THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION OF 2014: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
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Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION
OF 2014: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT
Roger Southall
Department of Sociology,
University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
1. Introduction
The outcome of the 7 May 2014 general elections in South Africa would
seem to indicate, at first glance, that the business of democracy is con-
tinuing as usual. As Table 1 suggests, the African National Congress
(ANC) may have obtained its lowest ever share of the vote, yet it ob-
tained a result that was in many ways remarkable given its 20 years in
power. Indeed, far from choosing to turn the rascals out, the electorate
returned them with a resounding 62 per cent of the poll, only marginally
less than in 1994. Further, it re-elected the ANC in eight out of the nine
provinces (it having always previously won outright in seven or more).
Correspondingly, the Democratic Alliance (DA) continued its steady rise
in the polls, defying oft-made predictions that it in 2009 it was approach-
ing its 'racial ceiling' (that is, that while able to aggregate the votes of
racial minorities, it is unable to attract the votes of black Africans).
Thirdly, while much hype has accompanied the birth of the Economic
Freedom Fighters (EFF), the latter's securing of over six per cent of the
votes — while highly creditable for a party formed only months before
the election — may define it as a new 'third' party along the lines of the
United Democratic Movement (UDM) in 1999 and the Congress of the
People (Cope) in 2009. As with the EFF, both of these were essentially
breakaways from the ANC, and both proved unable to maintain their
share of the vote after a reasonable first showing. This points to a fourth
dimension of election 2014 — the continuing squeeze of the smaller
parties, and the seeming drift towards a de facto two-party system,
within the context of ANC party dominance (Southall 2014).
ANC intellectual Pallo Jordan (2014) has compared the result of
80Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
the 2014 election with that of 1994, and concluded that South Africa is
coming to resemble a 'normal' democracy, with the DA having taken the
place of the New National Party —NNP (and drawing its votes from the
same electoral basis). Such a 'normal' democracy does not, self-evidently,
exclude the representation of parties other than the big two, yet it man-
ages to severely constrain their electoral territory. This and other ten-
dencies are illustrated by Table 1:
There is much to be said for the 'business as usual' perspective
on the 2014 elections. Nonetheless, it is arguable that if we dig beneath
the surface, then the outcome also points to undercurrents that are likely
to challenge the character of South African democracy. In what follows
below, I suggest:
— first, that while continuing to remain solid overall, the foundations
of the ANC's vote are beginning to crumble;
— second, that the DA gives every indication that it will continue to
rise in the polls;
— third, that even if the EFF proves no more able than the UDM and
Cope to sustain a significant political presence, its appear-
ance suggests a new dimension to 'third' party politics.
2. The ANC: Defying expectations — but for
how long?
The ANC entered the election against the background of opinion polls
that suggested that it might be hauled back to just over 50 per cent of
the vote. Widespread labour disputes, highlighted by the tragedy of
Marikana (when police killed 44 striking mineworkers) and the long run-
ning strike on the platinum mines, combined with other depressing news
to contribute to declining confidence in the economy. The death of Nelson
Mandela in December 2013 symbolised for many the end of an era, re-
inforcing narratives that the ANC had lost its idealism, and had become
the vehicle of a political class out of touch with its historic constituency
amongst, notably, the poor. Indeed, a continuing high level of popular
protests among communities around the country highlighted deep-seated
discontent with government performance on the ground. Meanwhile,
the coalition which had elevated Jacob Zuma to the presidency had be-
gun to dissolve, and the President himself, a major asset in the elections
of 2009, had become a major electoral liability, with numerous allega-
81Roger Southall
Table 1: Summary Results of the National Elections1)
Party Percentage of Votes Number of Seats
1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
ANC 62.7 66.4 69.7 65.9 62.2 252 266 279 264 249
DP/DA 1.7 9.6 12.4 16.7 22.2 7 38 50 67 89
NP/NNP 20.4 6.9 1.7 - - 82 28 7 - -
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2
IFP 10.5 8.6 6.9 4.6 2.4 43 34 28 18 10
COPE - - - 7.4 0.7 - - - 30 3
EFF - - - - 6.4 - - - - 25
Other Parties 4.7 8.5 9.3 5.4 6.1 16 34 36 31 24
82Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
tions that he had used state office to benefit his family and those around
him at public expense. Further, the tripartite alliance which linked the
ANC to the South African Communist Party (SACP) to Cosatu (the
Congress of South African trade unions), was openly divided. Not only
had the expulsion of Julius Malema, the former president of the ANC
Youth League from the ANC in 2012 led to the creation of the EFF, but
Cosatu was faced by the prospect of a breakaway to its left by forces
congregated around the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
(Numsa). In short, the ANC entered the election on the defensive, under
widespread attack for having failed to reap the dividends of democracy
(Southall 2014).
