Large-scale Fires in support of - Army.mil
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals May - June 2018
Fires in
support of
large-scale
combat
operations
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters, Department of the Army. PB 644-18-3
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 1
Table of contents
3
8
The Fires complex
Organizing to win in large-scale combat operations
By Col. Chris Compton and Lewis Lance Boothe
Shaping the division fight
Targeting doctrine reapplied
By Maj. Gen. Joseph Martin and Col. Rory Crooks
Editor
Marie Berberea
Art Director
Rick Paape, Jr.
14 Big data meets King of Battle Assistant Editor
Methods for improving Army’s cannon artillery system Monica Wood
By Maj. Jonathan Erwin The Fires staff can be reached by email at usarmy.
sill.fcoe.mbx.fires-bulletin-mailbox@mail.mil or by
22 Multi-domain operations phone at (580) 442-5121.
Communicate first, shoot, then move Disclaimer
By 2nd Lt. Daniel Osika
Fires, a professional bulletin, is published bi-
26 What is old is new again monthly by Headquarters, Department of the Army
Field Atillery in megacities under the auspices of the Fires Center of Excellence,
By Capt. Geoff Ross 455 McNair Ave., Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views ex-
pressed within are those of the authors and not the
30 The future of Fires software Department of Defense or its elements. The content
AFATDS and JADOCS contained within Fires does not necessarily reflect the
By Chief Warrant Officer 3 Christopher Thompson U.S. Army’s position or supercede information in oth-
er official publications. Use of new items constitutes
36 Multi-domain task force takes on near-peer neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product en-
operations dorsements. Fires assumes no responsibility for any
By Col. Christopher Wendland unsolicited material. By order of Mark A. Milley, Gen-
38 Challenges in NATO fire control and digital
eral, United States Army, Chief of Staff.
Official:
interoperability
By Lt. Col. Derek Baird
44 PCS like a pro Gerald B. O’Keefe
By Rickey Paape, Jr. Administrative Assistant to the
46 Increasing multi-domain capability Secretary of the Army
Auth. 1513304
Joint force training approach to third offset strategy
By Maj. Rich Farnell, Maj. Shane Williams and Capt. Chandler Rochell
49 Thunder from the sea
Naval surface fire support Wilson A. Shoffner
By Col. Brian Duplessis Major General, United States Army
Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla.
56 Integrating offensive and defensive Fires to
defeat indirect fire attacks Purpose
Originally founded as the Field Artillery Journal,
By Capt. Mary Jocelyn
Fires serves as a forum for the discussions of all Fires
60 ADAM/BAE keys to success at National professionals, Active, Reserves and National Guard;
Training Center disseminates professional knowledge about progress,
development and best use in campaigns; cultivates a
By Capt. Abbey Carter
common understanding of the power, limitations and
64 A way to execute the brigade targeting application of joint Fires, both lethal and nonlethal;
process fosters joint Fires interdependency among the armed
services; and promotes the understanding of and in-
By Lt. Col. Jonathan A. Shine
teroperability between the branches, all of which con-
67 U.S. artillery on the Korean Peninsula then tribute to the good of the Army, joint and combined
and now forces and our nation.
Fires is pleased to grant permission to reprint;
Incorporating past lessons to posture future operations please credit Fires, the author(s) and photographers.
By Capt. Joseph Schmid and Capt. Adam Wilson
On the cover: Marines assigned to F Battery, 3rd
74 Emerging air defense challenges Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 24th Marine Expe-
Unmanned aerial systems ditionary Unit (MEU) fire an M777A2 howitzer at an
By 1st Lt. Nicholas Culbert indirect firing range outside Camp Buehring, Kuwait
The Marines are in Kuwait for a sustainment training
76 In the next issue of Fires evolution. (Sgt. Matthew Callahan/U.S. Marine Corps)
2 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operations
The
Fires
complex
Organizing to win in large-
scale combat operations
By Col. Chris Compton and Lewis Lance Boothe
As the Army refocuses on what it takes to win in large-
scale combat operations (LSCO), determining the right or-
ganizational structure is a key component of the solution.
Army Fires will play a critical role in LSCO and must be
organized in a way that maximizes the timely, accurate em-
ployment of cross-domain Fires throughout the depth of an
increasingly lethal, expanded battlespace.
Post-Cold War divestiture of Fires capability and force
structure has left the Army at a disadvantage against peer
and near-peer threats who have continued to invest in long-
range Fires and air defense capability. While the newly
formed Cross-Functional Teams for long-range precision
Fires and air missile defense are addressing certain capa-
bility gaps to increase range and lethality in Fires platforms
and munitions, the Concepts Development Division at Fort Top: Spc. Jimmie Robinson, assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 377th Parachute
Sill is proposing force structure concepts that merge future Field Artillery Regiment, gathers his T-11 advanced tactical parachute sys-
material solutions with robust mission command for em- tem after completing an airborne training jump at Malemute Drop Zone,
ploying cross-domain Fires at echelon. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, March 22, 2018. (Alejandro
Creating a Fires force with the capacity, range and lethal- Peña/U.S. Air Force) Bottom: Soldiers from B Battery, 4th Battalion, 27th
ity to provide a credible deterrence and achieve overmatch Field Artillery Regiment, fire 155 mm rounds from their M109A6 Pala-
dins. (Staff Sgt. Matthew Keeler/U.S. Army)
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 3
US Fires Complex in MDB
Employ cross-domain fires to open localized successive and/or simultaneous windows of advantage across domains for exploitation
with joint combined arms operations aimed at destroying the enemy’s long range fires and IADS network
Fires forces fight dispersed, yet retain the ability to mass combat power in time and space to achieve localized superiority at decisive
points on the battlefield to defeat enemy forces
TFC stationed forward in theater during competition period to support security cooperation, build interoperability, participate in
targeting, and enhance situational awareness
FIRES STRONG! – AMERICA’S WARS WON HERE!
