al level with more authority than ever before, un- rule of law, and towards democratization, placing
dermining the consent principle in interstate de- universal liberal ideas over popular sovereignty.
cision-making (Lake 2009; Börzel 2013; Zürn 2018). The promotion and protection of liberal norms by
The social purpose of these institutions beyond international institutions increase the propensi-
the nation-state was strongly liberal, promoting ty particularly for authoritarian populists inside
and protecting individual economic, political, and and outside liberal societies to contest the intru-
civil rights. We argue that the increased author- siveness of postnational LIO II. In addition, the re-
ity of international institutions and strength of distributive consequences of international insti-
their liberal content combined into a systemic tutions become much more visible. Rather than
shift from the liberal multilateralism of LIO I to being indifferent, citizens have increasingly tak-
the postnational liberalism of LIO II. en a stance on neoliberal international agree-
ments, as exemplified by the worldwide anti-glo-
Second, to the extent that international institu- balization protests by civil society groups against
tions increased their liberal intrusiveness, we ex- the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
pect a growing propensity of contestation. This ship (TTIP). International liberal institutions al-
argument draws on the link between authority so constrain states in their redistributive capac-
and legitimation (Tallberg/Zürn 2019). We identi- ity to compensate the losers of “disembedding”
fy two causal mechanisms at work that limit the liberalism, yet they shirk their political respon-
legitimation of an institution as it gains author- sibility for compensating the losers of globaliza-
ity. The starting point for both is that interna- tion (see also Gulotty/Goldstein 2021). As a result,
tional authority concentrates decision-making we see an overall rise in the level of LIO contes-
power in the hands of executives of a few pow- tations that informs the theme of this special is-
erful states backed up by technocrats. On the one sue (Lake et al. 2021).
hand, these executives utilize international in-
stitutions to affect the policies of less powerful Third, both of the described mechanisms are ac-
states. Core states, in contrast, tend to be less tar- centuated by moments of crises when the lib-
geted by international institutions. Like cases are eral intrusiveness of international institutions
often not treated alike. In this sense, internation- becomes visible. Two such moments are par-
al institutions formalize stratification between ticularly relevant for translating legitimation
states through weighted voting and veto power problems into actual contestations. Regarding
as well as through more informal stigmatization security issues, the attack on the Hussein gov-
processes (Adler-Nissen/Zarakol 2021; Tourinho ernment in Iraq by a US-led “coalition of the will-
2021; Búzás 2021). As a result, actors that are not ing” in 2001 increased suspicions that LIO main-
at the core of the decision-making process tend ly served the national interest of the hegemon.
8SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
The final justification of the attack, which re- Fourth, the growing visibility of the steep rise of
ferred to the non-proliferation of nuclear weap- liberal intrusiveness has led to a wave of differ-
ons, made it especially obvious that like cases entiated contestations with significant variation
were not treated alike. The intervention in Lib- concerning what is contested and where. In gener-
ya in 2011 also fueled the suspicion that inter- al, we define contestations of the liberal interna-
national institutions were used to let Western tional order as discursive and behavioral practices
interests prevail over others. Regarding econom- that come with a certain level of social mobiliza-
ic issues, the financial crisis of 2008 as well as tion and challenge the authority of internation-
the ensuing Euro-crisis showed with remarkable al institutions, their liberal intrusiveness, or the
clarity that major decisions were carried out via liberal international order as a whole. Based on
international institutions with little accountabil- this general definition, we develop a typology to
ity, such as the International Monetary Fund and contrast different strategies of contestation that
the European Central Bank, or as a result of be- target rule-based multilateralism and/or the lib-
hind-closed-door negotiations. National parties eral social purpose of international institutions.
and parliaments played, at best, a marginal role.
