The Influencers' Futile Toils: Russia and Turkey in the Balkans - IEMed
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Geographical Overview | Western Balkans
Panorama
The Influencers’ Futile Toils: Russia and
Turkey in the Balkans
Geographical Overview | Western Balkans
Dušan Reljić loniki summit, the EU extended to the Western Bal-
Head of Brussels Office kans, meaning the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia
German Institute for International and Security (this country being at that moment already at the
Affairs (SWP)
gates of the EU) plus Albania, a formal offer of mem-
bership once conditions were fulfilled. The motiva-
tion was to put an end to the conflicts for Yugosla-
Oddly, the Western Balkans, a region with a popu- via’s succession, which in the previous decade had
lation constituting barely 3.5% of the European Un- escalated into the first war on the continent since
ion’s total population, regularly manages to attract 1945, and repeatedly caused division among the
the interest and engagement of all three world pow- Western allies. In parallel, the US strategy for the re-
ers – the US, Russia and China –, as well as major gion focused on making it part of a continent that
regional actors such as Turkey and the Islamic was “whole and free,” meaning that every European
states in the Gulf region.1 The roots of this unlikely state should be as much a part of Euro-Atlantic inte-
187
competition go back to the post-1991 disintegra- gration as possible.
tion of non-aligned Yugoslavia. It coincided with the Thus, the EU is offering supranational economic, so-
end of the Cold War in Europe and triggered a quest cial and political integration to Bosnia and Herze-
among external powers to fill the emerging void in govina, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia as
this geopolitically important part of the continent. well as Serbia and Kosovo, the so-called Southeast
After all, the region connects the east and west, and Europe Six (SEE6). 2 NATO is making a similar offer
north and south of the continent. In modern history, in the field of security and defence. For the SEE6,
it has been the arena for conflicts among great pow- membership of these two organizations would mean
ers, including the outbreak of the First World War. giving up central sectors of national sovereignty in
This competition has persisted to the present day, exchange for the promise of rising prosperity and
three decades after the outset of Yugoslavia’s disin- unquestionable security.
tegration. In the first place, however, it is the EU that In the meantime, the EU has enclosed the region,
is still labouring to achieve its long-standing goal to leaving only the SEE6 outside of its territory: Croatia
usher into membership the so-called Western Bal- became an EU member in 2013. Albania and Mon-
kans, while avoiding the real or imagined risks that tenegro entered NATO in 2009 and 2017, respec-
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019
may entail. tively, so that there is now a chain of NATO states
Since 1991, the EU has taken it upon itself to be the stretching from the Baltic to the Black sea. Essen-
driving force behind settling the conflicts in the for- tially, the SEE6 have been economically “swallowed”
mer Yugoslavia. Its most effective instrument was the by the EU, and the ring of NATO states around the
promise of membership to the warring parties once region isolates it from power projections by third
the conflicts were resolved. In 2003, at its Thessa- parties.
1 Bonomi, Matteo and Reljić, Dušam. “The EU and the Western Balkans: So Near and Yet so Far.” SWP Comments, No. 2017/53, December 2017.
2 Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia are the EU members that are refusing to recognize the secession of Kosovo from Serbia that took
place in 2008. China and Russia are the two members of the United Nations Security Council also withholding recognition.Stalled Drive for EU Membership and many political and economic flaws these applicants
Panorama
External Spoilers still have to overcome, but also because of Brexit,
the populist wave, the repercussions of the financial
Map 1 shows several “blank spots” in the Western and economic crises in 2008 and the other facets of
Balkans surrounded by NATO and/or EU Member the EU’s current travails.
States: Serbia with Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovi- However, the EU as a pole of attraction in terms of
Geographical Overview | Western Balkans
na and North Macedonia. Pristina (because of its un- economic and political integration is far from being
resolved international status), Belgrade (because of substituted by external competitors. Overwhelming-
NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999) and Sarajevo ly, foreign direct investments, financial sector owner-
(because most Serbs in this country see the West ship, remittances from migrant workers and foreign
as the protector of their Croat and Muslim compatri- trade stem from the EU, mostly from Germany and
ots and contenders) are not likely to join the Western Italy. Trade between the EU and the SEE6 is about
military alliance any soon. Similarly challenging is ten to 15 times bigger than with China, Russia or
their bid to enter the EU, not only because of the Turkey. About 1.7 million people from the former Yu-
MAP 1 NATO Member States 1990 and 2009
188
Source: SWP 2017.
