A Little of the Old, a Little of the New: A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe1 - Deep Cuts ...
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Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
A Little of the Old, a Little of the New:
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe1
By Wolfgang Zellner, Olga Oliker, Steven Pifer
The ongoing NATO–Russia confrontation otherwise expire in February 2021.5 The
has increased the risk of military conflict,2 former “cornerstone” of European conven-
particularly in Europe. The military relation- tional arms control, the Treaty on Conven-
ship between Russia and NATO is far less tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), has
stable than political leaders may assume and been rendered politically dead and militar-
poses increasing risks in particular sub-regions.3 ily all but useless following its suspension
Three interrelated trends have given rise to this by Russia in 2007. The Vienna Document
development: on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures 2011 (VD11) is thoroughly
• Most NATO states and Russia appear to outdated, but modernization is currently
be focused on strengthening military de- being blocked by the Russian Federation.
terrence while eschewing dialogue, crisis Finally, in May 2020, the U.S. administra-
prevention, and arms control. Strategic di- tion announced its intention to leave the
alogue between the United States/NATO Open Skies Treaty (OST), a cooperative
and Russia has almost completely col- aerial observation regime,6 in November.
lapsed.
We believe that efforts to reverse these trends
• Scenarios for the use of nuclear, conven- and to address the resulting dangers can use-
tional, and cyber capabilities increasing- fully begin with conventional arms control
ly overlap.4 This, combined with rapid (CAC) in Europe. Over the past two decades,
modernization in all three categories, has discussions on this subject have focused on
increased escalatory risks. Land-, air- and finding a way to reinvigorate and modestly
sea-based long-range strike (LRS) capabil- improve the Adapted CFE (ACFE) Trea-
ities, including and perhaps primarily their ty. This approach has failed in part because
conventional variants, have raised particu- NATO member states linked ratification to
lar concerns. Russia’s 1999 commitment to withdraw forc-
es from Georgia and Moldova (the so-called
• Bilateral U.S.–Russian and European arms “Istanbul commitments”). Even putting aside
control regimes are crumbling. The In- this impasse, however, the CFE-centered ap-
termediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) proach no longer reflects the military realities
Treaty, which also placed limits on conven- and threat perceptions in Europe. The CFE
tional capabilities that posed a particular Treaty was designed to respond to plausible
threat to European countries, was buried in Cold War dangers. Today’s dangers are differ-
August 2019. As of July 2020, there is little ent. Although the broad notion of a standoff
indication that the United States and Rus- between Moscow and Washington/Brussels
sia will extend the New Strategic Arms Re- has resurged, and countries continue to worry
duction Treaty (New START), which will about both force concentrations and adver-
www.deepcuts.org 1Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
sary capabilities, three fundamental elements A fresh approach requires implementing
have changed significantly over time: a little of the old, a little of the new. The
isolated modernization of the VD11
• The overall size and posture of armed forces remains a worthwhile, if insufficient, goal.
throughout Europe is now far less impor- A multilateral Prevention of Dangerous
tant than force postures and activities in Military Activities Agreement could build
certain critical sub-regions, particularly in on existing tools by creating new ones.
the Baltic and Black Sea areas.7 Ideally, the new CAC approach in Eu-
rope would be able both to address current
• The prospect of the swift reinforcement threats and to aid in the fostering of political
of forces in the sub-regions by forces from consensus to prevent the emergence of new
outside of those sub-regions worries neigh- ones. A complicated endeavor of this sort
boring states and others.8 would require time and extensive exchanges. As
it is difficult at present to imagine how a large-
• There has been a proliferation of new scale, overarching agreement could be nego-
technologies and capabilities in sea- and tiated in toto, a wiser course would be to seek
air-based LRS systems, which, along with smaller-scale agreements and arrangements, fo-
land-based ballistic and cruise missiles that cusing on what is most critical and feasible and
have been recently unbound by the demise building on that. What this paper proposes is
of the INF Treaty, are not addressed by any a patchwork approach involving measures that
arms control agreements. can lay the groundwork for a more comprehen-
sive future European security order.
Further proof that the CFE approach has
been outrun by changing military-political This new approach to CAC is meant to take
developments is the fact that almost all sig- into account how a variety of European actors
natories to the CFE Treaty have holdings of perceive their threat environment and what
treaty-limited equipment (tanks, armored they worry about most. This includes regional
combat vehicles, artillery pieces, attack heli- force concentrations and options for their rein-
copters, and combat aircraft) below the levels forcement, LRS capabilities, and naval forces.
permitted by the CFE Treaty and the ACFE It focuses on the Baltic and Black Sea sub-
Treaty. This has not prevented an increase in regions as a matter of priority.
tensions in recent years. Even if some of the
specifics of the CFE and the ACFE Treaty To show why a new approach to CAC is nec-
are outdated, however, their lessons remain essary, this paper first addresses the issues of 1)
valuable. Just as limits on conventional weap- threat perceptions and 2) how military capabil-
ons helped to manage tensions at the end of ities can drive conflict and escalation. It then
the Cold War, a fresh approach to European offers solutions by outlining 3) the necessary
CAC can help to decrease the risk of conflict elements of future CAC agreements and 4)
and escalation today. possible negotiation formats.
