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Military Drones
and the EU
The role of unmanned systems in the European Union’s defence developments
www.paxforpeace.nl
Colophon November 2019 Author: Foeke Postma Editor: Susan Clark Cover photo: German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen and her French counterpart Florence Parly (L) pose next to a MALE drone made by Dassault and Airbus during the ILA Berlin International Aerospace Exhibition at Schoenefeld airport near Berlin on April 26, 2018. Photo author: AFP PHOTO / John MACDOUGALL Graphic design: Het IJzeren Gordijn Contact: postma@paxforpeace.nl I am grateful for the help and support of Rosie Ball, Alice Beck, Raluca Csernatoni, Alies Jansen, Laëtitia Sédou, Frank Slijper, Michel Uiterwaal, and Wim Zwijnenburg. This report was made with the financial support of the Open Society Foundations About PAX PAX means peace. Together with people in conflict areas and concerned citizens worldwide, PAX works to build just and peaceful societies across the globe. PAX brings together people who have the courage to stand for peace. Everyone who believes in peace can contribute. We believe that all steps, whether big or small, inevitably lead to the greater sum of peace. info@paxforpeace.nl www.paxforpeace.nl 2 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU
Military Drones
and the EU
The role of unmanned systems in the
European Union’s defence developments
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 3
Table of Contents
Abbreviations 5
Executive Summary 6
Introduction 7
1. Armed Drones 8
2. The EU’s Road to Drones 10
2.1 Capability Gap and 10
2.2 EU-Supported Drone Development (2005-2016) 14
2.3 Deepening of EU Defence (2016-2019) 18
2.4 Future Plans and the European Defence Fund (2020 onward) 20
2.5 What Drone Developments Have There Been in the EU? 21
3. The EU as a Security Provider 23
3.1 Joint EU Military Action 23
3.2 EU Military Operations and NATO 24
3.3 New Military Frameworks 25
3.4 Drones, Counter-Terrorism and the Sahel 26
3.5 Parliamentary Oversight 28
3.6 How has EU Defence Developed? 30
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 31
End Notes 34
4 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU
Abbreviations
CARD Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP Capability Development Plan
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
ECAP European Capability Action Plan
EDA European Defence Agency
EDF European Defence Fund
EDIDP European Defence Industrial Development Programme
EP European Parliament
EPF European Peace Facility
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
FP Framework Programme
GoP Group of Personalities
HALE High Altitude, Long Endurance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
MALE Medium Altitude, Long Endurance
MPCC Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MS Member States of the European Union
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PADR Preparatory Action on Defence Research
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft
UAV/S Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/System
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 5
Executive
Summary
A
s the international security environment becomes increasingly more complex
and contested, the European Union has begun to make significant progress on its
security and defence policies. Though it is far from establishing a European Army,
the EU is being increasingly adapted for military purposes. New instruments related to the
integration, financing, and coordination of military research, development, and operations
have been created in quick succession. Military unmanned systems, or drones, have taken
a central stage within these developments. Their development is considered to be essential
for future military operations, for the EU’s strategic sovereignty, as a future export product,
and as a testbed for closer EU cooperation. However, the use of these systems has also raised
serious legal, ethical, and humanitarian concerns. Armed drones have been extensively used
to carry out extrajudicial killings, have caused numerous civilian casualties, and there are
ethical implications of having a relatively cheap and risk-free tool to use lethal force with. It is
therefore worth examining how the developments within the EU might affect the use of military
drones by Member States.
The findings of this report show that within the EU there is a clear intention to develop armed
drones, but that discussions or policies that guide their use are absent. This gap is concerning, as
the way in which the EU Defence is developing does not bode well for issues of accountability and
transparency.
Firstly, the EU processes that have guided the development of drones so far were civilian in name,
but the defence industry has had significant influence behind closed doors. In the new European
Defence Fund (EDF), in which armed drones also feature prominently, the European Parliament’s
political leverage and ability to scrutinize have been reduced. This has prevented an open debate
about how the systems currently under development may be used, and what the implications and
risks accompanying the use of such systems may be.
Secondly, despite the growing role of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, the European
Parliament’s involvement in decision-making or ability to scrutinize remains as limited as it is. More
oversight is needed, however. Some European Member States have already acquired armed drones,
carried out targeted killings, or provided assistance to the US in its lethal drone programme. As the
EU’s capacity to act as a security provider is growing and cooperation among EU Member States is
strenghtened, these issues raise questions on what future EU Defence will look like.
These developments underscore the need for more scrutiny, transparency, accountability, and clear
policies on the use of armed drones on both national and EU levels.
6 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU
Introduction
I
nstability and conflict along the EU’s borders, refugee flows, terrorism, hybrid threats
and the annexation of Crimea have all contributed to a sense of insecurity in European
capitals. Following calls from previous US administrations to take more responsibility in
burden sharing and the volatility caused by Brexit and the election of US President Donald
Trump, the EU is increasingly expected to amplify its own foreign and security policies. In
response, Member States have taken steps to significantly deepen their defence cooperation
within the EU. Policies and frameworks at the European level now help steer the coordination
and integration of Member States’ militaries, setting the agenda that determines which future
challenges need to be addressed and which capabilities need to be developed.
