Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium

 
 
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
VenuesLive




Bankwest Stadium



Flood Emergency Response Plan
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
Bankwest Stadium




             F LOOD E MERGENCY R ESPONSE P LAN




                                           for




                                   VenuesLive




                                           by


                        Molino Stewart Pty Ltd
                            ACN 067 774 332




                                     MARCH 2019


                MOLINO STEWART PTY LTD ABN 95 571 253 092 ACN 067 774 332

PO BOX 614, PARRAMATTA CBD BC, PARRAMATTA NSW 2124 TEL: (02) 9354 0300 FAX: (02) 9893 9806

                                www.molinostewart.com.au
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
DOCUMENT CONTROL

Document Reference        1091 Bankwest Stadium FERP Report_Final_v2

Project                   Bankwest Stadium

Document Type             Flood Emergency Response Plan

Author                    Filippo Dall’Osso, Steve Molino




REVISION HISTORY

Date          Version Name               Comments

08/03/2019      1    Filippo Dall’Osso   Draft for Internal review

08/03/2019     1.1   Steven Molino       Draft for Client review

08/03/2019      2    Steven Molino       Final




DOCUMENT APPROVAL

For Molino Stewart




Name                         Steven Molino

Position                     Principal

Venues Live


Name                         Simon Davies

Position                     General Manager Asset Management




ii                                                                     VenuesLive
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
CONTENTS

1   INTRODUCTION                                            1
    1.1 Background                                          1
    1.2 Site Details                                        1
        1.2.1 Locality                                      1
        1.2.2 Site Layout                                   1
        1.2.3 Access                                        2
        1.2.4 Topography                                    2
        1.2.5 Operation                                     3

2   FLOOD BEHAVIOUR                                        10
    2.1 Flood Generating Weather                           10
    2.2 Flood Probabilities                                10
    2.3 Flooding of the Site                               10
        2.3.1 Flood Extent and Levels                      11
        2.3.2 Frequency of Flooding                        14
        2.3.3 Flood Rate of Rise and Duration              14

3   FLOOD FORECASTS AND WARNINGS                           15
    3.1 Bureau of Meteorology (BoM)                        15
    3.2 Floodsmart                                         16
    3.3 Observed Flood Levels                              18

4   EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CONSIDERATIONS     19
    4.1 Evacuation Modelling                               19
        4.1.1 Scope                                        19
        4.1.2 Assumptions                                  19
        4.1.3 Evacuation Time Needed                       21
        4.1.4 Evacuation Timeline                          21
    4.2 Consultation                                       22
        4.2.1 Evacuation Challenges                        23
        4.2.2 SIP Challenges                               24

5   FLOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN                          28
    5.1 Emergency Response Philosophy                      28
        5.1.1 Priorities                                   28
        5.1.2 Alert Modes                                  28
    5.2 Responsibilities                                   30
        5.2.1 NSW State Emergency Services                 30
        5.2.2 The Emergency Organisation Committee (ECO)   30
        5.2.3 Chief Warden                                 31
        5.2.4 Area Wardens and Wardens                     31
        5.2.5 Staff and Contractors                        31




Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                iii
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
5.2.6 Patrons, Entertainment Personnel and Media                                  31
     5.3 Communication Methods                                                             31
         5.3.1 The Emergency Committee Organisation (ECO)                                  31
         5.3.2 Chief Warden                                                                32
         5.3.3 Patrons                                                                     32
     5.4 What do to Before, During and After a Flood                                       32
         5.4.1 White Alert Mode – Normal Operations                                        32
         5.4.2 Yellow Alert Mode                                                           33
         5.4.3 Orange Alert Mode                                                           33
         5.4.4 Red Alert Mode                                                              35
         5.4.5 Black Alert Mode                                                            37
         5.4.6 Green Alert Mode                                                            41

REFERENCES                                                                                 43


APPENDICES
Appendix A – Flood Actions Checklist

Appendix B – Emergency Contacts List


 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Location of the site                                                              4
Figure 2. Level L00 – Pitch and Services                                                    5
Figure 3. Level L01 - Concourse                                                             6
Figure 4. North and East elevation                                                          7
Figure 5. South and West elevation                                                          8
Figure 6. Location of the 14m AHD topographic contour line with respect to level L00.       9
Figure 7. Flood depths and velocities in the 20% AEP event (adapted from CSS, 2018)        12
Figure 8. Flood extents and levels adopted by the City of Parramatta Council               12
Figure 9. Flood hazard adopted by the City of Parramatta Council                           13
Figure 10. PMF hydrograph near O’Connell Street showing peak levels of the 5% and 1%
          AEP (in black) and floor levels at the site (in red)                             14
Figure 11. Flood warning areas as defined in the Floodsmart war system                     17
Figure 12. Pedestrian Evacuation Route                                                     21
Figure 13. Evacuation timeline and trigger levels plotted on the PMF hydrograph near
          O’Connell Street                                                                 23
Figure 14. Position of flood gates and retaining wall to water proof the southern access
          points to level L00                                                              25
Figure 15.Estimated relationship between peak flood levels and Average Recurrence
          Interval of flood events upstream of O’Connell Street.                           26



iv                                                                                         VenuesLive
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Annual probabilities of a large flood happening while an event is taking place
          within the site                                                                 14
Table 2. Flood smart warning system: types of warning messages                            16
Table 3. Flood warning types relevant to different items within the site as per the
           Floodsmart system                                                              17
Table 4. Alert Mode Table setting triggers for each Alert Mode. A single trigger is
          necessary and sufficient to activate the relevant Alert Mode.                   29




Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                               v
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
1        INTRODUCTION                              1.2       SITE DETAILS