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
1. Threat Perceptions Russia military conflict would be comprehen-
sive in nature and risk broader escalation, but
Any country’s perception of its threat envi- strategists from a range of perspectives worry
ronment is a combination of how it views the about sparks in two critical sub-regions.
military capabilities of its potential adversaries
and how it views their intentions. Perspectives Both the Baltic Sea sub-region and the Black
on another country’s military capabilities are Sea sub-region are hosts to significant mari-
based on an assessment of that state’s weaponry, time, air, and ground capabilities on the part of
its force posture, its personnel, and the military potentially antagonistic forces. The Baltic Sea
activities it undertakes – all with an eye to that sub-region seems to cause the most nervous-
country’s capacity for possible offensive action. ness, reflected, for instance, in the number and
While there is plenty of room for interpreta- type of mentions in Russian, U.S. and Swedish
tion, the factors themselves are generally quan- studies.9 Driven in part by Russia’s seizure and
tifiable and concrete. Assessments of intentions annexation of Crimea, Western states’ worries
(that is, the likelihood that potential adversar- center on the vulnerability of the three Baltic
ies will threaten or initiate armed conflict) are countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), es-
based on more ambiguous factors. Thus, while pecially on the potential threat posed by Rus-
military capabilities can be addressed by means sian forces in the Western Military District
of arms control, assessments of intentions can- (particularly the Pskov and Leningrad oblasts)
not be directly addressed by treaties and com- and in the exclave of Kaliningrad.10 For Russia,
mitments – although an arms control frame- a possible future NATO buildup in the Baltic
work may lead to adjustments over time. sub-region and the related infrastructure, as
well as Kaliningrad’s vulnerability, are central
This paper therefore offers a menu of arms con- concerns. Meanwhile, the Black Sea region is
trol and confidence- and transparency-building notable for its multitude of conflicting national
measures intended to mitigate countries’ fears interests, Russia’s growing military presence on
of one another’s military capabilities. In doing the Crimean Peninsula, and NATO’s increas-
so, it makes no effort to determine whether any ing naval presence.11
state’s threat perceptions are accurate. Rather, it
accepts that NATO members and Russia hold Concentration of forces. NATO and EU
these perceptions about one another, and that member states Sweden and Finland, on the
these perceptions feed insecurity in Europe. one hand, and Russia, on the other, are pri-
The following summarizes the most prominent marily worried about the potential concen-
features of military threat perceptions held by tration of adversary forces deployed in the
Russia and NATO states. Baltic Sea sub-region, as well as infrastructure
such as command posts, ports, airfields, roads
Sub-regional nature. During the Cold War, and rail networks that could be used for rein-
the opposing sides were concerned with one an- forcement.12 Thus, the 2017 Polish Defence
other’s military build-up throughout Europe, Concept speaks of “the asymmetry of military
albeit with a focus on forces in Central Europe, capabilities between Russia and NATO’s east-
particularly in the then divided Germany. To- ern flank members” that “creates a direct threat
day, by contrast, their worries tend to focus on for Poland and the region.”13 Several studies
specific sub-regions. Of course, any NATO– postulate a Russian attack on one or more
www.deepcuts.org 3Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
Baltic countries, which would be difficult to Parallel concerns have roiled the Black Sea
defend if Russia were to deny NATO control sub-region. Since annexing Crimea in 2014,
of the “Suwalki Gap,” the Polish–Lithuanian Russia has increased its military presence on
border between Kaliningrad and Belarus.14 the peninsula, including the deployment of
While most Western experts assess the proba- S-400 air defense systems and advanced fighter
bility of a Russian military assault on the Baltic aircraft, and in Russia’s Southern Military Dis-
states as being very low, NATO does not whol- trict, which spans the space between the Black
ly discount it given recent Russian actions, in and the Caspian Sea.19 Not only has this con-
particular the use of force to seize Crimea and cerned Ukraine, whose territory Crimea legally
engage in conflict in Donbas. remains, but it has worried NATO allies, par-
ticularly Romania and Bulgaria. To show sup-
From the Russian perspective, the potential port for these allies (and for Ukraine), NATO
for the reinforcement of Western deployments warships have been entering the Black Sea on
made since 2014, including the Enhanced For- a much more regular basis than they did from
ward Presence of NATO battlegroups, is seen 2010 to 2013. This is part of the Tailored For-
as dangerous. According to retired general Evg- ward Presence that the alliance has adopted in
eny Buzhinskiy, “the increasing capacity for the the Black Sea sub-region.
deployment and concentration of forces and a
lack of regulation of the maritime domain pose The U.S. military has upgraded facilities in
a serious threat to European security, increasing Romania and Bulgaria, and U.S. army units
the risks of armed clashes and the unintended regularly deploy to those countries. Moreover,
escalation of crisis situations.”15 the United States conducts regular reconnais-
sance flights by P-8s, RC-135s, and unmanned
As Charap et al. have written, NATO views Ka- aerial vehicles over the Black Sea, which are
liningrad as a threat because of the Russian mili- often intercepted by Russian fighters.20 In late
tary capabilities located in the area. At the same May 2020, two U.S. B-1 bombers rehearsed
time, it is perceived as a vulnerability on Russia’s anti-ship strikes over the Black Sea.21 From
part because of NATO’s capacity to isolate the Russia’s perspective, such activities are escalato-
exclave, which is already separated from the Rus- ry, whereas from NATO’s perspective they are
sian mainland by NATO member states Lithu- meant to deter and demonstrate resolve.