In the event, of course, the ANC managed to turn the difficult
situation it was facing around. Which other governing parties around the
world would not be delighted to secure a 62 per cent victory at the polls?
How did the ANC manage to achieve this, seemingly against the odds?
The immediate answer is that South African voting behaviour is
rooted in political identity, and for the majority of black South Africans
this means that they identify with the ANC. This is their default position,
so come an election campaign, the ANC works hard to ensure that
identity turns into votes. In successive studies of the ANC's election
campaigns in 2009 and 2014, Anthony Butler has demonstrated the
organisational strength and finesse of the ANC. It is based upon a pro-
found and methodical approach to election campaigning, which begins
as much as a year before any particular election. It is shaped by extens-
ive research (from polls to focus groups), and is carefully adapted to
provincial peculiarities. It draws upon a mass membership, with branches
located in virtually every community across the land, with cross mem-
bership of Cosatu enabling it, among other things, to mobilise numer-
ous school teachers and public officials on its behalf. Furthermore, it
usually centres its campaigning around its leader, while simultaneously
keeping the temperature of its electioneering low (so as not to provide
undue opportunities to its opponents). Lastly, it is able to call upon mas-
sive financial resources: quite how much money it throws into its cam-
paign it is difficult to ascertain, but there is no doubt whatsoever that the
amounts it can call upon dwarf those available to even the DA. Nor is it
shy of diverting state resources to its cause (Butler 2009, 2014).
If this is the general picture, there are always difficulties peculiar
to any individual campaign. In 2014, embarrassing instances of Zuma
being roundly heckled at mass gatherings led to his appearances being
83Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
very carefully controlled. The ANC faced a particularly difficult challenge
in Gauteng, where the party's provincial organisation was hostile to
Zuma's leadership, trade unions with large memberships (notably
Numsa) were refusing to campaign for the party, and there was wide-
spread opposition to the 'e-tolling' of the major highways. Furthermore,
as will be elaborated below, both the DA and the EFF posed new prob-
lems which the ANC had to negotiate. Nonetheless, overall, the ANC
juggernaut managed to steamroller its way to a comfortable victory in
circumstances which were more difficult than in any previous election.
Even so, there are grounds for arguing that the ANC should be worried.
I highlight two here:
First, the electoral demography is changing. The voting age
population (VAP) is becoming younger. Whereas in 1996 36 per cent of
the population was in the 15-34 age group and 24 per cent in the 35-64
category, by 2011 the former proportion had increased to 44 per cent
and the latter had decreased to 21 per cent. While on the whole we
may accept that younger people are likely to vote in much the same
way as their parents, it is generally accepted that their levels of commit-
ment to a particular party are likely to be less strong. Prior to the
election, then Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe warned that voters
were increasingly inclined to judge the ANC not by its 'glorious history'
but by its performance in government (Financial Times 2014). Although
he was not referring specifically to the 'born free' generation, it is more
than likely that he had such voters particularly in mind. In any case, as
Schulz-Herzenberg (2006; 2009) has demonstrated, levels of party
'partisanship' are declining, suggesting movement towards a more
open political terrain. It is relevant, in this regard, to note that whereas
the ANC obtained the votes of some 53 per cent of the VAP in 1994, its
similar proportion came down to 35 per cent in 2014.
