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Participant Handbook
MILE HIGH DICE
ELECTRIC SECTOR WORKSHOP & TABLETOP EXERCISE
NOVEMBER 15, 2018
Prolonged Power Outage Workshop
from an agency or business point of view
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Continuity planning may be the answer to a power outage event
A catastrophic power outage presents a significant danger to lives, infrastructure, and
critical lifeline sectors with electrical power interdependencies. A large-scale power
outage impairs social and economic processes that citizens require to meet their daily
needs.
What today’s workshop is not:
Today’s workshop is not a version of a grid security exercise (GridEx), which is a
biennial operational exercise with utilities and stakeholders from North America. The
focus of GRIDEX is on the electrical grid, and other critical infrastructures, and how
the utility companies demonstrate their response recovery actions to a simulated
coordinated cyber and physical security incident.
What Today’s workshop is:
A training and exercise opportunity that focuses on you and your agency, or business,
and the resources you have influence on. The idea is to look internally at:
• Incident Response and/or Continuity plans;
• Local and regional response depending on the size of your organization;
• Interdependencies;
• Communication Plans;
• Lessons Learned; and
• Engage Senior Leadership
A government-centric approach to a prolonged power failure will not be enough to
meet the cascading difficulties of water supply and wastewater treatment,
telecommunications, transportation, refining, healthcare, the list goes on…It is vital
that citizens, households, communities, businesses and governments be prepared to
meet this challenge. Engaging the whole community and empowering local action
will better position stakeholders to plan for and meet the actual needs of a
community and strengthen the local capacity to deal with the consequences of all
threats and hazards. 1
Common Industry Terms
Grid: Layout of the electrical transmission system; a network of transmission lines and the
associated substations and other equipment required to move power
1
FEMA FDOC 104-008-1, A whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and
Pathways for Action
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
CONTENTS
Agenda .................................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction
Background ................................................................................................................................................. 5
Purpose and Objectives ............................................................................................................................. 5
Facility Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 5
Electric Sector Overview ............................................................................................................................ 6
Biography
Featured Speakers Biographies................................................................................................................... 9
Seminar and Discussion-based Exercise
Why We Are Here .................................................................................................................................... 13
Most Likely Events ........................................................................................................................... 13
Most Dangerous Events .................................................................................................................. 14
Incorporating Prolonged Power Outage into Continuity Planning .................................................. 17
Tabletop Exercise ...................................................................................................................................... 18
Continuity Basics
Elements of a Viable Continuity Program ................................................................................................. 27
Resources
List of References ...................................................................................................................................... 31
Lifelines ..................................................................................................................................................... 32
ESF-14 /Survey Information ...................................................................................................................... 33
Common Industry Terms
Frequency: The oscillatory rate in Hertz (Hz-cycles per second) of the alternating current in a
circuit. The standard frequency across the bulk power system is 60 Hz in the United States and
50 Hz in Europe. Maintaining standard system frequency of the grid within acceptable limits is
the responsibility of the control area operator (CAO)
Contents 3
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
MILE HIGH Dice
NOVEMBER 15, 2018
SEMINAR AND TABLETOP EXERCISE AGENDA
Time (MST) Session Comments
7:30 am Registration Participants sign in
8:00 am Welcome Opening comments
• Mr. Jim Gray, Director, Bureau of Prisons-National Corrections
Academy
• Mr. Fred Eidson, Executive Director, Colorado Federal Executive
Board (CFEB)
• Ms. Nancy J. Dragani, Deputy Regional Administrator, FEMA Region
VIII, and Colorado FEB Chair
• Mr. Shawn Graff, Regional Director, DHS/Office of Infrastructure
Protection
Introductions & Continuity Basics
• Mr. Mike Brinkman, Regional Continuity Manager, FEMA Region VIII
• Mr. Gilbert D. Flores, Emergency Management Specialist, Western
Area Power Administration
8:40 am Training #1 Mr. Steve Yexley
Western Area Power Administration,
Vice President of Technical Services
9:30 am Networking Break (Optional: Facilitator Training)
9:55 am Training #2 Mr. Bob Johnson, Principal Operations Engineer
Mr. Mark Newby, Director, Xcel Energy Colorado Control Center
Xcel Energy | Responsible by Nature
12:00 pm Lunch On your own
1:00 pm Training #3 Mr. Peter Navesky
US Army Corp of Engineers,
Emergency Operations Specialist
Permanent Cadre ESF #3 Team Leader
1:30 pm Panel Discussion All Presenters (Q&A)
2:00 pm Networking Break
2:15 pm TTX Scenario #1 48-24 Hours Before Power Loss
Out brief(s) Exercise Director | Mike Brinkman
3:30 pm Hot Wash / Exercise Director | Mike Brinkman
Final Comments
3:45 pm Adjourn
Agenda 4
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
INTRODUCTION
Background
Mile High Dice is an annual training and exercise event hosted by the Colorado Federal Executive Board
(CFEB) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VIII. The event provides
participants the opportunity to improve their plans and procedures by learning the latest policy updates,
discussing their response and contingency planning efforts, testing their planning assumptions, and
sharing best practices.
Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this event is to provide a forum for interagency coordination and improvement of continuity
and response plans – The 2018 theme of a prolonged power outage ties to Critical Infrastructure, which is
the Colorado Preparedness Coalition’s (CPC) priority this year. The CPC consists of the Colorado Emergency
Preparedness Partnership (CEPP), State of Colorado Division of Homeland Security & Emergency
Management (CDHSEM), CFEB & FEMA. Today’s objectives center on the Electric Sector and include:
• Develop a common understanding of:
- What is the Power Grid;
- What are the risks/vulnerabilities of the Power Grid; and
- How do we mitigate against the risks and vulnerabilities.