ania and Poland.16 This mutual interlocking of
threat and vulnerability perceptions presents a LRS capabilities. Both NATO and Russia are
substantial potential danger, as it puts a premi- concerned by the other side’s LRS capabilities:
um on preventive strikes in an escalating crisis.17 advanced aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise
In part because of this, both Russian and NATO missiles. NATO sees these capabilities as part
exercises in the region have further unnerved and parcel of Russia’s capacity to achieve a fait
each party. For example, the 2016 Latvian Na- accompli in the Baltic Sea sub-region. If Russia
tional Defence Concept claims that Russia “de- were to carry out military action in the region,
velops and exercises capabilities that can be used LRS capabilities would help to prevent NATO
to launch an unexpected military attack against from bringing airpower to assist the three Bal-
the Baltic countries that would split them from tic states and Poland and would hinder the al-
the rest of NATO and obstruct implementation liance’s capacity to move reinforcements into
of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”18 the region by sea or air.22 Russia has expressed
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
its own concerns: “NATO, and particularly LRS nor naval forces. Other issues, such as a
U.S., (air-, land- and sea-based) LRS capabilities potential concentration of forces, are similar
are seen in Moscow as perhaps the single most to the fears of decades ago, but the geographic
threatening capability in the European regional focus has shifted: It is the Baltic and Black Sea
context.”23 Sea-based LRS capabilities play a spe- sub-regions – rather than a divided Germany
cial role in Russian threat perceptions.24 From an and Central Europe – that could benefit from
arms control perspective, air- and sea-based LRS new limits and confidence-building meas-
capabilities are global in character and there- ures. Finally, the loss of established treaties has
fore not easily addressed in sub-regional arms brought back and heightened the threats that
control agreements. are potentially posed by the capabilities they
once constrained. Following the demise of the
Cyber operations are not inherently a sub- INF Treaty, there are no new limits on systems
regional issue, although they can manifest them- such as the Russian 9M729 ground-launched
selves at the sub-regional level. If command and cruise missile or the new conventionally armed
control systems are not well-protected, a cyberat- ground-launched missiles currently being de-
tack could have effects similar to an attack carried veloped by the Pentagon.
out with weapons, costing lives and damaging in-
frastructure. There is also an increasing risk that As an alliance, NATO is presently more con-
third parties could maliciously trigger a NATO– cerned about threats at the sub-regional level,
Russia military conflict by means of a cyberattack. e.g., in the Baltic region.26 Russia, by contrast,
These very real cyber threats are only marginally has more global fears, namely the perceived
touched upon in the context of CAC discussions U.S. superiority when it comes to LRS capa-
and almost completely excluded from arms con- bilities. At the sub-regional level, particularly
trol agreements.25 in the Baltic region, both sides seem largely to
agree on the nature of the threats: a potential
This may be in large part because arms control concentration of forces and reinforcement ca-
agreements are a poor fit for cyber threat re- pabilities, as well as exercises and LRS capabili-
duction. Measures regarding cyber operations ties, which add up to an increased potential for,
might be better developed on a global scale and and thus perhaps risk of, sub-regional surprise
may need to involve not only states but other attacks and escalation.27 In the Black Sea re-
entities, such as corporations. By their very gion, the worries are different but no less reflec-
nature, regional arms control agreements and tive of mutual fears. These parallel perceptions
arrangements will not address these concerns. in both sub-regions may open up options for
Thus, cyber operations remain beyond the joint threat reduction by means of arms con-
scope of this paper. trol, including confidence-, transparency- and
security-building measures.
The case for a fresh approach. Some of the
current threat perceptions described above re- Moreover, all parties’ threat perceptions are
flect concerns that were not prevalent during accompanied by an equally genuine and firm
the Cold War, either because they did not ex- belief that their own posture and actions are
ist or because dynamics have changed. Thus, defensive and/or deterrent in nature and
the remaining Cold War era infrastructure that the other side’s posture and actions are
of arms control agreements addresses neither aggressive. These mutually exclusive interpreta-
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
tions of the status quo stem mainly from how Military escalation can be understood as a pro-
each party ascribes intentions to the other. As cess in which the intensity of a conflict increases
Charap et al. have written, this mutual distrust as the result of one side and/or the other mak-
is further aggravated by mirroring beliefs that ing decisions to apply greater military power.
the other side is acting both strictly rationally Escalation may be intentional or the result of
and with nefarious intentions. This dynamic accident or miscalculation, e.g., an errant air-
presents an escalatory factor in its own right.28 strike misinterpreted as an escalatory step by
It also underlines the imperative that any se- the other side, which then responds. States may
rious discussions potentially leading to CAC escalate within an ongoing military conflict in
agreements must begin with conversations the hope that their escalation will deter further
that address the very real military capabilities escalation from the other party, but if each
involved. This is not intended to preclude a responds in kind, the result will instead be an
NATO–Russia discussion of their respective escalation spiral.29
doctrines, but such an exchange will invariably
take time and runs the risk of being stymied The likelihood of conflict and escalation spirals
by discussions of intentions. In the meantime, caused by accident or miscalculation may be in-
steps to address capabilities can bring concrete creased or decreased by the military capabilities
security improvements. and postures of the parties involved. Existing
capabilities and their suitability for launching
2. Military Drivers of Conflict hostilities or increasing the intensity of conflict
and Escalation can lead countries to expect aggression from the
other party. Drawing on the above discussion
Many of the fears described above hinge on of threat perceptions, this paper identifies three
both parties’ concern that in the current securi- categories of conventional military drivers of
ty landscape, the offense has an advantage over conflict and escalation (and their interaction)
the defence. This can increase the probability that seem most likely to feed these dynamics in
of military conflict: Either party may attack the NATO–Russia context: the concentration
because it believes it will win or because it be- of forces in critical sub-regions, LRS capabili-
lieves it will lose if it allows the other to go first. ties, and short distances and reaction times.
A standoff of this nature can also increase the
risk of violence as a result of incident, accident, The concentration of forces in critical sub-
and/or miscalculation. One side may misread regions is a potentially powerful driver of
the other’s actions as a preparation for conflict conflict and escalation as it can be perceived
– even if the other has no offensive intentions as sufficient for a sub-regional surprise attack.