This momentum continues to build up. As the European Commission noted with regard to European
defence in June 2017, “More has been achieved in the past 2 years than in the last 60.”1 Since 2017,
the ambition for deepening European defence has intensified and has been matched by equally
ambitious defence spending. Vast amounts of EU funding have now been allocated for defence
research and investment raising important questions about how the EU will influence the security
and defence policies of Member States. Unmanned systems, commonly known as drones, play a
prominent role in these developments. But these investments in drone technology have not been
without criticism, as there are ethical, strategic and legal concerns about the growing use of drones
in counter-terrorism and military operations. At the same time, critics also express concern about
the decision-making processes behind these investments.2
So where exactly is the EU’s security and defence
policy headed, how will such systems be used
and what are the implications?
To find an answer to these questions, this report
will analyse the current plans and policies for
the EU’s military capability agenda. Then the
report will seek to place these developments
in the context of the EU as a military actor
and security provider. The increased reliance
on unmanned systems in these policies raises
important questions about the implications
of their use in military and counter-terrorism
operations.
The front cover of the European Defence Agency's magazine in 2018, featuring
the nEUROn military drone with various European flags on its chassis.
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 7
1. Armed Drones
T
he use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also called remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)
but more commonly known as drones, continues to increase. Available in varying forms
and sizes, from hand-held drones to vehicles the size of a passenger plane, they use
powerful cameras and sensors to observe and gather data. These functions make them useful
for various civilian purposes, such as policing, environmental monitoring or disaster rescue.
The same capabilities, when combined with long flight endurance and the ability to carry
weapons, also make them especially useful for military operations. The medium altitude, long
endurance (MALE) drones in particular have become highly popular for monitoring and striking
suspected terrorist and armed groups in remote areas. Without pilots on board, they can carry
out operations in large swathes of territory without risk to military personnel, which is why
they have become the weapon of choice within the broader trend towards warfare aimed at
minimising risk and costs. Drones are now the main weapon in the US’s counter-terrorism
wars3 and are rapidly proliferating across the globe.4
The development and acquisition of military drones is not problematic in and of itself, and
improved situational awareness can support better decision-making and more precise targeting.
However, the use of armed drones for targeted killings by the US, the UK, Turkey, Israel and the
United Arab Emirates5 has been accompanied by serious ethical and legal issues.
ISSUES OF TRANSPARENCY AND LEGALITY
States that use these armed drones often try to keep the public in the dark6 about the details of
targeted killings, hiding basic information on who is being targeted and why, the legal and policy
rules that govern such drone strikes, or information related to accountability procedures. 7 However,
international human rights organisations8 and journalists conducting independent research have
consistently found higher numbers of civilian casualties than these countries would admit: US
drone strikes have caused thousands of civilian casualties, hundreds of whom were children.9
In the US, the terminology has also been adapted to accommodate the use of drones. For example,
boys from the age of 14 who are killed during a drone strike are now automatically counted as
‘military-aged males’ and no longer as civilian casualties. 10 Moreover, drone strikes have taken place
both in conflict zones, such as Afghanistan, and outside war zones without clear legal justifications,
such as in Somalia.11 The use of force outside of conflict zones could set a dangerous precedent
in human rights violations12 for other countries to follow, and risks undermining established
international legal frameworks on the use of lethal force.
Despite slight improvements in the safeguards near the end of the Obama administration,
the Trump administration has reduced transparency measures, frustrated public oversight and
accountability, as well as removed the requirement that only high-value terrorists should be
targeted, further increasing the risk of civilian harm. 13 Only recently the United States Africa
Command and the Pentagon, both involved in the US drone programme, have launched reviews
of the ways in which they track civilian casualties, admitting that mistakes have been made.14
8 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU
EXPANDING USE
But the US is not alone in this. The number of countries possessing armed drones is growing
year on year, as is the number of drone strikes being carried out. More states have also started
the domestic production of military drones, such as Turkey and Iran.15 The European Union and its
Member States are developing and acquiring armed drones too. The United Kingdom has already
carried out targeted killings.16 France and Italy have decided17 to arm their drones. Other European
countries have also moved towards acquiring drones that can be armed or they have expressed
willingness to do so. Unmanned systems, both armed and unarmed, now feature heavily within EU
joint research and development projects and frameworks, receiving large amounts of funding.
SOCIETAL RESISTANCE
European civil society organisations have previously criticised the EU’s use of civilian research
funds for drone projects that the arms industry profits from18 , as well as the possible implications
for surveillance and human rights. 19 The involvement of EU Member States in the US targeted
killing programme has been criticised as well.20 Over 25 NGOs that are affiliated to the European
Forum on Armed Drones21 have, together with the European Parliament and in support of
recommendations made by UN Special Rapporteur Heyns22 , called on the EU to formulate clear
positions on the legal and ethical frameworks for the use and export of armed drones.
The development of armed drones combined with the EU’s ambition to increase the scope and
intensity of military cooperation raise important questions about the EU’s views and policies
regarding their use. To find out more about what kinds of systems the EU is developing and
the reasoning behind this, it is necessary to have an overview of EU drone developments. This
report begins by giving a historical overview of how drones became part of the EU’s research and
development efforts and how they relate to closer EU security cooperation. It then proceeds to
examine the growing role of the EU as a security provider and how this relates to the use of armed
drones. The report concludes with recommendations on how to ensure armed drones are developed,
used and exported in ways that safeguard international law and human rights.