                                                   1.2.1 Locality
1.1      BACKGROUND
                                                   The stadium is located in Parramatta, between
VenuesLive      Pty Ltd      is   taking  over     O’Connell Street and the Parramatta River,
management of the Bankwest Stadium, due to         north-west of the Marsden Weir. It is located
finish construction in early 2019. The stadium     on the parcels previously occupied by the
is located on O’Connell Street Parramatta,         demolished Parramatta Stadium and the
next to the Parramatta River, and has been         Parramatta Pool.
previously known as Parramatta Stadium.
                                                   It is bounded by the Parramatta Leagues Club
The Stadium will seat 30,000 spectators,           and Eels Place to the north, O’Connell Street
include five levels of premium, corporate and      to the east, the Parramatta River to the south,
function spaces, and incorporate a range of        the Old Kings Oval to the south-west, and the
food and beverage outlets. The stadium will        Parramatta River to the west and north-west
predominately cater       for  sporting   and      (Figure 1).
community events but will also cater for
concerts and functions.
                                                   1.2.2 Site Layout
Before operations can commence, a Flood
Emergency Response Plan (FERP) must be
                                                   The stadium will include six levels, namely:
completed and implemented as a condition of
the development approval (DA     condition           L00 – Service level, located at a level of
D4.e).                                                9.12m AHD (Figure 2). L00 will include
                                                      the playing field, a series of rooms and
To satisfy the condition, the FERP must:              facilities located along the western side of
                                                      the site, and four access tunnels
   Address evacuation, emergency access,
                                                      connecting the pitch either directly to the
    flood warning and awareness, and refuge
                                                      outdoor area east of the stadium (i.e. the
    requirements within the site and any other
                                                      south east and north east tunnels), or to
    relevant matters
                                                      the indoor area along the western side of
   Be based on the flood levels supplied by          the site. Specifically, the rooms and
    Council and any additional local flood and        facilities mentioned above will include:
    flow path modelling that may be required
                                                         -    The players and officials area, with
   Be prepared in consultation with the                      lockers, showers, warm up space,
    Council, the NSW State Emergency                          medical and physio rooms, coaching
    Services and NSW Fire and Rescue                          rooms, and press conference room
   Be fully operational prior to the                    -    A loading dock at the south-western
    commencement of the use and must be                       corner, accessed via a road running
    maintained in operation perpetually.                      along the southern end of the site to
VenuesLive engaged Molino Stewart to                          O’Connell Street
prepare this FERP to meet the above listed               -    Media rooms and facilities
requirements.
                                                         -    Kitchen an    catering   rooms      and
In addition to this, while the objective of the               equipment
consent condition is the protection to life,
VenuesLive is also concerned about flood risks           -    Staff rooms and facilities (lockers,
to property and profits. As such the FERP                     uniform store, briefing rooms,
                                                              communication facilities, computer
includes measures and actions to protect the
                                                              room, DAS rooms, offices)
facility itself, ensuring flood damage and
associated recovery time is minimised.                   -    Security rooms (i.e. security staff
                                                              offices, breakout room, cash room)

                                                         -    Critical facilities, including the
                                                              generator and tank room, main

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                    1
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
switch room, waste management              1.2.3 Access
           rooms, fire pump and valve room, air
           circulation room                           The stadium will be accessible via O’Connell
       -   Storage space.                             Street either by car or on foot. There will be
                                                      two access driveways, north and south of the
     L01 - Concourse Level, located at a             stadium, leading to three car parking areas,
      level of 14.67m AHD (Figure 3). This level
                                                      located north, west and south of the stadium.
      includes a free flow walkway running
      along the south, east and north perimeter       The southern car park is not part of the Bank
      of the stadium and providing access to          West Stadium site. Part of the southern car
      the seating area, as well as to toilet
                                                      park is operated by Parramatta Park Trust and
      facilities, cafes and entry/exist gates. The
      western part of the concourse is gated          the remainder operated by Parramatta Council.
      and includes the VIP area with related          Nevertheless, it is expected that the southern
      facilities and function rooms.                  car park will be available to the stadium
                                                      patrons during each event. The capacities of
       It should be noted that the ground level at
       all the entry/exit gates along the northern,   the car parks are:
       western and eastern side of the stadium           North - 292
       are about at the same level of the
       Concourse level (i.e. a14.67m AHD), the           West -187
       gates on the southern and south eastern           South- 348
       side of the stadium have external stairs
       going down to the level of L00 (i.e. 9.12m        Total – 827
       AHD).
                                                      It is assumed that the large majority of patrons
     L02 – the Club Level, at a level of             will access the site on foot and will arrive in
      20.07m AHD. This level’s footprint, as          Parramatta by public transport (bus, train or
      well as all the levels above, occupies only     light rail) or drive and park remote from the site
      the western part of the site. L02 includes
                                                      (street parking to the north and east or parking
      rooms and facilities for the Directors’
      Club. It can be accessed from the               stations in Parramatta CBD). The western car
      Concourse level via stairs or lifts.            park will be predominantly used by sport
                                                      players and performers, support staff, media
     L03 – Suite Level, located at a level of
                                                      and suppliers. The northern car park will
      24.57m AHD, L03 occupies the same
      footprint as the Club Level. L03 includes       accommodate VIP patrons and corporate
      26 suites with access to private terraces       patrons with access to suites.
      overlooking the pitch. It also includes a
      kitchen area, and the executive offices.
                                                      1.2.4 Topography
     L04 and L05 - the Media Level and
      Media Roof level, located at a level of         The overall topography of the site is sloping in
      29.07m     AHD     and   33.57m    AHD
                                                      a north-west to south-east direction, however it
      respectively, including a camera deck,
      commentary rooms and additional suites.         has been significantly altered locally by cut and
                                                      fill operations associated with the construction
     L06 – Roof Level, at a level of 33.57 m         works. The highest topographical level is just
      AHD.                                            below 15m AHD nearby the River, at the north-
The open seating area will surround the               western end of the site, while the lowest point
playing field and extend from Level L00 (the          is in the southern car park at a level of 6.7m
playing field level) up to level L05.                 AHD.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the stadium                The stadium will be built so that the northern
elevations.                                           end will have level L01 at ground level, while
The site will incorporate a stormwater drainage       the south part will have level L00 at ground
system collecting rainwater falling over the          level (Figure 4 and Figure 5)
whole footprint of the site (including the pitch
                                                      Figure 6 shows the as-built contour line
and the roof) and discharging to the
                                                      corresponding to 14m AHD, which is just
Parramatta River via the exiting stormwater
drainage network.

2                                                                                              VenuesLive
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
above the reach of floodwaters in a Probable        level L00 or through the glass entry doors in
Maximum Flood (PMF).                                the middle of the western stand on level L01.
                                                    Weekends will see minimal staff on site unless
                                                    an event or function is happening.
1.2.5 Operation
                                                    There will be a security presence on site 24/7
The stadium will host two types of activities:      and several of the rooms and facilities on level
                                                    L00 will be in use at all times.
   Events (i.e. activities utilising the
    playing field). It is anticipated that the
    stadium will host between 40 and 50
    events per year with the number of
    patrons ranging between 10,000 and
    30,000. These will generally be sports
    competitions, during which patrons will
    occupy the seating area, the concourse
    level and the suites at the upper levels.
    Media will occupy the media areas and
    most other areas within the stadium will
    be used during these events.
      In addition to sport events there might be
      up to two music concerts per year, with
      up to 40,000 patrons each. In music
      concerts, the northern part of the seating
      area will be behind the stage and will
      have no patrons in it, resulting in a
      maximum of 25,000 patrons in the
      seating areas. However, there will be up
      to 15,000 patrons on the pitch at level
      L00.
      There would be minimal vehicles in the
      stadium for events (less than 10) but the
      car parks around the perimeter of the
      stadium are expected to be full for every
      event. A typical event day would see
      stadium staff, players or performers,
      support staff and media arriving on site 2-
      4 hours prior to the start of the event.
      Public     entry     gates    will    open
      approximately 2 hours before kick-off.
      Most sports events will last approx. 2
      hours and the Stadium would be clear of
      all spectators within an hour of the end of
      the game.

   Functions (i.e. smaller activities not
    utilising the playing field). Functions
    could occur on any day of the year and
    there would be a maximum of about 800
    patrons on site. These would held on
    level L02, L03 or L04. Function patrons
    would utilise the external car parks with
    minimal (less than 10) vehicles in the
    stadium.