– and initiate military hostilities preemptively NATO has put particular emphasis on the dan-
to gain the advantage. The concentration of gers of potential concentrations of this sort.
forces in particular sub-regions, as well as other Awareness of potential adversaries’ means and
actions such as reinforcements and the deploy- options when it comes to reinforcing deployed
ment of LRS capabilities that can quickly strike capabilities may further drive escalation, even if
targets in the sub-region, could increase the risk forces are not initially as concentrated. This in-
of such miscalculation and unintended conflict cludes, for instance, quick-reaction forces that
because both parties view these as threats. can flow into the sub-region facilitated by the
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
necessary command, transport, and logistical missile-, and/or sea-based LRS are employed,
infrastructure, including pre-deployed equip- constitute further drivers of escalation. Military
ment. As discussed above, this is both a key exercises can lead to accidents and incidents that
Russian concern and a NATO concern, given in themselves are drivers of escalation. As already
the road and rail network that the Russian mil- noted, whereas NATO is particularly worried
itary could use to concentrate forces near the about Russia’s LRS capabilities in the region,
borders of the Baltic states from throughout Russia’s main concern is U.S. global air- and
Russia’s Western Military District. Military sea-based capabilities.
exercises present another factor that can ag-
gravate the risks of concentration and rapid re- Short distances and reaction times. Par-
inforcement capacity. The larger the exercises, ticularly in the Baltic Sea sub-region, the geo-
the closer to state borders they are staged; the graphic distances separating the sides are small.
shorter the pre-warning time (as in snap exer- Naval and air assets often operate in close prox-
cises), the greater the possibility of their being imity. Russian and NATO ground force units
misinterpreted as preparations for a surprise may be deployed within tens of kilometers of
attack. one another. Accordingly, warning and reac-
tion times regarding events that could be per-
LRS capabilities constitute a second complex ceived as hostile or dangerous are short. This in
of conflict and escalation drivers. These refer itself constitutes a further potential driver of
to existing and planned NATO and Russian conflict and escalation.30
air-, sea-, and land-based LRS capabilities with-
in critical sub-regions or located outside of the The situation in the Black Sea sub-region is
sub-regions but within range of having a swift qualitatively different. NATO and Russian
military impact on the sub-region. For example, ground forces are not situated in as close a
Russian land-based LRS capabilities deployed in proximity as they are in the Baltic Sea sub-
Kaliningrad or the Western Military District of region. However, like the situation in and over
Russia would worry NATO countries. Ship- and the Baltic Sea, frequent intercepts and encoun-
submarine-based LRS capabilities do not need ters between NATO and Russian warships and
to be deployed in the Baltic Sea to affect the Bal- aircraft are taking place in and over the Black
tic sub-region. NATO could launch LRS sys- Sea as well.
tems from ships and submarines in the North,
Norwegian, or Barents Seas, while Russian ships Each of these categories of military drivers of
and submarines could launch LRS systems from conflict and escalation poses its own risk of un-
those seas and the White Sea. The Black Sea intended and/or accidental escalation. In com-
region could be reached by NATO ship- and bination, they can become even more volatile.
submarine-based LRS capabilities in the Med-
iterranean, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas, while 3. Elements of Future CAC Agreements
Russian ships and submarines could launch LRS
systems from the Caspian Sea. Both NATO and Elements of CAC agreements aimed at reduc-
Russia can launch air-based LRS systems against ing the risks posed by conflict and escalation
targets in the Baltic and Black Sea sub-regions drivers should focus on the Baltic Sea and Black
from aircraft based at airfields thousands of Sea sub-regions. Specific agreements would
kilometers away. Military exercises, where air-, emerge as the result of negotiations. This pa-
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
per offers ideas for ways in which old and/or should be large enough to cover a significant
new tools could address existing and emerging share of the armed forces that would be rele-
security problems. Specifically, components of vant in any military conflict.
future CAC agreements should:
Options for defining the territory covered by
• reduce the risk of war by accident or mis- a Baltic sub-regional agreement include, from
calculation,31 largest to smallest:
• stabilize the relationship in sensitive • Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
sub-regions by reducing the risk of conflict Kaliningrad, the part of Germany where,
or, if conflict breaks out, further escala- according to the Two-Plus-Four Treaty,
tion,32 and “[f ]oreign armed forces and nucle-
ar weapons or their carriers will not be
• prevent destabilizing sub-regional force ac- stationed,”34 equivalent parts of the West-
cumulations suitable for a surprise attack.33 ern Military District of Russia (other than
Kaliningrad), Denmark, the Baltic Sea,
In all three cases, the objective is the same: to and Belarus. Sweden and Finland could
prevent unintended or accidental conflict or be invited to join as well.35
escalation by alleviating the fears of all parties.
Beyond that, the measures also aim to decrease • Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Kalin-
the likelihood of intended escalation by in- ingrad, other parts of the Western Mili-
creasing transparency and improving verifica- tary District of Russia, the Baltic Sea, and
tion of the agreed-upon measures to increase part of Belarus, and perhaps parts of Ger-
warning and reaction time. many.36
The following elements are necessary for any • Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad,
successful CAC agreement: defining the northeastern Poland, northwestern Bela-
sub-regions covered by the agreements or rus, and Russia’s Pskov oblast, the western
arrangements (point a); confidence- and part of Russia’s Leningrad oblast, and the
transparency- building measures (points b–f ); Baltic Sea.
limitations (points g–i), and measures of
verification (points j and k). Defining a sub-region is not an exact science,
and shifting geopolitical circumstances can
a) Defining Sub-Regions affect which countries need to be included.