The fluidity of the electorate is further illustrated by registration
trends. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is credited with
having undertaken the chore of registering eligible voters efficiently, and
it claims to have arrested a decline in the level of registration, increas-
ing it from 77 per cent in 2009 to 81 per cent in 2014. However, Schulz-
Herzenberg (2014b: 20-24) has pointed out that because the IEC based
its calculations upon the population size as reported by the census of
2011, rather than from updated estimates of an increasing population
as offered by Statistics South Africa in 2013, it overestimated the level
of registration, which falls back to 78 per cent if the latter figures are
84Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
used. In other words, well over 20 per cent of the VAP is either unable
or disinclined to vote.
While this is bad news for democracy in general, it is rather
worse news for the ANC than for its principal rivals. This is for the sim-
ple reason that, while the population as a whole is becoming increas-
ingly urbanised, registration levels tend to be higher in rural areas than
in urban areas, yet it is in the former where the ANC is at most advant-
age. It is only the ANC which can claim to have established a deeply
rooted organisational structure of branches in the rural areas, these in
turn backed up at election time by the authority of traditional leaders,
which since 1994 have been brought in line with the ruling party and
who play an important part in mobilising the vote. Rural bias in voting
patterns is also shaped by the preponderance of women amongst the
registered electorate (55 per cent). In short, as the tide of migration
from rural to urban areas continues, so it is likely to erode the founda-
tions of a rural vote which plays a major role in sustaining ANC hege-
mony. In contrast, urban populations — increasingly subject to a greater
diversity of influences — are likely to be more discriminating (fickle!) in
their political affiliations.
The second challenge which confronts the ANC which can be
usefully highlighted is that hitherto it has not been faced by a party of
opposition which has been seriously capable of appealing to the major-
ity black African vote. The latter has never been unanimous. While the
majority portion has always gone to the ANC, there have always been
significant minorities of black Africans who have voted for other parties:
some because they are invested in rival political traditions (such as the
Pan Africanist Congress —PAC), some for ethnic-political reasons (for
example, the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] of Chief Mangosothu Buthe-
lezi), some because for one reason or another they have wanted to
register a protest vote against the ANC leadership without abandoning
the ANC tradition altogether (the UDM and Cope). In short, there is
much to be said for the argument that while disillusion with the ANC
has become widespread, many ANC voters have stuck with the ruling
party because for them there has been no credible alternative party to
vote for. However, the evidence — borne out by the 2014 election out-
come — is that this situation may be changing.
Let us start by examining the increasingly credible challenge
being offered by the DA.
85Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
3. The DA's ever rising ceiling
As Table 1 indicates, the DA's vote has increased remarkably since
1994. In that year, despite the DA's predecessor, the Democratic Party,
having punched well beyond its weight, and despite the fact that the
new democratic constitution largely reflected its political principles, it
polled a miserable 1.7 per cent of the vote. Its appeal was always going
to lie mostly with the racial minorities, yet in 1994 the latter — if not
celebrating with the ANC — largely plumped for the devil they knew, the
National Party (NP, later the New National Party). The story is now well
known how, in subsequent years, NP/NNP inability to decide whether
to coalesce with the ANC or to espouse opposition led to internal divi-
sions, its unlamented demise, and the migration of its support base to
the DA. Under the assertive leadership of Tony Leon, the DA pro-
ceeded to claim the overwhelming majority of white and Coloured
votes. This was achieved through a mix of robust opposition and the
absorption of other parties (notably Patricia de Lille's Independent
Democrats alongside much of the NNP) in the guise of coalition. In so
doing, it was to earn the scorn of the ANC as the party for whites, the
further accusation being made that it wanted to take the country back to
apartheid. And so on and so forth. Whatever the flow of insults, Tony
Leon could legitimately claim, with his characteristically insouciant belli-
gerence: 'Job well done'!
Under Helen Zille, who replaced Tony Leon as leader, the DA
has sought very deliberately to change its profile. On the one hand, it
has continued to consolidate its hold over the racial minorities (aided by
the fact that under the influence of President Thabo Mbeki, the ANC
was to become increasingly Africanist, despite its continuing to formally
adhere to a non-racial platform). On the other, it has recognised that
ultimately, in a country where three quarters of the population is black
African, it has to expand its appeal to African voters if it is to continue to
grow.