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 92. The EU’s
Road to Drones
W
ithin the EU, the ambition to become a stronger global actor with higher defence
spending has been followed up with a push for more cooperation and collaboration
in developing military capabilities. European cooperation on defence systems is
not new, but the depth of the involvement of EU institutions is. Starting from the end of the
Cold War and the Yugoslav wars, the EU and its Member States gradually moved towards closer
cooperation, delegating more and more processes related to capability development to EU
institutions along the way.23
Unmanned systems were present from the beginning, and have continued to play a key role,
culminating in the game-changing European Defence Fund in 2020. As will be shown, Member
States, the European Council and the European Commission have all shied away from discussing
the possible military use of drones, despite overwhelming signals that the unmanned systems
currently under development are not meant for civilian use only.
This chapter is organised around distinct periods
and turning points in the EU’s capacity and
1999: European Security and Defence Policy interest in unmanned systems, beginning in the
2001: European Capability Action Plan 1990s, when the United Kingdom changed its
2003: European Security Strategy attitude towards autonomous European military
capabilities.24 It ends with a summary of the
drone developments which have taken place,
and which are scheduled to take place in the
Though the EU has directly funded civilian re- foreseeable future.
search projects dominated by defence companies,
until 2016 the EU was not using the EU budget to
fund military research. The projects covered here 2.1 Capability Gap and
involve dual-use technologies, funding for which Unmanned Systems
has been justified as research in the ‘security’ do- (1998-2004)
main, not ‘military’. The erosion of the distinction
between internal and external ‘security’, and the in- Though EU treaties contain the
clusion of fighting terrorism as an aspect of ‘secu- foundations for a common European security
rity’ have enabled the funding of drone technology, and defence policy,25 formal European
which has become so notorious for its military use. cooperation in security and defence began in
earnest in 1998 when, in response to armed
For more, see Statewatch: Arming Big Brother. conflict in Kosovo (1998-1999), France and the
UK jointly declared a wish for the EU to “have
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up
10 PAX ! Military Drones and the EUby credible military forces” and “which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence
industry and technology.” 26 This led to the formulation of a European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) a year later. The ESDP successfully27 helped foster cooperation between EU Member States
in security and defence, and enabled the EU to send troops for crisis management outside of its
borders.
The EU’s involvement in the development of drones also began in 1998, taking place within the
framework of the EU’s fifth Research and Innovation Funding Programme (FP5). 28 The funding was
limited to 13 projects, which were explicitly not to be defence-related, though they could have
a dual-use nature.29 Though officially ‘civilian’, the scope of some of these projects went beyond
quadcopters and small UAVs traditionally used for scientific or commercial purposes, and covered
projects such as the high altitude, long endurance (HALE) drones typically used for military
intelligence gathering.30
2.1.1 NEW MILITARY GOALS AND INTEREST IN DRONES
The need for drones as a military capability was already felt among leading EU Member States
in the first few years of EU defence cooperation. In 1999, European leaders met in Helsinki and
expressed the ambition of establishing a joint military force by 2003 that would be able to
intervene rapidly, carrying out tasks such as peacekeeping and crisis management.31
However, a shortfall in military capabilities necessary to achieve these goals32 was quickly identified
by the Member States, which led to the establishment of the European Capability Action Plan
(ECAP) in 2001. In this plan, Member States agreed on a voluntary basis to improve their military
capabilities and bring current and future projects in line with the needs of both national and
multinational aims. That same year, “In part in response to the September 11th attacks on New
York”, France and the UK expressed their interest in addressing three specific shortfalls, one of
which was drones.33
This interest was quickly followed up by a report by an influential lobbying group in 2002.34 The
European Advisory Group on Aerospace35 , which included members of the European Commission,
the European Parliament, the High Representative for the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security
Policy) and CEOs from the defence industry, echoed the desire of France and the United Kingdom,
and noted that UAVs would be critical for carrying out the tasks and military actions to which the
EU had now committed itself:
“The nature of warfare is going through fundamental change, driven by the need
to maximise the efficient deployment of military forces, increase surveillance
against the threat of terrorism, give a flexible response to such a threat and
recognise the vital need to minimise military and civilian casualties resulting from
military action. This scenario involves the use of unmanned aircraft systems for
both surveillance and force projection. [...] Deployment of unmanned systems
can provide a reliable and cost-effective means of [civilian applications] with
considerable market potential. Both civil and defence applications can and should
be met by the European aerospace industry.”36
The advisory group particularly emphasised the United States’ use of unmanned systems, noting that
without such capabilities, Europe would be limited when carrying out independent military action.