Figure 1. The Fires complex roles in multi-domain operations. (Courtesy illustration)
in multi-domain operations (MDO) re- throughout the depth of the battlefield to fight with Fires and win. Success depend-
quires a revolutionary shift in current Fires enable maneuver and set conditions for ed upon the right capability and the right
force organization, capability and employ- victory. Army Fires units assigned to for- organizations.
ment. Peer adversaries already employ a mations at all echelons, supported by joint The Fires force from World War II
recon-strike Fires complex with long-range
enablers, formed the necessary structure to through Operation Desert Storm was or-
Fires, integrated sensor networks along
with counter-rocket, artillery, mortar and Figure 2. An example of a Division Fires Command unit. (Courtesy illustration)
air defense systems designed to offset the xx
maneuver and technological advantages of
U.S. forces. To face the increasingly lethal
threats of today and tomorrow, the Army
requires a more formidable Fires complex I I I I I II II (DET)
I
capable of delivering precise, responsive, HHB
COMPOSITE
BSB
L
effective and multifunctional Fires against I I I I Observation
HHB HHB HHC
targets in all domains (land, air, maritime, S1-9 CMD HHB JPST
I I I I
space and cyberspace) and at all echelons
FCE
(tactical, operational and strategic). This M-SHORAD
I
requires both reinvesting in ground-based I I I
Fires capabilities and reorganizing Fires IFPC
FSC FSC
I
forces. LNO
I
FSC
The starting point for this proposed re- HHB: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
CMD: Command
organization involves at least a cursory FCE: Fire Control Element
LNO: Liaison
review of the past. Historically, the great FC: Fires Cell
CEMA: Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activities
strength of Army Fires was the ability to FC ADAM: Air Defense and Air Management
IO: Information Operations
deliver timely and accurate massed Fires M-SHORAD: Maneuver Short Range Air Defense
IFPC: Indirect Fire Protection Capability
with field artillery and provide protection FSC: Forward Support Company
BSB: Brigade Support Battalion
of critical assets with air defense artillery JPST: Joint Precision Strike Team
4 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operations
ganized to fight and win against peer and dilemmas for an adversary and enable joint critical nodes. The DFC provides a division
near-peer adversaries. The Army invested force operations. commander with a force Fires headquarters
heavily in FA and ADA in the 1970s-90s to The seamless integration and synchro- capable of integrating the employment of
optimize for large-scale combat. The Army nization of cross-domain Fires throughout cross-domain Fires between the division’s
had tactical, operational and strategic Fires the depth of an expanded and contested coordinated fire line and the fire support
capability that ranged the depth of the bat- battlefield requires Fires organizations at coordination line (FSCL), setting conditions
tlefield to counter peer adversary air and each echelon – an integrated Fires complex for successful brigade combat team opera-
ground capabilities. The Army organized – with the right capability and leadership tions.
effectively at echelon to deliver accurate to provide precise and responsive Fires. The Operational Fires Command ad-
massed Fires as well as create integrated This is the central idea behind the proposed dresses perhaps the most critical gap in the
layers and redundancies of air defense to operational and organizational concepts. Army, the employment of ground-based
maximize capability and lethality against a Each Fires command is structured to max- operational Fires. The OFC is assigned
threat with superior numbers. imize organic delivery capability, enhance to a corps, is commanded by a brigadier
Today’s Army is characterized by modu- sensor-to-shooter linkages, and conduct general and serves as a Force Fires Head-
larity and is no longer optimized for LSCO. cross-domain targeting and fire control us- quarters at the operational level. The OFC
As a result of the post-Cold War drawdown ing an integrated fire control network. converges the lethal Fires capability of an
and modularity, the Army restructured to At the division level, the Division Fires FA brigade and ADA brigade along with
support operations in stability and count- Command expands the current division ar- non-lethal Fires capability in an intelli-
er-insurgency environments. During this tillery structure as a tactical Fires formation gence, cyberspace, electronic warfare and
period, the Army divested of nearly all capable of supporting divisions as a force space company into a single cross-domain
short range air defense (SHORAD) in the Fires headquarters. Commanded by a col- Fires formation. The OFC is capable of ex-
active component and suffered a 70 per- onel with supporting staff, the DFC con- ecuting joint suppression of enemy air de-
cent overall reduction in field artillery plat- tains an assigned Multiple Launch Rocket fense, operational strike and shore-to-ship
System battalion for deep shaping Fires Fires through enhanced sensor-to-shooter
forms in the total force, eliminating a total
and a composite M-SHORAD/Indirect Fire linkages over an integrated Fires network.
of ~3,800 cannon and all Lance and Persh-
Protection Capability battalion to protect Like the DFC, the OFC’s observation
ing Missile systems.1 This resulted in a 60
the division’s maneuver forces and critical battery contains a multi-mission radar de-
percent reduction in range and no strategic
command and control and logistics nodes. tachment, a JPST platoon, and organic UAS
strike capability. Transition to modularity
Additionally, the DFC has an assigned ex- platoon to engage operational deep targets.
also purged Fires structure at the corps and
tended-range cannon artillery or hypervel- Additionally, the cross-domain Fires cell is
division level, eliminating corps artillery
ocity gun weapon system battalion to pro- designed for conducting operational target-
and DIVARTY structures. While the DI-
vide increased flexibility and lethality to ing and fire planning. To support the corps
VARTY returned in 2015, it remains a mere
support the division in the close area. as a joint task force (JTF), the OFC retains a
headquarters leaving our divisions and
The division retains the current Joint number of liaison positions for interopera-
corps with no organic firepower to shape
Air-Ground Integration Center capability, bility with joint, interagency and multi-na-
the deep maneuver and Fires areas.
but gets an expanded Fires cell with cyber tional (JIM) partners.
While the past provides a useful refer-
electro-magnetic activities, air defense and The OFC gives a corps headquarters
ence point for determining the right capa-
air management and information opera- what it does not have today – a force Fires
bility and organizations, re-optimizing for
tions (IO) cells for full cross-domain Fires headquarters with the capability for engag-
LSCO today requires adapting to an oper- integration in targeting and fire planning. ing the enemy beyond the FSCL at ranges
ational environment (OE) where the U.S. To increase intelligence, surveillance, and out to 500 km. While today’s FA brigades
military will be contested in all domains reconnaissance coverage and responsive- are aligned with U.S. corps, the brigade’s
and the information environment. This ness, the DFC includes an observation structure is insufficient for corps needs in
emerging OE is the driving force behind detachment with multi-mission radars, LSCO. The robust cross-domain Fires capa-
the Army’s MDO concept and is redefining a runway independent unmanned aerial bility in the OFC, including the integrating
how the Army will employ Fires on the fu- system platoon and joint precision strike functions residing within the headquarters,
ture battlefield. teams (JPSTs) capable of engaging targets provides a corps or JTF commander with
Threat anti-access/area denial strate- in the division’s deep area. Additionally, true operational reach to strike peer ad-
gies (A2/AD) are challenging previously the DFC concept includes an assigned bri- versaries attempting to engage U.S. forces
held assumptions that the U.S. will retain gade support battalion and signal company from standoff ranges.