Aside from the above listed activities, the site
will be operated from 7AM to 7PM Monday to
Friday with up to 50 staff on site every day.
Staff will enter either via the loading dock on

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                   3
Flood Emergency Response Plan - Bankwest Stadium
Figure 1. Location of the site

4                                VenuesLive
Figure 2. Level L00 – Pitch and Services

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan   5
Figure 3. Level L01 - Concourse


6                                     VenuesLive
Figure 4. North and East elevation


Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan   7
Figure 5. South and West elevation




8                                    VenuesLive
Figure 6. Location of the 14m AHD topographic contour line with respect to level L00.




  Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                      9
2      FLOOD BEHAVIOUR                            consecutive years or even two in the same
                                                  year. This happened in several locations in
                                                  Queensland and Victoria in 2010 and 2011.

2.1    FLOOD GENERATING                           Another way of expressing flood probability is
       WEATHER                                    in terms of Annual Exceedance Probability
                                                  (AEP). A 100 year ARI flood has roughly a 1%
Coastal areas of eastern Australia mostly         AEP. That is, each and every year it has a 1%
receive flooding rains from so-called "east       chance of being reached or exceeded. This is
coast lows" that develop from time to time over   perhaps a more helpful way of thinking about
the adjacent Tasman Sea. These are intense        flood probabilities, as it encapsulates the
depressions off the coast and can produce         variability in the frequency with which similar
thunderstorm activity associated with troughs.    flood events represent over time. A flood with
                                                  a 1% AEP has about a 1 in 2 chance of being
Depressions can develop at any time of year,      reached or exceeded in the average person’s
but are most likely when sea surface              life time, the same probability of tossing a coin
temperatures are high and the air is humid.       and getting a head.
Therefore, these events usually occur in the
summer months and over the first half of the      Bigger floods can and do occur. There were
year.                                             several floods with greater than a 1% AEP
                                                  experienced in Eastern Australia in early 2011.
Flooding can also be a winter-spring              Some reached levels which have a 1 in 2,000
phenomenon, associated with unusually             (0.005%) AEP. A flood with a 1 in 500 (0.02%)
frequent or active extra-tropical depressions     AEP has about a 1 in 6 chance of being
and fronts. However some major events have        reached or exceeded in the average person’s
occurred in the summer half-year as systems       life time, the same as tossing a dice and
of tropical origin extend or move south.          getting a 6.
Flooding over inland areas is usually
associated with southward-moving tropical         The largest flood that can possibly occur is
systems, but in the cooler months, may occur      referred to as the Probably Maximum Flood
when well-developed cloud bands extend            (PMF). Although it has a very low probability
across the interior from the oceans north and     of occurring in any one year (1 in 1000,000 or
northwest of Australia.                           less), events approaching a PMF have been
                                                  recorded.
Rainfall patterns are also dependant on longer
term weather patterns. Flooding is more           Flooding may occur at any time of year and at
prevalent in a La Nina year when rainfall is      any time of day. The most recent major floods
significantly greater than the mean average       in Parramatta – 1986 and 1988 – peaked in
rainfall. Thunderstorms, which generally occur    the afternoon and at night however there is no
during the summer, can also result in localised   seasonality associated with flooding in Sydney
flooding which could impact specifically on the   and an event could occur at any time of day or
site.                                             night and on any day of the year.



2.2    FLOOD PROBABILITIES                        2.3    FLOODING OF THE SITE

Flood probability can be expressed in more        Flooding of the site is primarily caused by the
than one way. For example, a flood may be         Parramatta River overtopping its banks,
described as having a 1 in 100 year Average       however minor flooding can also be caused by
Recurrence Interval (ARI). This means that        rainwater running across the ground (overland
over many thousands of years, a flood of this     local flooding).
magnitude would occur on average once in          The flood information certificate provided by
100 years. This does not mean that a flood of     City of Parramatta Council (Figure 8 and
this size only occurs once every 100 years. It    Figure 9) shows that the site is flood affected
is possible to have floods of this size in        in the Probable Maximum Flood(PMF). The


10                                                                                        VenuesLive
site is not affected by floods as large as the     the site can be obtained by interpolating the
1% AEP event. This means that the site might       levels upstream (profile 1021, PMF level of
flood to some extent only as a result of events    13.8m AHD) and downstream of it (profile
with a probability smaller than 1% per year.       1935, PMF level of 13.12m AHD).
The above information was obtained from the        Importantly, the flood extents showed in the
flood model currently in use at the City of        map provided by Council would have been
Parramatta Council, which underpins the            obtained using a topography surveyed when
Upper Parramatta River Catchment Flood             the old stadium was in place, however the
Study, undertaken by Bewsher Consulting in         construction of the new stadium will affect the
2003. The modelling uses a RAFTS-XP                local topography as a result of cut and fill
hydrologic model and a MIKE-11 hydraulic           operations.
model. From the early 1990s the model was
                                                   Figure 6 shows the expected position of the
progressively updated to account for significant
                                                   14m AHD contour line once the new stadium
changes in the catchment including completion
                                                   will be completed. Because the maximum PMF
of flood mitigation works. However the
                                                   level will be 13.8m (upstream of the site), it is
software underpinning the model has now
                                                   reasonable to expect that floodwaters would
become obsolete and a new, more accurate
                                                   not be able to go past the 14m AHD contour
model is being prepared by Council and the
                                                   line, meaning that the flood affectation of the
results are likely to be officially released in
                                                   site is likely to be smaller than what is shown
early 2020.
                                                   in the flood maps.
                                                   Flooding of the site is therefore likely to occur
2.3.1 Flood Extent and Levels                      in two ways. Initially, the river will overtop its
                                                   banks in the vicinity of O’Connell Street and
The flood information certificate provided by      rise through the southern car park towards the
Council for the site does not include the exact    site. Given that level L00 is at 9.12m AHD, the
flood levels for the 5% AEP, 1% AEP and PMF        maximum PMF depth at the southern end of
on site, as it usually does for smaller size       the site would be between about 4m. This
developments. Instead, the certificate makes       would be sufficient to flood level L00 facilities
reference to the attached flood maps (Figure 8     and services, the pitch and all of the car
and Figure 9), where flood levels for the above    parks.
listed events are extracted at multiple cross
sections of the Parramatta River, upstream         However, at some point as the river is rising it
and downstream of the site.                        would break its banks north and/or west of the
                                                   site and flow around the site towards
The maps confirm that, according to the flood      O’Connell Street where the topography is
model currently used by Council, the site does     lower than the river level. For example, at the
not flood in the 1% AEP event, but is affected     peak of a PMF, the river would be overflowing
in the PMF.                                        upstream of the site and would flow east along
However, the southern car park, which is as        the site’s northern access road towards
low 6.7m AHD, would be partly flooded in the       O’Connell Street at a depth of 0.5m or more.
5% (1 in 20) AEP flood which reaches 7.02m         Once it reaches O’Connell Street it would flow
AHD at cross section 1935 which is adjacent to     south towards the river and join the flood
the car park. The highest part of the car park     waters which have reached the L00 level from
is at 8.6m AHD and this is about 0.5m higher       the river rising to the south.
than the peak of the 1% AEP flood at this
location (8.14m AHD).
The format of the flood certificate provided by
Council makes it difficult to obtain the exact
peak flood level at the site in a PMF, because
these vary along the river depending on the
location of the cross section. However, a
reasonable estimate of the PMF flood level at