As we will show below, the so-called European In our alternative account, the attitude of contes-
refugee crisis in 2015 equally disclosed contro- tants towards liberal authority (preferences) and
versial features of postnational liberalism (Bör- their relative position in the contested institution
zel/Risse 2018). We argue that these moments (power) pre-determine the strategy of contesta-
of visibility have influenced the growing contes- tion. The combination of these two distinctions
tations of LIO driven by the open display of in- leads to a two-dimensional space of LIO II contes-
creased liberal intrusiveness. tations (figure 1). The horizontal dimension refers
Figure 1 Varieties of Contestations
REJECTION OF LIBERAL AUTHORITY
Pushback Dissi-
dence
STRONG INFLUENCE
WEAK INFLUENCE
With-
Reform
drawal
REJECTION OF THE EXERCISE OF LIBERAL AUTHORITY
9SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
RISE PROBLEMS VISIBILITY VARIETIES OF
CONTESTATIONS
Authority + Inequality and Iraq War /
Liberal Content = Double Standards Intervention in Pushback
Liberal Libya Reform
Intrusiveness Limitation of Dissidence
Popular Financial Withdrawal
Sovereignty Crisis /
”Refugee Crisis”
Figure 2 Postnational Liberalism and Its Varieties of Contestations
to the degree to which an actor has the power to of less liberal intrusiveness. In many cases, it in-
shape the decisions of an institution (institution- volves challenging core components of the dom-
al influence). In our broad understanding, institu- inant liberal order. Pushback contestations are
tional influence consists of a formal element that voiced by governments that wield enough power
refers to its material capabilities and the institu- to affect institutional change in international au-
tional rules an actor can draw on to affect deci- thorities or social movements and political par-
sions. Another more informal element describes ties that are close to such governments.
the extent to which the actor is part of back-
ground talks prior to decisions, or is stigmatized Actors that are dissatisfied with the way authority
as a trouble-maker that needs to be controlled is exercised but accept international liberal au-
as opposed to recognized as an order-maker that thority in general should opt for “reform” if they
controls others. These two elements are com- have sufficient capabilities to make their de-
bined into a dimension the extreme values of mands for change heard within the international
which we label as weak and strong institution- institution.2 Reforms that aim to strengthen lib-
al influence. eral authority or change policies are examples.
The vertical dimension registers the position or In contrast, outsiders that see little chance to
attitude of a contestant towards postnational lib- change the way liberal authority is exercised are
eralism. While some contestations are directed likely to opt for “withdrawal”. This can take the
against the specific way in which liberal author- form of “counter-institutionalization” (Zürn 2018:
ity is exercised (“rejection of the exercise of lib- 173), that is, the creation of new liberal authorities,
eral authority”), others defy liberal international without necessarily abandoning the existing ones.3
authority as a whole (“rejection of liberal authori-
ty”). This distinction refers to the question wheth- 2 “Reform” is an established term for “within-changes” both
in IR and comparative politics. It is very close to what Albert
er an international authority in place is rejected Hirschman (Hirschman 1970) has labelled as “voice” in his typolo-
as such or whether its practices (decisions and gy of strategies used by dissatisfied actors.
decision-making) are challenged. 3 We consider “withdrawal” as more appropriate than the more
specific terms like “regime-shifting” and “contested multilateral-
ism” used in the regime complex literature. See Alter/Raustiala
“Pushback” describes a strategy to reduce liberal (2018) for an overview of regime shifting and contested multilater-
alism. The common feature of all strategies falling into this cate-
international authority from the inside. The core gory is the threat or the attempt to withdraw, which has affinities
of this strategy is to return to a prior condition with Hirschman’s “exit” (Hirschman 1970).
10SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
Another form of withdrawal is to disregard liber- argument on how the shift towards postnational
al authority that actors find disagreeable but lack liberalism has given rise to varieties of contesta-
the means to change or replace with alternative tions in two issue-areas that are key to LIO: inter-
international institutions. national security and international refugee law.