air and maritime dominance throughout to provide required logistics and communi- The third organization completing the
all phases of conflict, creating the need to cations support to the formation. Fires complex is the Theater Fires Com-
establish temporary windows of advantage This concept addresses the most fun- mand (TFC). The Army lacks a strategic
across multiple domains in time and space damental needs at division level, the prin- ground-based Fires capability. The TFC is
to enable joint force operations. To that end, ciple tactical warfighting headquarters in assigned to a theater Army and expands
Army Fires forces must be structured to the Army. The DFC specifically addresses the Army Air Missile Defense Command
employ effective cross-domain Fires, that is, the current lack of organic long-range Fires and the battlefield coordination detach-
capable of employing lethal and non-lethal capability for shaping the close fight and ment (BCD) force structure into a single
effects across all domains to create multiple SHORAD needed to protect maneuver and theater-enabling command with strategic
1 McKenney, Janice E., “The Organizational History of the Field Artillery: 1775-2003,” Center for Military History Publication 60-16, 2007, p. 338.
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 5
Air defenders from D Battery, 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, conduct march order and system validation training for the MM-104 Patriot
missile system during Juniper Cobra 18 at Mount Eitam, Israel Feb. 27, 2018. The Juniper Cobra series consists of ballistic missile defense exercises
that have been regularly conducted since 2001. (Sgt. 1st Class Jason Epperson/U.S. Army)
attack capability. The TFC is the senior operations or striking targets in support of A2/AD strategies by opening windows
Fires command in the U.S. Fires complex, the theater Army with long-range precision of advantage for joint force exploitation.
commanded by a major general with sup- strike missiles, or potentially with sophisti- The MDTF’s ability to deploy forward in
porting staff in a headquarters and head- cated land-based cruise missiles. Addition- theater and protect critical nodes early in
quarters battalion. ally, the inclusion of an ADA brigade with operational phases provides increased de-
The most notable addition to the TFC is Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and cision space for the joint force commander,
the inclusion of a strategic missile battal- Patriot launchers provides protection for flexibility to address emerging threats with
ion capable of striking targets beyond op- strategic nodes in the theater. massed cross-domain Fires, and the capa-
erational distances with ground launched Another unique capability of the TFC bility required to prevent sequential threat
strategic attack missiles. Conceptually, this is the multi-domain task force (MDTF). escalation activities. The MDTF’s ability to
battalion is a component of a theater mis- Multi-domain capabilities from theater en- employ cross-domain Fires to disrupt and
sile brigade equipped with High Mobility abling commands combined with TFC fir- destroy threat formations prior to their
Artillery Rocket System battalions capable ing units create an MDTF. This formation interdiction of the joint force sets the con-
of providing additional support to corps is designed specifically to counter threat ditions for follow-on operations and cam-
Figure 3. An example of a Operational Fires Command unit. (Courtesy illustration) paigns.
The TFC integrates fully with JIM part-
+
xxx
ners through the combat coordination el-
ement (CCE), an expansion of the current
BCD. The CCE provides the Army’s “plug”
I I I I X X
into the air, maritime and special opera-
HHB ICEWS
L
tions components of the joint force through
Observation
real and virtual liaison teams to ensure
G1-9 CMD
CEMA JPST
I I II I I I I Army cross-domain Fires are planned, re-
HHB HHB
FCE (Det) COMPOSITE sourced and employed effectively in all do-
I
SOF
I HHB mains. Envisioned as a forward-positioned
JIM LNO
enabling command, the TFC is a powerful
AVN
Rnwy indept HHB I
Stealth
USAF I IFPC
I arm for the joint force commander to pre-
Fires
SECURITY
I
PATRIOT
I vent, shape and win during competition
Cell I
FSC AVENGER
OR M-SHORAD and conflict periods.
HHB: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery FSE: Fire Support Element
I
JAMT CEMA IO FSE TGT CMD: Command
FCE: Fire Control Element
TGT: Targeting Cell
JPST: Joint Precision Strike Team FSC
Optimizing for LSCO against emerging
LNO: Liaison
JAMT: Joint Airspace Management Team
M-SHORAD: Maneuver Short Range Air Defense
IFPC: Indirect Fire Protection Capability peer and near-peer threats requires a force
CEMA: Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activities FSC: Forward Support Company
IO: Information Operations ICEWS: Intelligence, Cyber, Electronic Warfare and Space capable of employing precise, responsive
6 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operations
++
xxxx
to host a conference in early 2019 to discuss
the concepts in detail, make necessary re-
finements and continue to chart a path for-
(Det) II X X X ward for reorganization.
x
CCE HHBN MDTF Col. Chris Compton is the Concepts Develop-
PLANS
ADAFCO
I
G2
ment Division in the Capabilities Development
TADCE OPS
and Integration Directorate chief at the Fires
ACTIVE DEF* G3/5/7
PASSIVE DEF* (Det)
ATK OPS*
ACC
PLANS/CUOPS
AIRSPACE MGT*
Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Okla. Compton
AIRLIFT
is a career field artillery officer and a veteran of
FSE
MCC PLANS/CUOPS
TGT CEMA MISO Operation Iraqi Freedom. He commanded 2nd
SOCC
Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment and re-
PLANS/CUOPS
G6
GLD AMD COORD TMs*
cently served as Deputy Chief of Staff, United
I HHBN: Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion OPS: Operations
States Army Central at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
G1 CCE: Combat Coordination Element FSE: Fire Support Element
SPT G4 TADCE: Tactical Air Defense Control Element TGT: Targeting Cell
G8 ADAFCO: Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer CEMA: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities
ACC: Air Coordination Cell
MCC: Maritime Coordination Cell
MISO: Military Information Support Operations
MDTF: Multi-Domain Task Force
He holds master’s degrees from the University
SOCC: Special Operations Coordinatoin Cell
GLD: Ground Liaison Detachment
THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
FSC: Forward Support Company of Oklahoma, the U.S. Naval War College, and
* Functions expected to be supplanted by automation or executed through virtual liaison U.S. Army War College.
