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PERSPECTIVE
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus Transmission
Marie E. Killerby, Holly M. Biggs, Claire M. Midgley, Susan I. Gerber, John T. Watson
(Figure). MERS-CoV human cases result from primary
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
or secondary transmission. Primary transmission is
CoV) infection causes a spectrum of respiratory illness,
classified as transmission not resulting from contact
from asymptomatic to mild to fatal. MERS-CoV is
transmitted sporadically from dromedary camels to humans with a confirmed human MERS case-patient (15) and can
and occasionally through human-to-human contact. result from zoonotic transmission from camels or from
Current epidemiologic evidence supports a major role in an unidentified source. Conzade et al. reported that,
transmission for direct contact with live camels or humans among cases classified as primary by the WHO, only 191
with symptomatic MERS, but little evidence suggests (54.9%) persons reported contact with dromedaries (15).
the possibility of transmission from camel products or Secondary transmission is classified as transmission
asymptomatic MERS cases. Because a proportion of case- resulting from contact with a human MERS case-
patients do not report direct contact with camels or with patient, typically characterized as healthcare-associated
persons who have symptomatic MERS, further research is or household-associated, as appropriate. However,
needed to conclusively determine additional mechanisms
many MERS case-patients have no reported exposure to
of transmission, to inform public health practice, and to
a prior MERS patient or healthcare setting or to camels,
refine current precautionary recommendations.
meaning the source of infection is unknown. Among
1,125 laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV cases reported
M iddle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV) was first detected in Sau-
di Arabia in 2012 (1). To date, >2,400 cases globally
to WHO during January 1, 2015–April 13, 2018, a total
of 157 (14%) had unknown exposure (15).
Although broad categories of exposure are
have been reported to the World Health Organiza- associated with transmission (e.g., exposure to camels
tion (WHO), including >850 deaths (case fatality rate or to healthcare facilities with ill patients), exact
≈35%) (2). Illness associated with MERS-CoV infec- mechanisms of MERS-CoV transmission are not fully
tion ranges from asymptomatic or mild upper respi- understood. Little direct epidemiologic evidence
ratory illness to severe respiratory distress and death. exists regarding transmission routes or the efficacy
MERS-CoV is a zoonotic virus, and dromedary of interventions in reducing transmission. However,
camels are a reservoir host (3–5). Bats are a likely other potentially important factors, including
original reservoir; coronaviruses similar to MERS- detection of virus in different secretions, detection and
CoV have been identified in bats (6), but epidemiologic survival of virus in the environment, and detection
evidence of their role in transmission is lacking. of virus in aerosols, lend support for the biological
Infection of other livestock species with MERS-CoV plausibility of certain transmission pathways.
is possible (7); however, attempts to inoculate goats, We summarize the available evidence regarding
sheep, and horses with live MERS-CoV did not camel-to-camel, camel-to-human, and human-to-
produce viral shedding (8), and no epidemiologic human transmission of MERS-CoV, including direct
evidence has implicated any species other than epidemiologic evidence and evidence supporting
dromedaries in transmission. biologically plausible transmission routes.
Sporadic zoonotic transmission from dromedaries
has resulted in limited human-to-human transmission
MERS-CoV in Camels
chains, usually in healthcare or household settings (9–14)
Evidence for Infection of Camels
Author affiliation: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, MERS-CoV infection in camels has been demon-
Atlanta, Georgia, USA strated through serologic investigations, molecular
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2602.190697 evidence using real-time reverse transcription PCR
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 26, No. 2, February 2020 191PERSPECTIVE
Figure. Summary of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus transmission pathways. Solid lines indicate known transmission
pathways; dashed lines indicate possible transmission pathways for which supporting evidence is limited or unknown.