Initial agreements could encompass a limited
Agreements or arrangements that are meant number of countries that are interested in and
to address threats as they are perceived in a willing to be parties. They could later be ex-
sub-region will in most cases need to define panded – both to include additional parties
the territory or territories at issue, and thus the and to cover more capabilities, provided that
parties that must sign on. In political terms, the existing parties agree.
sub-region should be large enough to avoid the
perception of discrimination against smaller A Black Sea sub-regional agreement would
states by larger states. In operational terms, it logically include the Black Sea itself, all or
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
parts of NATO allies Romania, Bulgaria, c) Limitation of Military Exercises in and
and Turkey, and all or parts of Russia’s South- Transfers into the Sub-Region
ern Military District. Ukraine and Georgia
would also likely need to be involved. However, This measure would render military exer-
because of break-away regions recognized cises, quick deployment capacities (logis-
by few states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and tical infrastructure) within the designat-
the disputed status of Crimea, where impor- ed sub-regions, and transfers of armed
tant elements of Russian armed forces are forces into these regions subject to limitation,
deployed, defining the Black Sea sub-region notification, and observation.38 It would
poses unique challenges. Any agreement would ban no-notice snap exercises within the sub-
almost certainly require a status-neutral regions.39 This measure might also prohib-
approach.37 This would require artful draft- it the conduct of military exercises within
ing by legal experts: Could an agreement be a certain distance from international borders
worded such that Russia could sign it un- (this could prove difficult in practice,
derstanding itself as sovereign over Crimea, given the small size of some parts of the
while other parties continued to view Russia sub-regions, such as Kaliningrad). Such
as an occupying power making commitments measures would substantially decrease the
regarding the territory it occupies? danger of a surprise attack carried out under
the guise of a military exercise, something
Confidence- and Transparency-Building several European states fear.
Measures
d) Notification of Naval Forces
b) Inclusion of All Kinds of Forces in an Up-
graded Notification and Observation Re- This measure would require notification of
gime vessels with LRS capabilities entering the
Baltic and the Black Sea and of warships and
The VD11 thresholds for the notification and submarines permanently deployed or based
observation of certain military activities would at ports in those seas. It would also limit the
be significantly lowered, and the quota for inspec- scope and parameters of maritime exercises
tions and evaluation visits increased in its entire in these seas (e.g., geographic area, number
area of application. Regional states might also of participating ships and aircraft, nature)
consider even lower thresholds and higher quo- and render them subject to notification and
tas specific to the Baltic Sea and Black Sea sub-re- observation.40 As the Baltic and the Black Sea
gions. In contrast to the current version of the are inseparable parts of both sub-regions, the
VD11, it would include all kinds of armed forc- regulation of maritime forces would be criti-
es (ground, air, air defence, naval, and coastal). cal for the effectiveness of the other proposed
The result would be the increased transparency measures.
of military exercises and a lower risk of inadvert-
ent conflict as a result of such exercises.
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
e) Prevention of Dangerous Military update existing agreements and to add new
Activities Agreement bilateral agreements to cover those countries
that are not currently signatories.
A number of NATO states and Russia already
have agreements on preventing incidents on f) Creation of a European Risk Reduction
or over international waters based on the Centre
model of the 1972 U.S.–Soviet Agreement
on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over A future European Prevention of Dangerous
the High Seas.41 While similar, they are not Military Activities Agreement would be im-
identical, and they do not cover all coun- plemented by a newly established Risk Reduc-
tries. A single Europe-wide agreement would tion Centre.44 More than a “hotline” contact
standardize the rules and procedures for ap- channel between NATO and Russian military
proaches to and intercepts of the other side’s headquarters, it would be a continuously and
warships and military aircraft.42 jointly-staffed centre with multiple satellite
offices located on either side of the NATO–
In addition, the comprehensive agreement Russia border in the various neighboring coun-
should include provisions that expand on the tries. These offices would have observers (liai-
1989 U.S.–Soviet Agreement on the Preven- son officers with diplomatic immunity) present
tion of Dangerous Military Activities, which from both NATO member states and Russia.
focused on U.S. and Soviet ground forces These could quickly visit conflict and accident
along the inner-German border.43 That agree- sites to investigate and report on the situation.
ment outlined steps to prevent accidental en- As such, rather than simply responding to inci-
counters among forces from developing into dents as they occur, these offices would be in a
dangerous situations by establishing agreed position to prevent them from escalating into
communication channels and procedures something worse.
that units in contact could use on the ground.
Like the 1989 agreement, the modern ver- Limitations
sion could establish rules about the use of
lasers and interference with the other side’s g) Limitation of Armed Forces in
command and control systems. In addition, it Sub-Regions
could set out new rules that take into account
the revolution in communications technolo- This measure would limit permanently de-
gies, cyber, and reconnaissance activities that ployed combat forces in specific sub-regions,
has since taken place. possibly building on the commitments con-
tained in the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding
Together with the creation of a Europe-wide Act and in Annex 5 of the 1999 CFE Final
Risk Reduction Centre described below Act. In the former document, NATO stipulat-
(point f ), this kind of comprehensive agree- ed that “in the current and foreseeable securi-
ment would substantially lower the danger ty environment, the Alliance will carry out its
of unintended conflict or escalation. If nego- collective defence and other missions by ensur-
tiating such an agreement proves impossible, ing the necessary interoperability, integration,
however, Russia and NATO members (with and capability for reinforcement rather than
the alliance’s support) should take steps to by additional permanent stationing of sub-
www.deepcuts.org 10Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
stantial combat forces” (within the territory limits would help to constrain the possibili-
of new NATO members). In the latter docu- ty, and thus the fear, of pre-emptive strikes.