Figure 4. An example of a Theater Fires Command unit. (Courtesy illustration) Mr. Lewis Lance Boothe is the Capabili-
ties Development and Integration Directorate
and multi-functional cross-domain Fires to integrate and employ new capabilities is Concepts Development Division Fires concepts
throughout the depth of the battlefield. The just as important. specialist the at the Fires Center of Excellence,
Army once had the force structure at eche- The proposed operational and organiza-
Fort Sill, Okla. Boothe is a retired field artillery
lon required to meet the serious threats of tional concepts, creating a U.S. Fires com-
officer with deployments to Albania, Afghani-
the past. Building on that understanding plex, are currently undergoing thorough
stan and Iraq. He is the principle author of the
while adapting to the changing demands of experimentation in numerous Army and
the operational environment, the Army can joint exercises to ensure validity and de- Multi-domain Task Force, Theater Fires Com-
once again regain the technological and or- sign soundness. Additionally, the Concepts mand, Operational Fires Command, and Divi-
ganizational advantage required to win in Development Division at the Fires Center sion Fires Command Operational and Organi-
MDO. As the Army pursues material solu- of Excellence welcomes feedback from the zational Concepts. He contributes to Army and
tions to address its range and lethality gaps, force as the team continues to make mod- joint experimentation on the Fires commands as
the need to create the right force structure ifications and refinements. The CDD plans the lead concept developer.
An M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System is loaded onto a C130-J during Green Flag Little Rock April 10, near Alexandria, La. (Airman 1st
Class Codie Collins/U.S. Air Force)
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 7
Shaping the division fight
Targeting doctrine reapplied
By Maj. Gen. Joseph Martin and Col. Rory Crooks
Targeting can confound staffs familiar
with its application within stability oper-
ations yet attempting to apply it within
decisive action. Developing target fold-
ers, dedicating multiple persistent intel-
ligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR)
assets to “soak” areas hiding suspected
high-value individuals, and disrupting
networks long enough for civil authori-
ties to assume greater security roles bears
little relevance when facing near-peer ad-
versaries. As recent warfighter exercises
Virginia Army National Guard Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 111th Field Artillery Regi- (WFXs) demonstrate, threats present as
ment, 116th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, conduct training on an air delivered field artillery raid formations rather than individuals. ISR
April 14, 2018, at Fort Pickett, Va. U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers assigned to B Company, 5th Battal- platforms must loiter only long enough
ion, 159th Aviation Regiment, 224th Aviation Brigade, flew CH-47 Chinook helicopters to transport to positively identify, guide Fires onto a
four M777A2 howitzers and Virginia National Guard Soldiers assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 224th target, and conduct battle damage assess-
Aviation Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, flew UH-60 Black Hawks to transport eight M119A3 ment (BDA). Platforms that linger become
howitzers. (Cotton Puryear/U.S. National Guard) subject to enemy destruction or interdic-
8 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operations
tion through means of electronic warfare of their scheme of maneuver, then gener- will consume them and resign themselves
(EW), and acquisition of these lethal, mo- ate a list of targets (a subset of the enemy’s to reacting to enemy contact—at least until
bile formations increases in difficulty. Rath- HVTs) that will provide maximum payoff reaching transition points identified when
er than buying time for host nation forces, for friendly forces known as a high payoff phasing the operation. Priming the ATO
decisive action targeting objectives seek target list or HPTL. Fire supporters on staff cycle for the first 72 hours after initiating
to shape enemy forces and thereby create choose a method familiar to joint services the operation during initial planning cre-
exploitable conditions of relative advan- to constrain the time variable: the joint air ates decision space for commanders and
tage against them. The incompatibility of tasking cycle—known informally as the air staffs. Battle rhythm events for targeting,
stability operations targeting in a decisive tasking order (ATO) cycle. While it affords including the target working group (TWG)
action operational environment (OE) lies air force and naval aviation assets with the and target decision boards (TDB), provide
not in the targeting principles but in their most efficient means of managing their predictable periodic opportunities to cog-
application. platforms, division and brigade staffs make nitively get ahead of the enemy based on
Joint Publication (JP) 3-60 Joint Target- it effective by applying lethal or non-lethal refined running estimates—if command-
ing describes the joint targeting process as platforms upon selective formations during ers and key staff place emphasis on them
“…a rational and iterative process that me- windows of time that best support maneu- through their direct participation. Nothing
thodically analyzes, prioritizes and assigns ver. The predictable iterative nature of the replaces the value of battlefield circulation
assets against targets systematically.” This ATO cycle provides common focal points and evaluation shared face-to-face between
process applies equally across the entirety for employing joint assets, most of which commanders and subordinates on the
of an area of operations (AO)—including operate entirely or partly utilizing an air ground, but relegating targeting to junior
the deep, close, support and consolidation component. Constraining the staff to a time staff deprives commanders from running
areas—using the same principles through- framework driven by the ATO cycle also estimates derived holistically. Doing so
out. It provides commanders and staffs creates manageable periods within which leaves their assessments and corresponding
with a vehicle to prioritize and apply avail- to engage and measure effects of engage- decisions to chance, rather than prompted
able joint assets to achieve layered effects ment. Creighton Abrams advised, “When methodically through input from various
in a way most advantageous to friendly eating an elephant, take one bite at a time.” sources. Commanders require refined un-
maneuver. The process creates decision Engaging and shaping enemy formations derstanding from both subordinates on the
space for commanders, provides a meth- within the framework of the ATO cycle al- ground and structured engagement with
od for applying combat power in a way lows just this. key staff at targeting events.
that is both manageable and measurable, Developing the initial plan using the Shaping through targeting:
and achieves the objective of developing MDMP, staffs invest energy into phasing Manageable and measurable
windows of opportunity to create relative an operation that logically predicts transi- Through initial analytical planning ef-
advantage against an enemy. The follow- tion points important for sequencing com- forts, staffs painstakingly build running es-
ing paragraphs illustrate ways in which a bat power. These transitions often generate timates. The targeting process refines these
division fighting in a decisive action train- associated decision points (DPs) for the estimates through a multi-pronged empha-
ing environment (DATE) including a WFX commander to weigh conditions prior to sis on deliberate and granular assessment.