• Facilitate active learning opportunities and peer-to-peer exchanges, highlighting beneficial
redundancies and identifying potential gaps in long-term continuity plans; and
• Examine and assess plans, processes, and procedures for responding to, and recovering
from a prolonged power outage and discuss potential solutions/mitigation measures to
lessen its impact.
Facility Overview
The event will be held in the Vail room at the Bureau of Prisons National Corrections Academy.
Note: The top level of the parking garage is restricted to GSA vehicles.
BOP National Corrections Academy
11900 East Cornell Avenue
Aurora, Colorado
Parking
Building
Main Entrance
DIRECTIONS FROM I 225 & PARKER RD
North on Parker Road
North (Right) on South Peoria St
*Facility fire arm policy for Law West (Left) on East Cornell Ave
Enforcement: Only responding (not Left into the parking lot for UNIT C
visiting / meeting / student / attending) The training academy is in an office complex – you will see their National
law enforcement are allowed to enter with Corrections Academy sign as you enter the parking lot.
weapons. There is no visitor weapons **IMPORTANT NOTE**
locker on site, if authorized to carry a You must have your Government (federal, state or local) employment photo ID or
weapon, you must secure it IAW another official government issued photo ID, i.e., Driver’s License, to enter the
governing policy. building.
Introduction
5
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Electric Sector Overview
Citizens of the United States depend on secure and reliable electric power for their contemporary way of
life. If electric power is not available for weeks, months, or even a year, then cascading impacts would
degrade multiple critical infrastructures: water supply and wastewater treatment; telecommunications
and the Internet; food production and delivery; fuel extraction, refining, and distribution; financial
systems; transportation and traffic control; government, including public works, law enforcement, and
emergency services; hospitals and healthcare; business supply chains; and other critical societal
processes 2.
The electric industry provides the energy essential to power modern commercial, industrial, residential,
and transportation needs. Geographically distributed power plants convert mechanical work into
electricity which is carried over large distances to customers. The structure of electricity delivery can be
categorized into three functions: generation, transmission, and distribution, all of which are linked through
key assets known as substations 3. The private sector, States, and Federal Government all play crucial roles
in ensuring that electricity infrastructure is reliable, resilient, and secure.
• Generation: Electrical energy is created by transforming mechanical power to electrical power at
a generation station. The majority of turbine generators used are thermally driven by steam. In
thermal generation, fuel is combusted to produce steam from which mechanical work is extracted as
it releases energy through high-pressure condensation in a turbine. Under high pressure, steam turns
the blades of a turbine that spins a generator producing electricity. Coal, gas, nuclear, and petroleum
power plants all use thermal power generation in combustion turbines. With wind turbines, the flow
of the wind turns the turbine blades, which then turn an electric generator. With solar power, sunlight
is converted into electricity through solar cells that absorb the sun’s energy. Hydro based power
plants use the flow of water to spin turbines thereby generating electric power.
• Transmission: Power transmission lines facilitate the transfer of electricity from a generating
station to a local distribution network. Transmission components include structural frames,
conductor lines, transformers, switches, and substations.
• Distribution: The power distribution system is the part of the electric power system that carries
electricity from transmission systems to individual customers. Power distribution is performed by
distribution networks, which consist of the following main parts: distribution substations, primary
distribution feeders, distribution transformers, distributors, and service mains.
Basic Structure of the Electric Power System
2 Powering Through, From Fragile Infrastructures to Community Resilience, 2016 Electromagnetic Pulse Special Interest Group of Infragard
3 U.S. Department of Energy, United States Electricity Industry Primer, July 2015 https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f28/united-
states-electricity-industry-primer.pdf
Introduction
6
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
The Grid4
The combined transmission and distribution network is referred to as the “power grid” or simply “the grid.”
North America’s bulk power system is comprised of four distinct power grids, also called interconnections,
as shown below. Interconnections are zones within which utilities are electrically tied together during
normal system conditions. Each interconnection generally operates independently of one another, except
for a few direct current (DC) conversion links in between.
Electricity Providers
Over 1,400 electric companies in FEMA Region VIII generate, transmit, and distribute electricity. There are
two main types of utilities: for-profit (investor-owned utilities [IOUs]) and not-for-profit, which include
public power utilities, rural electric cooperatives (co-ops), and the Federal Power Program.
For-Profit Utilities:
• Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) – IOUs are utilities owned by private investors and may have
service territories in one or more states. State commissions grant IOUs licenses to operate in specific
areas of a state and regulate a utility’s distribution system and retail sales. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates a utility’s interstate generation, transmission, and power
sales.
Not-For-Profit Utilities:
• Public Power Utilities – Public power utilities are not-for-profit utilities owned and operated by
state or local governments or by agencies, authorities, or instruments of such governments. City-
owned utilities are also known as municipal utilities. Public power utilities are regulated and governed
by locally elected or appointed officials.
• Rural Electric Cooperatives (Co-ops) – Electric co-ops are private, non-profit entities owned by
their members. They tend to provide services in rural areas that are not served by other utilities.
They operate at cost, and any revenue generated in excess of operating costs is returned to members.
Governance is by a member-elected board of directors that oversee operations.
• Federal Power Program – In FEMA Region VIII, the Federal Power Program includes the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA) and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). They are Power
Marketing Administrations (PMAs), which are U.S. federal agencies within the Department of Energy
(DOE) responsible for marketing hydropower, primarily from multiple-purpose water projects
operated by the Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the
International Boundary and Water Commission.