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 11“The US has so far made the greatest advances towards (the development) and deployment of unmanned systems. Unless Europe can build its own independent capability in this area, albeit at an affordable lower capability level, there will be severe limitations both in terms of being able to play a significant role in military operations alongside the US or, most significantly, being able to mount independent actions. The key issue here will be interoperability amongst the European countries as well as with the US and NATO.” Following the advice of the group37, 19 working groups composed of different EU countries were set up that same year to address military capability shortfalls. One of these groups dealt with ”Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV)/Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Units”38, and another concerned “UAVs (HALE, MALE and tactical UAVs)”. The other 17 groups focused on other areas, including air capabilities, intelligence gathering, helicopters and special operation forces, though the UAV groups attracted the most interest from Member States.39 Despite early momentum, the political will to commit to investments waned. Awareness among Member States that the ‘bottom- up’ approach, dependent on political impetus from Member States themselves, was not working eventually gave rise to a ‘top-down’ approach, through what would become the European Defence Agency (EDA).40 2.1.2 ARMED DRONE DEMONSTRATORS Member States also began to undertake efforts to pursue both the development of unmanned systems and closer EU cooperation. The French government, building upon its call for more European cooperation and UAV technology, launched a programme with the aim of demonstrating the viability of critical technologies, as well as “the build-up of a clear European defence identity by fully opening it to cooperation” with non-French actors. Though not part of EU institutions, the programme involves six EU countries, each providing their niche technologies and getting more “value for money”.41 The drone at the centre of this programme, called the nEUROn, is capable of deploying arms, but the aim is “not to perform military missions” but to demonstrate effective “technical solutions” for the development of future combat aircraft, according to the lead company.42 In 2003, Germany and Spain began the joint development of another armed drone technology demonstrator. The ‘Barracuda’ made its first test flight in 200643 ; the year in which the United Kingdom began the development of the ‘Taranis’, another stealth armed drone demonstrator.44 Both projects continue to be in development as of October 2019. 2.1.3 DRONES AND CIVILIAN - MILITARY SYNERGY The UAV capability gap identified by Member States was also seen as an issue by the European Commission, which had financial arguments for tackling it. In March 2003, the European Commission released a communication decrying the lack of “real military capability” that could be fielded by Member States given what they were spending, especially compared to the ‘value for money ’ that the United States was getting. The Commission proposed coordinating defence investments and opening up the internal market to encourage the exchange of military equipment and research, noting: “...technology transfers between the civilian sector and the defence sector remain minimal. To remedy this, there is a need to improve the coordination and coherence of security-related research at European level through the exploitation of civil-military synergies.” 45 12 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU
© Tangopaso
Mockup of Dassault Neuron at the Paris Air Show 2009
Although showing awareness that this might infringe on legal principles regarding export controls
of dual-use goods and technologies, the Commission stated that “care should be taken in future to
ensure that these controls do not hamper the competitiveness of the EU defence industries”.
The need for the joint development of UAVs was also taken up in the new EU outlook on security
issues. In December 2003, the European Security Strategy was adopted, which officially shifted
the security paradigm from the ‘old’ threat of Cold War military invasion to the threat now posed
by armed groups and terrorist networks. The strategy identified issues such as failed states,
international criminal networks, regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and terrorism as key threats to the EU, and noted that the EU would have to become more active
in deploying the “full spectrum of instruments” in pursuing strategic objectives, including military
activities and instruments.46
“With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new
threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist
networks will become ever more dangerous. [...] As a Union of 25 members,
spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to
sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value
by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.“47
The development of such capabilities formed the basis for the creation of a new advisory group
that same year, the so-called Group of Personalities (GoP).48 Consisting of the CEOs of military-
industrial firms, representatives of ministries of defence, and members of the European Commission
and European Parliament (EP), the GoP was set up to provide the EU with ‘guidance’ in its security
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 13research. Their report published in 2004 lamented the “dividing line” between civilian and military
research, noted how UAVs can be used both by coast guards and armed forces in crisis management
operations, and further on, how new technological opportunities would “enable us to neutralize”
threats.49
In short, ever since 2003 drones have been very much part of efforts to advance and meet the
new ambitions of the EU’s security policies, amid concerns over the lack of military UAV capability
in comparison with the United States. The policies and funding for the development of UAV
technology were spearheaded based on their potential for civilian use. But the influence of the
defence industry50 in setting up these policies, combined with the expressed desire among key
Member States for armed drones, suggests the development of civilian UAV technology serves more
as a precursor for (armed) military drones.
The push for military drones, combined with the promotion of collaboration within the European
defence industry for financial and interoperability reasons, led to the call in the 2003 Security
Strategy for an EDA. This action was approved in July 2004 and the EDA became operational in 2005.
2.2 EU-Supported Drone Development (2005-2016)
The EDA plays a crucial role in
promoting collaboration amongst Member 2005: European Defence Agency
States in their efforts to improve their defence 2008: Capability Development Plan
capabilities.51 It was set up in 2005, in part as a
result of lobbying by major European aerospace
and defence companies, which expressed
worries about declining EU defence spending.
The aim was to strengthen the European
defence industry, develop military capabilities
and promote research in strategic technologies.
In the same year, UK officers embedded with US troops started operating US armed drones over
Iraq and Afghanistan, underscoring the continued need among Member States for armed drones. 52
It is not surprising then that, from the start, the EDA identified UAVs as one of its four key flagship
programmes53 and that it awarded its very first contract to a consortium led by a Finnish aerospace
and defence company for carrying out a technology study on long-endurance UAVs and related
technologies.54
Aside from the EDA, the EU’s own funding for civilian research and innovation steamed ahead under
the 7th Framework Programme (FP7), which lasted from 2007 to 2013. The number of drone-related
projects in the new ‘Security category’ grew to 18, often coordinated by defence companies and
national defence departments. 55 These drone projects received a disproportionate share of EU funding
56
and were justified in terms of their perceived necessity for border management and surveillance.
The EU has frequently justified the development of unmanned systems by pointing to the need to
strengthen Frontex, the EU’s civilian border management organisation, and ‘manage’ its borders in the
light of migration flows across the Mediterranean. Often however, these systems, developed by the
defence industry, have a dual-use aspect and could also be deployed for military operations.