or as a higher headquarters (HICON) for a proceeding to the next phase. When ad- Land and maritime components of the joint
combat training center (CTC) rotation can opted across the staff to define time (and force doctrinally follow the decide, detect,
apply targeting principles throughout the space1), the ATO cycle generates DPs on deliver and assess (D3A) methodology. Ap-
depth of the AO. a daily basis with targeting battle rhythm plied at tactical echelons in DATE scenar-
Creating decision space events driving frequent smaller decisions ios such as a WFX, phasing of D3A takes
Divisions and brigades dedicate sig- based on most current running estimates. a different form to integrate joint assets on
nificant organizational energy toward an- This often reduces the magnitude of course common focal points of enemy formations
alytical decision making (in the form of corrections characteristic of strictly waiting and time (expressed in ATO day). Figure 1
the military decision making process or for DP conditions to be met. graphically depicts an adaptation of D3A
MDMP) on the eve of a WFX or CTC rota- Initial MDMP produces a plan that pro- phasing, beginning with assessment. De-
tion. In the absence of current operations, vides a logical framework and sequencing veloping inputs prior to the TWG including
staffs exert maximum effort in gaining of the operation, reflecting the best attempt a commander-approved HPTL and maneu-
understanding of the OE, specifics of the to predict enemy actions while aligning re- ver execution matrix, key staff participants
threat situational template (SITEMP), and sources to thwart them. Unfortunately, the approach four days of the joint air tasking
building running estimates within an un- heavy staff investment in the plan comes at cycle by ATO day.2 Figure 2 offers an exam-
familiar environment. This includes un- a point where understanding of conditions ple of key staff at a division level TWG as
derstanding those elements valuable to the on the ground are at their worst—before well as their primary roles in phasing de-
enemy that enable them to fight in the most maneuvering and making contact. The en- tect-deliver-assess or integrating shaping
advantageous manner, known as high-val- emy SITEMP has not yet matured as it soon assets to facilitate this activity. The figure
ue targets (HVT). Staffs then constrain the will. Staffs, especially at lower tactical ech- suggests “a way” of arraying TWG partici-
variables of space and time to a window elons, acknowledge that current operations pants around analog (i.e., large map of the
1 The depth of friendly maneuver, or time phase lines of a decision support template, can be expressed by estimated ATO cycle day (e.g., “BK” instead of D+48). Done habitually, it facilitates commonality of products and
thereby enriches the common operational picture (COP) across the enterprise.
2 D+24 hours corresponds to the Review day, where joint assets apportioned/allocated in the form of a published ATO and will be executed the following day. The available assets programmed are reviewed to see if
re-tasking must be requested. D+48 corresponds to the Validate day just one day after the ATO was published (“validating” that assets requested were apportioned/allocated). D+72 corresponds to the Approval day
during which the staff recommends to the commander what joint assets to request for his/her approval. D+96 corresponds to the Guidance day during which the commander shares his visualization of the battle informed
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 9
Integrating and Synchronizing Joint Fires – the How
By ATO day
DETECT • Assign collection asset
• Assign non-lethal and lethal delivery
ASSESS HPTL DELIVER
to achieve effect (e.g. 12 systems)
ASSESS HPTL ASSESS • Assign assessment asset
INTEGRATE • Integrate via permissive ACM,
DECIDE ASSESS HPTL
FSCMs
FO P ASSESS HPTL
DECIDE
RM RI
1
N
I
AT 3
PR
O
PRI 2
Input from BCT
I
AT
IO
N
M
FORMATION
R
DECIDE LNOs required
FO
FO P
RM RI
1
N
I
A 3
PR
O
DETECT PRI
2
DETECT DETECT
TI
I
AT
O
N
M
DECIDE
FORMATION
DELIVER DELIVER DELIVER FO
R
P
FO
RM RI
1
ASSESS ASSESS ASSESS
N
I
AT 3
PR
O
PRI 2
Input from MEB/SACP
I
AT
IO
INTEGRATE DETECT INTEGRATE DETECT INTEGRATE DETECT N F
M
FORMATION P
O
R
DELIVER DELIVER DELIVER RM RI & SOF LNOs required
1
FO
N
I
AT 3
PR
O
PRI 2
ASSESSDETECT ASSESS ASSESSDETECT
I
AT
IO
REVIEW IncludeDETECT
Close Shaping N
M
FORMATION
R
INTEGRATE INTEGRATE INTEGRATE
FO
DELIVER DELIVER DELIVER
ASSESSDETECT ASSESSDETECT ASSESSDETECT
VALIDATE INTEGRATE INTEGRATE Deep Shaping
INTEGRATE
DELIVER DELIVER DELIVER
ASSESS ASSESS ASSESS
APPROVAL INTEGRATE Include Consolidation
INTEGRATE Area Shaping
INTEGRATE
GUIDANCE Deep Shaping
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Figure 1. Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess (D3A) phasing adapted 100 Years
within DATE targeting at division of Service
level. (Courtesy | Leadership |
illustration)
Tradition !1
AO) and digital common operational pic- support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the di- sure that the staff addresses consolidation
tures used in the process. vision, arbitrates any indecision. If the 12th area shaping every working group and, by
Within each ATO day, the division G2 or Artillery Brigade happens to be the greatest the timing, allows adequate coordination
his target officer begins by arraying the en- threat to friendly forces that day because of with the most effective joint asset operating
emy on the analog COP by numbered for- its ability to engage at long range, followed in this area—friendly special operations
mations across the area of interest (usually by artillery organic to the 345th Armor Bri- forces (SOF) conducting counter-SOF. For
by sizes two echelons down; for a division gade and finally systems of the 67th Divi- divisions with a maneuver enhancement
fight, arraying down to not smaller than sion Artillery Group, for example, TWG brigade (MEB) attached or a support area
battalion-sized formations). The G3 future participants assign them as priority forma- command post (SACP) for those without,
operations (FUOPS) officer follows on the tions #1, #2 and #3 respectively.3 This prior- the MEB/SACP staff may target down to
map adding friendly maneuver/disposition itization constitutes the Decide phase of the individual level, similar to methods used in
across the AO during the examined day. D3A methodology. stability operations targeting. The outputs
The USAF staff weather officer (SWO) de- The Decide phase can vary day-to-day from this subordinate process, however,
scribes environmental impacts of weather within the ATO cycle to accommodate the only enter the targeting process at echelon
on joint and organic assets forecasted that entire framework of the division AO (deep, (i.e., division) when requesting joint assets
day. The TWG then assesses the strength of close, support and consolidation areas). (e.g., signals intelligence collection or elec-
capabilities within the enemy formations The division deep area can be defined by tronic warfare platforms on elements op-
arrayed and compares these to the HPTL any graphic control measure (e.g., phase erating within support and consolidation
applicable for that day. These capabilities lines, BCT forward boundaries) or fire areas).
