Populist games: discourse on domestic gas prices in Ukraine in 2005-2011
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Populist games: discourse on domestic gas prices in Ukraine in 2005-2011 Katerina Malygina PhD candidate University of Bremen, Research Centre for East European Studies Paper prepared for the 4th ECPR Graduate Conference Jacobs University, Bremen July 4-6, 2012 Abstract: When studying the gas politics of the post-Soviet states, researchers focus predominantly on the mutual interdependencies inherited from the Soviet period. These are recognized to be the key structural constraints to the political behavior of the post-Soviet elites. As of yet, no one analyzed the energy discourses and their enabling and constraining role in the policy-making either in Russia or in Ukraine. In this paper, I seek to fill this research gap through analysis of Ukraine’s gas discourse on domestic gas prices in 2005-2011. In particular, I argue that politicization of this issue since 2006 institutionalized a certain action pattern that is not easy to change.
Katerina Malygina
Introduction
Despite the great pressure from the rising gas prices, constant conflicts with Russia and acute
need for reforms, the Ukrainian gas policy remains practically unchanged for over two
decades now. The reasons for this policy failure have been thoroughly discussed in the
academic literature. In 2005 Havrylyshyn (2005: 42) stated even that there are hardly any new
issues to study. Yet the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 renewed
the interest of many researchers to the post-soviet energy trade. In general, the Russian-
Ukrainian gas relationship was analyzed from three perspectives - the “Russia’s use of energy
as a weapon” perspective (Goldman 2008; Lucas 2008; Larsson 2006; Smith 2006, Woerl
2009), the “Ukrainian traders seeking rents” perspective (Fujimori 2005; Balmaceda 2007)
and from the economic “export-transit energy games” perspective (van Hirschausen et al
2005; Yegorov & Wirl 2009; Cherniavsky & Eismont 2012).
As of yet, no one analyzed the energy discourses and their role in the policy-making either in
Russia or in Ukraine. In this paper, I seek to fill this research gap through analysis of
Ukraine’s gas discourse in 2005-2011. In particular, I look at the discourse on domestic gas
prices and argue that politicization of this issue especially since 2006 institutionalized a
certain action pattern that is not easy to change.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section I give an overview of the research
strands that study discourse and its “enabling” and “constraining” behavioral effects. In the
second section I briefly provide information on my sources and research design. Then I turn
to analyzing the discourses on domestic gas prices in 2005-2011. A special attention here is
paid to the discourse dynamics for which I reconstruct the context using the process-tracing
method. After that I identify positions of the key actors in the discourse. Finally, I draw
conclusions about the role of a discourse in the policy-making in Ukraine, by linking the
empirical cases study with the theoretical part of this paper.
Theory Overview: ‘Enabling’ and
‘Constraining’ Discourse Studies
Discourse is a rather vague concept with different disciplines having different definitions. In
this paper I will use the term “discourse” to refer to “socially constructed knowledges of some
aspect of reality”, as defined by Kress & Leeuwen (2001: 4). Yet my understanding of the
term differs from that of the authors. Thus, the word “knowledges” denotes the process of
meaning creation – interpretation – which is yet socially constructed and therefore allows for
existence of multiple realities instead of a single one. Such a definition makes it possible to
encompass discourse and frames under one conceptual umbrella, which in turn allows
2Katerina Malygina
systematization of the role that discourse play in a social world. The sketch offered here has
limited ambitions and should not be considered as a full-fledged typology.
Defining the discourse as ‘constructed knowledges’ has a heuristic advantage in that it helps
to delineate the term from other concepts like ideologies, beliefs, values, norms and attitudes.
The latter are cognitive models, either individual or collective, that describe what is right and
appropriate. As proposed by van Dijk (2006a: 372), ideologies, norms and values are social
representations1 that are gradually acquired throughout life, and although can be changed, are
rather stable. Similar distinction is made in media studies where the term ‘schemata’ is used
for mental structures as opposed to media frames (see e.g. van Gorp 2007: 63). While social
representations and schemata can be manifested via discourse, the latter is not necessarily
linked to them. In the case when discourse is used as a mean for establishing and maintaining
power, it could diverge from the actual belief system of the speaker, while concealing his or
her real intentions. In other words, actors might utter statements based not only on their
cognitive models, but also on their strategic goals in mind. Furthermore, framing theory
underlines the two-fold relationship between frames and cognitive structures: while the latter
definitely aid interpretation and social action, the former are not purely cognitive entities; they
are first of all “products of the interindividual, interactional and contested process of framing”
(Snow & Benford 2000) 2.
There are many social science disciplines that analyze discourse, including linguistics,
political sociology, policy studies, cognitive and social psychology, communication studies,
to name but a few. Having recognized that “discourse matters”, different research traditions
have been assessing the power of a discourse differently. Some of them focus on its enabling
effects, while others pay more attention to the constraints that a discourse imposes. In
following these two different research traditions – “enabling” and “constraining” discourse
studies - will be introduced in a more detail.