14 PAX ! Military Drones and the EUIn terms of the EU’s military capability planning, the ECAP was followed by a new Capability
Development Plan (CDP) under the auspices of the EDA in 2008. Similarly to the ECAP, the CDP is
meant to identify future trends in defence challenges and opportunities, inform Member States’
national defence planners about the future capabilities they will require and should prioritise, and
identify areas for cooperation within EU frameworks.57 The decisions to invest and define needs and
priorities remain in the hands of Member States, but at the EU level, the CDP now serves as the key
reference. Its first iteration in 2008 specifically identified the need for “intelligence surveillance
and target acquisition architecture”, and “deployable airpower” for European military operations,
amongst other things.58
2.2.1 EURODRONE AND STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
Apart from the EDA’s influence in planning which capabilities need to be developed and in
coordinating that development, it also became more involved in how these capabilities might
be used. In 2010, the European Commission and the EDA together held a High-Level Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Conference, which was described as “the first European joint civil/security/defence
initiative in the field of UAS”.59 The EDA’s brochure for the event notes how UAS will be a key
element for present and future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations.60 In a series
of workshops held with the industry in 2011, a policy officer at the EDA mentioned during a speech
that the EU should foster a European drone industry, as “interest in UAS has grown dramatically
since their deployment to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the demand for the military
capabilities they bring has exceeded supply.” 61 The use of UAS in Afghanistan and Iraq has however
extended far beyond just intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks, and the lack of
any mention of the most notorious aspect of drones, namely their deployment to carry out strikes, is
a glaring omission that prevents debate on the issues surrounding their use.
In 2013, the EDA62 noted that in accordance with a decision made by Member State leaders, drones
would again be one of four key defence capabilities on which it would be focusing. That same year,
the EDA formed a ‘drone users club’ 63 which aims to facilitate cooperation among Member States 64
who use, or are planning to use, the MALE type of drones that are most commonly used for drone
strikes. In 2013, Member States also endorsed an EDA roadmap for the development of a European
MALE drone.65
Eurodrone
As previously mentioned, EU Member States still rely primarily on imports from the United
States and Israel for their armed MALE drone capabilities. The proven track record of these MALE
drones, their short-term availability and compatibility requirements have been reasons for EU
Member States to purchase them. However, this has put the EU’s own military aerospace industry
at risk, according to the defence industry itself. By relying on imports, the EU is allegedly losing
the technical expertise and capability to develop its own drones at a time when EU Member
States want to deepen their cooperation in defence development. Germany, France and Italy, all
of which have imported MALE drones, agreed in 2013 to cooperate on a UAV. 66 Two years later,
these countries jointly launched a study which culminated in the European MALE RPAS project.
The ‘Eurodrone’ will be “operated worldwide to especially support intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance missions”, and will also be able to carry arms.67 Spain and the
Czech Republic have joined the development of this drone since then, and it is now expected to
be operable in 2025.68 It has been cited by the EU as an example for other defence cooperation
projects. The European Defence Fund, discussed below, even describes the Eurodrone project as a
“crucial capability for Europe’s strategic autonomy”.69
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 15© Youtube Screenshot
The European MALE RPA revealed in 2018.
The Eurodrone’s role in ‘strategic autonomy’ also refers to the capability which sets it apart from other
EU-supported drone projects: the ability to carry arms, and hence provide an alternative to the US’s
Reaper and Predator drones. Depending on these imports for an armed drone capability poses risks,
as became clear when Italy’s decision to weaponise its US-built drones had to be approved by the US
Department of State, which gave its approval four years after Italy requested it.70 The then German
Defence Minister and soon to be President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen noted that:
“The goal of the Euro-drone is that we can decide by ourselves in Europe on what
we use it, where we deploy the Euro-drone and how we use it.71
It is important to note that not only does the EU want to replace imports, it also seeks eventually to
export the Eurodrone to other states.72
Aside from this flagship project, the EDA runs many other capability development programmes
relevant to drones73, in both civilian and military operations.74 While the EU has now begun to
support the development of military drones through the EDA, the EU’s current research programme,
Horizon 2020, also continues to support the defence industry in the development of unmanned
systems.
2.2.2 CIVILIAN RESEARCH AND MARITIME SECURITY
In December 2013, the Council made a call to improve “the capacity to conduct missions and
operations” to further develop the CSDP and rapid response capabilities, and welcomed the
operability of the Eurodrone by 2025.75 The Council also again underscored the importance of using
16 PAX ! Military Drones and the EUcivilian-military synergies, mentioning in particular how the findings of the research programme
Horizon 2020, can benefit defence and security capabilities under the heading of ‘dual-use’. Halfway
through Horizon 2020, the EU has already spent EUR 190 million on research funding for drone
projects, the number of which has risen to more than 100. 76 According to the latest draft work
programme, titled ‘Horizon 2020: Secure societies - Protecting freedom and security of Europe and
its citizens’ 77, the drone projects are aimed at collecting data and improving situational awareness
in maritime areas.78
The use of unmanned systems also features heavily in the new Maritime Security Strategy, which
notes how civil and military authorities may share resources and how “remotely piloted aircraft […]
could support the conduct of CSDP missions.” 79 This closely matches the ‘internal-external nexus’
view of security which dominates EU thinking, in which criminal networks, border control and
domestic terrorism are linked to international terrorist networks, instability and failing states in
the ‘neighbourhood’.80 In this sense, the same unmanned technology developed in ‘civilian’ research
programmes can quickly be adopted for military usage. Frontex is already being equipped with
military-grade unmanned systems.81 These developments support the notion that there is a risk that
the EU militarises82 the issue of migration, preferring surveillance over rescue, and that drones are
being perceived as a high-tech panacea to a complex problem.83
Seemingly aware of the risks new ‘disruptive’ technologies create, the Horizon 2020 work
programme includes the addendum that “the perception of security, and possible effects of
technological solutions on societal resilience” must be taken into account. 84 The document does
not specify what these ‘effects on societal resilience’ could potentially be.