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                   11
Figure 8. Flood extents and levels adopted by the City of Parramatta Council

12                                                                              VenuesLive
Figure 9. Flood hazard adopted by the City of Parramatta Council

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                    13
2.3.3 Flood Rate of Rise and
2.3.2 Frequency of Flooding                                          Duration

The information provided by Council does not                   Figure 10 shows the hydrograph of the PMF
allow to define exactly from which probability                 upstream of the Marsden Street weir extracted
event the site would start flooding, however                   from the Upper Parramatta Mike 11 flood
this would be significantly less frequent than                 model. The hydrograph shows the water level
the 1% AEP event. Although it is noted that                    at a point along the Parramatta river between
the southern car park can begin flooding in                    section 1733 and 1935 in Figure 8. The level at
events more frequent than the 5% AEP event.                    this point is about 0.2m higher than the gauge
                                                               readings at the Marsden Weir.
Importantly, the probability that a large flood
occurs when a major event is taking place at                   This hydrograph was used in this study as a
the site is extremely low, ranging from 0.034%                 reference as it represents the worst case
to 0.0000001%, depending on the event and                      scenario of rate of rise in proximity to the site.
the flood AEP (Table 1). For reference, the                    Even in events smaller than the PMF,
probability of an individual being in a fatal car              floodwaters could rise as fast as shown in this
crash in Australia in year 2016 was                            hydrograph. For reference, the peak levels of
0.005%.(BITRE, 2018), which is about 1,500                     the 5% AEP and 1% AEP flood are also
times higher than the probability of the site                  shown, as well as the levels of Level L00 and
experiencing a PMF during a 30,000 people                      Level 01 at the site.
sport event, and 36,500 times higher than this                 The chart shows that in a flood rising as fast as
happening during a 40,000 people concert.                      the PMF, floodwaters would reach Level L00
However, it is acknowledged that the number                    after about 2h 20min from the beginning of the
of people at risk in the stadium during any                    rainfall, and that level would be isolated for up
individual event is at least 10,000 greater than               to 5 hours.
the number of people in most car accidents.


Table 1. Annual probabilities of a large flood happening while an event is taking place within the site

                                  No. of events per        1% AEP                         PMF
                                  year
                                                           (the site is flood free)

30k patrons sport event           Up to 50                 0.034%                         0.0000034%

40k patrons concert               Up to 2                  0.001%                         0.0000001%




 Figure 10. PMF hydrograph near O’Connell Street showing peak levels of the 5% and 1% AEP (in black) and floor
            levels at the site (in red)
14                                                                                                        VenuesLive
3        FLOOD FORECASTS                                        specific information on individual
                                                                severe thunderstorm locations;
         AND WARNINGS
                                                            -   Broad-based State-wide Warnings.
                                                                These are based on broad areas
Monitoring the weather forecasts and warnings                   such as the Bureau's weather
will be an integral step in managing the flood                  forecast districts, and are issued
risk of the site. This will be critical to being                with up to 3 hours’ notice.
able to evacuate the site before flooding
                                                        A Flood Watch for the Parramatta River
commences.
                                                         area.
                                                          A Flood Watch is a “heads-up” that flood
                                                          producing rainfall is forecast and flooding
3.1      BUREAU OF                                        may eventuate. These are usually issued
         METEOROLOGY (BOM)                                one or two days in advance of the
                                                          expected flooding and about 25% of the
The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) has a                     time flooding does not eventuate.
number of generalised warning products that          In addition to the above listed warning
could provide an indication of an increased          products, the BoM has forecast rainfall maps
flood threat:                                        which can be used to estimate the amount of
   Severe Weather Warnings.                         rain expected to fall over the next eight and
                                                     four days, as well as the next 24 hours. This
      The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) issues
                                                     information is available at the following
      Severe Weather Warnings whenever
                                                     website:
      severe weather is occurring in an area or
      is expected to move into an area. The          http://www.bom.gov.au/jsp/watl/rainfall/pme.jsp
      warnings describe the area under threat        The radar service on the BoM website also
      and the expected hazards. Warnings are
                                                     shows current rainfall locations and intensities.
      issued with varying lead-times, depending
      on the weather situation, and range from       The radar station to be used for the site would
      just an hour or two to 24 hours or             be     the   Sydney Terrey Hills          Radar
      sometimes more. The key subtype of             (http://www.bom.gov.au/products/IDR714.loop.
      Severe Weather Warning to be monitored         shtml#skip).
      for the site are warnings with reference to
      flash flooding for the Sydney Metropolitan     The Bureau of Meteorology also has rainfall
      Area. These are issued directly to the         and river gauges which show the amount of
      media by the BoM when there is a high          rainfall that has fallen in the previous 24 hour
      probability of flash flooding as a result of   period and stream gauges which indicate
      intense      rainfall.   Severe    Weather     water heights. The closest river gauge is
      Warnings may also include other                located at the Marsden Weir. Live readings of
      conditions such as damaging winds. New
                                                     the river level can be seen at this webpage:
      South Wales weather warnings are
      issued by the BoM and can be found at          Plot version:
      the               following            link:
      www.bom.gov.au/nsw/warnings/           and     http://www.bom.gov.au/fwo/IDN60233/IDN602
      access the relevant warning;                   33.567107.plt.shtml
   Severe Thunderstorm Warnings.                    Tabulated version:
      A severe thunderstorm may produce              http://www.bom.gov.au/fwo/IDN60233/IDN602
      intense rain and flash floods, hail,           33.567107.tbl.shtml
      damaging winds, and even tornadoes.
      The BoM provides two types of Severe           In order to relate the gauge readings to the
      Thunderstorm Warnings:                         hydrograph shown in Figure 10, an offset of
        -    Detailed Severe Thunderstorm            3.94m should be used to account for the fact
             Warnings. These are issued for          that the gauge zero is 3.74m AHD and that in
             capital cities only with up to 60       floods there is a slope on the water surface
             minutes of notice, and provide more     from upstream of the O’Connell Street bridge
                                                     to the gauge at Marsden Weir of about 0.2m.


Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                    15
For instance, if the gauge reading is 0.5m, the           called “Floodsmart” and can be accessed at
actual flood level will be:                               the following link:
Flood level AHD = gauge reading + 3.94m                   https://www.cityofparramatta.nsw.gov.au/recre
                                                          ation-environment/floodsmart-
                 =0.5m+3.94m= 4.44m AHD
                                                          parramatta/flood-warning-service
                                                          Floodsmart provides flood early warning
3.2     FLOODSMART                                        messages via text, email, or automated voice
                                                          message. The system includes seven different
In addition to the information provided by the            warning areas covering Parramatta LGA. The
BoM, the City of Parramatta Council has                   area relevant to the Bankwest stadium is
recently put in place a local flood warning               “Westmead and North Parramatta”. The
system which is freely available to anyone                types of flood warnings provided are
subscribing to the service. The system is                 summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Flood smart warning system: types of warning messages

Type of Warning Message           Description

                                     Risk to life from fast flowing or deep water near the river or
MINOR:                                creek

High risk areas may                  Closure of roads most at risk of flooding
experience property                  Flooding of land near rivers, creeks, low spots and recreational
flooding                              areas
                                     Water levels may be high for many hours



                                     High risk to life from fast-flowing or deep water near the river or
MODERATE:                             creek

High and Medium risk areas           Closure of many bridges and roads
may experience property              Widespread flooding in areas not necessarily near the river
flooding.
                                     Water levels may be high for many hours

                                     Damage is possible to buildings and infrastructure
MAJOR:                               Extreme risk to life from fast-lowing deep water even in areas
High, Medium and Low risk             not near the river or creek
areas may experience                 Closure of many bridges, roads and transport routes
property flooding
                                     Widespread deep flooding in many areas not necessarily near
                                      the river
                                     Water levels may be high for many hours

                                     The local conditions should now be improving:
NO FURTHER                           No further flooding is expected in the next 12 hours
IMPACT
                                     Flood levels will continue to drop
                                    However:
                                     There may still be dangerous fast flowing water near the river or
                                      creek
                                     Debris and contamination may still cause problems in areas that
                                      have been flooded


16                                                                                              VenuesLive
According to Council’s classification of flood                   warnings can be issued with a maximum
warning areas (Figure 11), the stadium is                        notice of up to 2 hours, however in rapidly
classified as a development at LOW RISK of                       evolving circumstances the warning notice
flooding. As such, it is at risk of flooding only                may be shorter.
during a MAJOR flood. However the southern
car park is classified as being at MEDIUM
RISK and it may experience flooding in a
MODERATE flood (Table 3). Floodsmart


Table 3. Flood warning types relevant to different items within the site as per the Floodsmart system

Element at risk                                    Flood Warning Area               Relevant Flood Warnings
                                                   Classification

Stadium, including northern and                    LOW RISK                         MAJOR,
western car parks and access
                                                                                    NO FURTHER IMPACT
driveway

Southern car park                                  MEDIUM RISK                      MODERATE, MAJOR,
                                                                                    NO FURTHER IMPACT




Figure 11. Flood warning areas as defined in the Floodsmart war system



Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                          17
3.3    OBSERVED FLOOD
       LEVELS
While the BoM and Council have several
products which can provide some advanced
warning of potential or actual flooding or
provide real time data on actual rainfall
intensities and river levels, this data may not
be accessible during a flood. This may be
because the severe storms or flooding damage
the     gauges     or    they     damage     the
telecommunications or electricity infrastructure
needed to transmit data and disseminate
warnings, or there may be human error in
interpreting data and issuing warnings.
It will therefore also be important to visually
monitor water levels in the river. This would
most easily be done from the southern end of
the concourse level looking over the southern
car park.




18                                                 VenuesLive
4        EMERGENCY                                  4.1    EVACUATION MODELLING
         PREPAREDNESS AND
         RESPONSE                                   4.1.1 Scope
         CONSIDERATIONS                             An assessment of the evacuation time in the
                                                    largest possible site event was undertaken to
The two main types of responses to a flood          understand if:
emergency are to either:                              Evacuation would be possible at all
                                                       before evacuation routes are cut by
   Evacuate to an area above the reach of
                                                       floodwaters in a PMF;
    floodwaters. This is the NSW SES
    preferred response, provided that the             At what point in time an evacuation order
    risks of evacuating are deemed                     would need to be issued to provide
    acceptable;                                        enough notice for all patrons and staff to
                                                       leave the site before evacuation routes
   Take Shelter in Place (SIP) (i.e. within the
                                                       are cut; and
    Stadium) and wait until floodwaters have
    receded and the emergency has passed.             How often, on average, floodwaters
    SIP is to be considered an alternative to          would reach the level selected as a
    evacuation only when the risks of                  trigger for evacuation. It should be noted
    evacuating are higher than the risks of            that even if the evacuation trigger level is
    SIP.                                               reached and an evacuation order is
                                                       issued, in most instances floodwaters
Both evacuation and SIP were considered as
                                                       would stop rising before affecting the site
possible flood emergency response strategies           or cutting evacuation routes. However in
in this FERP. This Section provides a                  extremely rare circumstances floodwaters
summary of the flood emergency response                would keep rising to the peak of the PMF
analysis (for evacuation and SIP) that was             and would isolate the site. During a real
undertaken as part of this FERP to inform the          event it will not be possible to know with
identification of the most suitable response           sufficient notice when floodwaters will
strategy and management actions.                       stop rising after the evacuation trigger
                                                       level is reached. It was therefore deemed
The analysis was undertaken using a worst              desirable that the evacuation trigger level
possible scenario approach. Namely, it was             is not reached too often (ideally less often
assumed that the worst possible flood (i.e. the        the once every 20 years).
Probable Maximum Flood, or PMF) would               Because in each large event several hundred
occur during the largest possible event that will   patrons would reach the site by car,
be held at the Stadium (i.e. a 40,000 patron        evacuation was modelled as a combination of
concert). However it should be emphasized           pedestrian and vehicular evacuation.
that flood emergencies are more likely to occur
during normal operating hours (Monday to
Friday, 7AM to 7 PM), when only up to 50 staff      4.1.2 Assumptions
will be onsite, or during the night, when only
security will be on site. Furthermore, most         The following assumptions were used:
flood emergencies will be much smaller events         The event would host 40,000 patrons, of
than the PMF.                                          which 15,000 would be in the pitch and
                                                       25,000 in the seating areas;
However, by having a FERP which can cater
for the largest event in the largest flood, all       Management would take about 10
floods can be appropriately responded to at            minutes to decide to evacuate and
any time.                                              disseminate an evacuation order after
                                                       they become aware that the trigger level
                                                       has been reached;
                                                      To avoid traffic delays due to pedestrians
                                                       blocking access to the road to vehicles
                                                       and vice versa, pedestrian evacuation


Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                 19
would begin only when            vehicular        2005), pedestrians would be able to move
        evacuation has completed.                         at a speed of at least 700 metres per
                                                          hour, with a density of up to two people
      Patrons would decide to evacuate                   per square metre through the concourse
       immediately after an evacuation order is           and in areas external to the stadium.
       issued;
                                                      Further assumptions     regarding   vehicular
      In line with the assumption of the Stadium
       Emergency Management and Response              evacuation only:
       Plan, it would take up to 8 minutes for          People evacuating by car would exit the
       anyone in the stadium’s seating area to           stadium using the closest exit to the
       reach the Concourse level from the                relevant car park and would take about
       moment they decided to evacuate after             10 minutes to reach their cars after
       an evacuation order has been issued.              leaving their seats, as they would need to
       Once on the concourse there would be no           walk a maximum distance of 500m;
       further bottlenecks within the stadium to
       slow down the flow of evacuees (i.e. free        All car parking spots would be occupied
       flow);                                            in any event. These equate to the
                                                         following number of cars:
      Patrons on the pitch would be able to
       evacuate by either walking up to the                      -   Northern car park - 292
       Concourse level (L01) using the aisles in
       between seats (20 aisles would be                         -   Western car park -187
       available to do so), or walking through the
                                                                 -   Southern car park- 348
       north-east and north-west tunnels at the
       relevant corners of the pitch. Because the                -   Total – 827
       south-east and south-west tunnels
       terminate at level L00 (i.e. 9.12m AHD),         In line with the assumptions of the NSW
       these will be cut earlier that all the other      SES Timeline Evacuation Model (Opper
       exits and as such it was assumed that             et al, 2009), vehicular evacuation would
       these tunnels will be closed during an            proceed at a speed of 600 cars per lane
       evacuation. This means that patrons in            per hour;
       the pitch would take an extra couple of          All cars in the southern car park would
       minutes to reach the Concourse level or           leave the site from the south driveway
       to exit the stadium though the north-east         and move north along O’Connell St or
       tunnel in addition to the 8 minutes               east along Victoria Rd, then north on
       mentioned above.                                  Villiers St;
Further assumptions applying to pedestrian              All cars parked in the western and
evacuation only:                                         northern car parks (total of 479 cars)
      Pedestrians would exit the site either from       would leave the site from the northern
       the north-east gate at the Concourse              driveway and move north on O’Connell
       level or from the north-east tunnel as            Street up to Grose St, then continue in
       these exit points are the closest to a flood      O’Connell St and Grose St;
       free area in the PMF. Pedestrians would          Each driveway would have two lanes
       then continue walking north along                 available to exit the car park during a
       O’Connell St up to the crossroad with             flood emergency.
       Ross St, where some of them would
       continue on Ross St (Figure 12);
      The bottleneck along the pedestrian
       evacuation route would be in O’Connell
       St, immediately north of the stadium’s
       north-east gate. About 40,000 people
       would need to walk past this point in an
       evacuation. The road width here is 22m
       (footpaths plus road), but it was
       conservatively assumed that only 20m
       would be available for evacuation;
      In line with the relevant literature on
       pedestrian evacuation (Seyfried et al.,


20                                                                                           VenuesLive
Figure 12. Pedestrian Evacuation Route
                                                        min for patrons to walk to the Concourse
                                                        level and 10 additional min to walk to the
                                                        car, would be 45min.
4.1.3 Evacuation Time Needed                         The 479 cars in the northern and western
                                                      car parks would take 24 minutes to clear.
Under the assumptions listed in previous              The total evacuation time for this car
section, the following evacuation times were          park, including 10 min for Management to
obtained.                                             decide to issue the evacuation order, 8
                                                      min for patrons to walk to the Concourse
                                                      level and 10 additional min to walk to the
a) Pedestrians
                                                      car, would be 52min.
   It would take 1h 25m for 40,000
    pedestrians to walk past the bottleneck in
    O’Connell Street and reach a flood-free        4.1.4 Evacuation Timeline
    area;
                                                   An evacuation timeline is usually defined by:
   The total pedestrian evacuation time,
    including 10 min for Management to               Identifying the hydrograph of the worst
    decide to issue the evacuation order and          possible flood event (the PMF) at a
    8-10 min for patrons to walk to the               known location nearby the site. This is
    Concourse level, would be 1h 45 min.              shown in Figure 10 and Figure 13.
                                                     Identifying the level of the lowest point
b) Cars                                               along the evacuation route;
   The 349 cars in the southern car park            Using the hydrographs, identifying the
    would take 17 minutes to clear. The total         time at which the lowest point is cut by
    evacuation time for this car park,                floodwaters;
    including 10 min for Management to
    decide to issue the evacuation order, 8

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                   21
 Subtracting the total evacuation time from      southern car park would end up flooding (if at
       the time at which the evacuation route is       all).
       cut to identify the time at which
       evacuation should begin;                        As such, it was decided to evacuate the site in
                                                       three stages, each one having its own trigger:
      Identifying the level of floodwaters at the
       time evacuation should begin to set the             1. A first evacuation order would be
       evacuation trigger.                                    triggered only for patrons who have
In this case, given the large size of the site and            parked their cars in the southern car
the fact that the local topography ranges                     park, which is the first to flood;
between 6.7m AHD and 15m AHD, two                          2. If floodwaters continue to rise, a
evacuation routes were identified (one                        second evacuation order would be
vehicular only for cars in the southern car park,             triggered only for patrons who have
the other one both pedestrian and vehicular,                  parked their cars in the western and
for cars in the western and northern car parks                northern car park;
and for all patrons on foot).
                                                           3. Once      vehicular      evacuation    is
The lowest point of each route is at very                     completed,      if  floodwaters     have
different levels and they are each impacted by                continued      to     rise,   pedestrian
flooding rising in the river at different locations.          evacuation      would     be   triggered.
The lowest point along the evacuation route                   Alternatively, pedestrians could remain
from the southern car park is within the car                  within the stadium (SIP) until
park itself, at its south-east corner, at a level of          floodwaters have receded.
6.7m AHD. This is flooded from water rising in         A timeline of the above described evacuation
the river at O’Connell Street at the location          process was generated and associated to the
where the hydrograph in Figure 13 has been             hydrograph of the PMF near O’Connell Street
extracted from the model. These river levels           (Figure 10). This was achieved using the total
are about 0.2m higher than the corresponding           evacuation times calculated in Section 4.2.3 to
levels at the Marsden Weir about 200m                  work backwards from the moment when
downstream.                                            evacuation routes are cut and identify the
The lowest point along the evacuation route            relevant evacuation trigger levels and times.
from the western and northern car parks, as            The resulting evacuation timeline is shown in
well as along the pedestrian evacuation route,         Figure 13.
is near the junction between the northern
driveway and O’Connell Street, at a level of
13.25m AHD. This is first affected by flooding         4.2    CONSULTATION
from water breaking out of the river north of the
stadium about 1km upstream of O’Connell                The evacuation modelling results, assumptions
Street. Water levels at this point are about           and timeline described in Section 4.2 were
0.5m higher than at O’Connell Street in large          presented and discussed in a face to face
floods.                                                meeting with:
The significant difference in ground levels              A representative from the NSW SES;
between these two low points and the river
                                                         The Local Emergency Management
levels which affect them means that the two
                                                          Officer, who is the liaison officer for all
evacuation routes would be cut at very                    hazards in Parramatta LGA, including
different times during a flood. Namely, the               floods and fires ;
southern car park will flood much earlier and
                                                         A    representative   from     Council’s
more frequently than the northern driveway.
                                                          Development Applications Office;
In these circumstances, having a single
                                                         VenuesLive’s General Manager;
evacuation trigger for the whole site would be
highly impractical, because in most flood                Molino Stewart’s flood engineers.
events that trigger an evacuation only the



22                                                                                            VenuesLive
Figure 13. Evacuation timeline and trigger levels plotted on the PMF hydrograph near O’Connell Street