The “enabling” discourse studies
The “enabling” discourse studies in political science include some approaches in social
movement theory and public policy studies. Researchers of this branch view discourse as a
resource that actors employ to achieve their political goals like, for instance, gaining
prominence in the case of social movements or implementing a certain public policy in the
1
Teun van Dijk borrows the term of social representations from social psychologist Serge Moscovici, although
uses it in a broader sense.
2
For more on the relationship of ideology and discourses in CDA see e.g. van Dijk, T. A. (2006b), in social
movement theory – Snow et al (1986), Snow & Benford (1992); Snow & Benford (2000).
3Katerina Malygina
case of policy networks. Therefore one can speak about instrumentalization of a discourse for
which a strategic action is required in the sense of Habermas’ theory of action3.
One way to study such instrumentalization empirically is by revealing media/policy/collective
action frames in a text. For example, the researchers of social movements focus on how
movements “frame” their issues in order to create a collective identity and maintain solidarity
(see e.g. seminal articles by Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1992; for an overview –
Benford & Snow 2000). Social movement theory even developed key “framing tasks”
(diagnosis, prognosis and motivation) for successful participant mobilization (Snow &
Benford 1992).4 Frames are therefore conscious constructions that intentionally omit or
emphasize different aspects of social life5 and are a product of socialconstructivist process
called framing (see Snow & Benford 2000). Frames function is “to organize experience and
guide action, whether individual or collective” (Snow et al 1986: 464). All in all, framing
process is political, because framing agents along with media, state and other stakeholders are
involved in “politics of signification”, that is the struggle to define social reality (cf. Snow &
Benford 1988: 198).
Similarly, policy studies make use of frame analysis in their research agendas. Here policy
frames play multiple roles in a policymaking process – either as overture, weapon or outcome
(Weiss 1989). Thus, policy frames could be understood as initial phase of policy cycle,
namely issue definition during agenda-setting. But they could also be used by policy
entrepreneurs for building coalitions “as a weapon of advocacy and consensus” (Weiss 1989:
117). The following passage illustrates this point the best:
At whatever stage a new problem definition gains significant support, it shapes the ensuing
action. It legitimates some solutions rather than others, invites participation by some political
actors and devalues the involvement of others, focuses attention on some indicators of success
and consigns others to the scrapheap of the irrelevant. To reap these rewards, participants in
the policy process seek to impose their preferred definitions on problems throughout the
policy process. Much policymaking, in fact, is preoccupied with whose definitions shall
prevail. (Weiss 1989: 98)
The alignment of stakeholders around some issues is usually studied within discourse network
approaches like the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Weible 2007), Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1991) or Epistemic Communities (Haas 1992).
Here discourses are linked to specific actor constellations that try to persuade others in
adopting their policy images and in such a way invoke policy change. Yet it should be noted
that these frameworks center on mobilizing ideas and beliefs in a first place and therefore are
3
That is action should be oriented toward success in influencing the decisions of other actors in contrast to a
communicative action that is aimed at mutual agreement under conditions of rational argumentation. See e.g.
Johnson (1991).
4
Similarly, Gamson (1992) argues that a successful frame must include three elements – “njustice”, “agency”
and “identity”.
5
There is a debate whether frames are conscious and deliberate representations of the world or not. Some
theorists in the social movement literature consider frames to be cognitive models that unconsciously reflect
beliefs and worldviews of the framing agents (see e.g. Oliver & Johnston 2000). The framing theory as presented
by Snow and Benford, however, stresses purely constructivist approach to frames and framing (see Snow &
Benford 2000).
4Katerina Malygina
more in line with the rational choice theory. Thus, they predict the behavior based on the
cognitive models such as beliefs and values which are presumed to be stable and given. Due
to this partially positivist perspective, discourse network approaches aren’t purely
constructivist like, for instance, framing literature.6 What makes them constructivist is the
discursive character of policy-making seen as “a constant discursive struggle” (Fischer &
Forester 1993: 1f). Moreover, because these approaches examine the rhetorical strategies of
the actors to achieve some goals (e.g. policy change), they could be qualified as “enabling”
discourse studies.
Similar to discourse network approaches, the researchers from the institutionalist tradition in
the political science started treating discourse as an independent variable in explaining
institutional change and continuity. In particular, Vivien Schmidt (2008; 2010) develops the
theoretical concept of “discursive institutionalism” (DI), which she calls the fourth type of
institutionalism. A distinctive feature of the DI is the differentiation between ‘coordinative’
and ‘communicative’ forms of discourse, with the former taking place in the policy subsystem
among policy actors and the latter in the public sphere between political elites and general
public. What puts Schmidt’s DI on a par with other “enabling” discourse studies is the
assumption that institutional change is dependent on the ‘background ideational capacities’
and ‘discursive capacities’ of social actors (Schmidt 2008: 305). Schmidt’s approach is
therefore agent-centered with the discourse being one of the actors’ resources.