To be fair, the DA's strategy is backed by far more than just
cynical electoral calculations. It espouses a significantly different ideo-
logical path to the ANC. Its mantra of an 'open opportunity society' argues
that societal benefit is more likely to be fostered by enabling individuals
to better themselves within a broadly free-enterprise economy than by
ANC emphases upon collectivism and extensive state intervention. Yet
86Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
whatever the merits of such a position, they have to be sold to a black
African majority for whom the DA's origins in the former white parlia-
ment, and its forthright backing of capitalism (in contrast to the ANC's
ambiguous attitude towards a still white-dominated private sector),
arouses considerable suspicion.
The DA's efforts to expand its support base have both style and
substance. Style has been transformed, led forcefully by the Xhosa-
speaking Zille leading her troops into the townships, bedecked by the
DA's blue T-shirts, and emulating virtually all the dancing and celebrat-
ory techniques previously the property of the ANC. White decorum has
given way to black joi-de-vivre, along with DA loud challenge to the
ANC's monopoly claim to have driven the struggle for liberation. Sub-
stance has changed too. Major efforts have been made to recruit black
Africans into the party machinery, and to promote their role in the Na-
tional Assembly and the provincial legislatures. With Helen Zille choos-
ing to serve as premier of the Western Cape after the election in 2009,
Lindiwe Mazibuko assumed the role of leader of the opposition in the
National Assembly, despite her youth and inexperience. In the most
recent contest, the DA's charge in the strategically important province
of Gauteng was led by the impressive Mmusi Maimane, who launched
out on what Jolobe (2014) describes as an 'Obama-like' campaign. Fol-
lowing the election, with Mazibuko opting to resign to study abroad (and
thereby to avoid a bruising fight to maintain her parliamentary leader-
ship), Maimane has taken her place, backed by a team of MPs a signi-
ficant number of whom are black African. Today, the DA archly claims to
be the true party of non-racialism, contrasting its multi-coloured hue
with the overwhelmingly African membership of the ANC.
The transformation of the DA has not been without its tribula-
tions. Zille's endorsement of DA-style affirmative action and black eco-
nomic empowerment (BEE) has aroused the ire of some of the party's
old guard, who complain that stress on pigmentation rather than indi-
vidual merit contradicts the party's ideology of merit and individualism.
Counter-critics have responded that South Africa's history demands
deliberate efforts at redress, claiming its consonance with JS Mill and
historic liberalism (Vigne and Lipton 2014). Further, as the party cohort
in parliament grows, it risks the intra-party struggles which since 1994
have so overtly characterised the ANC — although Zille lays great stress
upon the fact that intra-party battles are fought openly in democratically
run contests. Whatever the costs, the increasing racial diversity of the
87Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
DA's assembled ranks in parliament and elsewhere ensure that the
ANC's constant sniping at its being a party for whites sound increas-
ingly hollow.
The assertion that the DA is confronted by a 'racial ceiling' has
been a constant of analytical focus upon its potential for expansion (for
example, Maloka 2011; Southern and Southall 2011). A consensus has
built around the impermeability of the DA's racial image (that is, as a
party objectively defending historically accrued racial privilege), blocking
the significant expansion of its black African voter base. Focus-group
research amongst black middle class voters (regularly touted as the
DA's particular target group) has backed this unwanted perception
(Everatt 2012, Ngoma 2014). Basically, the findings that emerge are that
black voters admire the DA in many ways. They value its role in de-
manding accountability from an ANC which many view as increasingly
corrupt, and many endorse a view that it is likely to perform better at
delivering services and promoting an efficiently functioning economy.
Even so, most blacks participating in focus groups have nonetheless
stopped short of saying that they are prepared to vote for the DA. Quite
simply, it goes against the grain of their interpretation of history, and their
sense of identity as Africans. Come election time, they imply, they opt
either return home to the ANC, vote for a party such as Cope which
resonates with the liberation tradition, or simply abstain from voting.