2.2.3 PREPARING FOR EU - FUNDED MILITARY RESEARCH
Though civilian research for the benefit of military capabilities ‘through the back door’ was in
full swing through FP7 and Horizon 2020, in June 2014 the Commission took a significant step
by proposing that the EU should fund military research directly through a ‘preparatory action’
for defence research.85 Again, drones were specifically mentioned in the section on dual-use
capabilities to be developed. To sort out the scope and principles of such a preparatory action, the
Commission also proposed setting up another Group of Personalities, a small group of influential
current and former politicians, and CEOs from the military-industrial complex. This group convened
from March 2015 to February 2016.86 The Group of Personalities was not registered as an expert
group and as a result did not appear in the register for such groups.87 The final report endorsed the
‘preparatory action’ and further raised the stakes by proposing a pathway towards the much larger
European Defence Fund.
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 17© Thierry Roge / Belga / AFP
European leaders watch a drone demonstration during the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, (PESCO), a pact between 25 EU governments to fund,
develop and deploy armed forces together, at the European Council on December 14, 2017 in Brussels, Belgium.
2.3 Deepening of EU Defence (2017-2019)
The election of Donald Trump as
US President and the decision of the United
Kingdom to leave the European Union severely 2017: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
impacted EU thinking on a common defence. 2017: Preparatory Action on Defence Research
Uncertainty about the commitment of the US to 2018: Permanent Structured Cooperation
come to the aid of European countries, as well 2019: European Defence Industrial Development Plan
as the departure of the UK, the country with
the second biggest defence expenditure within
the EU, pushed Member States to seek further
independence on security and defence matters,
to increase their capabilities and to deepen their
cooperation. A short overview is given below
of how new instruments will affect EU Member
States’ capability development, and how they
touch upon unmanned systems.
2.3.1 COORDINATING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
In May 2017, the Council of the European Union endorsed a process to have Member States
voluntarily develop a more structured way of delivering defence capabilities, and to foster
capability development that addresses shortfalls. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
(CARD) aims to do this by having Member States be transparent and provide information on their
defence capabilities and spending plans.88 CARD uses that information to identify areas where
Member States can undertake joint capability development.
18 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU© Youtube Screenshot
The THeMIS unmanned ground vehicle, equipped with a machinegun.
2.3.2 JOINT DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established in 2017 and is aimed at increasing
defence cooperation between EU Member States, including with regard to military exercises and
the development and acquisition of military equipment. PESCO is different from other forms of
cooperation in this area as it has legally binding commitments between Member States to “join forces
on a regular basis, to do things together, spend together, invest together, buy together, act together”.89
In December 2017, the first 17 PESCO projects were declared, including two on maritime
surveillance, and one on maritime autonomous and semi-autonomous systems for mine
countermeasures. Interestingly, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are developing an unmanned ground
vehicle called the THeMIS under PESCO90 ; a project which has drawn interest from Germany,
France, the Netherlands and Belgium too.91 THeMIS has already undergone live-fire exercises and
can be equipped with machine guns, anti-tank missiles and automatic grenade launchers.92
The second round of PESCO projects has expanded its scope with regard to unmanned systems. The
Eurodrone, which was previously managed by the EDA has become a PESCO project.93 Like THeMIS,
unmanned ground vehicles in general have started receiving more attention. For 2018, one of the
priorities of the EDA was to “Upgrade, modernise and develop land platforms (manned/unmanned
vehicles)”,94 in addition to the development of air and maritime ISR capabilities.
2.3.3 EU - FUNDED MILITARY RESEARCH
The proposal of a ‘preparatory action’ by the Commission in 2014, with the subsequent
establishment of a Group of Personalities as described earlier, resulted in the launch of the
Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) in 2017.95 Whereas defence research used to take
place in joint initiatives by Member States, with PADR the EU began to fund defence research
directly for the first time.96 This significant change has been heavily criticised. Over a thousand
researchers have signed a pledge calling on the EU to stop such funding and invest in peaceful
means instead.97 The PADR is meant to assess and demonstrate “the added value of EU supported
defence research and technology”, and lays the foundation for the massive EU Defence Fund that
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 19will start a year after the PADR ends. It has a budget of EUR 90 million for research in two areas:
unmanned systems in naval environments, and soldier systems. The biggest single PADR project is
OCEAN2020,98 which aims to integrate air, naval surface and underwater unmanned systems into
fleet operations, and use these in support of interdiction missions.99
Another investment programme is the European Defence Industrial Development Programme
(EDIDP), established in 2018. It is the precursor to the ‘development window’ of the European
Defence Fund aimed at creating “an interoperable and integrated common defence system – all the
more urgent given the current geopolitical situation – by boosting Europe’s strategic autonomy in
the defence industry and developing a solid common European industrial and technological base.”100
Again, EDIDP reaffirmed that investing in remotely piloted aircraft is one of the top five priorities
for European defence. Underscoring the priority which armed drones have in EU defence research,
the EDIDP will mobilise EUR 100 million to invest directly in the Eurodrone project.101
2.4 Future Plans and the European Defence Fund (2020 onward)
The most ambitious plan to date is the
European Defence Fund (EDF), described as a
“game-changer for strategic autonomy and the 2021: European Defence Fund
competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry”.102
Part of the EU budget for 2021-2027, over
EUR 13 billion, will be allocated by the EDF
for “investments in state-of-the-art and fully
interoperable technology and equipment in
areas such as encrypted software and drone technology.”