The “constraining” discourse studies
The “constraining” discourse studies derive from post-structuralist and psychoanalytic
perspectives, particularly the writings of Faucault, Lacan, Derrida, Saussure, Lacau and
Mouffe. Discourse theorists of this tradition affirm the discursive character of all social
practices (Howarth et al 2000: 4). This implies that all kind of data, linguistic and non-
linguistic, can be treated as a text. “There is nothing outside the text”, to invoke Derrida’s
famous dictum (Derrida 1998: 158). As a result of these ontological assumptions, a number of
post-structuralist methods7 have been developed. According to Howarth et al
These include Derrida’s ‘method’ of deconstruction, Foucault’s archaeological and
genealogical approaches to discourse analysis, the theory of rhetoric and tropes, Saussure’s
distinction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic poles of language, the Jakobsonian
concepts of metaphor and metonymy as developed by Lacan, and Laclau and Mouffe’s logics
of equivalence and difference (Howarth et al 2000: 6).
Perhaps, the most influential to the subsequent works in discourse analysis were the works of
Michel Foucault. Foucault defines discourses as “practices that systematically form the
objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 49). According to him, it is the discourse that
6
Discourse coalitions approach by Hajer (1993; 1995) is in this sense different and therefore will be discussed
later.
7
It is to note that scholars generally do not refer to themselves as post-structuralists, but their works are often
characterised as post-structuralist.
5Katerina Malygina
organizes the way people behave by regulating what can and cannot be said and thought. In
Stephen Ball’s words, “We do not speak the discourse. The discourse speaks us” (Ball 1990:
18). Thus, Foucault considers individuals constrained insofar as their actions are inevitably
determined by institutional tradition and power relations into which they are embedded.
But exactly because of such understanding of a discourse Foucault has not prescribed some
specific research method. Nevertheless, both in policy studies (Bacchi 2009; Ball 1990; for an
overview see Hewitt 2009) and in social movement scholarship (Sandberg 2006; Death 2010;
Baumgarten 2010, Hessdörfer et al 2010) there are researchers who deconstruct power
dynamics using Foucaultian understanding of a discourse. In policy studies this research
strand has been recently coined as ‘policy as discourse approach’ (Goodwin 2011). Most
notably, Bacchi (2009; 2012) has developed a framework for studying ‘problem
representations’, taking her lead from Foucault’s concept of problematization.8 Studying
problematizations means exploring the processes of meaning construction by observing how
“things” come to be (Bacchi 2012: 5). Because every practice relies on a particular
problematization, revealing the problem representation shows how governing takes place.
Moreover, Bacchi’s approach to problematization is not linked to specific subjects using
discourse, but is rather about how subjects are produced in a discourse, the process called
‘subjectification’ (Bacchi 2009: 16f).
Unlike Foucaultian approach to discourse that embodies discourse determinism (i.e.
everything is discursively constructed), the school of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
represents a weaker version of social constructivism in that it draws an ontological separation
between discursive and non-discursive practices (cf. Whetherall 2001: 392). Discourse is seen
here as just one form of social practice. CDA scholars concentrate on the concepts of power
and ideology and study the way discursive practices produce or reproduce unequal power
relations between different social entities like, for instance, social classes, gender groups, etc.
“In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed,
constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse)”(Wodak & Meyer 2009:
10).
Empirical work within CDA centers on discursive manifestations of gender, ethnicity, racism
and other forms of domination and social inequality. Within CDA there are approaches that
are more agency oriented (like sociocognitive approach by Teun van Dijk or social actors
approach by Theo van Leeuwen) or more structure oriented (dialectical–relational approach
by Norman Fairclough and discourse-historical approach by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl)
(Wodak & Meyer 2009). The agency oriented CDA approaches are somewhat similar to
“enabling” discourse studies, because they study strategies of legitimization employed by
powerholders to justify their actions (for an overview see e.g. Reyes 2011). Yet the overall
focus stays on practices and not activities, discourse internalization and not externalization.
Furthermore, although CDA states that discourse is both “socially constitutive” and “socially
shaped”, the approach was criticized for not providing insights into “how discourse becomes
action and action becomes discourse” (Scollon & Scollon 2005: 101).
8
The method is called “What the Problem represented to be?” or abbreviated WPR.
6Katerina Malygina
Apart from the Foucaultian and other postr-structuralist approaches to discourse analysis,
there are also other approaches that take into account the “constraining” discourse effect.
Particularly, the researchers with the epistemological view on “discourse as a resource” have
been trying to incorporate this idea into their frameworks. For instance, Schön and Rein
(1994: 33f) point to a “metacultural frame“, a kind of culturally shared systems of belief, that
constraints individual’s choice of frames. Another example includes Hall’s concept of a
“policy paradigm” that can be understood as an interpretative “framework of ideas and
standards that specifies not only goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used
to attain them, but also the very problems they are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993: 279).