Such findings constitute bad news for the DA. However, the DA
has set out to prove such prognostications wrong. Even if the carefully
devised photogenic images which it regularly conjures up (often a
jauntily dressed Helen Zille flanked by party attired black groupies) owe
as much to modern electioneering techniques as to reality, they state
that there are increasing numbers of black Africans happy to openly
identify with the party. Furthermore, whereas in 1994 it was difficult for
'white parties' to campaign freely in black areas, now the legitimacy of
the DA staging rallies in 'ANC territory' is widely admitted. It follows, too,
that success breeds success. Today in control of the Western Cape pro-
vincial government and a fair sprinkling of local municipalities around
the country, the DA has largesse to provide in terms of political oppor-
tunities for the ambitious. This means that at times it gets burnt by the
politically unscrupulous, yet this goes with the territory of power. The
upshot of these and other factors is that the DA is beginning to increase
its black African vote significantly.
Overall, the DA reckons that some 760 000 of its enlarged vote
88Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
in 2014 (4.09 million, up 1.15 million on 2009) came from black Africans.
Presuming that it had already attracted something of a black vote in
earlier years, this would seem to suggest that about a quarter of its sup-
port is now coming from black voters. Yet what the socio-economic pro-
file of these voters are remains something of a mystery, demanding
further analysis. It could well be that while black middle class individuals
are increasingly prepared to vote for the DA, they are not yet prepared
to admit it!
None of this disproves the view that the DA is constrained by a
'racial ceiling' — yet it does suggest that somehow the height of the latter
is raising! Perhaps if — as seems quite possible — Maimane succeeds
Zille as leader before the 2016 local government elections, the DA may
snub its critics by bursting right though its roof and sweeping to power
in one or more further metros (Nelson Mandela in Eastern Cape the
most likely, with Johannesburg a reasonable possibility).
Such a triumph might be facilitated by the lower turnout rate which
is customary in local government elections, and a greater propensity of
ANC voters to register protests. One outcome in various councils across
the land might be the need for power at local level to be exercised by
coalitions. But who would coalesce with whom?
4. The EFF – Survival beyond infancy?
The EFF was a product of two intersecting events: Malema's expulsion
from the ANC and the Marikana massacre. When his final efforts to
remain in the ANC had failed, Malema had been freed from political
constraints and enabled to present himself as a champion of the poor.
While the striking mineworkers at Marikana had repudiated ANC
politicians, they had lionised Malema, who had yoked support for their
wage demands to the need for radical economic transformation. The
EFF soon positioned itself as the vehicle for all those who had lost
patience with the ANC. Initially it looked as though it would target the
youth, particularly after the collapse of ANC Youth League structures.
But soon it cast its net much wider, appealing to the unemployed and
blacks who felt their upward mobility was blocked by white racism. Ap-
propriating a populist-militarist persona, with Malema its 'Commander in
Chief' atop an army of red-bereted foot-soldiers, the EFF proclaimed
itself a government-in-waiting (Sosibo 2013).
The EFF's manifesto was radical nationalist. The state would be
89Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
empowered to take over all land without compensation; it would take 60
per cent ownership of mines, banks and other sectors of the economy;
the Reserve Bank would be nationalised; state-owned enterprises would
be placed under worker control; BEE and affirmative action would be
vigorously pursued; sustainable development would be promoted by
local beneficiation of mineral resources and small enterprises; a min-
imum of wage of R4 500 per month would be instituted for all full time
workers; salaries of public servants would be increased by 50 per cent;
existing social grants would be doubled; free quality education, health-
care, houses and sanitation would be provided for all; privileges for politi-
cians would be curbed; and the EFF would enhance the accountability
of state institutions (EFF 2013).
The articulation of its programme enabled the incorporation into
the EFF of a number of various individuals and small pre-existing
organisations which were already dismissive of the 1994 settlement
and of the ANC for collaborating with the white capitalist establishment.
Its radicalism also appealed to young black activist intellectuals for
whom the ANC had become too staid. Given the lack of an organisa-
tional structure on the ground, the resultant political amalgam was
glued together by the popular appeal of Malema, who grew in stature
throughout the campaign.