(rRT-PCR), and by virus isolation, as described in introduced via calf saliva or nasal secretions or fecal
recent reviews (16,17). Geographically wide-ranging contamination. Experimentally introduced virus can
seroprevalence studies have identified MERS-CoV– survive in milk but did not survive when heat treated
specific antibodies in camels in countries across the (28). It is also not known if the virus would remain vi-
Middle East and North, West, and East Africa, often able in milk from seropositive dams when antibodies
with >90% seroprevalence in adult camels (18). Stud- could be found in the milk.
ies in many of these countries have shown molecular These shedding data indicate that contact with
evidence of MERS-CoV RNA and isolation of infec- camel nasal secretions, saliva, and respiratory
tious MERS-CoV in camels (16,17,19–21). droplets carry potential risk for camel-to-human
or camel-to-camel transmission. Contact with
Viral Shedding in Camels nasal secretions can occur when directly handling
In naturally or experimentally infected camels, live camels, and virus from camel nasal secretions
MERS-CoV appears to cause an upper respiratory can contaminate fomites in the environment (29).
tract infection with or without symptoms, includ- Although rRT-PCR evidence of MERS-CoV and
ing nasal and lachrymal discharge, coughing, sneez- genome fragments have been detected in air samples
ing, elevated body temperature, and loss of appetite from a camel barn (30), no live virus was detected,
(20,22,23). In naturally infected camels, MERS-CoV and no epidemiologic study has implicated airborne
RNA has been recovered most commonly from na- transmission. Transmission following exposure to
sal swabs but also from fecal swabs, rectal swabs, camel feces may be biologically plausible, although
and lung tissue (20,24). No evidence of viral RNA has no epidemiologic evidence indicates the likelihood of
been demonstrated in camel serum, blood, or urine such transmission. Similarly, although transmission
using rRT-PCR (25,26). In experimentally infected following consumption of raw camel milk may
camels, infectious virus and RNA was detected in na- be biologically plausible, epidemiologic studies
sal swab and oral samples but not in blood, serum, fe- have not consistently identified milk consumption
ces, or urine (23). MERS-CoV RNA has been detected as a unique risk factor for MERS-CoV infection
in raw camel milk collected using traditional milking or illness, independent of other direct or indirect
methods, including using a suckling calf as stimu- camel exposures (31,32). No epidemiologic evidence
lus for milk letdown; presence of live virus was not supports transmission associated with camel urine
evaluated (27). Viral RNA may therefore have been or meat.
192 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 26, No. 2, February 2020MERS-CoV Transmission Camel-to-Camel Transmission Dynamics including age, smoking, handwashing after camel MERS-CoV RNA is detected most frequently in contact, consuming camel meat or milk, or specific younger camels (22,25,33) but has been detected in occupation (camel truck driver, handler, or herder) camels >4 years of age (22). In a longitudinal study of (47). Neither investigation controlled for possible a camel dairy herd, most calves became infected with confounding risk factors (e.g., age or duration of MERS-CoV at 5–6 months of age, around the time ma- exposure to camels). In Abu Dhabi, an investigation ternal MERS-CoV antibodies wane. The calves then of 235 market and slaughterhouse workers showed produced MERS-CoV antibodies by 11–12 months of that 17% were seropositive for MERS-CoV and that age (34). In seroprevalence studies, camels 2 years of age (25,35). Across many countries, the se- factors for seropositivity (32). Among market workers roprevalence of adult camels is >90% (16,17). Overall, in the same study, handling live camels and either these data suggest most camels are initially infected cleaning equipment (e.g., halters, water troughs, etc.) with MERS-CoV at
PERSPECTIVE
to camels (Appendix reference 52). MERS-CoV se- associated outbreaks have provided most of the con-
quences from camels in Africa phylogenetically cluster text for investigation of risk factors for human-to-
separately relative to camel and human MERS-CoV human transmission.
from the Arabian Peninsula, suggesting single or few
introductions into Saudi Arabia and limited contact Viral Shedding in Humans
(19). Differences in virus growth have been shown be- MERS-CoV shedding in humans appears to dif-
tween MERS-CoV strains isolated from West Africa fer from the pattern of viral shedding in camels. In
and those isolated from the Middle East (19); relative humans, MERS-CoV RNA and live virus have been
to human and camel MERS-CoV from Saudi Arabia, detected in both upper (nasopharyngeal and oropha-
virus isolates from Burkina Faso and Nigeria had low- ryngeal swab) and lower (sputum, tracheal aspirate,
er virus replication competence in ex vivo cultures of and bronchoalveolar lavage fluid) respiratory tract
human bronchus and lung. These findings may sug- samples, although RNA levels are often higher in
gest regional variation in the potential for MERS-CoV the lower respiratory tract (Appendix reference 61).