identified within the HPTL, such as artil- support coordination measure (e.g., coor- Division retains responsibility for shap-
lery, are assessed down to numbers of sys- dinated fire line or CFL, fire support coor- ing formations within its close area until
tems when possible (e.g., 12 of 18 remain- dination line or FSCL). The majority of the the division main (DMAIN) conducts a de-
ing 240 mm multiple rocket launchers or division’s shaping fight takes place in the liberate battle handover of the fight. During
MRLs in the 12th Artillery Brigade). Based deep area. For Validate and Guidance days, this deliberate handover, DMAIN (either
on friendly maneuver, TWG participants the enemy formations considered are al- the chief of operations—CHOPS—or the
prioritize which arrayed formation poses most exclusively within this division deep Joint Air Ground Integration Center—JAG-
the greatest threat to maneuver on that day area. For Approval day, threats to the con- IC—chief) updates the BCT on enemy dis-
and focus on shaping them based on this solidation area can additionally be includ- position for which it will assume shaping
priority. The DIVARTY commander, as fire ed with those in the deep area. These en- responsibility as well as disposition of any
by subordinate and staff estimates at the target decision board, approving a HPTL for that period. The staff then adopts this at the following target working group.
3 The number of priority formations engaged is limited only by those arrayed and joint assets available to detect them, deliver against them, and assess the effects. For any given ATO, the number of priority formations
rarely exceeded five.
10 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operationsTWG Key Participants
Screen for Slides Screen for Digital
(HPTL) COP (CPOF)
DIV_Fires: Targeting
Warrant SWO: (USAF)
G2: Collection TACP: Air Liaison
DETECT/
ASSESS
Mgmt Chief Officer (USAF)
DELIVER/
ASSESS
(Lethal)
G2: Target DIVARTY: S3
Officer DIVARTY: S2
Analog Mapboard
LNO: Special LNO: Combat
Operations Forces Aviation BDE
G3_Air
(Non-lethal)
INTEGRATE
DELIVER/
G7: EW Officer
ASSESS
G3_Air: AMS Officer
G7: Space Ops G4: Chief Ammunition
Officer NCO
G3_FUOPS
DIV_Fires:
DFSCOORD G2 FSCOORD CoS G3 LNO: Maneuver BCT 1
LNO: Maneuver BCT 2
SJA
Figure 2. An example of target working group participants, layout, and roles within D3A. (Courtesy illustration)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 100 Years of Service | Leadership |
friendly elements remaining in what will Eagle UAV to acquire the 122 mm MRLs ly achieve Tradition
the effects, then prompts !1 the
soon become BCT battle space. BCT liaison against a named area of interest (NAI) de- group for assets assigned to assess effects.
officers (LNO) provide ideal conduits for veloped in conjunction with the DIVARTY Assess. Since the F16CJs offer the great-
prompting and facilitating this handover as S2 ahead of the TWG. Historic data from est capability to both engage the MRLs and
they are both situationally aware of current the DIVARTY’s AN/TPQ-53 radars contrib- evaluate the results of the engagement, the
operations as well as being invested in the uted to the NAI development. ALO acknowledges the assessment task.
targeting process. Within the process, the Deliver. The division G7 EW officer The collection management chief follows by
Review day of the TWG provides the last then recommends disruption of the 12th reiterating the same line of Grey Eagle that
opportunity for BCT LNOs to request ad- Artillery Brigade’s Fires nets during a giv- detect the MRLs. DIVARTY S2 announc-
ditional emphasis on specific enemy forma- en window of time relevant to friendly es responsibility for providing predictive
tions of concern prior to assuming shaping maneuver that ATO day, as well as mes- BDA as well as assigning radars to monitor
responsibilities for them in the close area. the NAI (in the form of a programmed ra-
sages delivered in support of information
Within each of these priority formations dar zone) and share assessments.
operations to noncombatants in vicinity of
identified in the Decide phase, TWG par- Integrate. The division Fires and G3
the targeted formation. The deputy FSCO-
ticipants methodically align assets against air announce the permissive airspace co-
ORD then lists the division surface-to-sur-
detecting the targeted capabilities, deliv- ordination area (ACA) developed for this
face target groups (e.g. A14B) delivered
ering lethal and non-lethal Fires on these engagement to facilitate proactive airspace
by DIVARTY assets upon detection. The
capabilities, and assigns assets responsible clearance.
DIVARTY S3 (without prompting during
for confirming that the delivery had its in- By priority formation, TWG participants
tended effect. As Figure 1 depicts, the TWG the meeting) announces the target numbers succinctly covered joint asset responsibili-
iteratively assigns detect, deliver and assess and total number of rockets/rounds deliv- ties for detecting the relevant capability, for
tasks, as well as integration responsibilities ered when initiating the group. The USAF delivering layered effects upon the capabil-
for each priority formation. Each TWG par- air liaison officer (ALO) from the division ity, for assessing results of the engagement
ticipant will have developed prerequisite tactical air control party (TACP) follows and for integrating friendly capabilities
staff inputs prior to the event. The discus- with the number of strike coordination and through developing planned permissive
sion around the table then proceeds suc- reconnaissance missions required to bring clearance measures within the ATO day.