During the meeting the challenges of                         park would likely cause concern, if not panic,
evacuation and shelter in place for the site                 among all the other patrons.
were identified. A series of measures to
                                                             Finally, patrons who have their cars in the
address these challenges were also proposed,
                                                             southern car park would need to walk from a
discussed    and    approved.    These    are
                                                             lower risk zone (i.e. the stadium) to a higher
summarised in the following sub-sections.
                                                             risk zone (i.e. the car park). Any unforeseen
                                                             delays in the evacuation could result in patrons
4.2.1 Evacuation Challenges                                  reaching the car park when this is already
                                                             flooding.
The following challenges of the proposed                     To address these challenges, the NSW SES
evacuation strategy and timeline were                        proposed to close access to the southern car
identified:                                                  park before the event, if the available flood
                                                             forecasts suggest that a flood large enough to
a) Evacuation of Southern Car Park                           affect the car park may occur within a few
                                                             hours. This suggestion was implemented in
Even though the proposed staged evacuation
                                                             this FERP by creating a series of Alert Modes
strategy would avoid unnecessary and
                                                             and triggers (refer to Section 5.1).
frequent evacuations of all patrons on site,
evacuation of the southern car park would still
be triggered very often. In fact, the trigger level          b) Flooding of Level L00 from Southern
at the Marsden Weir gauge would be 4.3m                         Gates
AHD, and the average level at this gauge is                  In a flood rising as fast as the PMF,
about 4.2m AHD, meaning that a small                         floodwaters would start entering Level L00
fluctuation in level would trigger evacuation of             about 20-30 minutes after the pedestrian
the car park.                                                evacuation order is issued. At that point in time
Moreover, issuing an evacuation order only for               all patrons at level L00 should have already
patrons who have their cars in the southern car              evacuated, but any delays may result in
                                                             patrons becoming in contact with floodwaters.


23                                                                                                      VenuesLive
In addition to this, Level L00 contains a large       d) Where to Evacuate?
part of the infrastructure and facilities that will   Even if all pedestrians evacuated north using
need to be fully operative during a flood             the designated evacuation route, there would
emergency (e.g. power generator and fuel              be no suitable facilities within walking distance
tank, electric power main switches, fire pump,        to receive such a large number of people.
security rooms).                                      Evacuees would most likely have to wait in the
These issues will be addressed by water               streets until floodwaters withdraw, under
proofing the two southern access points to            intense rain and without any of the services
level L00 with two 2.4 m high automatic flood         that the stadium would have otherwise
gates. The western gate will also require a           provided (e.g. shelter, sustenance, access to
retaining wall along the road connecting the          toilets, access to information, access to
southern driveway to the western car park             medical aid). This may expose evacuees to
(Figure 14). The retaining wall will have the         risks that could be deemed higher than the
same height as the flood gate (i.e. 2.4m AHD).        risks associated with taking shelter within the
The gates and retaining wall will be coupled          stadium.
with a series of automated backflow blocking          This issue was discussed during the
devices to be placed along all drainage pipes         consultation meeting and it was agreed that
connecting the stadium to the river. This             the most appropriate solution would be to offer
system will protect level L00 up to a level of        patrons the choice to either evacuate or shelter
11.52m AHD. Based on the flood levels                 in place. This will be done by providing suitable
provided by Council, it was estimated that this       information    to     patrons   regarding     the
level corresponds approximately to a 1 in             implications of evacuating or taking shelter in
50,000 year average recurrence interval (ARI)         place. This information will be provided via
flood (Figure 15).                                    emergency messages issued via the PA
                                                      system.
c)      Risk of Pedestrians Evacuating South
As discussed in Section 4.2, once they have           4.2.2 SIP Challenges
left the site all evacuees would have to head
north on O’Connell Street, because there is a         If patrons made the decision to take shelter
risk that at that point O’Connell Street will         within the stadium until the emergency has
already be cut by floodwaters in proximity to         passed, in the worst possible scenario they
the river, or that most roads in the CBD will be      would be isolated by floodwaters for about 2h
cut by local flooding. However patrons who will       40min (Figure 13). In addition to the relatively
reach the site on foot will likely arrive at          short isolation time, the maximum water depth
Parramatta by train or bus, and both the train        along the evacuation route would be around
station and the bus interchange are located           0.5m. While it is widely acknowledged that
south of the river. Other patrons may decide to       there are risks associated with taking shelter in
drive and park their cars in one of the covered       place, these are generally greater for longer
secure car parks in the CBD. These patrons,           isolation times. Nevertheless, the risks of SIP
when asked to evacuate, would naturally go            were identified and addressed as part of this
home in the same way they arrived to                  FERP. These include:
Parramatta, and would therefore try and walk
south on O’Connell Street and cross the river.
This risk will be addressed by ensuring that
when pedestrian evacuation commences,
there is a sufficient number of staff in
O’Connell Street advising evacuees to walk
north.




24                                                                                            VenuesLive
Figure 14. Position of flood gates and retaining wall to water proof the southern access points to level L00

Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                               25
14
      Peak Flood Level Parramatta River Upstream of



                                                      12       11.52m

                                                      10
                   O'Connel St (mAHD)




                                                       8


                                                       6


                                                       4


                                                       2


                                                       0
                                                           1            10   100     1000           10000        100000        1000000
                                                                                   Flood ARI                50,000


Figure 15.Estimated relationship between peak flood levels and Average Recurrence Interval of flood events
          upstream of O’Connell Street.




                                                                                             Providing access to food and water. The
a) Patrons Walking through Floodwaters                                                        stadium will host several food and
Some patrons might become impatient while                                                     beverage retailers. It is expected that the
                                                                                              normal stock of food and beverage will be
the site is isolated and walk though
                                                                                              sufficient to cover any sustenance needs
floodwaters. This is a known risk for any SIP-                                                for an isolation time of less than 3h.
based response strategy and can exacerbated                                                   Furthermore, the stadium management
by circumstances in which there is a lack of                                                  will have authority to distribute food and
power, sustenance, access to medical care, or                                                 beverage free of charge, should this
overall comfort or inability to access                                                        become necessary. A decision to do so
information of the expected duration of                                                       will be made based on an assessment of
isolation.                                                                                    isolation time and overall condition of
                                                                                              patrons.
These risks will be reduced by:
                                                                                             Providing shelter from the rain and
      Reducing the probability of power failure                                              access to toilets. The stadium roof was
       to acceptable levels. The stadium will be                                              designed     to    provide      satisfactory
       equipped with two independent power                                                    protection against weather and rain to
       substations. If both substations ceased to                                             patrons in the seating area. During
       function, an emergency power generator                                                 concerts however, patrons in the pitch
       located al level L00 would automatically                                               would be exposed to the rain and may try
       turn on. Furthermore, Level L00 will be                                                to climb up in the seating area to seek
       protected from flooding with flood gates                                               shelter. This may result in a higher
       and retaining walls as described in                                                    density of patrons in the seating area,
       previous section up to flood events as                                                 which could eventually lead to public
       rare as the 1 in 50,000 ARI                                                            order issues. This risk will be reduced by
       (corresponding to a 0.002% AEP on any                                                  (a) providing patrons a chance to
       day or about a 0.00004% AEP during an                                                  evacuate, which will create additional
       event).                                                                                room in the covered seating area, and (b)