replication in humans. Other factors contributing to In humans, MERS-CoV is predominantly thought to
the limited evidence of zoonotic MERS transmission in infect the lower respiratory tract (Appendix reference
Africa may include differences between virus surveil- 62), where the MERS-CoV dipeptidyl peptidase-4
lance, human populations, camel populations, camel (DPP4) receptor predominates, in contrast to camels,
husbandry, and the type of human–camel interactions where DPP4 is found predominantly in the upper re-
in these regions. spiratory tract (Appendix reference 63). More severe-
ly ill patients typically have higher MERS-CoV RNA
Prevention of Zoonotic Transmission levels, as indicated by rRT-PCR cycle threshold (Ct)
WHO recommends that anyone presumed at higher values and more prolonged viral shedding (Appen-
risk for severe illness (e.g., persons who are older, have dix reference 64). MERS-CoV RNA has been detected
diabetes, or are immunocompromised) should avoid from the lower respiratory tract >1 month after illness
contact with camels and raw camel products (Appen- onset (Appendix references 65,66), and live virus has
dix reference 53). Although no evidence definitively been isolated up to 25 days after symptom onset (Ap-
links raw camel products with MERS-CoV infection, pendix reference 67). RNA detection is prolonged in
WHO presents these precautions in the context of con- the respiratory tract of patients with diabetes mellitus,
siderable knowledge gaps surrounding MERS-CoV even when adjusting for illness severity (Appendix
transmission. In addition, WHO recommends basic reference 66). Among mildly ill patients, who might
hygiene precautions for persons with occupational ex- typically be isolated at home, viral RNA levels in the
posure to camels (Appendix reference 53). upper respiratory tract have been detected for several
weeks (Appendix references 68,69). Infectious virus
Human-to-Human Transmission has been isolated from the upper respiratory tract of a
After zoonotic introduction, human-to-human trans- patient with mild symptoms (Appendix reference 68),
mission of MERS-CoV can occur, but humans are suggesting a potential for transmission among less
considered transient or terminal hosts (40), with no severely ill patients. However, there is no definitive
evidence for sustained human-to-human community evidence of transmission from asymptomatic cases,
transmission. In addition to limited household trans- and epidemiologic evidence suggests that transmis-
mission, large, explosive outbreaks in healthcare set- sion from mildly symptomatic or asymptomatic cases
tings have been periodically documented. In South does not readily occur (Appendix reference 70).
Korea in 2015, a single infected traveler returning In humans, MERS-CoV RNA has been detected
from the Arabian Peninsula was linked to an out- outside of the respiratory tract (Appendix references
break of 186 cases, including 38 deaths (case-fatality 66,71,72). Viral RNA has been detected in the whole
rate 20%) (Appendix reference 54). Multiple other blood or serum of mildly or severely ill patients (Ap-
healthcare-associated outbreaks have been described pendix references 66,72) and in the urine of patients
in Saudi Arabia (Appendix references 55,56), Jordan who subsequently died (Appendix reference 66), al-
(Appendix reference 57), and United Arab Emirates though virus isolation attempts on urine samples (Ap-
(Appendix reference 58). Healthcare transmission pendix reference 66) and serum (Appendix reference
has also occurred outside the Arabian Peninsula 71) have been unsuccessful. MERS-CoV RNA has also
from exported cases, including in the United King- been detected from the stool of mildly and severely ill
dom (Appendix reference 59) and France (Appendix patients (Appendix reference 66). Subgenomic MERS-
reference 60). Given their size and scope, healthcare- CoV RNA, an intermediate in the virus replication
194 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 26, No. 2, February 2020MERS-CoV Transmission
cycle, has been detected in stool, suggesting that not wearing an N95 respirator. All 20 healthcare
MERS-CoV might replicate in the gastrointestinal tract workers had been in the same room or automobile
(Appendix reference 73); however, it is not clear if this or within 2 m of a MERS patient. This study provid-
contributes to pathogenesis or transmission. ed evidence to suggest that aerosol transmission of
MERS-CoV may be possible at close range, as seen
Reproduction Number and Attack Rates with other respiratory viruses (e.g., influenza) spread
The number of secondary cases resulting from a single primarily by droplet or contact transmission, particu-
initial case (reproduction number, R0) (Appendix ref- larly during aerosol-generating procedures. Having
erence 74) ranges widely for MERS-CoV, e.g., from 8.1 participated in infection control training specific to
in the South Korea outbreak, compared with an over- MERS-CoV was associated with a decreased risk for
all R0 of 0.45 in Saudi Arabia (Appendix reference 74). seropositivity; in healthcare workers in South Korea,
Superspreading events, which generally describe a a lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) use
single MERS-CoV case epidemiologically linked to >5 was more likely in MERS-CoV–infected healthcare
subsequent cases, have been frequently described, par- workers than among exposed uninfected healthcare
ticularly in healthcare-associated outbreaks (Appendix workers (Appendix reference 78).