• Independent Power Producers – Often called non-utility generators, independent power
producers generate electric power for sale to utilities and end users. They may be privately held
facilities, corporations, co-ops such as rural solar or wind energy producers, or non-energy industrial
capacities capable of feeding excess energy into the system.
4
United States Electricity Industry Primer. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. DOE/OE-0017, July 2015.
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f28/united-states-electricity-industry-primer.pdf
Introduction
7
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Power Sector Vulnerabilities5
The power sector is vulnerable to various disruptive events that require preparation for mitigating impacts
and restoring service in a timely fashion. The following is a list of risks that the sector is susceptible to:
• Weather-Related: Outages due to weather events such as hurricanes, tropical storms, tornadoes,
snow and ice storms, and flooding. Outages due to weather are the most common type of disruptive
events.
• Cyberterrorism: Hackers from around the world can attack areas within the U.S. power grid,
shutting off power to millions. While there have been no known cases of cyberterrorism affecting the
U.S. grid and causing power outages, utilities and agencies across the country are well aware of the
potential risks associated with cyberterrorism.
• Theft and Physical Attacks: Electric assets are sometimes targets of theft and physical attacks by
individuals or groups. For example, a California substation was attacked, resulting in the shutdown of
numerous transformers that supplied power to an extensive commercial and industrial customer
base.
• Human Caused Accidents: Vehicle crashes, software-related glitches, and other human errors
can also result in power outages. Examples include, civilian vehicles crashing into utility poles or utility
employees accidentally tripping wires while conducting routine maintenance.
• Supply/Demand: A supply and demand imbalance within a given area can produce power
failures. This could result from a sudden surge in demand due to extreme temperatures or unplanned
power plant outages. In April 2006, parts of Middle and South Texas faced rolling blackouts due to
high excess demand from high temperatures. In February 2011, 50 power plants tripped offline,
causing rolling blackouts in North and Central Texas.
• Other Natural Events: Wildfires, earthquakes, and animals can interfere with electrical
equipment. In August 2014, an earthquake in Napa County, California left more than 70,000
customers without power.
Interdependencies
Interdependency, in the general sense, is mutual dependence between entities. In the energy industry,
interdependencies across various sectors, particularly in oil, gas and electric, can further complicate power
restoration. The production and delivery of oil and gas heavily depends on the supply of power. The production of
electricity requires the steady supply of fuels such as natural gas, coal, and oil. Furthermore, petroleum product
pipelines and terminals around major hubs, petroleum product pipelines to big cities, natural gas lines to
communities, and gas stations depend on a reliable supply of electricity. Water treatment facilities, pumping
stations, and communication systems also rely heavily on electricity supply.
5
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, DOE/OE-0017
Introduction
8
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Featured Speakers Biography
Mr. Steve M. Yexley
Vice President of Technical Services
Western Area Power Administration
Mr. Steve M. Yexley serves as the Vice President of Technical
Services at Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). He oversees
the functional areas of Aviation, Energy Services, North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standards, Power Operations and
Marketing Support and WAPA’s Electric Power Training Center (EPTC).
He has over 36 years in the electric utility industry, working for
Asea-Brown Boveri (ABB) as a field engineer initially and has been with
Western the over 34 years. In his career at Western he has done work
in the areas of Operations, Maintenance, Engineering and IT (cyber
security), which has provided a wide variety of experience he now
applies in managing these programs.
Steve has a degree in Engineering specializing in Electrical Power Systems from South Dakota State
University and has spent time working in field offices prior to coming to WAPA’s Headquarters to work with
Operations and Maintenance. Steve has been involved in the commissioning of the Miles City and Virginia
Smith back-to-back High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) ties that join the Eastern and Western
interconnections and with the initial implementation and upgrades of WAPA’s asset management system.
Biography
9
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Mr. Bob Johnson
Principal Operations Engineer
Xcel Energy | Responsible by Nature
Mr. Robert K. “Bob” Johnson is a Principal Operations Engineer with
Xcel Energy and has 40 plus years of experience in transmission planning
and operations. He was an engineer and Manager of Transmission
Planning for the Western Area Power Administration before joining Xcel
Energy in the Operations group at Lookout Control Center.
Bob was heavily involved in the Miles City and Sidney High Voltage
Direct Current (HVDC) tie projects for Western and Lamar Direct Current
(DC) tie for Xcel. He has served on numerous Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) technical committees over the course of
his career.
Bob is very active in support of the Rocky Mountain Reserve Group of which Xcel is a founding member.
Bob serves as technical advisor in a wide variety of operating areas. He is a graduate of the University of
Colorado at Boulder and has done graduate work at CU and the University of Minnesota.
Mr. Mark Newby
Director, Xcel Energy Colorado Control Center
Xcel Energy | Responsible by Nature
Mr. Mark Newby is the Director of the Xcel Energy Control Center
operations located in Denver Colorado and has 39 years’ experience in
Distribution Field Operations with 24 years as a Journeyman
Lineman/Foreman and 15 years as Electric Operations Manager for Xcel
Energy in Metro Denver.
Mark has been involved with escalated operations events his entire
career and has been deployed to many Storm Restoration efforts
assisting other utilities nationwide, the most recent, he and his team
were deployed to Puerto Rico to help with the massive storm restoration
effort.
Mark was member of RMEL (Rocky Mountain Electrical League) Distribution committee for 5 years whose
mission is dedicated to sharing, networking, and solutions of all issues related to planning, operating, and
maintaining distribution facilities in the utility industry.
Biography
10Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Mr. Peter Navesky
Emergency Operations Specialist
HQ, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Mr. Peter Navesky has worked for USACE for over 36 years. He is one
of six (6) members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
“Permanent Cadre” of Emergency Support Function #3 (ESF #3) Public
Works and Engineering Team Leaders (TL) working for the USACE
Directorate of Contingency Operations (DCO)/G3 (Operations) at USACE
HQ.