CHART 10 Western Balkans 6, International Trade. Top Trading Partners 2018
Japan 0.6% Rest of the world Value,
India 0.6% 7.3% Partner
Iraq 0.7% million €
Ukraine 0.9%
Switzerland 1.1% EU 28 51,861
USA 2%
China 4,138
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019
Turkey 4.2%
Russia 3,322
Russia 4.6% Turkey 3,009
USA 1,415
China 5.8% Switzerland 814
Ukraine 643
EU 28 Iraq 512
72.2%
India 466
Japan 407
Rest of the world 5,264
World 71,851
Source: IMF, EU DG Trade.goslavia have migrated to Germany alone. Vienna is Surveys have shown that even in a country such as
Panorama
probably the third biggest Serbian city in terms of Serbia, where a majority of the population favours al-
the number of inhabitants of that ethnic origin. liances with Russia and overwhelmingly rejects
NATO membership, support for joining the EU hov-
ers at around 50 percent. In fact, the public opinion
The EU as a pole of attraction in towards the EU in the whole region is contradictory
Geographical Overview | Western Balkans
and shifting. The percentage that approve member-
terms of economic and political ship shot up after each successful step in the EU ac-
integration is far from being cession process, such as the lifting of visa require-
substituted by external competitors ments in 2010, only to fall again when bad news
came from Brussels – whether in connection with
the euro crisis, the flow of migrants through the Bal-
kans, the difficulties in the EU-brokered talks be-
Yet, as long as the Euro-Atlantic integration of the tween Belgrade and Pristina, or most recently the
Western Balkans is stalled, Russia, Turkey and the Brexit referendum. The foreign policy leanings of the
other external “influencers” have the opportunity to Serbs and other Western Balkan nations consider-
act as “spoilers” in the region, mostly through political ing EU accession are plainly shaped more by politi-
manoeuvres, public diplomacy and agitation as well cal perceptions of current events than by suppos-
as, particularly in Moscow’s case, according to West- edly deep-seated preferences and animosities.
ern allegations, through undercover subversion. Moscow’s second instrument of influence – south-
east Europe’s dependency on Russian energy sup-
plies and especially natural gas – is also diminishing.
Three Instruments of Russia’s Influence In 2015, Russia abandoned the planned construc-
in the Region3 tion of the South Stream gas pipeline partly on ac-
189
count of the EU’s strict conditions, alongside high
Alongside its strategic and economic displacement construction costs and uncertain price trends for
from southeast Europe after the fall of the Berlin fossil fuels. The Western Balkan countries are mem-
Wall, the instruments of Russian leverage in the re- bers of the EU’s Energy Community and have agreed
gion are becoming less and less effective. The first to adopt its acquis. This has prevented Russia’s
instrument was always more imagined than enacted: Gazprom from using South Stream to expand its
although Serbs, Montenegrins and Slavic Macedo- predominance in southeastern Europe.
nians share Slavic roots and the Orthodox religion Moscow’s third - and most effective - instrument of
with Russia, and while memories of historical allianc- influence in the region relates to Serbia, and is the
es with Russia continue to play an important role in threat to use its Security Council veto if the West
the construction of their identities, the region’s nu- attempts to make Kosovo a member of the United
merous ethnic minorities, such as the Hungarians Nations. This is the only critical tie between the two
and Albanians, are indifferent to tales of historical states. Moscow is keen to draw Serbia further from
and religious ties with Russia. On the contrary, over- the West because no politician who wants to suc-
stated closeness to Russia breeds ethnic tensions ceed in Serbian politics can risk losing Russia’s
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019
that no one government in the region can afford, in support over the Kosovo conundrum. A sign of Mos-
light of the determination to join the EU. Also, many cow’s advancement in this respect would be for
Orthodox Slavs in the region view Russia with scep- Serbia to raise its military and security cooperation
ticism, as a great power whose actions, as demon- with Russia to the same level that it has with the US
strated by a number of episodes in the past centu- and NATO. According to Russian figures, there were
ries, have not always being supportive of their goals. 22 Serbian military exercises with NATO in 2015,
3 For a detailed analysis see Reljić, Dušan.“The impact of Russia.” In Lange, Sabina; Nechev, Zoran and Trauner, Florian (eds.). Reports EUISS
Resilience in the Western Balkans. Paris: EUISS Report No.36, August 2017.and two with Russia. The numbers have not changed lomatic effort in a political rapprochement with Ser-
Panorama
significantly since then. bia, particularly in the context of opening channels
of communication between the more politically con-
servative Bosnian Muslim leaders and Belgra de.