Furthermore, the social movement literature has developed the “constraining” perspective on
a discourse of its own kind. Especially after the cultural turn in late 1980s -early 1990s
researchers shifted their analytical focus from the movement itself to its larger cultural
embeddeddness (Williams 2004). Following these changes framing literature acknowledged
the fact that frame agents rely on existing cultural environment during framing. This cultural
field was conceptualized in different ways – either as ‘codes’, ‘repertoires’, ‘scripts’, ‘tool
kits’, ‘mentalities’, the ‘discursive content’, ‘cultural structure’, the ‘cultural opportunity
structure’ (see Williams 2004: 95). It was found that in order to be successful frames should
resonate with individual’s beliefs, worldviews, and life experiences, on the one hand, and
with ideas widely accepted in a broader society, on the other hand. While the first condition or
constraint to framing efforts has been dubbed as “frame resonance”, the second one relates to
“cultural resonance” or “narrative fidelity” (Benford & Snow 1988: 210; Snow & Benford
2000: 622). In the author’s view, the functioning of the “frame resonance” could be best
explained with the “interpretative packages” model, whereas the quality of the “cultural
resonance” of a frame could be best captured by “discursive opportunity structure”.
As proposed by Gamson and Lasch (1983), “interpretative packages” are building blocks of a
frame that all together produce meaning. A package can manifest itself through a number of
devices related to an issue at stake (like metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions or
visual images) and to a reasoning structure of an argument (like roots, consequences, appeals
to principle). While symbolic devices organize cognitively the argument, the reasoning
devices justify it. Thus, ‘interpretative packages’ (referred also as ‘media packages’ or ‘frame
packages’, see Gamson & Modigliani 1989; van Gorp 2007) present the frame structure
which parts become later congruent with audience’s beliefs and experiences during the
cognitive process.
The “discoursive opportunity structure” refers to the playing field in which framing contests
take place (Koopmans & Statham 1999: 228f; Ferree et al. 2002: 62f). It predetermines what
kind of ideas will become successful and “legitimate” and what not, thus imposing restrictions
on the movement’s success.
7Katerina Malygina
Synthesizing “enabling” and “constraining” discourse
effects
The described above distinction between “enabling” and “constraining” discourse studies is
based on how various research strands prioritize different aspects of a discourse. While
“enabling” discourse studies talk about ‘discursive/framing activity’ and are, thereby, agency
oriented, “constraining” discourse studies employ the concept of ‘discursive practice’ and
concentrate on societal macro structures. The distinction thus follows the classical agency-
structure debate. On the whole, the “enabling”/”constraining” dichotomy provides a
conceptual scheme of grouping research strands across disciplines. Yet there are also
approaches that cannot be regarded as exclusively “enabling” or “constraining” because they
are trying to synthesize both aspects of a discourse.
One of such models was proposed by Steinberg (1998; 1999) in the social movement theory.
While acknowledging the cultural embeddedness of framing actors, Steinberg criticized the
models with linear micro-macro linkages (like “interpretative packages” model or “discursive
opportunity structure”) that implied a top-down causation, that is when “top level of public
discourse determines the meanings generated below” (Steinberg 1998: 858). Hence, he
proposed a dialogic model that bridged the “enabling” and “constraining” discourse
perspectives. This was made possible only after rethinking of culture in terms of
communication and interaction instead of in terms of “identities”.
In particular, Steinberg argues that framing process takes place in the discursive field that
contains different genres - typical sets of meanings and rules for using them - to draw upon
for successful framing. The discursive field is context-specific and at the same time
unorganized and fuzzy. Yet it becomes organized once actors take up discursive repertoires,
an action-specific combination of genres. Moreover, interlocking of various repertoires is not
predefined by cognitive models of the actors, but is rather a product of interaction. Thus,
actors can borrow genres from other discursive fields and from discursive repertoires of
others, the latter being called a ‘master frame’ by Snow and Benford (1992). Due to their
situational character, discursive repertoires should be regarded not as resources, but as a
medium where social reality is jointly constructed. The meaning production is therefore a
very dynamic, collective and often conflict-laden process. While powerholders can
instrumentilize genres for their own purposes and demarcate discourses within a field
presenting them as a common sense, they cannot determine discursive repertoires of other
actors. Exactly this unpredictability allows for dominant discourse to be challenged and a new
cycle of meaning creation to be started.
Interestingly, in the field of policy studies Hajer (1993; 1995) proposed a similar to
Steinberg’s model, although using other concepts based on other research objectives. Hajer
sets himself the task to find “ways of combining the analysis of the discursive production of
reality with the analysis of the (extradiscursive) social practices from which social constructs
emerge and in which the actors that make these statements engage” (Hajer 1993: 45). For this
end, he introduces the concept of “discourse coalitions” that are “the ensemble of a set of
8Katerina Malygina
story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story
lines, all organized around a discourse” (Hajer 1993: 47). Actors use story lines in order to
impose their view of reality on others in the “struggle for discursive hegemony” (Hajer 1993:
47; Hajer 1995: 263). The state of discursive hegemony Hajer names “discourse
structuration”, “that is, central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical
power of a new discourse” (Hajer 1993: 47). But as Hajer proves on the example of acid rains
in Britain, discourse structuration is albeit necessary, but not sufficient condition for a policy
change. The latter occurs only when discourse is reflected in the institutional practices of the
political domain. This condition Hajer calls “discourse institutionalization”. Moreover, actors
that have been socialized within particular institutionalized discourse will facilitate its
reproduction either during communication processes or in their social practices.