When deployed to a disaster event he becomes the principal
interface between USACE, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), and the supported State/Territory/Tribe. In this capacity he
becomes the “One Door to the Corps” for any ESF #3 related mission
requirements assigned/tasked to USACE by FEMA for that disaster event
in support of State and FEMA identified requirements.
He is also the HQ USACE program proponent for the Temporary Emergency Power Stafford Act mission
under the National Response Framework (NRF). Mr. Navesky is also the USACE Liaison to the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) and the Electrical Infrastructure Security Council (EISC).
Common Industry Terms
Alternating Current (AC): An electric current that reverses its direction of flow periodically, AX is
wave of electrons that flow back and forth through a conductor wire
Direct Current (DC): Electricity flowing continuously in one direction, the constant flow of electrons
in a wire
Biography
11Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
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Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 12Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
SEMINAR AND DISCUSSION-BASED EXERCISE
Why are we here?
CARRINGTON EVENT
Our society relies on critical THE CARRINGTON EVENT OF SEPT. 1859 WAS A SERIES OF POWERFUL
infrastructure. Presidential Policy CORONAL MASS EJECTIONS (CMES) THAT HIT EARTH HEAD-ON, SPARKING
Directive (PPD) 21 identifies 16 critical NORTHERN LIGHTS AS FAR SOUTH AS TAHITI. INTENSE GEOMAGNETIC
infrastructure sectors whose assets,
STORMS CAUSED GLOBAL TELEGRAPH LINES TO SPARK, SETTING FIRE TO
systems, and networks, whether
SOME TELEGRAPH OFFICES AND DISABLING THE 'VICTORIAN INTERNET." A
physical or virtual, are considered so
vital to the United States that their SIMILAR STORM TODAY COULD HAVE A CATASTROPHIC EFFECT ON MODERN
incapacitation or destruction would POWER GRIDS AND TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS. ACCORDING TO A
have a debilitating effect on security, STUDY BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE TOTAL ECONOMIC
national economic security, national IMPACT COULD EXCEED $2 TRILLION OR 20 TIMES GREATER THAN THE COSTS
public health or safety (or any OF A HURRICANE KATRINA. MULTI-TON TRANSFORMERS FRIED BY SUCH A
combination of those listed). The
STORM COULD TAKE YEARS TO REPAIR AND IMPACT NATIONAL SECURITY.
sectors include: Chemical; Commercial
Source: https://science.nasa.gov
Facilities; Communications; Critical
Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and
Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear
Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation Systems; and Water and Wastewater Systems. Today’s
endeavor is to gain more information about the electric sector and our shared responsibility to withstand
and recover from a long-term power outage using a whole community approach.
Snapshot 6 (Most Likely Events)
Many areas of the United States have experienced major blackouts or power outages over the years. The
following is just a snapshot that may be worth exploring after this workshop has concluded:
• November 1965 – Northeast Blackout, transmission system failed due to a mistaken setting on a
protective device near Niagara Falls. Improper coordination caused four more lines to disconnect.
Imbalances continued to swing until power was out for 30 million people. The outage lasted up to 13
hours.
• July 1977 – New York City, transmission failures caused by lightning strike shutting lines, and the
tripping offline Indian Point No. 3 nuclear generating plant. When a second lightning strike caused the
loss of two more 345-kV lines, the last connection for New York City to the northwest was lost. Power
surges, overloads, and human error soon followed. Nine million people in New York City suffered outages
and looting up to 26 hours. Poor coordination, malfunctioning safety equipment, and limited awareness
of conditions contributed to the outage.
• December 1982 – West Coast Blackout, over 5 million people in the West lost power after high
winds knocked over a major 500-kV transmission tower. The tower fell into a parallel 500-kV line
tower, and the failure mechanically cascaded and caused three additional towers to fail on each
line. When these fell, they hit two 230-kV lines crossing under the 500-kV lines. From that point,
coordination schemes did not operate, communication problems delayed control instructions.
Backup plans failed because the coordination devices were not set for such a severe disturbance.
Data displayed to operators was unclear, preventing corrective actions.
6
Mike Jacobs, senior energy analyst, Climate & Energy Program | August 8, 2013, 11:18 am EDT
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 13Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Snapshot (continued)
• June 1998 – North Central US, a lightning storm in Minnesota initiated a transmission failure.
A 345-kV line was struck by lightning. Underlying lower voltage lines overloaded. Soon, lightning
struck a second 345-kV line. Cascading transmission line disconnections continued until the entire
northern Midwest was separated from the Eastern grid, forming three isolated “islands” with
power. 52,000 people in upper Midwest, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan saw outages up
to 19 hours.
• August 2003 – Northeast Blackout,
MOST DANGEROUS EXAMPLE #1 transmission system failed for many
ON DECEMBER 23, 2015, UKRAINIAN POWER COMPANIES reasons seen in major outages that came
EXPERIENCED UNSCHEDULED POWER OUTAGES IMPACTING A years before. Information was
LARGE NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS IN UKRAINE. THE POWER incomplete and misunderstood;
OUTAGES WERE CAUSED BY EXTERNAL CYBER ATTACKERS, inadequate tree trimming caused short
REMOTE CYBER INTRUSIONS AT THREE REGIONAL ELECTRIC circuit; operators lacked coordination.
POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES (OBLENERGOS) IMPACTING System imbalances and overloads seen
early in the day were not corrected due
APPROXIMATELY 225,000 CUSTOMERS.THE CYBER-ATTACK
to lack of enforcement of coordination.