ment, Russia stated that it would show “due NATO and Russia could also consider air-
restraint with regard to ground [treaty-limited and sea-based LRS capabilities that they
equipment] levels and deployments in the deploy permanently outside of the sub-regions,
region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast which could be used in military conflict in or
and the Pskov oblast” and that it had “no rea- over the territories. However, constraining ca-
sons, plans or intentions to station substan- pabilities outside of a sub-region would be a far
tial additional combat forces, whether air or more complicated endeavor, and thus it would
ground forces, in that region on a permanent be better to begin with limits on weapons and
basis.”45 To build on this, NATO and Russia platforms deployed within the defined territory.
would have to reconfirm these commitments In addition, transparency and notification meas-
and define the as yet undefined term “substan- ures on LRS capabilities deployed beyond the
tial combat forces.” NATO and Russia were defined sub-regions should be considered.
reportedly close to agreeing that “substantial
combat forces” referred to a brigade in each Verification
concerned state, about 4,000 troops, but this
agreement was never finalized. This would be j) Verified Transparency
supplemented by rules for temporary deploy-
ments in the sub-regions and by the limita- All parties should be confident that the meas-
tion of military exercises as mentioned above ures are being implemented faithfully. To sup-
(point c). The effect of these measures would port this, any arrangement or agreement must
be to constrain the possibility of critical force incorporate sufficient transparency and verifi-
concentrations in sensitive regions. cation measures. The ACFE Treaty provides an
ample toolbox to this end.
h) Limitation of Military Infrastructure
in Sub-Regions k) Maintenance of the Open Skies Treaty as
a Cooperative Tool
This measure would limit critical infrastruc-
ture in the designated sub-regions (command The OST can serve as a cooperative confidence-
posts, storage sites, airfields) and make such in- building and verification tool. It can be made even
frastructure subject to notification and obser- more valuable if it is expanded to cover maritime
vation.46 As a result, it would be more difficult exercises in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea sub-re-
for prospective combatants to reinforce their gions. Large states have the capability to gath-
forces in sensitive sub-regions. er information by national intelligence means,
though the OST’s use of aircraft offers flexibility
i) Limiting LRS Capabilities in Sub-Regions and the capability to operate below cloud cover.
For smaller states, OST pictures represent a way
This measure would limit and render subject to access this kind of information directly, with-
to notification and observation the number out having to rely on the larger states. If the OST
of air-, sea-, and land-based LRS capabilities fails, states can agree on a number of overflights
deployed in a designated sub-region.47 Such as a confidence and transparency measure.
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A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
These eleven measures fall into three cate- Specific rules for sub-regions could be nego-
gories from the standpoint of innovation: tiated by interested parties and subsequently
agreed under Chapter X (Regional Meas-
• Measures b, e, g, j and k would expand and ures) of the VD11. The result could be a mix
update existing instruments. of politically-binding agreements and unilat-
eral declarations rather than just one or more
• Measures c and f would introduce new ele- legally-binding large-scale treaty (or treaties).49
ments into existing instruments. Under the present circumstances, it is difficult
to imagine that a large-scale CAC treaty could
• Measures a, d, h and i require the creation be ratified by a significant number of parlia-
of completely new instruments. ments. The U.S. Senate consent to ratification
poses particular challenges, and the failure of
4. Possible Negotiation Formats of the United States to ratify could doom a trea-
Future CAC Agreements ty. A patchwork of agreements also permits the
initiation of negotiations on some issues even
One beneficial side effect, given that threats com- when agreement on others remains too diffi-
prise both old and new factors, is that some of the cult – provided there is general consensus that
toolboxes developed during the Cold War (such as such negotiations are overall worth pursuing.
the ACFE Treaty) retain value even if they are insuf-
ficient to address certain types of modern weapons Negotiations will be most effective if there is
(such as LRS systems). An effective CAC approach both a NATO and an OSCE imprimatur to
for today would build upon ACFE Treaty instru- both negotiations and any final agreements.
ments as well as other established tools, combining For some of the measures in question, it is dif-
them with new tools in a new regime. ficult to imagine how they might be structured
or negotiated if not through a NATO–Russia
But combining old and new is a complex un- channel. For example, a Europe-wide Danger-
dertaking. First, it requires pulling together ous Military Activities Agreement and Risk
(elements of ) existing agreements and combining Reduction Centre would make most sense if
them with new agreements and arrangements. undertaken as a NATO–Russia mechanism
Second, it means somehow layering rules for spe- which could potentially be expanded to addi-
cific sub-regions atop measures for the whole area tional countries. The NATO–Russia Coun-
of application of the VD11. cil can serve as a forum in which Russia and
NATO members discuss potential new Euro-
One way to manage the complexity may be to pean agreements to ensure that the alliance as
build on existing agreements or elements there- a whole supports the approach. Alternatively,
of (CFE Treaty, ACFE Treaty, VD11, OST, NATO members who are party to negotia-
NATO–Russia Founding Act), rather than try- tions can go to NATO as a whole for support.
ing to negotiate a completely new framework.48 NATO involvement can help to cement new
agreements as part of a revamped European
For example, a modernized VD11 can serve as security architecture. The OSCE, for its part,
a mechanism for upgrading the notification and can provide the framework of the VD11 for
observation rules for the whole area of applica- the general improvement of verified transpar-
tion, including the sub-regions. ency and for classifying the new sub-regional
www.deepcuts.org 12Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
agreements as “Regional Measures” under parties should consistently brief the OSCE and
Chapter X of this document. Such discus- its participants on plans and progress – just as
sions could even begin within the existing the 23 states that negotiated the CFE Treaty in
OSCE Structured Dialogue, although some- 1989–1990 informed the CSCE’s (the OSCE’s
thing more formal would eventually be nec- predecessor) participating States.
essary.