In contrast to the discourse network approaches introduced above, Hajer considers values and
beliefs to be unstable that can change over time in response to new story lines (Hajer 1995:
71). Moreover, in Hajer’s view, the outcome of the ‘discursive struggle’ doesn’t automatically
imply policy change, as the discourse network approaches assume. Besides discourse
structuration, discourse institutionalization is equally important. All in all, Hajer manages
with his framework to look simultaneously at both agency and structure and their interplay.
The “enabling” perspective is sustained by the concept of story lines, while the “constraining”
one – by discourse institutionalization. Moreover, Hajer’s storylines are somewhat similar to
Steinberg’s discursive repertoires of the framing agents, but these concepts are not identical.
While Hajer emphasizes the logical structure and consistency of a story line that a discourse
coalition adopts (see Hajer 1993: 47), Steinberg claims that “repertoires are relational
products of contention” (Steinberg 1999: 750), stressing therefore their contingent character.
Furthermore, while Steinberg focuses on features of the “meaning creation” processes; Hajer
is more interested in the conditions of the discourse institutionalization. Yet both authors drew
inspiration from the works of social psychologists and therefore developed similar models of
the so called “discourse cycle”, that is when actors use discourse, when it becomes
institutionalized and when it then influences actors’ actions.
Research Design
For the purposes of this paper I utilize the analytic utility of news data. In the author’s view,
there is a certain advantage of using news outlets rather than newspapers as a data source. It is
a well-known fact that there is certain selection and description bias inherent to newspaper
articles as a data source. This methodological shortcoming has been much discussed in a
literature (see e.g. Earl et al. 2004; Barranco & Wisler, 1999). Since newspapers have to meet
audience expectations, they have different selection criteria like, for instance, news-
worthiness. Yet news agency performs a different function and doesn’t have such coverage
constraints. Given the independency and professionalism of the news provider, the selection
bias is in this case lesser. Moreover, the news data provides the kind of information I am
looking for, namely the actors’ statements and not their interpretations by the media.
9Katerina Malygina
For conducting the process tracing I have created a database that consists of 17.349 news
articles on gas politics provided by the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN in Russian language
for the period 2005-2011. These were gathered using the research tool Factiva. The choice of
the news agency was dictated by data availability for the whole period rather than some other
criteria. The articles were saved in xml format and later compiled in a single csv document
using RapidMiner, an open-source software package for data mining. The resulting data set
includes, for instance, such columns as text of the article, its title, its publication date, etc.
Discourse on domestic gas prices in Ukraine
in 2005-2011
The context
Low gas prices for households have been long recognized to be one of the key problems in
Ukraine’s gas sector (World Bank 2003; Meissner et al 2012; Petri & Taube 2003; Hi-chun
2009; Chukhai, & Ferdinand 2006). Although gas prices for households were reviewed during
1999-2010 seven times and rose in general by 4-15 times depending on the household (see
Fig. 1), they still remain below the cost-reflective level. Before 2006 the issue was not so
pressing, because Ukraine had one of the lowest gas prices in the region. Moreover, the state-
owned NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy reexported some gas to Europe and was selling gas to
industrial consumers that were much more disciplined in its payments and paid higher prices
than households. But after 2006 these conditions no longer existed. As a result, the growing
disparity between import prices and domestic prices burdened the state’s budget with each
year more and more. While in 2002 the gas price subsidies in Ukraine were equivalent to 2,5
% of GDP (World Bank 2003), they corresponded to some 6% of GDP a decade later
(Meissner et al 2012).
Yet despite the increasing macroeconomic pressures, most of the Ukrainian politicians resist
changes. Interestingly enough, the reason for such irrational behavior has not even once been
explained in a public discourse. Thus, the ‘cheap gas granted by the state’ axiom is so deeply
rooted in Ukraine’s energy culture, so that everybody takes it for granted. While low price
policy dates back yet to the Soviet times, until now there was no information campaign aimed
at changing this perception. Even more, it was reproduced and intensified by the populist
discourse and politics in 2005-2011. In the following section I reconstruct the course of
events during 2005-2011 and actors’ positioning in the discourse on the gas prices for
households.
10Katerina Malygina
Fig. 1 – Average gas prices for households in 1999-2010, UAH/ m3
up to 2500 m3 2500-6000 m3 more than 6000 m3
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
1999 01.05.2006 1.07.2006 01.11.2006 01.01.2007 1.09.2008 01.12.2008 01.08.2010
Source: author’s own calcualtions based on NECR’s resolutions.