WAS REPORTEDLY SYNCHRONIZED AND COORDINATED,
50 million people across eight states and
PROBABLY FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE OF THE Ontario were without power up to four
VICTIM NETWORKS AND ACQUIRING LEGITIMATE CREDENTIALS days.
PRIOR TO THE CYBER-ATTACK TO FACILITATE REMOTE ACCESS.
Source: https://ics-cert.gov
• June 2012 – Derecho Blackout, wind storm damaged trees and
equipment, cutting power to approximately 4.2 million customers
across 11 Midwest and Mid-Atlantic states and the District of
Columbia. Widespread tree clearing and line restoration efforts in
many cases took 7 to 10 days.
• October 2012 – Hurricane Sandy, flooding damaged vulnerable
equipment and downed trees cut power to 8.2 million people in
17 states, the District of Columbia, and Canada, many for 2 weeks.
The impacts from sea level rise and flooding are leading to re-
evaluation of local design criteria.
MOST DANGEROUS EXAMPLE #2
IN MARCH 1989, QUÉBEC EXPERIENCED A BLACKOUT CAUSED BY A SOLAR STORM
ON MARCH 10, A STRONG WIND LEFT THE SUN, HEADING FOR EARTH. ON MARCH 12, THE FIRST VOLTAGE
FLUCTUATIONS WERE BEING SEEN ON THE HYDRO-QUÉBEC TRANSMISSION GRID. THE SYSTEM CONTROL
CENTRE WAS DOING WHAT IT COULD TO MAINTAIN STABILITY. HOWEVER, ON MARCH 13 AT 2:44 A.M., THE
EARTH'S MAGNETIC FIELD WAS FLUCTUATING VIOLENTLY. THE GRID'S PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS TRIGGERED,
AND A BLACKOUT OCCURRED IN LESS THAN A MINUTE! THE PROVINCE WAS SUBMERGED IN DARKNESS FOR
MORE THAN NINE HOURS.
Source: www.hydroquebec.com
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 14Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
• September 2017 – Hurricane Maria, after Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico had no electricity, no
water, no telecommunications and no transportation systems. In 30 days, 21% of customers were
restored to power; in 60 days, 49%; in 90 days, 65%. Today, power has been restored to 99.99%
of customers able to receive an electrical hookup. Water systems were inoperable. Water service
went from 20 to 69% operational in 30 days, 91% percent in 60 days.
MOST DANGEROUS EXAMPLE #3
EXTREME ELECTROMAGNETIC INCIDENTS CAUSED BY AN INTENTIONAL ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK
OR A NATURALLY OCCURRING GEOMAGNETIC DISTURBANCE (GMD, ALSO REFERRED TO AS “SPACE WEATHER”)
COULD DAMAGE SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF THE NATION’S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, INCLUDING THE
ELECTRICAL GRID, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, WATER AND WASTEWATER SYSTEMS, AND TRANSPORTATION
MODES. THE IMPACTS ARE LIKELY TO CASCADE, INITIALLY COMPROMISING ONE OR MORE CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS, SPILLING OVER INTO ADDITIONAL SECTORS, AND EXPANDING BEYOND THE INITIAL
GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS.
EMPS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH INTENTIONAL ATTACKS USING HIGH-ALTITUDE NUCLEAR DETONATIONS,
SPECIALIZED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, OR NON-NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY DEVICES. EFFECTS VARY IN SCALE
FROM HIGHLY LOCAL TO REGIONAL TO CONTINENTAL, DEPENDING UPON THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
WEAPON AND THE ATTACK PROFILE. HIGH-ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE ATTACKS (HEMP) USING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE OF MOST CONCERN BECAUSE THEY MAY PERMANENTLY DAMAGE OR DISABLE LARGE
SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRIC GRID AND OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONTROL SYSTEMS.
EXTREME EMP AND GMD INCIDENTS CERTAINLY FIT INTO THE CATEGORIZATION OF “HARD PROBLEMS”—BOTH
ARE LOW PROBABILITY/HIGH CONSEQUENCE SCENARIOS THAT CHALLENGE EFFECTIVE POLICYMAKING.
Source: DHS: strategy for protecting and preparing the homeland against threats of electromagnetic pulse
And geomagnetic disturbances, Oct 9, 2018
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Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 16Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Incorporating Prolonged Power Outage into continuity planning
Continuity planning should be accomplished with an All Hazards perspective. The term "all hazards" means
a threat or an incident, natural or manmade, that warrants action to protect life, property, the environment,
and public health or safety, and to minimize disruptions of government, social, or economic activities. It
includes natural disasters, cyber incidents, industrial accidents, pandemics, acts of terrorism, sabotage, and
destructive criminal activity targeting critical infrastructure.
The fundamental elements contained within a Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan assist in identifying
solutions or actions to challenges faced during a prolonged power outage and looking specifically at the
unique consideration of sustaining essential functions.
Planning Assumptions for a prolonged power outage could include:
• The organization has a Continuity program, and they have determined their essential functions
and services (identified and prioritized);
• Emergency Event(s) have occurred that have partially or completely compromised your
organization’s access to commercial power and essential functions cannot be conducted using
normal electrical infrastructure;
• Personnel/employees have limited or no situational awareness due to inoperability of the
Emergency Notification System (ENS), telephone, Information Technology (IT) systems, and public
media.
• Generator power for information technology/communications are still available at your primary
building or at an alternate location for a period of:
o 3 Days (Ready.Gov/Business)
o Up to 7 Days (Scope in FEMA R-VIII Power Outage Incident Annex)
o 14 Day Planning Factor (DoD Unified Facilities Criteria)
o 8-15 days (Argonne Nat’l Labs, Chicago-8=25%, 11=50%, 13=75%)
Note: these recommendations are based on general information only, your organization can determine what is
required to maintain essential functions and services in the face of significant and sustained power loss.