5. Conclusion
The process could start with a NATO–
Russia channel – the NATO–Russia Council. A fresh approach to restarting conventional
While a new commitment to the Council arms control in Europe should aim to define
would involve a substantial shift in current building blocks for a series of agreements and
NATO policy, such as allowing NATO– arrangements that can support and enhance
Russia working-level contacts, it could open stability and security in Europe. Such instru-
the door to progress on CAC. In the Coun- ments should help assuage prospective ad-
cil, the parties could work towards consensus versaries’ fears of one another’s military capa-
on the general scope and parameters of agree- bilities, thus limiting the risk of conflict and
ments. In a sense, these talks would be the escalation. They are intended to take into ac-
equivalent of negotiations on a mandate – count new security and technological develop-
simultaneously, negotiations on the measures ments and to give prospective parties a certain
for specific sub-regions should be conducted amount of flexibility as they negotiate.
among the states concerned and interested.
For example, NATO might recognize the Although updates to Europe-wide security
authority of the states directly concerned to mechanisms would be valuable, most of the
negotiate on their own behalf, with the cave- newer agreements described in this paper are
at that they should also consult with the alli- sub-regional, reflecting a security dynamic that
ance as a whole to ensure that any agreement has changed since the days of the Cold War.
is acceptable to allies. Beyond NATO states This means that in many cases negotiations
and Russia, negotiations would likely have to would involve those states that are most con-
include Belarus, Finland, and Sweden in the cerned rather than every country on the conti-
case of a Baltic Sea sub-region and Ukraine nent. Some of these states are NATO members,
and Georgia in the case of a Black Sea sub- some are not. All participate in the OSCE.
region. While this would introduce signifi- Even if the agreements are sub-regional, how-
cant complexities (e.g., the status of Crimea as ever, their implications will affect the security
discussed above), an agreement would likely of the region as a whole. In this way, a patch-
not be sustainable or meaningful without the work approach to CAC can begin to lay the
participation of all concerned states. groundwork for a broader and more durable
future European security order.
Even though not all of the regional states are
NATO members, all are participants of the
OSCE. Whether in the NATO–Russia frame-
work or in a sub-regional context, negotiating
www.deepcuts.org 13Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
Endnotes
1 The authors would like to thank Samuel Charap, Andrei Zagorski, Kevin Ryan, and Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
for informal reviews and useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 Cf. Nicholas Williams, Simon Lunn, Modernising conventional arms control: An urgent imperative, London 2020
(European Leadership Network Global Security Policy Brief ), p. 2.
3 Cf. Lukasz Kulesa, The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, in: Survival, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2018), p. 82.
4 Cf. ibid., p. 87. Despite the close link between the nuclear and the conventional spheres, this study focuses on conven-
tional arms control.
5 Russia has repeatedly asked the U.S. government to jointly extend the New START Treaty. However, the U.S. ad-
ministration has laid down three conditions for such an extension: the inclusion of China in the negotiations; the
inclusion of nuclear weapons not covered by New START, particularly Russia’s large arsenal of tactical nuclear weap-
ons; and (additional) verification – “… conditions that, if adhered to, will ensure the Trump administration does not
extend the treaty” (Steven Pifer, Unattainable Conditions for New START Extension?, Commentary, 30 June 2020
(Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation), https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/unattainable-condi-
tions-new-start-extension).
6 Cf. Alexandra Bell, Wolfgang Richter, Andrei Zagorski, How to fix, preserve and strengthen the Open Skies Treaty,
Hamburg 2020 (Deep Cuts Issue Brief #9).
7 In his 2016 initiative “Reviving Arms Control in Europe,” former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Stein-
meier mentioned the need to “define regional ceilings, minimum distances, and transparency measures (especially
in militarily sensitive regions such as the Baltics)” (Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Reviving Arms Control in Europe, 26
August 2016 (Project Syndicate), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/reviving-arms-control-in-eu-
rope-by-frank-walter-steinmeier-2016-08?barrier=accesspaylog.
8 Cf. Evgeny Buzhinskiy, Oleg Shakirov, Outlines for future conventional arms control in Europe: a sub-regional re-
gime in the Baltics, London 2019 (European Leadership Network Policy Brief ), p. 2.
9 Cf. Buzhinskiy, Shakirov 2019, p. 2; Williams, Lunn 2020, p. 1; Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson (ed.), Robert Dalsjö,
Carolina Vendil Pallin, Mike Winnerstig, Conventional Arms Control. A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?,
Stockholm 2018 (Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI), p. 6.
10 Cf. Samuel Charap, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, Giacomo Persi Paoli, A New Approach to Con-
ventional Arms Control in Europe. Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century, Santa Monica 2020
(RAND), p. 21.
11 Cf. Wolfgang Zellner (Co-ordinator); Philip Remler, Wolfgang Richter, Andrei Zagorski (Drafting Group); Evgeny
Buzhinskiy, Vladilav L. Chernov, Ali Serdar Erdurmaz, Marc Finaud, Cornelius Friesendorf, P. Terrence Hopmann,
Lukasz Kulesa, Igor Rajevs, Bejamin Schaller, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Niklas Schörnig, Oleg Shakirov, Simon Weiß,
Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Arms Control in the NATO-Russia Contact Zones, Vi-
enna 2018 (OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions), p. 7.