Discourse dynamics
The politicization of gas prices for households started at the end of 2005 after Turkmenistan
raised its gas prices for Ukraine. In late 2005 the National Electricity Regulatory Commission
(NECR) raised the prices for district heating, but failed in its first attempts to raise them for
households, because the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine refused to register the NECR’s decree
on the grounds that price increases were not agreed with trade unions as it was prescribed in
the agreement between government and trade unions for 2004-2005. In October 2005, the
parliament too actively intervened in the process, having adopted the resolution on
establishing the gas prices moratorium.
In early 2006 the NECR tried to increase the prices once again while referring to the fact that
agreement with trade unions expired and no new agreement were signed. But after the gas
conflict with Russia in January 2006, the oppositional forces in the parliament reacted to the
NECR’s attempts to increase gas prices even more vehemently than in 2005. They
immediately linked the price increases for population with the growth of import prices after
the gas war with Russia and called for government’s resignation. In January 2006 the
Communist Party of Ukraine initiated the so called “moratorium law” that should have been
more binding than a resolution adopted in late 2005. The law was to prohibit raising gas
prices for households and district heating until minimum wages and pensions were set to the
subsistence wage level and wage debts were paid in full. The parliament adopted the
“moratorium law” on January 19, 2006, but the President sent it back for revision on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional. In March 2006 the parliament adopted the “moratorium
11Katerina Malygina
law” again. This time President vetoed it while referring to the Constitutional Court’s decision
in 1999 when a similar law was ruled unconstitutional due to the parliament’s abuse of
authority (only local authorities have the right to establish gas prices for district heating).
Immediately after the Presidential veto, the NECR scheduled the price increases for May
2006 and later for July 2006. Despite the large-scale protests organized by trade unions, the
gas prices for households and district heating were raised as planned.9
The politicization of domestic gas price issue in the first half of 2006 was the result of the
confrontation between the government and the President on the one hand10 and trade unions
and the parliament on the other hand. Yet the next ‘round’ of politicization in autumn 2006
had a different pattern and was mostly fueled by the ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
Although Tymoshenko criticized the domestic gas price increases since early 2006, she was
not the initiator of the “moratorium law” and in general was rather a passive co-actor. But
things changed when her party BYuT failed to create a coalition in the parliament following
the parliamentary elections in March 2006. As a result, the new government of Victor
Yanukovych was formed in August 2006 whose comeback was secured by communists and
socialists that signed the parliamentary coalition agreement with Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions.
In September 2006 Timoshenko started a campaign to override the Presidential veto on the
“moratorium law”. On September 22, the veto was overridden with unprecedented unanimity
- 341 out of 450 votes in favour. All parliamentary factions except for the pro-presidential
NUNS (“Our Ukraine- People’s Defense”) supported it in fear of being accused in not
protecting people’s interests. This notwithstanding, the “moratorium law” never entered into
force and was later abolished by the parliament itself. The reason for that was not the position
of the President as in early 2006. Yushchenko stepped down as it was required by the
Constitution in such a case11 and promised to sign the law, if only the government doesn’t ask
him to appeal to the Constitutional Court. But the parliament speaker, the socialist Oleksandr
Moroz took a principled stand and refused to sign the “moratorium law” as required by the
procedure for legal enactment.12 Moroz used the same argumentation as Yushchenko did,
stating that he had no right to sign the law because it violated the Constitution of Ukraine,
since the question of gas prices for households and district heating is not within competence
of the parliament, but falls under the jurisdiction of the executive brach.13
9
In May 2006 the gas price for households was increased by 25%, while in July 2006 – by 80%.
10
It should be noted that the position of the government in the first half of 2006 fully coincided with the one of
the President. It is because Yuschenko himself appointed Ekhanurov the Prime Minister after the resignation of
Timoshenko’s government in September 2005. The procedure of the government formation, however, was
changed after the constitutional reform came into force on January 1, 2006.
11
Art. 94 of the Constitution of Ukraine stipulates that if the parliament overcomes the Presidential veto, the
President has to sign it.
12
According to Ukrainian legislation, a law enters into force when it is signed by the parliament speaker and by
the President.
13
Because of this ‘antisocial’ position, the image of Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the Socialist Party of
Ukraine, was badly damaged. This was one of the reasons why his Socialist Party didn’t win the next
parliamentary elections in 2007.
12Katerina Malygina
Thus, within a year the “moratorium law” was adopted three times, once returned for revision,
once vetoed, once reconsidered and in the end still not enacted because of the failing
speaker’s signature. When the law was finally abolished in October 2006, the Yanukovych’s
government decreased the gas prices for households by 20% to calm the situation, but only for
two months. The confrontation was finally resolved in January 2006, when the government
introduced differentiation in gas prices for households that reduced the gas price burden for
low-income citizens. The issue of raising the gas prices for households was then frozen until
2008.