• Depending on the circumstances, up to 40% of the workforce may be absent. Note: 30-40%
absenteeism rate is an estimated rate. There is no scientific evidence to support a rate. For example,
commuter rail or bus service may be offline, or employees are unable to commute due to traffic
congestion and lack of traffic control systems, etc.
• Large-scale absences can affect every aspect of daily life, including public transportation,
communication systems, utilities, businesses, and food supplies just to name a few.
Continuity programs and operations are good business practices that ensure critical services will be available
to the Nation’s citizens under all conditions. It is applicable to all levels of federal, state, territorial, tribal,
and local government organizations regardless of their location. The private sector and other
nongovernment organizations may also benefit from establishing Continuity programs.
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 17Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Discussion Based Exercise
Tabletop Discussion Format
In a facilitated discussion, each of the table groups will examine communication plans, procedures and
challenges for their agency. The scenario will be described by the Exercise Director to provide the
background for the discussion and the table facilitator will walk the group through the questions
provided.
Following the discussion, selected facilitators from each of the groups will brief out to the larger
audience:
• Organization specific challenges,
• Any key findings or concerns they identified,
• Major changes needed to their plan, and
• Share any best practice that might help other agencies.
Tabletop Guidelines
Participants are encouraged to fully participate in the discussions resulting from issues raised relative
to a prolonged power outage and continuity planning. Facilitators will assist the participants in further
developing individual observations and discussions.
The following rules apply during the discussions:
• Non-attribution is in effect
• Promote maximum group interaction
• Offer inputs based on facts; avoid hearsay
• Non-constructive criticism is highly discouraged
• Focus on solutions
• Respect all ideas and comments
• Participate
Remember, the overall objective is to facilitate free information exchange and enhance participants’
knowledge of the Electric Sector and Continuity plans and procedures.
Assumptions and Artificialities
In any exercise discussion, several assumptions and artificialities may be necessary to complete play in
the time allotted. During this TTX, the following apply:
• There is no “hidden agenda” or trick questions.
• All participants receive information at the same time.
• Remain focused on your organization’s perspective and Continuity of Operations mission.
• Play as if all related topics have a direct impact on your organization.
Exercise Participants
The following are the categories of participants involved in this exercise; note that the term
“participant” refers to all categories listed below, not just those playing in the exercise:
• Players: Players are agency personnel who have an active role in reacting to and discussing
injects presented to them during the exercise.
• Exercise Director: The Exercise Director oversees all activities of the exercise and ensures the
exercise stays on track and on target in meeting exercise goals and objectives.
• Facilitators: The facilitator is responsible for keeping player discussions on track with the exercise
design objectives and insuring all issues and objectives are explored as thoroughly as possible
within time constraints.
• Scribes: The Scribe is responsible for taking notes for your agency to identify any findings.
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 18Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Discussion Based Exercise
Scenario
**Play as if all related Power Outage topics have a direct impact on your organization**
It’s mid-November and for the last seven days the National Weather Service has been supplying
warnings of an approaching severe winter storm, with the heaviest impacts occurring along the Front
Range of the Rocky Mountains and the I-25 corridor extending from Texas to Wyoming. The entire
region is expected to experience various levels of the following:
• Sustained winds exceeding 60 miles per hour (mph), with gusts over 90 mph (areas around
Denver would experience sustained winds of around 73 mph and gusts of 115 mph);
• Changing direction of heavy winds as the system slowly progresses northeastward;
• Four days of heavy snow resulting in 3-7 feet of snow within parts of the region, with the highest
amounts seen on the eastern side of the Rocky Mountain Range;
• Heavy snow and ice accumulation on equipment (1-3 feet on towers); and extreme low
temperatures for an extended period—temperatures hover around -15 degrees Fahrenheit for
seven days—accompanied by precipitation.
The impacts are common to severe winter storms—heavy icing, strong winds with changing directions,
extremely low temperatures extending over a period of a week—and will cause severe damage to trees,
power lines, power poles, power towers, and other critical infrastructure. The loss of power will have
cascading impacts to all sectors, including transportation, communications, water and wastewater, and
emergency services. Interdependent relationships between sectors will create feedback loops regarding
restoration requirements.
• Approximately 63,000 power poles, 12,000 pole-mounted transformers, 1,600 miles of
transmission line, and 1,600 power related facilities (substations, transformers, etc.) will
experience considerable damage.
• With the storm centered over the largest population center, 1.74 million customers, or roughly
5.2 million individuals (about 45% of the total population of 11.7 million), will likely be without
power at some point during the outage event.
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 19Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Module #1
48-24 hours before power loss
Winds are shifting and picking up speed ahead of the storm and the weather service predictions indicate
that overnight the rain will turn to snow, impacting the morning commute in several areas along the I-25
corridor. Your office appears to be in one of the heaviest impact prediction zones.
Questions: How is your organization preparing for an event like this and the actions you, as leaders and
managers, are taking prior to a major storm hitting in your area of operations.
Question Comments, Notes, Lessons Learned
1. For Notice events like this, are
there notifications to employees
that establish expectations or
protocols?
• Telework Ready? (bring home
laptop computers)
• Are Directed Work Locations
(alternate location) authorized
or feasible?
• For employees that must stay on
site? (Shelter in Place activities)
• Food/water
• Cots/blankets
2. Do you discuss the current or
projected effect of the outage on
performing mission essential
functions?