Out of this budget, a total of EUR 4.1 billion103 will be spent on research in these areas through
the follow-up to the PADR, This EDF ‘research window’ will focus on innovative, critical defence
technologies and strengthening the defence technology leadership of the EU.104 In the EDF’s
‘capability window’, another EUR 8.9 billion105 is earmarked to be spent on the development and
acquisition of technology and equipment. This part of the EDF programme will be carried out in
what is a follow-up to the EDIDP and is meant to fill the gap between research and production.
In February 2019, a provisional agreement between the EP, the European Council and the European
Commission detailed how EDF projects will be defined within the framework of the CFSP and the
CSDP. 106 Tying the defence investments to priorities set at the EU level would be another step in
extending the influence of the EU in defence affairs. In a statement preceding the agreement, drone
technology was specifically highlighted as a key area.107
Building upon the technology demonstrated by the Taranis, nEUROn and Barracuda technology
demonstrators discussed above, European countries recently laid out plans for the next generation
of fighter aircraft. France, Germany and Spain are developing the Future Combat Aircraft System,
which will make heavy use of drone swarms through manned-unmanned teaming.108 Meanwhile,
the UK is developing the Tempest, an optionally crewed fighter jet which will also use drones as
wingmates.109
20 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU2.5 What Drone Developments Have There Been in the EU?
The desire for unmanned systems appears to have gone hand in hand with the desire for
joint EU military capability development. The Balkan wars, where the US deployed MQ-1 Predator
drones for ISR purposes for the first time, were followed by the St-Malo Declaration, where the UK
and France called for the EU to have its own military capabilities to act. European Member States
identified drone technology as a capability shortfall and started investing in drone research and
technology.
Though civilian in name, the EU’s research funding for drone technology quickly securitised under
the influence of the defence industry and advisory groups. The Commission and Council, citing
financial arguments and cost-saving opportunities, emphasised ‘dual-use’ and ‘civilian-military
synergies’ to provide civilian research funding for military unmanned technology as well. Once this
connection was laid, another Group of Personalities pushed the envelope by suggesting the direct
funding of military research and development in 2016. These efforts culminated in the ‘preparatory
action’ which laid the ground for the European Defence Fund.
Apart from the EU’s direct funding, the Member States’ own efforts to develop drones were linked
to closer EU cooperation as well. The nEUROn drone project was launched not just to demonstrate
UAV technology, but also to build a European defence identity and strong collaboration. The EDA
prioritised unmanned systems from the outset, and has facilitated training and other projects
related to the use of military drones amongst Member States. Similarly Horizon 2020, Ocean2020,
PADR, PESCO and the EDF all feature or prioritise drones, which are tasked with different kinds of
surveillance for law enforcement and border patrol.
The ability to carry out strikes has been one of the major driving forces behind the development
and deployment of drones. The utility of armed drones has led to their quick proliferation, becoming
a routine presence in conflicts across the globe. EU Member States currently rely on imports from
the US and Israel to fulfil this capability—a reliance they seek to end by developing their own arms-
capable drones. Indeed, one of the unique features of the Eurodrone is that it can carry arms.110
It is not surprising then that the Council considers the Eurodrone “crucial” for the EU’s “strategic
autonomy”.111
It is noteworthy that, despite the obvious need for armed drones among EU Member States and the
prominence of drone projects in EU defence development, the arms-carrying aspect has rarely been
mentioned.112 Instead, mentions of the projects tend to leave out the capability to strike and focus
on their ISR capabilities. The lack of debate has even been noted by the Chief Executive of the
European Defence Agency himself:
“Considering the political, legal and also ethical aspects involved, it is worthwhile
stressing that the use of force must always abide by international law (including
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law) and that this also applies to
unmanned and autonomous weapon systems which must always remain under
human control. Political, legal or ethical considerations [...] are outside the
Agency’s mission, work scope and competencies. Political discussions are underway
in the appropriate fora (including the UN and the EU) to define common principles
and boundaries for the military use of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons.
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 21It is important, and urgent, that the research community and industry are provided with the required clarity about the limits in which they can explore the contribution unmanned and autonomous systems could make to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities, and with them European defence.113 ” As discussed in the first chapter, the use of armed drones has caused significant controversy among academics, 114 civil society organisations and legal experts.115 Drone strikes have also been the subject of several European Parliament resolutions, which will be discussed in the next chapter. But obfuscation of these details prevents the necessary public and political debates on how armed drones should and should not be used. So what policies are in place, and what can the deepening of the EU’s defence integration tell us about how armed drones might be used? 22 PAX ! Military Drones and the EU
3. The EU as a
Security Provider
T
hough individual Member States maintain a large degree of competence in security and
defence matters, the EU already has considerable influence. European institutions are
setting ambition levels, identifying priorities, initiating new policies and processes, and
coordinating and supporting Member States’ activities and capability developments, which all
help shape the ways in which the Member States now approach conflicts. This influence is only
set to grow.
With regard to unmanned systems, European countries already predominantly use MALE drones
for counter-terrorism operations.116 It is therefore worth analysing how new EU capabilities and
frameworks might coalesce with the use of armed drones. In order to do so, this chapter will briefly
consider the development of the CSDP and new missions, the use of force in an EU context, the role
of parliamentary oversight, the EU’s relationship with NATO, and several new instruments which
have sprung up in the wake of the EU’s renewed ambition. This chapter concludes by providing an
overview of how EU defence has developed and what the implications are.