cinctly as follows: the remaining 122 mm MRLs down to a The TWG will repeat this cadence of de-
Detect. Against Priority Formation #1 level acceptable for the BCTs to shape (e.g., tect-deliver-assess-integrate upon Priority
(the 12th Artillery Brigade in the above three systems remaining of the original 18). Formation #2, fire support assets organic
example), the division G2 collection man- The DFSCOORD checks the estimates to to the 345th Armor Brigade, this time in-
agement chief assigns a line of MQ-1C Grey ensure delivery assets dedicated sufficient- corporating a deep attack out of contact
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 11Soldiers in 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan., conduct live-fire training during Dynamic Front 18 in Grafenwoehr, Germany, March 6, 2018. Exercise Dynamic Front 18 includes approximately 3,700 participants from 26 nations training together from Feb. 23-March 10, 2018. Dynamic Front is an annual U.S. Army Europe exercise focused on the interoperabil- ity of U.S. Army, joint service and allied nation artillery and fire support in a multinational environment, from theater-level headquarters identifying targets to gun crews pulling lanyards in the field. (Spc. Dustin D. Biven/U.S. Army) with combat aviation brigade (CAB) assets group assigns detect-deliver-assess-in- for shaping four days out for the command- in the delivery to destroy 20 of the original tegrate against the 67th DAG before the ing general’s (CG) guidance. 36 152 mm 2S-19 self-propelled howitzers DFSCOORD closes the ATO day by re- When reinforced by command group in this formation. During integration, the viewing the HPTL, attack guidance matrix and key staff participation, the targeting DIVARTY S3, G3 air, and CAB LNO brief (AGM) and target selection standards (TSS) process contributes to shared understand- the air corridors, suppression of enemy air that has been published (or will be pub- ing—providing decision space to methodi- defense (SEAD) targets initiated, and oth- lished) in the division fragmentary order cally shape and assess enemy combat pow- er permissive airspace clearance measures (FRAGORD) for that ATO day. This process er—while driving other staff processes. Just needed to conduct a joint air attack team repeats over the period of 90 minutes until as TWG participants brought prerequisite (JAAT) upon the 345th AB howitzers. The the TWG has prepared recommendations inputs from other division and corps lev- 12 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operations
from all sources (including those assigned Targeting protection capabilities and en-
responsibilities in the previous TWG) into ablers requires assessing not only the extent
the overall assessment at the beginning of of their capabilities, but their vulnerabilities
each TWG and each TDB chaired by the in every domain. Targeting participants
CG. The TDB—where the CG approves the prepare prerequisite inputs to the TWG
method by which the division will shape that examine each enemy capability pop-
the enemy and maneuver in space and ulating a HPTL, listing a menu of friendly
time—provides outputs that formalize the multi-domain capabilities that can be used
Annex D (Fire Support) and leads ultimate- to engage those systems directly or the
ly to a published FRAGORD.4 formation with whom they are associated.
The ultimate purpose of shaping and Successfully creating windows of opportu-
the targeting process, however, remains to nity during which layered protection and
create positions of relative advantage over enablers are negated shifts the preponder-
the enemy. ADRP 3-0 defines a position ance of freedom of action from the enemy
of relative advantage as “…establishment
to friendly forces. Freedom of action (de-
of a favorable condition within the [AO]
scribed in FM 3-0 as including “secure lines
that provides the commander with tempo-
of communication, standoff, depth, access
rary freedom of action to enhance combat
to cyberspace, maritime and air enablers,
power over an enemy or influence [him] to
and friendly A2 and AD measures”) also
accept risk and move to a position of dis-
allows friendly forces to set operational
advantage.” Targeting participants develop
tempo. The targeting process creates these
the HPTL with this focus in mind—priori-
windows, giving friendly maneuver a posi-
tizing which enemy capability to interdict
tion of relative advantage to exploit.
or destroy to create relative advantage. The
In conclusion, targeting principles have
HPTL retains a time component, based
neither changed with a changing OE nor
temporally on enemy posture and friendly
posture within a defined window. Posture are they less applicable in DATE than in
in this case applies broadly over multiple stability operations. Adapting these prin-
domains, as engagement of an HPTL with- ciples thoughtfully to a more intense and
in the electromagnetic or cyber domains dynamic environment, however, provides
still constitutes establishment of a position an iterative and methodical means of prior-
of relative advantage. This facet proves crit- itizing an adversary’s capabilities to defeat
ically important when targeting against ad- and the focal points to which the spectrum
versaries layering their defenses with mul- of joint assets can be applied. Leveraged by
tiple protection assets and enablers. commanders and key staff members, the
Recent WFX experience has witnessed targeting process develops decision space.
an increase in enemy protection and en- Its focus on assessments (often empirically
abler capabilities to reflect the layering that derived but informed by subordinate com-
constitutes anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) mander intuition) generates in-stride deci-
developed by near-peer competitors. On sion points at a higher frequency than that
land, the stratification of air defense sys- afforded by current operations alone. Ulti-
tems of varying range and capabilities with mately and most importantly, targeting as
enablers such as EW- or global positioning a central part of the battle rhythm enables
el events to the working group, this battle system- (GPS) jammers by these adversar- a division to create conditions of relative
ies poses significant challenges to applying advantage to exploit against even the most
rhythm event influences others in succes-
friendly joint capabilities—many of which sophisticated enemy. The process allows
sion. The G3 and FUOPS officer, for ex-
rely on air platforms and GPS. This layer- even elephantine challenges posed by A2/
ample, take refinements to the execution
ing affords the enemy freedom of action AD to be reduced by manageable and mea-
matrix identified during the TWG into the
to maneuver out of contact and to employ surable bites.
operations synchronization meeting. com-
their Fires assets, some of which overmatch Maj. Gen. Joseph Martin is the 1st Infantry
mander’s update assessments at echelon current friendly capabilities. Targeting for-
further refine running estimates through Division commanding general. He served as
mations with these protection and enabler
subordinate, adjacent and senior command- the commanding general of the Combined Joint
capabilities seek to methodically strip away
ers’ perspective. The assessments working these layers (through destruction or disrup- Forces Land Component Command during Op-
group, led by the division’s team of Func- tion) and thereby allow friendly forces free- eration Inherent Resolve.
tional Area 49 Operations Research/Sys- dom of action to employ the entire range of Col. Rory Crooks is the 1st Infantry Divi-
tems Analysis officers, compile assessments joint capabilities. sion Artillery commander.
4 Appendix 2 to the FRAGORD’s Annex D includes the DIVARTY’s field artillery support plan (FASP) that aligns the resources required to deliver surface-to-surface Fires where and when needed to achieve intended
effects.