3. If Devolution is part of the
Continuity program, do you
contact the Devolution location
and notify them of concerns with
maintaining mission essential
functions at the primary location?
4. If applicable, do you review
Generator status?
• Last start up test
• Last load transfer Test
• Fuel capacity and burn rate
• Current fuel level
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 20Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Module #2
48 hours to 1 week after power loss
• Resources are in limited supply within the region due to the nature of the severe incident that
caused the region-wide power outage.
• Power companies are actively coordinating with, and request support from, other power
companies and organizations.
• Severe winter weather will delay the start of power restoration efforts for at least four days.
• It is estimated that 45% of the region’s population has lost power, and it will be a minimum of
four to eight days before it comes back on line; rural areas of the region will be without power for
more than 35 days.
• Loss of load capacity from each failed switch will cause cascading blackouts extending much
farther than the impacted area.
• To protect still-operable electrical grid sections from loss of load capacity caused by cascading
blackouts, planned shutdowns will be initiated.
• Weather, snow debris, landslides, impassable roadways, fuel shortages, and limited access to
repair sites will slow restoration.
Questions: Do not focus on restoration response efforts, focus on how your organization is affected by
an incident like this and the actions you, as leaders and managers, are taking in the first couple of hours
of a prolonged power outage.
TYPICAL POWER RESTORATION PROCESS
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 21Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Leadership Questions Comments, Notes, Lessons Learned
1. Does your organization have a
Continuity plan?
Is it from an All Hazards point of
view?
2. Is there a predetermined
location for leadership to meet if
communications equipment is
inoperable?
3. Who are the key decision
makers to activate the plan?
Are they aware of their roles and
responsibilities in a continuity
event?
4. If a leader in the organization is
affected by the event, how do you
determine who is in charge?
5. Does this successor have the
proper delegated signature or
approval authority?
• Has this been reviewed by your legal
team?
6. Can you deliver your product or
service (mission essential functions)
during the power outage?
7. Who from your organization
communicates with stakeholders or
the media on current abilities to
continue mission essential
functions?
Employee Engagement Questions Comments, Notes, Lessons Learned
8. What processes do you have in
place for employee accountability?
• Do you have a backup processes if
primary communications are down?
• How often do you update contact
information for employees to ensure
the information is correct?
• When was this protocol last tested
/exercised?
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 22Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
9. What instructions are given to
employees? Should they stay at
work, go home or proceed to the
continuity facility?
10. Can your employees get to work
without an operating mass transit
system?
11. If commuter employees are
needed on site, but transit is a
concern, are there billeting options
available?
Infrastructure Questions Comments, Notes, Lessons Learned
12. How would power loss affect
your building with the following
electrically supported systems:
heating, venting, and air
conditioning (HVAC), water heating/
distribution, elevators, or lighting?
13. If the power outage affects the
phone, internet, or cable, can your
organization operate without any of
them?
14. Does your location have a
generator and fuel?
• Fuel capacity and burn rate
Based on current fuel level and burn
rate, how many days of power is
available?
What office functions, locations,
outlets, etc. does the generator
feed?
15. If the cell network is
overwhelmed, how does that affect
your procedures?
• Are alternative communications
systems available, e.g. Government
Emergency Telecommunications
Service (GETS) or nationwide
Wireless Priority Service (WPS)?
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 23Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Devolution Questions Comments, Notes, Lessons Learned
16. If you have a Devolution
component to your plan, is this
considered at this point?
• If yes, what are the mechanisms for
those functions to transfer if there is
minimal communications between
their personnel and your agency?
• Will your Devolution partner be able
to immediately assume the
functions that cannot be interrupted
for any length of time?
• Do they have the resources to
handle your agencies essential
functions (access to records,
equipment, human resources, etc.)?
17. Are there active and passive
triggers for plan activation?
General Questions Comments, Notes, Lessons Learned
18. • Do your plans discuss cyber
threats and communications
outages?
19. Do you have a test, training, and
exercise program that will allow
your agency to test proposed
changes to the Continuity Plan prior
to the next Continuity activation?
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 24Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Findings
Based on today’s training and discussions:
• Does your continuity plan encompass an All Hazards point of view?
• Are all employees familiar with the organization’s continuity plan and, in this case, are
there periodic test of back up (generators) equipment?
• What are your principle findings or concerns from today?
• Are there any major changes to your plan or procedures that you’re considering?
• Do you have any best practices to share with other agencies that could help them in
their planning efforts?
• Agency specific challenges to share?
Seminar and Discussion-Based Exercise 25Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
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Continuity Basics 26Participant Handbook For Official Use Only Continuity Basics Agency resiliency is directly related to its continuity capability and its ability to perform essential functions continuously. Continuity Program Management is built on the pillars of leadership, staff, communications and facilities. Utilizing the Federal Government’s standardized continuity program management cycle ensures consistency across all Federal continuity programs. The cycle establishes consistent performance metrics, promulgates best practices and facilitates consistent cross-organization continuity evaluations Continuity Concept of Operations Continuity Basics 27
Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Elements of a Viable Continuity Capability
The table below contains the eleven elements of a viable continuity plan as specified in FCD 1.
Continuity Element Description
Establishment of continuity program planning objectives and procedural
requirements are critical to sustainment of essential functions during a
Program
continuity activation. Alignment of resources to continuity plans and procedures
Management,
is critical to ensure execution and to sustain essential functions through all
Plans, and phases of activation. The application of risk management principles can preserve
Procedures resources by assessing the probability of occurrence for catastrophic
emergencies and related consequences.
Organizational functions and activities that must be continued under any and all
circumstances. These functions are derived from the organizations overall
functions and missions and, when identified, should be prioritized to ensure the
most important, critical functions are properly identified and emphasized, as
Essential Functions
appropriate.