In contrast to the scandalous 2006, the growth of the gas prices for households by almost 50%
in 2008 passed practically unnoticed in the public sphere. In April 2008 Tymoshenko’s
government approved the financial plan for Naftogaz Ukrainy for 2008 that among other
things foresaw the gas price increases for households by 25% till the end of the year. Despite
this, no action was taken until August 2008, when the NECR finally raised the prices in
average by 13% starting from September. But following Naftogaz eurobonds drop in mid-
September 2008, the President started to demand to raise the prices again. On October 3, 2008
Yushchenko issued a decree that enacted the decision of the Council for National Security and
Defense (RNBO) from September, 25 2008. In particular, the RNBO, which is directly
subordinated to the President, recommended the government to reduce tax burden of Naftogaz
Ukrainy, increase subsidies for district heating and raise domestic gas prices. In November
2008 the NECR raised the gas prices for households by 35% starting from December under
pressure from the President and without prior consent of trade unions. Moreover, the
government removed the latter from the policy-making process by cancelling until July 2009
the requirement to agree the gas price increases for households with trade unions. The prices
were raised once again despite protests of trade unions in December 2008.
In 2009 the question of the gas prices for households was politicized again. The Prime
Minister Tymoshenko promised not to change the prices despite the economic crises and
made it implicitly one of her main slogans for the presidential campaign. The other
presidential candidate - Victor Yanukovych - took the same stance, stressing in his public
statements that gas price increases for households were unacceptable without simultaneous
increases in pensions and wages. Yet this position ran contrary to Ukraine’s international
commitments. The gas price increase in September 2009 was one of the key obligations under
the IMF loan agreement that the country signed in late 2008. Taking into account that the IMF
was extremely negatively framed in the media, this confrontation was detrimental to
Ukraine’s image as a country, but not to Timoshenko’s or Yanukovych’s public image.
In July 2009 the NECR decided to raise the gas prices for households by 20% starting from
September. The issue wasn’t in the public focus yet until the end of August, when
Tymoshenko declared that gas prices for households would not be raised. Following this
statement, the Minister of Energy Yuri Prodan said that gas prices can’t be raised, because
this question wasn’t agreed with trade unions. On August 27, 2009 trade unions refused to
give consent on raising gas prices for households and later sued the NECR for that decision.
Eventually, the gas prices weren’t raised in September 2009. Unlike the previous years, trade
unions played an important role here. This immediately had negative implications for
13Katerina Malygina
Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF, but Ukraine promised to raise them from October 2009.
In this confrontation with the IMF, only Yushchenko was on the IMF’s side, calling upon all
political forces to unite in order to fulfill Ukraine’s commitments to the IMF. When this did
not happen and the parliament adopted the populist law on raising wages and pensions, the
IMF suspended its cooperation with Ukraine in late 2009. Noteworthy, in the letter to the IMF
from December 7, 2009 Tymoshenko blamed the ‘unforeseen legislative challenges and court
decisions’ for preventing government’s efforts in raising gas prices for households and district
heating. Officially, the court reversed the NECR’s decision to raise gas prices starting from
September 2009 only in February 2010 when the presidential elections were over.
The next year IMF’s influence on gas price formation in Ukraine was even greater. When
Victor Yanukovych was elected the President of Ukraine in February 2010, he immediately
began making efforts to resume cooperation with the IMF. This was seen as ‘the access point
to funds of other international institutions’ needed for Yanukovych’s reforms plan. At first the
new government tried to circumvent the issue of domestic gas prices in the negotiation
process with the IMF. But the IMF made the gas price increases one of the main
preconditions for granting the new loan. In July 2010 the NECR scheduled the gas price
increases by 50% for August. To mitigate the negative effects of such a decision, the
government announced targeted subsidies for 9 mln people, thus stressing that it developed
the mechanism for protecting people.
Just like in previous years, the NECR’s decision was much criticized by the opposition and
trade unions. The latter tried to block the decision by challenging it in court just, thus
repeating their actions in 2009. But like in 2006, the NECR stated that it is no longer obliged
to obtain the consent of trade unions because the agreement between them and the
government for 2008-2009 expired. At the same time, Tymoshenko and her party BYuT
reminded the President both his promises not to raise gas prices for households that he made
during the election campaign and after signing the “gas-for-fleet” agreement in April 2010.
Tymoshenko stated that the government raised the gas prices for population in order to pay
RosUkrEnergo in compliance with the decision passed by the Stockholm Court of Arbitration
and called upon citizens to appeal the decision in court. Moreover, BYuT declared that by
introducing targeted subsidies the government acknowledged the fact that large number of
people cannot pay the new rates. It also expressed the doubt that these subsidies will be fairly
paid. Despite all the objections, the gas prices were raised in August 2010 as planned. In
response to this, BYuT blocked the parliament’s work as soon as the new session started in
September 2010, calling inter alia for adoption of the “moratorium law”. On September 7,
2010 large-scale protests took place, which however were to no avail. Moreover, in March
2011 the court uphold the NECR’s decision on raising gas prices since August 2010, although
the opposite decision was taken in 2009.
According to agreement with the IMF, the next gas price increase was planned for April 2011.
Yet in March 2011 the NECR deferred consideration of this matter for an indefinite period,
because of the disagreement with trade unions. A day before Tymoshenko’s arrest in August
2011, the NECR declared that it had no plans to revise the current gas prices for households
and district heating until 2012 and kept its word.