The EFF's claim to be a government-in-waiting was as nonsens-
ical as its programme was unrealistic, yet this was scarcely a constraint
for a party which in essence was articulating a cry of pain from im-
poverished communities which felt that they had been left out in the
cold by the ANC. Yet ultimately its appeal was limited, largely confined
to the platinum belt alongside the Malema followership in his home
province of Limpopo. Even so, for a party which had very limited finan-
cial and other resources, its electoral performance — gaining 6.4 per
cent of the vote, 25 MPs, the status of official opposition in Limpopo and
North West, and a total of 30 representatives in provincial legislatures,
was highly credible. The 2014 election saw the EFF replacing Cope as
the third party in South African politics (Robinson 2014). Yet numerous
doubts attend the prospects of its longevity.
For the moment, the EFF is indulging in political theatre to pro-
claim its difference from the political establishment. The challenge to
established parliamentary culture by its adoption of a bright red political
uniform (overalls for males, maids-wear for women) has already caused
clashes with officials, its tactics already leading to EFF walk-outs and
90Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
expulsions from legislatures. An offer to the ANC to lend its support to
enable it to secure a two-thirds majority to pass constitutional amend-
ments concerning property rights in order to implement radical land
reform was also designed to highlight its commitment to radical change.
However, while such tactics may shake up legislative practice in the
short term, it seems unlikely that they will make a significant impact in
the long term. When it comes to the crunch, to the hard work of demand-
ing accountability from government and debating proposed legislation,
the EFF is likely to be found wanting — not merely because of the
youth and inexperience of its representatives, but from their being far
more geared to spectacle than the hard graft of critique. In this, they are
unlikely to seriously challenge the DA.
Furthermore, although the EFF has injected a significant element
of class politics into the parliamentary arena and although its vocal
representation of impoverished elements is to be strongly welcomed,
this will not go unchallenged. First, there is no guarantee that the EFF
coalition will hold together (there is already suggestion of internal dis-
sidence within its ranks, notably in Gauteng, and some evidence of dis-
contented individuals heading back to the ANC) (City Press, 2014). It
may well prove highly combustible, rivalling Cope in a rush to extinction.
Second, the unspoken truce which existed between the EFF and
various groupings on the left which obtained during the election may
well give way, especially if Numsa fulfils its promise to become the core
of a new party of labour. Basically, such organisations viewed the EFF
as populist and Malema — who has yet to have his day in court to
defend himself against charges of corruption — as fraudulently radical.
Nonetheless, they appreciated the need to take the EFF seriously, for it
clearly had appeal for constituencies whose support they themselves
coveted. Consequently, while it is possible that a new labour party could
negotiate some sort of coalition or merger with the EFF, it is equally likely
that the formation of a new movement around Numsa will lead to a
battle for territory to the left of the ANC. Furthermore, EFF Mugabe-style
radical nationalist populism is likely to sit uneasily alongside a more co-
herent socialist alternative articulated by Numsa, despite shared rejec-
tions of neo-liberalism and imperialism. And would Malema himself be
prepared to subject himself to the bottom up democracy which Numsa
is likely to espouse? Or would Numsa be prepared to fall in behind an
ideologically wayward Malema? For the moment, all we can say with
certainty is that we simply don't know. But what we do know is that
91Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
election 2014 has rendered the political situation more fluid than at any
time since 1994.
5. Looking forward
It has been widely asserted that significant change will only come to the
post-1994 political landscape when there is a fracture within the
tripartite alliance. Usually this has been taken to mean that change will
only come when the organised left (Cosatu and the SACP) take their
leave from the ANC. In echo of much interpretation of the ANC's history,
this would give form to long standing tensions between 'nationalist' and
'communist' tendencies within the movement, enabling them to go their
separate ways. The nationalist wing would thereafter be free to nego-
tiate coalitions to parties to its right; the communist wing with organisa-
tions to its left. Politics would thereupon move towards a post-nationalist
class basis, akin to Pallo Jordan's 'normal democracy'.