references 55,56). R0 estimates, however, can vary de- Studies have shown infection among persons
pending on numerous biologic, sociobehavioral, and without close and prolonged exposure to MERS case-
environmental factors, and must be interpreted with patients during healthcare-associated outbreaks. In
caution (Appendix reference 75). Most studies estimat- Jeddah during 2014, a total of 53 healthcare-associat-
ing R0 across multiple areas, or at the end stage of an ed cases were reported among hospitalized patients,
outbreak, result in estimates of R0PERSPECTIVE
potential MERS cases in areas with local MERS-CoV has been described in Saudi Arabia in camels (48) and
transmission (e.g., Arabian Peninsula) is challenging humans (Appendix references 88,89) but no substan-
because signs and symptoms are often nonspecific tial change in human epidemiology was seen with this
(Appendix reference 83). In addition, complications circulating variant (Appendix reference 89). Deletion
or exacerbations of concurrent conditions, including variants of MERS-CoV were identified in humans in
chronic kidney or heart disease, can manifest with Jordan (Appendix reference 57), also without notable
acute or worsening respiratory symptoms that de- changes in epidemiology (Appendix reference 80).
lay suspicion for MERS. Patient crowding has been
associated with transmission in healthcare facilities, Conclusions
particularly in emergency departments (Appendix In areas in which MERS-CoV actively circulates
references 54,79). In multiple outbreaks, inconsistent among camels, human cases can result from zoonotic
PPE use has been reported as contributing to trans- transmission. In these areas, close contact with camels
mission (Appendix references 56,58), and transmis- (e.g., handling or training) is an identified risk factor
sion to healthcare personnel despite reported use of for infection. Direct or indirect contact with nasal se-
appropriate PPE (Appendix references 56,78) sug- cretions probably plays a role. Given limited knowl-
gests that improper PPE use may contribute to trans- edge of mechanisms of MERS-CoV transmission, cur-
mission. Transmission risk may be particularly high rent precautions to prevent zoonotic transmission,
during aerosol-generating procedures, in which large such as recommendations to avoid consumption of
quantities of virus might be aerosolized. raw camel milk and meat, are prudent despite the
lack of epidemiologic evidence linking these expo-
Household Transmission sures to MERS-CoV infec-tion. Such precautionary
Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV has recommendations, while appropriate in the context
been reported among household contacts. Drosten et of limited knowledge, should not be interpreted as
al. described 12 probable cases among 280 household evidence of an epidemiologic association with MERS-
contacts of 26 index case-patients (13). Arwady et al. CoV transmission.