14Katerina Malygina
Positioning of the key actors
The analysis of the public discourse on domestic gas prices during 2005-2011 showed how
this question was instrumentalized by politicians to create a positive image in the eyes of the
public, especially on the eve of elections.
The instrumentalization of a discourse is clearly seen in the case of Yulia Tymoshenko, who
made the issue one of her major concerns. Most prominently, she politicized the question in
2006 and 2009 when it was most advantageous to her, but opted not to attract much attention
to it in 2008 when her government was responsible for raising the gas prices. In her public
statements, she justified the prices status-quo by the fact that population receives not the
expensive imported gas, but cheap gas produced in Ukraine. At the same time, she never
mentioned that this could have negative consequences for the economy. Moreover, when
Victor Yanukovych was in power, either as a Prime Minister in 2006-2007 or as a President
since 2010, she blamed him and his government in raising gas prices for households, but she
never blamed Yushchenko for that, despite the fact that the latter was the only true proponent
of the gas price increases. Just like in other cases, Timoshenko’s accusations against
Yanukovych and his associates were reduced to their alleged corrupt practices, especially
their involvement in the work of the gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo.
Among all politicians, only Victor Yushchenko was openly pro gas price increases. It was he
who initiated the price hikes in 2006 and 2008. In his public statements, Yushchenko
substantiated it by economic necessity and the need to stabilize the financial situation of
Naftogaz Ukrainy. But he was never consistent in his position. For instance, he was very
persistent in his demands for raising gas prices in 2006 and 2008, but never raised the
question in 2007, when Yanukovych’s government was in power. In 2006 Yushchenko tried
to raise gas prices for population without any social measures in return and met stiff
resistance. Having learned the lesson, Yushchenko slightly changed his position and started
advocating the introduction of targeted subsidies, while at the same time pledging that gas
prices for households will not be increased.
Just like Tymoshenko, Yanukovych adhered to the populist politics. Yet unlike her, he
instrumentalized the discourse on gas prices for households only when he was in opposition,
advocating in his public statements for raising the prices only together with wages and
pensions. When in power, he tried to avoid the issue at all. Thus, he neither increased the
prices on his own will like Yushchenko nor boasted of the prices status-quo like Tymoshenko.
Conclusion and final reflections
This paper began with the overview of the research approaches to study discourse, focusing to
its “enabling” and “constraining” aspects on political behavior. Although different approaches
with distinct methodological apparatus prioritize either former or latter aspect of a discourse,
in essence it is a double-edged sword – actors use discourse for achieving some goals and are
15Katerina Malygina
at the same time constituted by it, as it was shown by Hajer’s and Steinberg’s discourse
models.
Although not explicitly drawing on some approach, I showed in this paper that discourse on
domestic gas prices in Ukraine followed the same logic of a double-edged sword. The
question of domestic gas prices is very sensitive in Ukraine, because the perception of the
‘cheap gas granted by the state’ is deeply rooted in Ukraine’s energy culture. Just like other
cultural constructs, it provides an easy and powerful way to channel others’ perception in a
particular way. Thus, when the issue became pressing due to changed conditions, Ukrainian
politicians started instrumentalizing it in order to earn political points and to achieve some
other goals. But in the course of time such an opportunistic and populist politics proved to be
destructive. The politicization of the issue reduced room for maneuver and institutionalized a
certain action pattern that is not easy to change now. All subsequent governments are bound
to pursue the ‘cheap gas’ politics or suffer from an image loss. In order to change this
perception, one needs a well thought out and carefully planned information campaign, a
united discourse of many actors.
Yet the paradox of the Ukrainian discourse in general (and not only on gas) is that despite its
polarizing character there is no discursive struggle in a sense of competing visions. Externally
Ukraine’s communication process might seem to resemble the dialogic model described by
Steinberg: Actors draw their discourses from the discursive field and combine them
unpredictably into their discursive repertoires during the process of communication. But there
are two fundamental differences. First, the Ukrainian discourse is very fragmented and
situational, so that one can speak about myriad of situational discursive struggles that yet
don’t translate into a more general discourse or discourses upon which Sabatier’s advocacy or
Hajer’s discourse coalition can be built. Second, when actors in Ukraine try to persuade others
of the superiority of their claims, they often do it by recrimination and negative statement
rather than by reasoning and arguing.
In the author’s view, these differences have serious consequences for the role of a discourse in
the policy-making. In economics and psychology the effects of negative framing had been
long studied. The Prospect Theory developed by Tversky and Kahneman proved that a
negative framing has different behavioral effects than a positive one (Tversky & Kahneman
1981). Yet in political science the consequences of the negative framing have been
conceptualized to a lesser degree. In the author’s view, arguing or positive framing
corresponds more to the communicative action which is cooperation oriented and relatively
power-free, while negative framing goes rather with strategic action aimed at changing power
relations, if to use the Habermasian language here. As a result, the discourse becomes the
venue for power struggles instead of being a venue for a discursive struggle understood as a
‘battle of ideas’.
16Katerina Malygina
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