26                                                                                                                               VenuesLive
if required in concert events the seating      reduced thanks to the stadium automated fire
      area behind the stage could be opened to       suppression system.
      accommodate patrons who decided to
      shelter in place.                              In addition to the above, the stadium will
                                                     feature the following emergency management
   Providing updates on the expected flood
                                                     equipment:
    duration based on communications with
    the NSW SES. Updates will be provided              Public Announcement (PA) system. The
    using the video screens and PA system               PA system features sufficient speakers to
    and the Emergency Warning Intercom                  reach each part of the playing field and
    System (EWIS), a fire safety system                 seating area. The PA system control
    controlled from the Fire Panel with                 room will be located well above the reach
    speakers all around the venue.                      of floodwaters at level L04.
                                                       The Emergency Warning Intercom
b) Patrons Requiring Medical Attention                  System (EWIS), a fire safety system
                                                        controlled from the Fire Panel with
A medical team will be on site with sufficient
                                                        speakers covering every part of the
staff and equipment to deal with the risk profile       venue. This will be used for official
of each event, as defined in the stadium                emergency communications such as
Emergency Management and Response Plan.                 evacuation messages. EWIS will have a
The medical services provider will have a               larger reach than the PA system, which
number of staff on site and be supported by St          was designed for entertainment purposes
Johns Ambulance for every event.                        and will cover only the pitch and seating
                                                        areas.

c) Risk of Fires                                       Video screen. A large screen will be
                                                        installed on top of the seating area and
A secondary risk generally associated with SIP          will be visible from the pitch and all seats.
is the risk of fire. This risk is exacerbated when      The screen main purpose will be to
the isolation time is long and there is lack of         provide information related to the event
power in residential dwellings where people             being held, but if needed will be used for
may improvise cooking, heat and lighting using          emergency purposes. For instance, flood
                                                        emergency messages will be displayed
naked flames. food, light or heat, pushing
                                                        on the screen.
people to light With an isolation time of less
than 3 hours, a non-residential setting and            A CCTV camera system. The system will
emergency power supplies it is extremely                cover all parts of the site including the car
                                                        parks. Live videos will be transmitted to
unlikely that the risk of fire at the venue would
                                                        the control room at level L04 and will be
be increased during a flood. Nonetheless, the           monitored by the Chief Warden (or
risk of fire will be managed according to the           delegates).
stadium Fire Emergency Plan, and will be




Bankwest Stadium - Flood Emergency Response Plan                                                   27
5         FLOOD EMERGENCY                              Red: flooding of the site in the next two
                                                        hours is possible
          RESPONSE PLAN                                Black: flooding of the site is possible
                                                        within the next hour
This section outlines the basic principles             Green: all clear, floodwaters have
underlying flood emergency response (Section            withdrawn and there is flood-fee access
5.1), roles and responsibilities (Section 5.2),         to or from the premises
communication methods (Section 5.3) and the          These may be revised up or down depending
list of response actions and triggers (Section       on the changing forecasts and actual
5.4).                                                conditions. Once a decision is made to cancel
                                                     an event this cannot be revised.
                                                     An Alert Mode Table has been developed
5.1       EMERGENCY RESPONSE
                                                     which nominates thresholds that trigger
          PHILOSOPHY                                 escalation of alert modes.
                                                     It is recommended that the Alert Table plays a
5.1.1 Priorities                                     key role in the planning and training processes
                                                     before a flood occurs, as well as when flooding
This FERP recognises that protection of life is      is possible and when it does happen. It will be
of critical and primary importance. This FERP        important to maintain the Alert Table and
is principally concerned with the safety and         update this if new information is made
comfort of patrons and staff. All flood              available and review it after events which
emergency responses recommended in this              trigger any level of flood response.
FERP are to recognise the primacy of life and
                                                     The Alert Mode Table is shown in Table 4 and
wellbeing over property.
                                                     will be used to define the trigger points for
Nonetheless, it is recommended that the              undertaking actions when flooding is occurring
Stadium Management and staff take all                or could possibly occur.
necessary measures outside of this FERP to
manage the risks which flooding poses to the         It should be stressed that the Alert Mode
                                                     MUST be escalated if any one of these
site.
                                                     thresholds alone is reached or exceeded
The FERP sets emergency management                   because there is a high degree of certainty that
prevention, preparedness and response                the corresponding management actions will be
measures that are relevant to a flood                necessary.
emergency. Broader emergency management
guidance for any type of hazards that could
affect the Stadium are defined in the Stadium
the Emergency Management and Response
Plan under which this FERP sits.


5.1.2 Alert Modes

To assist in managing flood risks and
communicating response actions, five flood
alert modes have been developed for use in
this FERP. They have been colour coded to
further assist in communication. They are:
      White: normal operations
      Yellow: flooding of the site in the next 24
       hours may be possible
      Orange: flooding of the southern car park
       in the next two hours is possible

28                                                                                          VenuesLive
Table 4. Alert Mode Table setting triggers for each Alert Mode. A single trigger is necessary and sufficient to activate the relevant Alert Mode.

                          WHITE                     YELLOW                    ORANGE                     RED                       BLACK                  GREEN
                          Normal Operations         Flooding of the site      Flooding    of   the       Flooding of the site      Flooding of the site   All clear after flood
                                                    possible within the       southern car park is       is possible within        is possible within     event
                                                    next 24 hours             possible within the        the next 2 hours          the next hour
                                                                              next 2 hours

BoM Severe Weather        Not Applicable            A Severe Weather          Not Applicable             Not Applicable            Not Applicable         Not Applicable
Warning    for  the                                 Warning is issued
Parramatta Area
                                                    OR ↴
BoM Flood Watch           Not Applicable            A Flood Watch is          Not Applicable             Not Applicable            Not Applicable         Not Applicable
issued           for                                issued for the
Parramatta River                                    Parramatta River
                                                    OR↴
City of Parramatta        Not Applicable            A MINOR flood             A MODERATE flood           A MAJOR flood             Not Applicable         A NO FURTHER
Floodsmart warning                                  warning is issued         warning is issued          warning is issued                                IMPACT warning is
system                                                                                                                                                    issued
                                                                              OR↴                        OR↴
Marsden Weir       live   Not Applicable            Not Applicable            Marsden Weir gauge         Marsden Weir gauge        Marsden Weir gauge     Not Applicable
gauge reading                                                                 reading = 0.56m            reading = 3.06m           reading = 4.16m
AND                                                                           AND                        OR↴                       OR↴
BoM forecast rainfall                                                         24h forecast rainfall is
                                                                              50mm or greater
                                                                              OR↴
Visual Observation        Not Applicable            Not Applicable            Floodwaters are            Floodwaters are           Floodwaters are        Not Applicable
                                                                              sighted in the green       sighted entering the      sighted half way
                                                                              area between the           southern car park         through the southern
                                                                              southern car park, the                               car park
                                                                              river and O’Connell        OR↴
                                                                              Street                                               OR↴

                                                                              OR↴
Direct                    Not Applicable            Not Applicable            Received advice that       Received notification     Received evacuation    The SES gives the all
communication from                                                            the southern car park      that a MAJOR flood is     order                  clear
NSW SES                                                                       may flood.                 expected


29                                                                                                         VenuesLive
You can also read
Next part ... Cancel