Finally, we use “dissidence” to refer to the strat- 4.1 LIBERAL INTRUSIVENESS
egy that aims to destroy liberal internation-
al institutions rather than reduce their power We measure the extent to which postnational lib-
because actors reject any form of liberal inter- eralism has evolved after the 1990s with a liber-
national authority yet lack the power to defy it.4 al intrusiveness index, using the data on interna-
A non-violent form of dissidence is the attempt to tional authority as developed in the International
fully repatriate international authority by trans- Authority Database (IAD) in two ways.5 First, we
ferring sovereignty rights back to states. Terror- assess the overall level of authority in the inter-
ism can be considered as a violent form of dis- national system as a whole. The IAD measures
sidence. the authority of international organizations (IOs)
in terms of their autonomy from states in tak-
In sum, we posit that postnational liberalism is ing decisions and the extent to which their de-
increasingly challenged by four different types of cisions, procedures, and rules are binding for
contestations. The expectation is, first, that we states, limiting a state’s discretion regarding a
see a general rise of LIO contestations, and, sec- number of policy functions.6 To empirically cap-
ond, that the choice of strategy is affected by the ture the autonomy and bindingness dimensions
contestant’s preference regarding postnational for each policy function, a comprehensive cod-
liberalism and its power to change internation- ing scheme with more than 150 items was used.
al authorities. Figure 2 summarizes our model, The “authority score” is the product of autonomy,
which provides a joint explanation of the rise in bindingness, and policy scope with a maximum
and varieties of contestations of LIO. of 10.25 for each IO. In figure 3, authority scores
are plotted over time to show how IO authority
has developed. The y-axis refers to the sum of
4 EMPIRICAL PROBE the authority scores of all 34 IAD assessed IOs,
with 358.75 as the overall maximum. The x-axis
Our empirical exploration proceeds in two steps. describes the development of these values over
First, the empirical probing of our argument is
based on demonstrating the transformation of
5 The database assesses the authority of 34 IOs and 230 IO
LIO from liberal multilateralism to postnational bodies based on geographic and issue-specific selection criteria
liberalism. For this purpose, we develop a mea- from the pool of all 359 active IOs in the Correlates of War dataset
on intergovernmental organizations (Pevehouse et al. 2007).
sure of liberal intrusiveness consisting of the The IAD coded approximately 1.000 legal documents comprising
overall degree of international authority com- founding treaties, potential amendment treaties, and rules of
procedures. See https://www.wzb.eu/en/research/internation-
bined with the relative strength of the liberal al-politics-and-law/global-governance/projects/international-au-
content. In a second step, we delve deeper with thority-database (accessed 2 July 2020) and Zürn et al. (i.p.), where
the method and major descriptive findings are presented.
two case studies that illustrate our theoretical
6 The database identifies seven crucial policy functions ranging
from capturing agenda setting via rule-making to monitoring, ad-
4 We borrow the term from Daase/Deitelhoff (2019), who use judication, enforcement, IO evaluation and knowledge generation.
“dissidence” to describe a full rejection of existing systems of For each of these seven policy functions, authority is assessed
rule, challenging both its social purpose and decision-making by collecting information on the actor performing the particular
structures and processes. policy function and on the corresponding decision rules.
11SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
150
100
50
0
year
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Liberal Authority Liberal Intrusiveness Index Overall Authority
Figure 3 The Liberal Intrusiveness Index
Source: Own compilation with data from the International Authority Database (IAD)
(https://www.wzb.eu/en/research/international-politics-and-law/global-governance/projects/international-authority-database,
accessed 2 July 2020).
time. The dotted line represents the combined coded “0” when neither trade nor human rights
authority scores of all coded IOs. We clearly see are their primary purpose, “1” when either of
two periods with a sharp increase in international them is the primary purpose, and “2” when both
authority: after 1945 and after 1990. The first pe- human rights and trade are major iss9ues. In this
riod of growth was driven by the founding of new way, we capture the degree to which internation-
IOs in the aftermath of World War II, the most im- al authority is of liberal content. Again, we see a
portant of which are the UN, the Bretton Woods steep rise of liberal authority after 1945 and 1990
Institutions, and the European. It levels out in the (indicated by the dashed line).