Essential functions are those functions that enable organizations to provide vital
services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety and well-being of the
general populace, and sustain the industrial/economic base in an emergency.
Specify who will succeed key positions, to include leadership and continuity
Orders of personnel, in the event that primary personnel are incapacitated. Orders should
Succession be of sufficient depth to ensure the organization’s ability to manage and direct
its essential functions and operations.
Clearly established delegations of authority are essential to ensure that
continuity personnel have the appropriate legal authority to make key decisions
and take action during catastrophic emergencies. Delegations of authority are
Delegations of activated when normal operational conditions are disrupted, and are
Authority deactivated once the organization determines that the disruption has ended and
normal operations can be resumed. Organizations establish delegations of
authority in advance to ensure the orderly transition of leadership
responsibilities during a continuity activation.
Availability, diversity, and redundancy of critical communications and
information systems are critical to sustain essential functions performed at
primary and alternate locations including devolution locations as well as
Communications telework or mobile work environments.
and Information Communications and information systems provide the connectivity between and
Systems among key government leadership, internal elements, other organizations, and
the public to perform essential functions. Telework and mobile work
environments require use of portable telecommunications technology such as
laptop computers, mobile telephones, and satellite communications equipment.
Continuity Basics 28Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Continuity Element Description
Include a comprehensive processes for identification, protection, and
accessibility of electronic and hardcopy essential records at primary, alternate,
and devolution locations. Redundant data management software applications
Essential Records and equipment should be standardized throughout the organization, and must
Management provide the appropriate level of access and cybersecurity to protect classified,
sensitive, and personally identifiable information. Primary and alternate
essential records management personnel must be identified to ensure access to
essential information at all locations, under all conditions.
Alternate locations are where essential functions are continued or resumed, or
where organizational command and control may occur during a continuity event.
An alternate location should be chosen based on risks identified during the
Business Impact Analysis process and should be located with sufficient
geographical distance from the organization’s primary facility.
Alternate
Telework, mobile work, and work performed from directed work locations may
Locations be leveraged to support continuity operations. Mobile work refers to tasks
performed while employees travel from one work location to another. Directed
work locations refer to occasions when employees are directed to perform
assigned duties at locations other than at designated work locations. Employees
who participate in an approved telework program may be leveraged during
catastrophic emergencies.
Agency continuity plans should include human resource guidance and
procedures for all employees during a continuity event to include procedures for
pay, leave, etc. An agency must ensure that its human resource strategies for its
Human Resources
personnel are adaptable to changing circumstances and a variety of
emergencies, and that these strategies and procedures are regularly reviewed
and updated, as appropriate.
Devolution is a component of continuity planning that establishes procedures to
transfer statutory authority and responsibilities from an organization’s primary
operating staff and facilities to another designated staff and one or more
facilities for the purpose of sustaining essential functions. Devolution may be
Devolution
temporary, or may endure for an extended period. A devolution plan is activated
upon the threat of, or in response to a catastrophic emergency that either
renders the organization’s primary leadership and operating staff unavailable, or
leave s them incapable of sustaining essential functions from primary facilities.
Continuity Basics 29Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Continuity Element Description
Reconstitution is the final phase of a continuity event, and is the process by
which surviving and/or replacement personnel resume normal operations and
may occur at any designated location that provides the staff, facilities, and
systems necessary to sustain essential functions.
Reconstitution involves three main tasks:
Reconstitution Transitioning from continuity status to normal operations after the
disruption has passed.
Coordinating and planning for reconstitution regardless of the level of
disruption.
Outlining the procedures for a smooth transition from a relocation site
to a restored facility.
Test, Training and Exercise events assess and validate continuity plans, policies,
procedures, systems, and alternate locations.
Periodic testing ensures that equipment and procedures are kept in a constant
state of readiness.
Initial and recurring training programs inform and familiarize leaders and staff
with continuity plans and procedures.
Test, Training, and
Exercise (TTE) Exercise programs consisting of both planned and short/no-notice events
improve an organization’s preparedness posture, and emphasize the value of
integrating continuity functions into daily operations. The corrective actions
identified during individual exercises are tracked to completion, ensuring that
exercises yield tangible preparedness improvements. An effective corrective
action program develops improvement plans that are dynamic documents,
which are continually monitored and implemented as part of the larger system
of improving preparedness.
Estimated Restoration Times delay due to weather
Continuity Basics 30Participant Handbook For Official Use Only
Resource Reference List
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Resources:
-Ready Business Power Outage Toolkit
-Strategy for protecting and preparing the homeland against threats of
electromagnetic pulse and geomagnetic disturbances (October 9, 2018)
Federal Resources for Critical Infrastructure
-Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT), US Army Corps of
Engineers
-U.S. Energy Information Administration
-IS-815 – ABCs of Temporary Emergency Power:
https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-815
Awareness Resources
-Electric Infrastructure Security Council Black Sky Hazards:
https://www.eiscouncil.org/blacksky.aspx
-Electric Infrastructure Security (EIA) Council: EPRO Handbook
Examines how lifeline utility companies, government agencies and other key stakeholders can
partner to build resilience and significantly reduce the impact of natural and manmade hazards
that could cause catastrophic, extended-duration power outages and critical infrastructure
failures over multiple regions of the United States or other nations. The Handbook also proposes
a “whole community” approach to restoration and response, managing the consequences of
outages that do occur with contributions from individuals and their families, agencies at all levels
of government, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the private sector.
-Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council
-https://colorado.feb.gov/programs/emergency-management/
-https://www.fema.gov/continuity-operations
-https://www.ready.gov/business-continuity-planning-suite
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