Turkey: Dissonance between Ambitions Parallel to this, Turkey gave special focus to strength-
and Capabilities4 ening its economic and cultural influences in the
Geographical Overview | Western Balkans
whole region. The political gains that Turkey accom-
The Balkans is especially important for Turkey’s re- plished during the times of crises and war in former
lations with the EU and presence on the European Yugoslavia started dissipating in times of political
continent in general. Simply put, there is no point in stabilization in the region. There are five main rea-
Europe to which Turkish political and other influ- sons for this:
ence reaches further west than Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Consequently, Turkey acted as a fierce ally — Turkish public diplomacy did not convince the
to Bosnian Muslims during the war in Bosnia and political actors in the region that its interests
Herzegovina and later wholeheartedly supported and goals would also benefit those communi-
the pursuit of Kosovo Albanians for secession from ties that were not marked as potential Turkish
Serbia. In this manner Ankara gained standing and political “clients” in the region from the very be-
influence among those population groups that it ginning, e.g. Muslims of various ethnicities;
considered from the very beginning to be inclined to — The “Leitmotif” of the Turkish public diplomacy
re-establish close ties with Turkey after the collapse discourse directed at the Western Balkans, fo-
of Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War. In his cusing on a romantic and rose-tinted interpreta-
speech at the opening ceremony of the conference tion of the history of Ottoman rule in the region,
“Ottoman legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities rekindled resentments and stirred suspicion in
today” held in Sarajevo in October 2000, former many parts of the region, rather than fostering
190
Turkish Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister commonality;
Ahmed Davutoglu claimed that it was only during
the Ottoman era that the Balkans had a central role
in the world’s politics. In his vision, the countries in The political gains that Turkey
the Balkans could escape the destiny of being on
the periphery or a victim of geostrategic competition accomplished during the times of
of great powers, by re-establishing their success crises and war in former Yugoslavia
from the Ottoman period. started dissipating in times of
political stabilization in the region
There is no point in Europe to which
Turkish political and other influence — Turkey has not achieved substantial progress in
reaches further west than Bosnia the field of trade and investments in the West-
and Herzegovina ern Balkan regions and has been unable to catch
IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019
up with Germany, Italy, Russia, and, more re-
cently, China, who remain its main external eco-
nomic partners;
Around 2010, when peace consolidations and the — Turkey has not significantly progressed on its
quest for EU membership was on the top of the path towards EU membership, whereas West-
agenda in the region, Turkey also invested much dip- ern Balkan countries consider EU membership
4 Cf. Bošković-Mitrović, Marija; Reljić, Dušan; and Vračić, Alida. “Elsewhere in the Neighbourhood: Reaching Out to the Western Balkans.”
In Çevik, B. Senem; and Seib, Philip (eds.). Turkey’s Public Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2015.as the paramount goal of their domestic trans- or able to invest enough political and financial capital
Panorama
formation and foreign policy: the capability of to match the region’s already existing level of inte-
Turkey to present itself as an example of suc- gration with the EU.
cessful “Europeanization” has regressed;
— Turkey’s domestic conflicts and its tarnished re-
cord regarding human rights and the rule of law Russia and Turkey’s toils to gain a
Geographical Overview | Western Balkans
has diminished its international image, and, con-
sequently, the country does not currently have decisive standing as geo-political
potential to act as an example for modernization “influencers” in the Western Balkans
and development in the eyes of the majority of will remain futile as long as the EU
the population of the Western Balkans.
credibly pursues its enlargement
goals in the region
Conclusions
Russia and Turkey’s toils to gain a decisive standing Recommended Bibliography
as geo-political “influencers” in the Western Balkans
will remain futile as long as the EU credibly pursues Bonomi, Matteo. “Off Track. The EU’s Re-engage-
its enlargement goals in the region. However, should ment with the Western Balkans.” IAI Papers
the presently narrow and restricted approach taken 19/08. Rome: IAI, April 2019.
by the EU and its most important Member States to- Hake, Mariya and Radzyner, Alice. “Western Balkans:
wards integrating the SEE6 persist, the other “influ- Growing economic ties with Turkey, Russia and
encers” might gain more traction. But they have a China.” Bank of Finland, BOFIT, Institute for Econ-
long way to go in terms of strengthening their trade omies in Transition, Bofit Policy Brief 2019/01.
191
relations, financial ties and human interaction with Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 2019.
the SEE6. Even if the authoritarian political models Reljić, Dušan. “South-East Europe needs zero-priced
emanating from Moscow and Ankara resonate today capital to boost growth.” Euractiv. Brussels, 14
in significant parts of the population in SEE6, there November 2018.
are no indications that Russia and Turkey are willing
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