1970s. The second wave started with the end of
the Cold War and is as steep as the first one. This Our liberal intrusiveness index combines the lev-
time, the number of IOs remains relatively stable; el of authority with its liberal content (indicated
thus, the growth mainly points to an increase in by the continuous line), which illustrates the shift
liberal practice among existing authorities rath- of the multilateral LIO I to the postnational LIO
er than the creation of new ones. II. First, after an initial rise of liberal internation-
al authority immediately after World War II fol-
Second, we zoom in on liberal IOs, which have lowed by a period of stagnation from the 1970s up
a clear focus on either trade (economic liberal- to 1990, we see a renewed phase of growth start-
ism) or human rights (political liberalism). IOs are ing in the 1990s. Second, after the end of the Cold
12SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
War, liberal authorities became not only stronger openly challenging liberal institutions (Inglehart/
but also substantially more liberal as evidenced Norris 2016). Third, it is widely recognized that
by the sharp increase of liberal international au- rising powers have contested postnational lib-
thority, which is steeper than it was after World eralism, especially after 2001. Similar to contes-
War II. The post-World War II LIO I was above all tants from the Global South, they target the West-
“rule-based”. Attempts to make it more intrusive, ern bias of these institutions as indicated by the
such as creating the International Trade Organi- voting behavior of BRICS in the United Nations
zation or the European Defence Community, had General Assembly (see Binder/Lockwood Pay-
failed. The postnational LIO II is both more lib- ton 2019). Fourth, starting in the late 1990s, LIO
eral in content and more authoritative in form. in general became the major target of contesta-
Third, the growth of liberal international author- tions from fundamentalist Islamism, which re-
ity seems to level off after 2010. According to our jects LIO’s liberal authority and the cosmopoli-
model, this is related to legitimation problems tan worldview associated with it. The increase of
that arose when crisis events, such as the military terrorist attacks provides an, albeit very rough,
interventions in Iraq and Libya and the global fi- indicator here.7
nancial crisis, made the intrusiveness of liberal
international institutions more visible. We probe the hypothesized relationship between
liberal intrusiveness and the rise of contestations
We argue that the steep increase in liberal intru- by looking in-depth at two cases that are central
siveness of LIO II after the end of the Cold War for LIO. Both cases show that increased liberal
triggered a major wave of contestations start- intrusiveness has led to increased contestation
ing at the turn of the century. First, transnational and that the attitude of contestants towards lib-
movements, mainly based in Western countries, eral authority and their position within the con-
battle neoliberal policies and demand the re-reg- tested institution pre-determines their choice of
ulation of global markets. They pursue a more or strategy.
less reformist agenda aiming to address the re-
distributive consequences of international trade 4.2 VARIETIES OF CONTESTATIONS OF THE
by strengthening international institutions. This NEW SECURITY-REGIME COMPLEX
form of contestation emerged from the late 1990s
on as reflected in research on the politicization Politically, the most relevant move to postnation-
of international institutions by transnational so- al liberalism is arguably in the field of security.
cial movements (Zürn et al. 2012; Tallberg et al. For some time, it appeared that the global gover-
2013). Second, international liberal institutions nance system would move from a regime based
have also become increasingly politicized with- on the principle of international security to one
in liberal societies where authoritarian populist based on human security. Liberal multilateral-
parties echo demands of illiberal regimes to pro- ism’s goal of preventing wars between states was
tect national sovereignty against external inter- broadened towards preventing any massive viola-
ference authorized and legitimized by liberal in- tions of human rights in world society. There are
ternational institutions, including the WTO, the two international institutions in particular that
UN, the EU, or the Organization for Security and became more liberal and more authoritative at
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The success of the same time: the UN Security Council (UNSC)
these authoritarian populist parties is indicated
by their increased appearance in electoral de- 7 Global Terrorism Database (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/,
mocracies as well as the escalation of autocrats accessed 30 May 2019).
13SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
and the International Criminal Court (ICC). After The lengthy negotiations and the early phase of
claims that both the UNSC and the ICC had exer- the ICC were characterized by strong resistance
cised their authority inconsistently and illegiti- from the US, which was overcome only when
mately, contestations increased significantly and France and Great Britain changed sides (Deitel-
ultimately resulted in a weakening of these insti- hoff 2009). African states overwhelmingly en-
tutions. dorsed the ICC with Senegal being the first coun-
try in the world to ratify it. Adopting the ICC stood
4.2.1 FROM LIO I TO LIO II: CASES OF for a new era of postnational liberalism, marked
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION by democratization, the expansion of global gov-
In the 1950s, the East-West conflict had dead- ernance and global institutions, and widespread
locked the UNSC. In response, in the 1960s Dag recognition and implementation of human rights
Hammarskjöld, former UN General Secretary, de- standards. In this vein, in 2001 the International
veloped the concept of peacekeeping, which re- Commission on Intervention and State Sovereign-
quired the consensus of all parties involved in ty (ICISS) called for a strong version of Responsi-
a conflict and was practiced almost exclusive- bility to Protect (R2P). The international commu-
ly in cases of interstate war. In the early 1990s, nity adopted a somewhat more limited version
a second generation of peacekeeping opera- at the UN’s 2005 World Summit, which, however,
tions emerged, which continued to observe the still provided justification for interventions in-
consensus rule but also deployed troops in in- to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
tra-state wars. It was this shift to peace enforce- crimes against humanity.