12 Cf. Buzhinsky, Skakirov 2019, p. 2.
13 Ministry of National Defence, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2017, p. 23.
14 Cf. David Shlapak, Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of
the Baltics, Santa Monica 2016 (RAND); Jüri Luik, Tomas Jermalavičius, A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Eu-
rope, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 4 (2017), pp.
233-239.
15 Buzhinskiy, Shakirov 2019, p. 1.
16 Cf. Charap et al. 2020, p. 21; Zellner et al. 2018, p. 12.
17 Cf. Charap et al. 2020, p. 22.
18 The National Defence Concept of the Republic of Latvia, adopted by the Parliament on 16 June 2016, p. 4.
19 Cf. Felix Chang, Are the Russians Coming? Russia’s Military Buildup near Ukraine, Foreign Policy Research In-
stitute, 25 February 2019, https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/02/are-the-russians-coming-russias-military-buildup-
near-ukraine/.
20 Cf. Brian W. Everstine, Russian Fighters Intercept U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft over Black Sea, in: Air Force Maga-
zine, 26 June 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/russian-fighters-intercept-u-s-reconnaissance-planes-over-black-
sea/.
21 Cf. Stephen Losey, USAF B-1B Lancers practices anti-ship missile strikes in Black Sea, in: Air Force Magazine, 1 June
2020, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2020/06/01/usaf-b-1b-lancers-practiced-anti-ship-mis-
sile-strikes-in-black-sea/.
22 Cf. Charap et al. 2020, pp. 17/18.
www.deepcuts.org 14Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
23 Ibid., p. 30.
24 Cf. ibid., p. 33.
25 However, see two OSCE documents outlining the very first steps towards cyber-related confidence-, transparen-
cy-, and security-building measures: OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No. 1106, Initial Set of OSCE Confi-
dence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communi-
cation Technologies, PC.DEC/1106, 3 December 2013; OSCE, Ministerial Council, Hamburg 2016, Dec. 5/16,
OSCE Efforts Related to Reducing the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communica-
tion Technologies, MC.DEC/5/16, 9 December 2016.
26 Cf. Wolfgang Richter, Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Con-
trol, Hamburg 2017 (Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 11), p. 11.
27 Cf. Buzhinskiy, Shakirov 2019, p. 2; Charap et al. 2020, p. 37.
28 Cf. Charap et al. 2020, p. 25.
29 Cf. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ 1976 (Princeton University
Press).
30 Cf. Charap et al. 2020, p. 54.
31 Cf. Williams, Lunn 2020, p. 3.
32 Cf. Zellner et al. 2018, p. 4.
33 Cf. Richter 2017, p. 14.
34 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 1990, Teil II, Nr. 38, pp. 1317-1329,
here Art. 5, p. 1324, 13 October 1990.
35 Cf. Zellner et. al. 2018, p. 21.
36 Cf. Buzhinskiy, Shakirov 2019, p. 2.
37 Cf. Sergi Kapanadze, Ulrich Kühn, Wolfgang Richter, Wolfgang Zellner, Status-Neutral Security, Confidence-Build-
ing and Arms Control Measures in the Georgian Context, Hamburg 2017 (CORE Working Paper 28).
38 Cf. Richter 2017, p. 14.
39 Cf. Buzhinskiy, Shakirov 2019, p. 2.
40 Cf. Williams, Lunn 2020, p. 8; Buzhinskiy, Shakirov 2019, pp. 5/6.
41 Cf. Department of State, Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, 25 May 1972,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm.
42 In September 2019, the OSCE Structured Dialogue discussed the issue of “preventing and managing incidents on
and over the high seas” (OSCE, Meeting of Structured Dialogue held at both political and expert levels in Vienna, 26
September 2019, https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/433457).
43 Wikisource, Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Prevention_
of_Dangerous_Military_Activities_Agreement.
44 Cf. Charap et al. 2020, p. 64.
45 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in
Paris, France, 27 May 1997; Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, CFE.DOC/2/99, 19 November 1999, ANNEX 5.
46 Cf. Williams, Lunn 2020, pp. 7/8.
47 Cf. Peter van Ham, Modernizing conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region, The Hague 2018
(Clingendael Report), p. 25; Kulesa 2018, pp. 81/82.
48 Cf. Van Ham 2018, p. 1; Zellner et al. 2018, pp. 14f.
49 Cf. van Ham 2018, p.1; Lukasz Kulesa, Making Conventional Arms Control Fit for the 21st Century, Post-
Conference Report, London 2017 (European Leadership Network), pp. 2/3.
www.deepcuts.org 15Deep Cuts Issue Brief #11 September 2020
A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe
About the Authors
Wolfgang Zellner is Senior Research Fellow at the IFSH. From 1994 to 2019, he
worked in different capacities within the IFSH, since 2005 as Deputy Director of
the IFSH and Head of the IFSH’s Centre for OSCE Research (CORE).
Olga Oliker is Program Director for Europe and Central Asia at International Cri-
sis Group. Prior to joining the Crisis Group, she directed the Russia and Eurasia
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and held various re-
search and management roles at the RAND Corporation, including as Director of
the Center for Russia and Eurasia.
Steven Pifer is a non-resident Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Prolifer-
ation Initiative, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and the Center
on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, and a William J. Per-
ry fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Uni-
versity. He is a retired foreign service officer with an over 25 years of experience with
the State Department.
About Deep Cuts Impress
Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicher-
The Deep Cuts Commission provides deci- heitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg
sion-makers as well as the interested public (IFSH)
with concrete policy options based on realistic
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in its deliberations by the Institute for Peace
Research and Security Policy at the Universi- Phone: +49 (0)40 86 60 77 70
ty of Hamburg (IFSH), the Arms Control As- Fax: +49 (0)40 866 36 15
sociation (ACA), and the Primakov Institute
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