The problem with such prognostications is that they are simply
too neat and tidy. What is true is that a significant reshaping of the party
system is likely to come about only as a result of some rupture within
the tripartite alliance. For all that the DA may continue to push its 'racial
ceiling' upwards, it seems inherently likely that it will be able to make
such constant inroads into black communities that it will become capable
of dislodging the ANC on its own. What seems far more likely is that,
whilst continuing to consolidate its rise as the major party of opposition,
any catching up with the ANC will be as much dependent upon the
latter losing votes to the left as to the DA picking up its votes to the right.
Yet present indications are that that any such scenario will not come
about in a clear cut fashion, not least because those continuing to back
the tripartite alliance will launch a vigorous counter-attack upon their
opponents.
Under Zuma, the SACP has been entrenched at the heart of
government. Indeed, many would say it has disproportionate repres-
entation in the cabinet and in provincial executives, as well as having
disproportionate influence in many policy decisions. It is highly unlikely
to abandon such advantage, and while making hay while the sun shines,
will seek to extend its grip on power beyond the Zuma presidency.
Moreover, the fact that many trade union leaders at national and lower
levels are members of the SACP provides it with major leverage within
Cosatu, notably within public sector unions. Further, dual membership
92Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
of the ANC and SACP opens pathways to political office and upward
mobility, access to material improvement for officials all wrapped up in
the quasi-revolutionary rhetoric of the National Democratic Revolution.
In short, the SACP is going to work desperately hard to keep the tri-
partite alliance together, and to portray those working to break it as
counter-revolutionary.
When the tripartite alliance splits, it is therefore probable that it
will not be a matter of the SACP or Cosatu breaking cleanly with the ANC.
Rather, individual unions are likely to split into majority and minority fac-
tions, public sector union majorities largely adhering to the tripartite
alliance, private sector majorities (which have benefited far less from
the ANC in power) largely breaking with it. Even that is too simple, for a
breach within Cosatu will also set off extensive intra-union rivalries, as
the different factions scramble for members and the right to retain union
names, buildings and financial resources. The struggle will be bitter —
indeed, it has already started. The SACP is constantly calling for the
unity of the working class in face of reactionary forces; Numsa general
secretary, Irvin Jim, is repudiating Cosatu claims that his union's current
strike action (July 2014) is primarily designed to destabilise the ANC;
and the inter-union violence that has characterised the post-Marikana
industrial conflict may well spread, reaching far into the workplace and
communities as well as the wider political arena.
For the moment it is obviously impossible to predict how such
political struggles will eventuate. However, if (more likely, when) Numsa
leads the way to a new party of socialism, it will provide a more coherent
alternative to the ANC than the EFF, and one that is more deeply rooted
in workplace and social movement structures. While claiming that the
ANC has betrayed its liberation heritage and is in bed with capital, it will
seek to revive traditions of popular struggle (reminiscent of the 1970s
labour movement and the United Democratic Front — UDF) which were
independent of the liberation movement. How successful it will be in
securing popular support and translating it into votes remains dependent
upon multiple factors: not only whether it will collaborate or compete with
the EFF, but also the strength of the ANC/SACP counteroffensive.
Few would be so bold as to suggest that a Numsa-formed party
will be able to challenge the ANC for a majority. However, it is not so
rash to predict that it will perform much better than either a Cope or an
EFF, perhaps obtaining 15 or 20 per cent of the vote, thereby placing
the ANC majority in peril, both nationally and in key provinces (notably
93Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 36, No 2 Roger Southall
Gauteng). In such a case, the ANC could be forced into coalition — but
whether with the DA or any new party of labour would remain to be
seen (dependent upon what it likes to term the 'balance of forces').
Leaving aside any changes in policy which mounting electoral
threat would propel the ANC into pursuing (presently, promises of radical
shifts in economic policy vie with calls for the nation to group around the
National Development Plan — NDP), the principal challenge may well
be to the quality of democracy. Will the ANC opt to abide by the consti-
tution, free elections, and 'normal democracy'? Or will it use state powers
to entrench its domination by foul means as well as fair? We cannot
know the answer yet, but we can expect that the years before the next
national election in 2019 are likely to offer an exceptionally bumpy ride.
Endnotes
1. Condensed from Schulz-Herzenberg, C (2014a: Table 4, 194-195).
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