ment that moved the UNSC into the age of post-
national liberalism. After Iraqi President Saddam 4.2.2 A DIFFERENTIATED WAVE OF
Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990 CONTESTATIONS
and refused to withdraw, the UNSC authorized Despite initial support, the exercise of liberal
the liberation of Kuwait by military means. While authority in the new security-regime complex
the social purpose of the intervention was still failed to produce legitimacy. Non-Western states
international security, it moved quickly towards claimed that the UNSC and the ICC did not treat
the liberal notion of human security in line with like cases alike but reinforced double standards
the new norms embraced by the second genera- and Western dominance. For the UNSC, the inter-
tion of peacekeeping. For the first time, the UN- ventions in Iraq (2003) and later in Libya (2011)
SC acknowledged that “a humanitarian crisis – in- were decisive events. Without authorization from
cluding threats to democracy – can constitute a the UNSC for an intervention in Iraq, US Presi-
threat to international peace, justifying actions dent Bush gathered a “coalition of the willing” to
as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter” remove Saddam Hussein from power and bring
(UNSC Resolutions 841/1993 and 1529/2005 on the about a regime change. In 2011, UNSC Resolution
situation in Haiti). This marked a heretofore un- 1973 had authorized the military intervention in
known height of liberal intrusiveness by the UN Libya by a multi-state NATO-led coalition. How-
intervention regime. ever, China and Russia had abstained and did not
see the Resolution as authorization for a regime
Whereas the UNSC changed practice after 1990, change. Regarding the ICC, mainly African states,
the International Criminal Court (ICC) was a new- which had initially supported the ICC, criticized
ly founded flagship organization of postnational the court for selective prosecution and the UN-
liberalism. The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 SC for selective reference of cases to the ICC. Pri-
July 1988 and entered into force four years later. or to an investigation in Georgia in 2016, the ICC
14SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
had only investigated African cases and was ac- threshold of “just cause” based on human secu-
cused of “neocolonialism” and “race hunting” by rity and R2P. After the UNSC’s liberal interpreta-
official representatives of the African Union (AU) tion of resolution 1973, they hardened their strat-
(Gissel 2018). egy by working more often and more forcefully
with their veto-right, again based on the justifi-
This decreased legitimacy of liberal authority led cation that humanitarian intervention was a Tro-
to an increased level of contestation. The sec- jan Horse for the advancement of the parochi-
ond Iraq intervention in 2003 was a game chang- al interests of Western states (Bellamy 2005: 42).
er. On 15 February 2003, there was a coordinat-
ed day of transnational protests across the world Pushback is different from full rejection or even
during which people in more than 600 cities ex- dissidence. Russia and China consistently empha-
pressed opposition to the imminent Iraq War. So- size the value of the UNSC as an authoritative
cial movement researchers have described these institution. China and, to a lesser extent, Russia
coordinated protests as the largest in human his- also reluctantly began to adopt the language of
tory (Walgrave/Rucht 2010). It was part of a series human rights but disentangled it from its liberal
of protests and political events that had begun in content (Morozov 2015). As a result, the purpose
2002 and continued as the war unfolded. These of the UNSC was reinforced, while international
developments also strengthened the mounting monitoring of Russia’s and China’s own domestic
critique by Russia and China towards so-called human rights records were prevented. While part
humanitarian interventions. At the same time, re- of this contestation strategy is certainly due to
gional powers and major contributors to the UN changes in domestic politics in China and Russia,
asked for a reform of the UNSC’s membership and the general trend towards increased contestation
decision-making rules. Attacks by African states can be explained by a failure to legitimize the
on the ICC can be observed from 2009 on (Gissel new liberal intrusiveness and perceived abuse of
2018). Contestations not only grew. They also dif- its power by Western states.