investigated MERS-CoV infections in an extended Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV
family of 79 relatives, of whom 19 (24%) tested positive most frequently occurs following close contact with
for MERS-CoV by rRT-PCR or serology (Appendix ref- MERS patients, predominantly in healthcare settings
erence 84). Risk factors for acquisition included sleep- and less frequently in household settings. Specifically,
ing in an index case-patient’s room and touching their contact with respiratory secretions, whether through
secretions. A study of MERS-CoV infection in a group direct contact or through aerosolization of secretions
of expatriate women housed in a dormitory in Riyadh, during aerosol-generating procedures, plays a
Saudi Arabia, showed an overall infection attack rate of role in transmission. Virus isolation from fomites
2.7% (Appendix reference 85). Risk factors for infection suggests the potential for alternative mechanisms
include direct contact with a confirmed case-patient of transmission, but direct epidemiologic evidence
and sharing a room with a confirmed case-patient; a is lacking. Although MERS-CoV has been isolated
protective factor was having an air conditioner in the from a mildly ill case-patient, available evidence is
bedroom. However, transmission among household not sufficient to conclusively state that asymptomatic
contacts is variable; Hosani et al. found that none of patients play an appreciable role in MERS-CoV
105 household contacts of 34 MERS-CoV case-patients transmission. Given the knowledge gaps surrounding
showed antibodies to MERS-CoV (Appendix reference transmission from asymptomatic patients, WHO
70). Among those 34 patients, 31 were asymptomatic recommendations state “until more is known,
or mildly symptomatic, suggesting a lower risk for asymptomatic RT-PCR positive persons should be
transmission among this group. isolated, followed up daily for development of any
symptoms, and tested at least weekly—or earlier,
Viral Factors Affecting Human-to-Human Transmission if symptoms develop—for MERS-CoV” (Appendix
No evidence has been reported that mutations or re- reference 90). Available evidence supports published
combinations in MERS-CoV have led to changes in hu- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance
man-to-human transmission. Recombination has been for infection prevention and control for hospitalized
documented among coronaviruses (Appendix refer- MERS patients (Appendix reference 91).
ence 86) and has been linked to increasing pathogenic- Large, explosive MERS-CoV outbreaks have
ity in strains of other animal RNA viruses (Appendix repeatedly resulted in devastating impacts on
reference 87). Circulation of recombinant MERS-CoV health systems and in settings where transmission
196 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 26, No. 2, February 2020MERS-CoV Transmission
most frequently occurs. Sporadic community cases hospital in Saudi Arabia. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol.
continue to be reported, and a small but consistent 2016;37:1147–55. https://doi.org/10.1017/ice.2016.132
11. Assiri A, McGeer A, Perl TM, Price CS, Al Rabeeah AA,
proportion of MERS cases have no camel, healthcare, Cummings DA, et al.; KSA MERS-CoV Investigation
or MERS-CoV exposure. Continuous epidemiologic Team. Hospital outbreak of Middle East respiratory
and virologic monitoring is required to determine syndrome coronavirus. N Engl J Med. 2013;369:407–16.
other exposures resulting in transmission and to https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1306742
12. Oboho IK, Tomczyk SM, Al-Asmari AM, Banjar AA,
assess for the possibility of improved virus fitness Al-Mugti H, Aloraini MS, et al. 2014 MERS-CoV outbreak
and adaptation. Until additional evidence is available in Jeddah—a link to health care facilities. N Engl J Med.
to further refine recommendations to prevent 2015;372:846–54. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1408636
MERS-CoV transmission, continued use of existing 13. Drosten C, Meyer B, Müller MA, Corman VM, Al-Masri M,
Hossain R, et al. Transmission of MERS-coronavirus in
precautionary recommendations is necessary. household contacts. N Engl J Med. 2014;371:828–35.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1405858
About the Author 14. Memish ZA, Zumla AI, Al-Hakeem RF, Al-Rabeeah AA,
Stephens GM. Family cluster of Middle East respiratory
Dr. Killerby is an epidemiologist in the Division of Viral syndrome coronavirus infections. N Engl J Med.
Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory 2013;368:2487–94. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1303729
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Her 15. Conzade R, Grant R, Malik MR, Elkholy A, Elhakim M,
Samhouri D, et al. Reported direct and indirect contact with
research interests include respiratory viruses, such as
dromedary camels among laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV
MERS-CoV, human coronaviruses, and adenoviruses. cases. Viruses. 2018;10:425. https://doi.org/10.3390/v10080425
16. Sikkema RS, Farag EABA, Islam M, Atta M, Reusken CBEM,
Al-Hajri MM, et al. Global status of Middle East respiratory
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