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 13Big data meets
King of Battle
Methods for improving Army’s
cannon artillery system
By Maj. Jonathan Erwin
14 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operationsSpc. Clayton McInnis, a human intelligence analyst with the Mississippi Army National Guard, analyzes data at the National Training Center, Fort
Irwin, Calif. (Staff Sgt. Shane Hamann/U.S. Army)
The United States Army’s field artillery require multiple adjustments to achieve degree of accuracy. As an example, the
community faces a myriad of challenges on effects on target. online retailer Amazon uses big data tech-
the modern battlefield. Areas of operations Big data technology may provide the nology to speculate on the buying habits of
(AOs) for Army units deployed overseas means to tackle some of the above-men- its customers.2 If a customer has recently
are trending toward urban, built-up areas tioned challenges. Big data technology may purchased a pair of running shoes via Am-
that include population centers and large assist the Army’s cannon artillery units azon’s online store, the customer’s Ama-
amounts of civilian infrastructure. These in being more precise, responsive and ef- zon homepage will include advertisements
AOs are crowded and contain numerous fective by improving the accuracy of con- related to running accessories. In order to
targets that are interspersed amongst large ventional artillery munitions, accelerating determine what items to advertise on a spe-
populations of non-combatants. Targets in the target identification process, rapidly cific customer’s homepage, Amazon lever-
these environments are often fleeting, pre- de-conflicting airspace, and speeding up ages big data technology to analyze other
senting commanders with small windows the sensor-to-shooter link. The following customer’s buying habits. Amazon can run
for conducting an engagement. In order to sections will address the advent of big data an algorithm through its databases to de-
remain relevant in these AOs, cannon ar- technology and the methods in which big termine what item customers most often
tillery units require precision, responsive- data technology can be applied to the can- purchase after purchasing a pair of running
ness, and effectiveness. Designed as an area non artillery system to improve precision, shoes. If Amazon determines that the ma-
Big data
fire weapon, a howitzer firing conventional responsiveness and effectiveness. jority of its customers buy a digital watch
“dumb” rounds has limited precision. In an after purchasing running shoes, then a cus-
urban setting, the responsiveness of cannon Big data technology aids the user in tomer can expect to see advertisements for
artillery platforms is constrained by decon- inferring probabilities through the appli- digital watches on their home screen imme-
fliction procedures and collateral damage cation of math to huge quantities of data.1 diately after purchasing a pair of running
requirements. Furthermore, cannon artil- In other words, it empowers users to make shoes. To be clear, Amazon does not choose
lery platforms are ineffective when they predictions about the future with a high to advertise items that fall in the same cate-
1Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that will Transform how we Live, Work, and Think (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 12.
2José van Dijck, “Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data between Scientific Paradigm and Ideology,” Surveillance & Society 12 (2): 200. http://search.proquest.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1547988865?ac-
countid=14746
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 15gory as the original purchase. Instead, they
analyze the buying habits of previous cus-
artillery operations. Targeting and fire mis-
sion processing produce large amounts of
Improving precision
On the modern battlefield, collateral
tomers to determine the next probable pur- data. Existing fire control systems, such as
damage is a primary concern for ground
chase for another customer. the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
force commanders (GFCs). Excessive col-
Amazon’s use of big data technology System (AFATDS), capture much of this
lateral damage during operations presents
to discern buying habits does not imply data. However, other data will require the
adversaries with the opportunity to exploit
that Amazon can determine the causal re- development of new methods to measure the employment of certain tactics. In an
lationships behind a customer’s purchase and capture the information to facilitate operating environment (OE) where adver-
decisions. Rather, Amazon uses big data to analysis by computer. saries can rapidly disseminate information,
reveal the correlations between separately Before delving into methods for apply- those adversaries can propagandize collat-
occurring purchase events. Analyzing mas- ing big data technology to the cannon artil- eral damage incidents to erode host nation
sive amounts of data facilitates the discov- lery system, it is first important to explain support for United States Army activities.
ery of correlation, not causation.3 Correla- the components of the system and its de- United States domestic audiences are sub-
tion provides probability, not certainty. sign. The cannon artillery organization has ject to influence by the same propaganda.
Probability can inform someone about what three main components: the firing platform, In such environments, Army units must be
might happen, but not necessarily why it the FDC and the forward observer (FO).8 consistently precise when applying combat
happened. Using a data-driven approach to The firing platform is the shooter, and the power. However, the Army’s cannon artil-
determine the correlations between various forward observer is the sensor. The FDC is lery platforms have limited precision when
phenomena can give results much faster the link between the sensor and the shooter employed without precision munitions.
than trying to determine the causal rela- (see Figure 1). The FDC receives the target Precision artillery rounds such as the M982
tionship.4 As a fire direction center (FDC)
location from the FO, and subsequently Excalibur are available, but are exceeding-
crewmember, knowing the net effect of a
translates the target location data into fir- ly expensive at almost $70,000 per unit. On
weather condition on the impact point of a
ing data for the howitzer. In addition to the the other hand, a dumb artillery round such
howitzer crew’s rounds is more important
FO, numerous other sensors now exist that as the M795 high explosive projectile has a
than knowing why. If the FDC crewmem-
are capable of providing target location in- production cost of only $333.9
ber knows the effect, they can make proper
formation to an FDC. Examples include the In order to improve the precision of con-
adjustments for the howitzer crew to ensure
various unmanned aerial systems (UASs) ventional cannon artillery munitions, AF-
their rounds impact on target. Knowing the
in the Army’s inventory, as well as the Per- ATDS’ gunnery solutions require improve-
why doesn’t help accomplish the mission.
sistent Threat Detection Systems found on ment. The gunnery solution is the firing
In order to reap the benefits of big data
many forward bases in Iraq and Afghani- data the FDC produces after it processes
technology, there are three key require-
stan. Rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft target information from the FO, or other
ments: processing, storage power and ana-
pilots are also capable of transmitting target available sensor. The gunnery solution does
lytical tools.5 Processing refers to the com-
data to FDCs. The FO is not obsolete, but is not account for inherent error, which is de-
puting power necessary to search through
now just one of a vast number of sensors fined in Training Circular 3-09.81 (Field Ar-
and sift large troves of data. Storage power
refers to the physical hardware that is re- that communicate with an FDC. tillery Manual Cannon Gunnery) as those
quired to capture and maintain the datafied Figure 1. The cannon artillery call for fire system. (Wikimedia)
information. Lastly, the analytical tools re-
fer to the algorithms that data scientists pro-
duce in order to mine data sets.6 Processing
and storing the information could be con-
sidered the science of big data technology,
while the development of algorithms could
be considered the art. The algorithms re-
quire creativity and critical thinking, since
they serve as the primary tool for gleaning
the relationships between various data sets.
Another important requirement to max-
imize the benefit of big data technology is
datafication, or the capturing of quantifi-
able information for subsequent storage,
processing and analysis.7 Fortunately, the
Army can datafy many aspects of cannon
3Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data, 7.
4Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data, 55.
5Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data, 27.
6Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data, 125.
7Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data, 15.
8Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Artillery Manual Can-
non Gunnery. TC 3-09.81. Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Department of the Army, April 13, 2016: 1-1 to 1-2.
9http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/m795.
htm
16 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operationsYou can also read