fered. In line with our argument, contestations in
the security regime complex can be accounted for Reform: India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany are cen-
by attitudes towards the liberal authority and the tral actors that do not challenge the liberal intru-
position within the institution in question. siveness of the UNSC but demand reforms of its
institutional rules to increase the representative-
Pushback: As members of the group of the five ness of the UNSC. The so-called G4 have seen an
permanent members of the UNSC (P5) equipped increase in their power since the UNSC was es-
with veto rights, Russia and China are very close tablished, including in their GDP, contributions
to the decision-making center and do not con- to the UN activities, and recognition as regional
test the political authority of the UNSC as such. powers. They posit that this should be reflected in
Instead, their contestations target the liber- their own permanent seat in the Council. The G4
al content of the human security approach (Jet- have advanced their demands by relating them
schke/Abb 2019: 180). They aim to push back any to three normative justifications: representation,
far-reaching interpretation of human securi- effectiveness, and power (to “reflect realities”).
ty and the R2P by emphasizing the principle of
Westphalian sovereignty and the need to act on- The P5 have so far shown no sign of supporting
ly with UNSC authority. Russia and China had al- such a reform, unless it is conducive to all five ve-
ready justified their abstention from voting on to powers at the same time. In the meantime, the
Resolution 1973 expressing doubts about the demands for change by Brazil, India, and South
15SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
Africa have become more accentuated in tone ruling by its High Court. Instead, Burundi with-
(Jetschke/Abb 2019). Yet, while the need for re- drew from the Court on 27 October 2017. Although
form has been more or less globally accepted, a the ICC still has 33 African state parties, its legiti-
reform of the UNSC remains unlikely. macy has been fundamentally damaged by these
challenges from African states and the AU. The
Withdrawal: Especially since 2009, African states recent crisis in Africa’s relationship with the ICC
have made decisions that have damaged the im- “reflects a dissonance between the ICC’s practic-
age of the ICC: failing to cooperate with the ICC in es and the court that African states sought to cre-
prosecuting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir ate or thought they were creating” (Gissel 2018:
and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, hosting 729). The threat of withdrawal is accompanied by
wanted individuals, threatening to leave the ICC, demands of replacing the ICC with a regional Af-
and voting indicted individuals into the highest rican institution corroborating our typology that
office. Over the years, the Assembly of the AU has places counter-institutionalization as a special
also adopted various resolutions critical of the form of withdrawal.
ICC and its practices (Gissel 2018).
Dissidence: In 2014, the Islamic State (IS) drew in-
The African critique is based on a perception of ternational attention when it brutally conquered
selective prosecution. The UNSC has referred to vast swathes of Iraq and declared itself a Caliph-
some cases, like Libya and Darfur, but not to oth- ate. By mid-2014, it had become “the strongest,
ers, such as Israel and Syria, supporting the ac- best-resourced and most ideologically potent ter-
cusations of a double standard and an anti-Af- rorist quasi-state of the post-9/11 era” (Brands/
rican bias (Asaala 2017). Two cases are notable Feaver 2017: 11). The central goal of the IS is to de-
examples of this bias. The first investigation ev- stroy the existing order substituting it with a uni-
er to be launched by the ICC Prosecutor herself versal Islamic order. The IS interpretation of Islam
(proprio motu) referred to Kenya in 2010. The ICC rejects state-based international order as an or-
ruled that the government of Kenya had not tak- ganizing principle. As a Jihadi-Salafi movement,
en sufficient steps towards investigating polit- it also rejects international law, because man-
ical leaders and Kenya challenged the jurisdic- made law subverts the principle of legislation as
tion of the court by asserting its right to handle the prerogative of God alone. Most importantly,
the cases under national law. Two of the accused international law is seen as emanating from the
were elected into official positions. Eventually, all most powerful states and reflecting the norms of
charges were dropped because the ICC Prosecu- the “Crusader West” (Mendelsohn 2015).