3.1 Joint EU Military Action
The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) allows the EU to use Member
States’117 civilian and military capabilities for a host of tasks ranging from crisis management,
peacekeeping and peace-making to military advice and assistance, all of which may contribute to
the fight against terrorism.
Looking to the future, the CSDP includes a “progressive framing” that “will lead to a common
defence”, whenever the European Council unanimously decides to do so. A rapidly changing security
environment, paired with new technological developments, has already spurred the EU into action.
In June 2017, the Commission noted in a document on the future of European defence that the
EU had moved “more in the past 2 years than in the past 60”. These are not empty words and, as
discussed above, significant steps such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund, CARD and other
initiatives have already been taken. Since 2003, the EU has launched over 30 civilian and military
operations across three continents,118 and EU forces have already used force, carrying out attacks on
land targets in the fight against piracy during Operation Atalanta.119
Accountability and Transparency in EU Missions
When an EU mission is launched, the Council entrusts a task to a group of Member States,
determining structural things such as command and control. The Member States voluntarily make
capabilities available and decide on the particular rules of engagement beforehand according to
PAX ! Military Drones and the EU 23their treaty obligations.120 Even when formally acting on behalf of the EU and under EU operational
command, Member States, which have ‘effective operational control’ over their troops, can be held
responsible for their actions.121
Accountability for the use of force can suffer if there is a lack of transparency. A lack of information
on which forces are responsible for attacks makes it difficult to hold anyone accountable if things
go wrong. In multinational coalitions, countries can ‘hide in the crowd’ by covering each other
and refraining from disclosing which country does what.122 Worryingly, on the first occasion of the
EU’s use of force in the anti-piracy Operation Atalanta, during which EU forces destroyed boats on
Somalia’s coastline, the EU did not disclose which countries were involved.123
The use of drones in counter-terrorism operations is typically secretive, making it difficult to assess
their legality and effectiveness. This is why both transparency and clear policies on the use of
armed drones, discussed further below, will be so important in guiding their use.
3.2 EU Military Operations and NATO
The EU forms only a small part of European defence. Despite the mutual defence clause
in the EU Treaty and the call of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel
Macron for a “real, true European Army” in November 2018,124 NATO is still broadly considered
the bedrock of European security. But this does not mean the EU is irrelevant. With interest in EU
defence surging, the relationship between NATO and the EU was re-evaluated, which led to a Joint
Declaration, “new impetus and new substance”, and 74 concrete actions for the EU-NATO strategic
partnership. 125 These actions largely focus on ensuring that the EU’s initiatives are coherent
with similar NATO processes, such as capability development and standardisation. EU and NATO
(military) staffs work together, sit in on and observe each other’s meetings, and have established a
dialogue on counter-terrorism and cooperation regarding terrorist threats.126
The EU’s Global Strategy recognises the importance of NATO but stresses that the EU needs to be
capable of acting autonomously to deal with both internal and external threats and challenges,
with full-spectrum “high-end military capabilities” to match this ambition.127 Specific EU policies to
achieve this will be discussed later on, but the point is that the prominence of NATO does detract
from the relevance of the EU. In fact, the EU is positioning itself to take up a range of military tasks
that can complement NATO. The EU Military Staff envisions the combination of EU civilian and
military capabilities as more suited to dealing with the grey-area scenarios between peace and
conventional conflicts, whereas NATO would remain the framework for conventional war.
The focus on ‘light-footprint’ tasks is not surprising given the EU’s history with establishing
conventional fighting forces. The EU Battlegroups, a standing force meant for rapid deployment in
a conflict and for paving the way for a much larger intervention, was set up in 2005 but despite
several opportunities has never been used.128 Member States could never agree on the financial
costs or political risks associated with deployment. As conventional conflicts and major theatre war
require large-scale deployment of ‘boots on the ground’, it is not surprising that the EU now focuses
on lower intensity situations (e.g. counter-insurgency), which are more suited to a light-footprint
approach, such as through the use of (armed) drones. As the EU is moving from being a ‘project
of peace’ and a ‘soft power’ to a more militarised union that is exploring ‘hard power’, there are
increasing opportunities for the EU to engage in this domain.
24 PAX ! Military Drones and the EUSlide from a presentation given by the Director General of the EU Military Staff, Lieutenant General Ton van Osch, on ‘The role of the military within the EU
Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’. 29 March 2012.
3.3 New Military Frameworks
The EU’s ambition to become a global security actor is not focused purely on the development of
military capabilities for its Member States; it is also about enabling Member States to act. In a short
time span, several instruments have been created and improved upon that provide some clarity on
where EU defence is heading.
In 2017, after 15 years of disagreements among Member States on a unified EU command structure,
the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established at the request of the European
Council.129 The MPCC has considerable influence as it can draft documents such as the operation
concept, the operation plan and the rules of engagement. 130 In 2020, the MPCC may also take
responsibility for an executive mission, meaning a mission where combat and the use of force is
authorised.131
To fund activities in the military and defence domain, the EU currently has two main instruments.132
Neither is part of the EU budget due to the legal requirement that the EU treaties prohibit any
“expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications”133 from being charged to
the EU budget. The European Peace Facility is a proposed new instrument which would circumvent the
EU’s rules on funding military activities. In spite of its name, it would provide lethal weapons and training
to partner countries, with a EUR 10.5 billion price tag. 134 Much like the deployment of unmanned systems,
supporting local partners in conflict areas is a form of engagement in low-cost, low-risk warfare.135
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