tor refused to present the cases. Moreover, the
AU claimed that the warrant against Libyan Pres- The differentiated wave of contestations – con-
ident Gaddafi complicated efforts to find a nego- sisting of the rise of pushback, reform, withdraw-
tiated political solution to the crisis. It asked the al, and dissidence – has been consequential. De-
UNSC to suspend the work of the ICC, but its re- bates about the security regime complex and the
quest was not honored (Vilmer 2016). R2P has changed course. The early debate fo-
cused on human security and aimed for a funda-
In 2016, three African states, Burundi, South Afri- mental “re-conception of security, solidarity, and
ca, and the Gambia, announced their withdraw- even sovereignty” (Slaughter 2005: 619) to allow
al from the Rome Statute. The Gambia revoked for a norm change aligned with the growing lib-
its withdrawal notification following the election eral intrusiveness of the UNSC. Since about 2001,
of a new president; so did South Africa after a R2P became much more narrowly defined. More
16SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 3
recently, it has been made clear that the final au- universal coverage is fortified by regional pro-
thorization of an intervention in domestic affairs tection regimes, such as the Organization of Af-
requires a decision by the UNSC with China and rican Unity (now African Union) Convention gov-
Russia insisting that any such measure would not erning the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
be considered legitimate without the consent of in Africa of 1969 or the Cartagena Declaration on
the affected sovereign state. Therefore, contes- Refugees of 1984. Asia is the only region that has
tation has been successful in the sense that the refrained from developing regional refugee re-
current situation is closer to the liberal multilat- gimes despite having the largest refugee popu-
eral security regime of LIO I than to the original lation in the world.
ambitions of the postnational liberal security re-
gime envisioned by supporters of human securi- 4.3.1 THE EU’S GROWING LIBERAL
ty and R2P in LIO II. INTRUSIVENESS
The European Union took almost 50 years to set
4.3 VARIETIES OF CONTESTATIONS OF up its own postnational refugee regime. All mem-
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: THE ber states have been party to the 1951 Geneva
EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Moreover, the
European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
The International Regime on Refugees built man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Europe-
around the 1951 Convention (Geneva Convention an Convention on Human Rights/ECM), which en-
on Refugees) and its 1967 Protocol (New York Pro- tered into force in 1953, has protected the human
tocol) are together the cornerstone of interna- rights of refugees. In case of violation, a state can
tional refugee law and, as such, form a consti- be taken to the European Court of Human Rights
tutive part of the liberal international order. The (ECtHR) and its judgments are binding and en-
Geneva Convention was inspired by and designed forced. With the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the EU
on the experience of massive refugee flows during obtained the authority to develop its own region-
and immediately after WWII. Several states had al refugee regime. The Common European Asy-
denied admission to Jews fleeing the Holocaust. lum System (CEAS) has been a decisive step to-
After the war, millions of refugees from the So- wards postnational liberalism. Between 1999 and
viet Union were forcibly returned despite con- 2004, the EU set supranational standards for re-
cerns they would face retaliation from the Sovi- ceiving asylum seekers, determining which mem-
et government. The refugee status as defined in ber states were responsible for registering asy-
the Convention therefore pertains to people per- lum seekers and handling their applications. EU
secuted in their home country; it does not cov- legislation also specified procedures for granting
er people fleeing from poverty or natural disas- and withdrawing refugee status and made provi-
ters. The core principle of the Geneva Convention sions for temporary protection in the event of a
is non-refoulement. The principle forbids a coun- massive influx. The Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 fur-
try receiving a refugee from expelling or returning ther strengthened the EU’s liberal authority giv-
them “to the frontiers of territories where [their] ing it the power to create a single European sys-
life or freedom would be threatened on account tem built around a uniform status of asylum and
of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership, subsidiary protection, a common system of tem-
of a particular social group or political opinion” porary protection for displaced persons, uniform
(Art. 33 para.1 Geneva Convention). The New York procedures for granting and withdrawing asy-
Protocol removed the geographic and tempo- lum or subsidiary protection status, and com-
ral limitations of the Geneva Convention. Their mon standards concerning reception conditions
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